The CSPC Dispatch - Sept 5th, 2025
Welcome back to the CSPC Dispatch.
This week, CSPC President & CEO Glenn Nye remembers the life and legacy of Judge William H. Webster, former FBI and CIA Director and longtime CSPC Counselor, whose extraordinary career in public service embodied integrity and reform. Senior Fellow Jeanne Zaino continues her Semiquincentennial series, reflecting on America’s founding principles and the urgent need for renewal to sustain them for another 250 years. Senior Fellow Hidetoshi Azuma examines the mounting crisis in Japan under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, tracing echoes of 1945 as the postwar political order shows signs of fracture. Meanwhile, Seth English explores the Supreme Court’s landmark decision ending the use of universal injunctions and its implications for the balance of power, and Sitara Gupta considers whether soft power, not tariffs, will ultimately determine the future of U.S.–India relations.
As always, we hope you find the Dispatch engaging and welcome your thoughts on how we can continue to improve.
Remembering Judge William H. Webster, CSPC Counselor
by Glenn Nye
Judge William H. Webster.
The Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) commemorates the life and mourns the recent passing of an extraordinary American, Judge William H. Webster. Judge Webster was the only official to ever lead both the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), taking the helm of the premier U.S. investigative and intelligence organizations during times of great upheaval and crisis, and imbuing each with his unique brand of steady leadership and integrity. Webster was also a member of CSPC’s Board of Counselors for many years, and we at the Center likewise benefitted greatly from his expertise in the ways of Washington, D.C., and from the power of his example.
During times of national need, William Webster always answered the call to duty. He did so as a young man during World War II by interrupting his studies at Amherst College to join the Navy, and again during the Korean War when he was recalled to active duty. When Senate hearings in the late 1970s during the Watergate era exposed the FBI’s history of warrantless wiretaps and burglaries under the former director J. Edgar Hoover, President Jimmy Carter turned to Judge Webster, a moderate Republican, to restore the bureau’s reputation as an organization that upheld the law, not broke it. Nearly a decade later in 1987, after evidence of CIA misdeeds came to light during the Iran-Contra scandal that nearly torpedoed his presidency, President Ronald Reagan also turned to Webster to reform the agency.
At CSPC the call to public service and spirit of reform are deeply embedded in our DNA, and with deep respect we celebrate the many achievements and mourn the death of our former counselor William Webster, whose life embodied those values.
Glenn Nye is the President & CEO at the Center for the Study for the Presidency and Congress.
At 250, What is at Stake When We Don’t Reform
by Jeanne Zaino
Signing of the United States Declaration of Independence, painting by Charles Édouard Armand-Dumaresq from 1873.
“Violence is as American as cherry pie.’ - H. Rap Brown
This quote, by Civil Rights activist H. Rap Brown, has been described as shocking and repulsive, and of course, violence of any kind is; so the historical and contemporary resonance of this quote in context.
If we want to honor the Framers during this important 250th anniversary, it means more than just accolades, parades and celebrations, it means re-examining and, when necessary, revitalizing and reforming the system they created to insure it lasts another 250 years.
I am beginning this second column in the series with this quote, because it reminds us of what is at stake that if we do not reform the system periodically - we risk losing it.
We know this because historically violence has functioned as a force for change when other means of reform failed.
This has long been the case going back all the way to the Colonists-turned-Revolutionaries.
The Declaration of Independence itself is a justification for the use of force. They were subject to “a long train of abuses and usurpations” by the King of England who they described as a tyrant and said was intent on reducing them “under absolute Despotism.” They petitioned for ‘redress’ only to have their “repeated petitions” ignored. It was this, they tell us, which necessitated the Revolution:
“When a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a
design to reduce them under absolute despotism,
it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
government, and to provide new guards for their
future security.”
The quote I began with was said by Brown in 1967, at the height of the Civil Rights movement.
Like other young black activists at the time, Brown was initially committed to non-violence, but overtime became disenchanted with this approach and increasingly attracted to the teachings of Black nationalist figures, like Malcom X, and the Black Panther party.
Brown, the Panthers, and Malcom X argued that the use of force was legitimate under the particular set of circumstances they were facing - centuries of oppression and the failure, despite repeated petitions for redress, to gain equal rights and liberties. The “Panthers, for instance, detailed their ideology and justification for the use of force in a 1966 document called the “Ten-Point Program” which ends with the same quote from the Declaration of Independence cited above.
In the late 1960s, Professor St. Clair Drake described Brown’s statement as “repulsiveand shocking” and on point. He contended that like it or not, violence is deeply ingrained in the national psyche and has long functioned ‘as a force for change’ - going back all the way to the Framers. Our nation was founded in a revolutionary war that was illegal but widely regarded then, and now, as legitimate.
The less responsive a system to the needs of its citizens, the more likely episodes of violence and revolution that ultimately threaten to dismantle the Framers work. The antidote is to ensure that the system is responsive and there are pathways for peaceful reform, change and progress.
Jeanne Sheehan Zaino is professor of Political Science and Senior Democracy Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. This piece draws on themes from her latest book, American Democracy in Crisis (Palgrave, 2025), and her Substack newsletter, The New Realist. It is the second in a series on reform marking the America’s Semiquincentennial.
Echoes of 1945 in Shigeru Ishiba’s Defiance
by Hidetoshi Azuma
Emperor Hirohito in military uniform, 1945, shortly before announcing Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II.
In the sweltering summer of 1945, as Allied bombs rained down on a devastated Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito’s broadcast announcing Japan’s unconditional surrender marked not just the end of World War II, but the collapse of an entire political system. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 had propelled Japan from feudal isolation to imperial great power, but by the 1930s, it had ossified into a militaristic regime, riddled with ultra-nationalism, economic strain, and an unyielding leadership that refused to adapt to the changing external realities. While this system’s implosion paved the way for a new democratic era under U.S. occupation, we may now be witnessing the end of another era, as the current 80-year-old cycle of history is about to yield to another.
On the surface, this reckoning revolves around Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s stubborn refusal to step down amid electoral humiliation and mounting public outrage since late July. Yet at a broader level, it signals the death knell of the postwar political order dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Just as the imperial system’s rigidity led to its downfall, the LDP’s entrenched hegemony—forged in the ashes of 1945—is now crumbling under the weight of its own leftist shift since the assassination of Shinzo Abe in July 2022, ushering in an era of uncertainty and potential renewal.
To grasp the gravity of this moment, we must revisit the historical parallels. The Meiji era (1868-1912) began with an ambitious vision: a rapid modernization that transformed Japan into Asia’s first industrial power, complete with a constitution, parliament, and global ambitions. The Meiji System thus emerged as an imperial oligarchy ruling over the Imperial Court, politics, and business. It succeeded in driving Japan’s rapid modernization, culminating in its victory over Russia in 1905. Yet, over decades, the Meiji System yielded its power increasingly to the military. By the early 1930s, the system devolved into a full-fledged militarist regime bent on transforming Japan into a totalitarian war machine for expansionism.
Wartime leaders, such as General Hideki Tojo, clung to power, dismissing defeats as temporary setbacks, until the U.S. atomic bombings and a Soviet invasion forced Imperial Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945. This wasn’t merely military defeat; it was a systemic failure of the Meiji System. Emperor Hirohito’s “jewel voice” broadcast shattered the myth of invincibility, dissolving the imperial state’s foundations and enabling General Douglas MacArthur’s reforms: demilitarization, democratization, and a new constitution renouncing war.
Fast-forward to postwar Japan, and a new order emerged from those ruins—the so-called “1955 system.” Named for the year the LDP was founded through a merger of conservative factions, this setup has defined Japanese politics for seven decades. Backed by U.S. Cold War alliances, the LDP presided over the “economic miracle,” channeling resources into export-led growth while maintaining one-party dominance through patronage, factionalism, and electoral gerrymandering.
Prime ministers came and went—often amid scandals—but the party endured, holding power almost uninterrupted except for brief periods in 1993-94 and 2009-12. This stability masked deep flaws: corruption scandals, bureaucratic inertia, and a failure to address demographic decline, gender inequality, and stagnant wages. The LDP became Japan’s de facto permanent government, much like the prewar genro elders, prioritizing internal harmony over national innovation. However, the assassination of Shinzo Abe in July 2022 marked a turning point, accelerating the party’s drift toward leftist policies that alienated its conservative base and eroded public trust.
The current, slow-burning crisis was ignited by Ishiba’s tumultuous leadership but rooted in this ideological shift. Elected LDP president in September 2024 and ascending to prime minister in October, Ishiba initially promised reform: bolstering rural economies, enhancing defense spending amid regional tensions, and tackling slush fund scandals that had plagued his predecessor, Fumio Kishida. Yet, his snap election call in late 2024 backfired spectacularly largely due to his misunderstanding of the public sentiment which had turned increasingly against the LDP due to its ideological departure from its original pro-US, conservative founding.
The LDP-Komeito coalition lost its lower house majority, securing only 215 seats out of 465, as voters punished the party for its perceived ideological shift which were further exacerbated by inflation, inequality, and ethical lapses. Undeterred, Ishiba refused to resign, citing the need for stability in a volatile world—echoing prewar leaders’ justifications for clinging to power amid crises.
Yet, the humiliations mounted. By July 2025, further electoral drubbings in the Upper House and local polls compounded the damage. Exit polls from the July 20 parliamentary elections showed the LDP suffering its worst defeat in decades, with voters flocking to opposition parties like the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and even alt-right alternatives, such as the “Japan First” Sanseito. Ishiba’s approval ratings plummeted below 20%, fueled by perceptions of arrogance and disconnection.
Despite intense pressure from within the LDP—lawmakers openly demanding an early leadership vote—and opposition calls for dissolution, Ishiba doubled down. In a July 23 statement, he insisted on remaining to finalize trade deals, particularly with the United States under President Trump, whose tariff threats loomed large. “I will not step down,” he declared symbolically after meeting with three former prime ministers, who had pressured him to resign immediately to take responsibility for the triple election loss during his short tenure. By doing so, Ishiba prioritized his own survival over democratic accountability.
This defiance has deepened the rift, transforming a political setback into a full-blown crisis. LDP insiders describe a “house of cards” collapsing, with factional infighting reminiscent of the prewar military cliques that undermined civilian control. Outcries against Ishiba have grown, yet party leaders attempt to “let off steam” rather than force change, fearing a power vacuum. The series of high-level LDP meetings held throughout the last two months only served to perpetuate the status quo, unceremoniously providing Ishiba with a platform for voicing his determination to stay in power in one gathering after another.
As of September 2025, Ishiba remains a lame duck, his government drifting amid policy paralysis. Criticism mounts that his refusal exemplifies irresponsibility, having “lost the public’s trust” in multiple elections without consequence. The deepening divide between Ishiba and reformist lawmakers threatens party unity, with some pundits warning of splits or mass defections. On September 3, former Prime Minister Taro Aso, the LDP’s unrivaled conservative kingmaker and Ishiba’s arch nemesis since 2009, de facto declared war on the incumbent Japanese leader by issuing a clarion call for an advance party leadership election to be held later this month. Aso still retains the LDP’s only surviving faction consisting of 43 parliamentarians whom he can mobilize along with other conservative allies in the LDP in a future party leadership election. In other words, the revived Aso-Ishiba feud will likely evolve into a decisive battle for the future of the LDP and Japan at large.
Ishiba’s dogged struggle for his own survival spells doom for the LDP. First, it exposes the LDP’s structural challenges, exacerbated by its leftist turn post-Abe. Abe’s assassination in 2022 removed a bulwark of conservative nationalism, allowing successors like Kishida and Ishiba to pursue policies that deviated from the party’s traditional pro-US, conservative stance. A prime example is the passage of the LGBT Understanding Promotion Law in June 2023, which aimed to foster acceptance of sexual minorities but was criticized by conservatives as a concession to progressive agendas, watering down traditional values without adequate protections.
This shift alienated the LDP’s core supporters, contributing to scandals and voter disillusionment. More recently, in August 2025, the LDP embraced initiatives perceived as opening doors to mass migration, including a cultural exchange program with African nations that sparked widespread fears of unchecked immigration and a joint vision with India for exchanging 500,000 personnel over five years, including 50,000 skilled workers from India. Although the government denied promoting mass African immigration, the “Africa Hometown” project ignited xenophobic backlash and protests, highlighting public rejection of these perceived leftist policies.
Economic stagnation—Japan’s GDP growth lagging behind peers, including even India, with a shrinking workforce and ballooning debt—mirrors the interwar era’s woes, but is now compounded by these ideological missteps that failed to resonate with the LDP’s traditional conservative base as well as the increasingly politically-awakened younger generations, such as Gen Z.
Second, Ishiba’s intransigence highlights the system’s anti-democratic tendencies, amplified by this leftist pivot and his strategic weaponization of postwar democratic institutions to prolong his beleaguered premiership. Ishiba has wielded his constitutionally mandated authority under Article 69 to dissolve the House of Representatives as a veiled threat, deterring parliamentarians from uniting behind a no-confidence motion by implying he would force a snap election instead of resigning— a tactic that keeps opposition in check and lawmakers wary of electoral risks.
Additionally, he exploits the LDP’s party regulations, which outline presidential elections but lack robust enforcement mechanisms for ousting a leader who has lost public confidence; challenges require substantial support from lawmakers, often unattainable amid factional divisions, allowing Ishiba to cling to his dual role as party president and prime minister without immediate repercussion.
In theory, even if ousted as the LDP president through an internal vote, Ishiba could retain his premiership, as the position is formally designated by the Diet; in a fragmented minority government, he might rally enough cross-party support or delay proceedings to extend his tenure, subverting the spirit of democratic accountability.
Ishiba’s bid to “stay in power” through August 2025 tests, like parliamentary votes, risks prolonged instability. This has emboldened Japan’s anti-establishment elements; the alt-right’s surge in July’s elections signals the country’s growing internal fragmentation, similar to the rise of militarists in the 1930s following the demise of party politics, as voters flee the LDP due to its perceived betrayal on immigration and cultural issues.
These fractures are intensifying amid a recent surge in foreign migrants—Japan’s foreign population reaching 3.8 million by 2024, up 10% year-over-year, and projected to grow further—fueling anti-immigrant protests in cities like Osaka and Tokyo. Growing internal divisions along party lines, with alt-right parties, such as Sanseito, are now gaining traction through anti-foreigner rhetoric, and even racial lines, as evidenced by xenophobic backlash against African and other migrant communities. This emerging reality threatens to plunge Japanese politics into a veritable Hobbesian anarchy driven by a veritable struggle of all against all across Japan's increasingly multiethnic and -cultural cities.
Third, generational and societal shifts are accelerating the social breakdown. Postwar Japan thrived on conformity and loyalty, but millennials and Gen Z, scarred by the “lost decades,” reject the LDP’s paternalism. Protests against Ishiba’s immigration initiatives, from Africa partnerships to Indian worker exchanges, evoke the 1960s Anpo demonstrations against U.S. alliances.
If the Meiji System’s collapse in 1945 stemmed from failing to adapt to the evolving external realities, including the battlefield losses in the Pacific, the LDP’s downfall arises from abandoning its own conservative heritage for leftist experiments, ignoring domestic backlash against demographic and cultural changes, and weaponizing institutions meant for checks and balances.
Critics may argue this is mere turbulence, not collapse; the LDP has survived scandals before. Yet, past recoveries relied on economic booms or opposition weakness. Today, with a resurgent CDP and fragmented right, Japan’s own political landscape differs substantially
Just as 1945’s surrender birthed a pacifist, prosperous Japan, this crisis could forge a more pluralistic, responsive system. However, it requires leaders to heed the lesson: ideological drift and institutional abuse invite ruin. Ishiba’ honorable departure could still save his status, allowing fresh elections and a return to the LDP’s conservative roots at a time the public increasingly demands the Japanese leader to put Japan first.
Failure to do so risks not just the LDP’s demise, but Japan’s drift into irrelevance in an increasingly disunited world. The echoes of 1945 are clear: when systems refuse to evolve—or worse, veer off course and twist their own rules—they implode. For Japan, the time for renewal is now, before the “jewel voice” of public discontent forces it upon its leadership in Tokyo.
Hidetoshi Azuma is a Senior Fellow at CSPC.
An Autopsy for the Universal Injunction
by Seth English
On June 27, 2025 the Supreme Court decided in Trump v. CASA that universal injunctions, sometimes called “nationwide” injunctions, exceed the federal courts’ “equitable relief” power. Although the Court did not rule on the case’s merits—namely, the constitutionality of President Donald Trump’s Executive Order revoking birthright citizenship—its decision nonetheless fundamentally alters the relationship between the Executive and Judicial branches.
Often, plaintiffs who challenge a government action in court seek a legal injunction. Courts use these injunctions to stop further, similar government action until a decision in the case is reached. Essentially, injunctions ensure plaintiffs are not irreparably harmed by a potentially illegal government act. While injunctions are usually limited to protecting only the plaintiffs in a specific case, universal injunctions extend this protection to nonparties throughout the country. The basic reasoning for universal injunctions follows that some cases impact entire sections of the population beyond just the plaintiffs. For these cases, halting the government’s actions in just one instance, while many impacted individuals are left unprotected, can seem unreasonable.
Universal injunctions are only a relatively recent development, however, in American jurisprudence. In the country’s first 175 years, courts mostly relied on narrow injunctions impacting only the plaintiffs directly involved in the litigation. In 1935, for example, 1,898 cases challenging a New Deal agricultural policy led to 1,600 unique injunctions—all for plaintiffs seeking the same relief. Although debate continued over what qualifies as a universal injunction, the Department of Justice estimates only 27 universal injunctions were issued in the entire 20th century. This contrasts with at least 120 universal injunctions that were issued under the last five presidential administrations (6 under Bush, 12 under Obama, 14 under Biden, and 64 and 25 under the first and second Trump Administrations, respectively). In just a few decades, universal injunctions have gone from a seldom-used last resort to a common, if controversial, tool in the judicial arsenal.
There are a number of plausible explanations for the explosion in universal injunctions. First, these injunctions have been steadily growing in use with little challenge, leading to more general acceptance and an increased willingness to use them by lower courts. Second, as executive power has grown in recent decades, presidents are issuing more executive orders—including those destined for legal and political challenges. President Trump opened his second term by unleashing a deluge of executive orders resting on questionable legal grounds, for instance, like imposing tariffs based on a largely novel interpretation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or firing federal officials despite their clear occupational protections. Likewise, contentious policies such as President Barack Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or President Joe Biden’s attempts at student loan forgiveness, were also subjected to universal injunctions.
A third contributing factor in their increased use is the broader issue of “forum shopping,” whereby plaintiffs specifically seek out a bench of sympathetic judges. In those scenarios, plaintiffs are deliberately pursuing an injunction to disrupt the current administration’s policy goals. Every universal injunction issued against the Biden Administration came from Republican-appointed judges, for instance, while 59 of the 64 issued against the first Trump Administration came from Democrat-appointed judges. In one notable example, plaintiffs delayed the Department of Education from forgiving student loans for almost Biden’s entire presidential term via universal injunctions issued by the conservative-leaning Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Given the context, the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in CASA came as little surprise. Since the first Trump Administration, the Court’s dominant conservative wing has signaled interest in settling the debate over universal injunctions, especially Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. In 2018, Justice Thomas wrote one of the most comprehensive critiques of the practice in his Trump v. Hawaii concurrence based on historical, prudential, and constitutional concerns. Central to his argument was that universal injunctions denied legal disputes the chance to percolate through the lower courts, thereby limiting reasoned debate and exploration of a constitutional question from a broad set of viewpoints. The majority’s opinion in CASA, delivered by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, echoes much of Thomas’s reasoning, ultimately concluding that universal injunctions fall outside the bounds of the federal courts’ statutory powers, as enumerated in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Importantly, however, the majority’s opinion did not declare universal injunctions expressly unconstitutional.
Conversely, the Court’s liberal wing maintains that universal injunctions are a necessary check on a modern, powerful Executive Branch. In fact, if there was any chance the Court would have upheld universal injunctions, it might have been that the merits in the CASA case were so well- suited to such relief. The 14th Amendment plainly states a right to birthright citizenship clearly at odds with the administration’s order, and it would seem absurd to limit an almost certainly unconstitutional policy in a single district while the rest of the nation is left subject to its dictates. In her CASA dissent, Justice Jackson went so far as to claim the majority’s ruling is an existential threat to the rule of law because it allows “the creation of a zone of lawlessness within which the executive has the prerogative to take or leave the law as it wishes.”
While the Court ruled that universal injunctions are outside federal courts’ “equitable relief” power, it left the door open for future Congressional authorization of such a power, as well as other ways to achieve similar relief. States may sue on behalf of their citizens in associational lawsuits and seek injunctive relief for their constituents, for instance, or litigants may organize under a class action lawsuit that could result in injunctive relief for a whole—potentially nationwide—class.
In addition, federal courts may retain power to enforce universal relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), rather than based on the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 706 of the APA allows federal courts to “set aside” agency rules that violate other APA provisions, for instance, though serious debate continues over whether “set aside” constitutes a complete prohibition of the rule in contention. At the very least, as litigants revise their strategies to take advantage of these openings, federal courts will now have to grapple with the myriad of questions related to associational suits, class certification, and the APA. Some of these questions will very likely reach the Supreme Court in the near future.
Seth English is a former intern at CSPC and a senior at Penn State majoring in Philosophy and Political Science.
Beyond Tariffs: Can Soft Power Save U.S.–India Relations?
by Sitara Gupta
Indian-Americans warmly welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Philadelphia, September 2024. (Photo Credit: Prime Minister's Office)
Trade disputes and coercive tariffs have grabbed recent headlines, but the future of U.S.–India relations may hinge on something more elusive and far less tangible: soft power.
Economic issues dominate the bilateral agenda of the two major powers, including President Donald Trump’s recent imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods, in part at least due to Washington’s frustration with New Delhi’s closed agricultural markets. Yet beyond sometimes contentious trade disputes, the resilience of U.S.–India ties depends just as much on soft power, as represented by 331,000 Indian students inside the United States helping drive American research and innovation, and a 5.2 million–strong Indian diaspora that has shaped Silicon Valley business and culture. Understanding the dynamics of this soft power can shed light on what lies ahead for one of the world’s most consequential partnerships.
For much of the past quarter-century, New Delhi and Washington have moved steadily closer, but the foundations of that relationship are beginning to show cracks. U.S.–India relations entered an especially fractious period recently after the Trump Administration imposed a 25% tariff on Indian goods on August 7, 2025, following failed negotiations over a trade deal. On August 27, Washington doubled down with a second 25% tariff, tied to U.S. pressure over India’s imports of Russian oil despite sanctions tied to the Ukraine war. Recent U.S. restrictions on Non-Immigrant (F-1) Student Visas and H-1B Specialty Occupation Visas also threaten the Indian students and professionals who have long cemented bilateral ties. These trade and immigration barriers thus risk chipping away at the trust and personal relationships that have built up over years, leaving the U.S.–India partnership vulnerable.
Indian students studying in America have long served as a bridge, for instance, producing a flow of talent and ideas that benefits both nations. According to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) report SEVIS by the Numbers 2024, in the 2023–24 academic year, India sent over 331,000 students to U.S. universities—a whopping 23% surge from the previous year. That made them the largest international student cohort inside the United States.
Aside from tuition revenue, these students advance American research and the STEM workforce through their studies, Optional Practical Training (OPT) programs, and H-1B work visas. Returning graduates also bring skills and professional networks that strengthen India’s own technology and innovation sectors. The two-way street is exemplified by Indian entrepreneurs who returned from the United States to build billion-dollar companies, including Flipkart, India’s leading e-commerce platform, co-founded by Sachin and Binny Bansal; and Ola, a ride-hailing service founded by Bhavish Aggarwal.
Another part of this critical interchange is the Indian diaspora living inside the United States. According to a 2023 U.S. Census Bureau report, that population was 5.2 million-strong, making them the second-largest Asian-origin collective in the country. From that strategic foothold, Indian-origin leaders have become a major influence in Silicon Valley boardrooms.
Standout Chief Executive Officers such as Sundar Pichai (Google and Alphabet), Satya Nadella (Microsoft), and Neal Mohan (YouTube) demonstrate how student-to-professional pipelines have enabled Indian expertise to directly benefit the American economy. Politically, figures such as former Vice President Kamala Harris, former Governor Nikki Haley, and New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani illustrate the diaspora’s growing influence in U.S. governance and policy.
The Indian diaspora has also had a major impact on America’s vibrant culture, whether it’s through the popularity of Bollywood, or Indian cuisine and music. Indian-themed festivals are also widely celebrated, including last year’s “All That Glitters Diwali Ball” in New York City, co-organized by Teen Vogue. Institutions like the Nita Mukesh Ambani Cultural Centre (NMACC), opening this September at Lincoln Center in New York, showcase Indian art, fashion, and live performances. These cultural exchanges, and the artistic interplay they promote, create lasting social connections, and foster dialogue and mutual appreciation.
All of those ties that bind Indians and Americans in close partnership are now fraying due to an escalating trade war and geopolitical frictions. In his Independence Day address on August 15, 2025, for instance, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India’s pursuit of Atmanirbhar Bharat—a “self-reliant India”— a policy aimed at insulating the economy from external shocks. Trade talks with the U.S. continue to stall over the opening of India’s agricultural sectors.
Foreign policy disagreements are also compounding frictions in the U.S.-Indian relationship. India’s well-established energy ties with Russia, which accounts for 35% of its total oil imports today, are a major complication. New Delhi’s purchase of the S-400 missile defense system also risks U.S. sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Meanwhile, Washington’s growing outreach towards Pakistan inevitably fuels suspicion in New Delhi. The White House has hosted Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir twice since the most recent India-Pakistan conflict began, for instance, including on August 10, 2025. Major power competition and shifting alignments in the Indo-Pacific also add to the pressure, with China eager to capitalize on the widening fissures in the U.S.-Indian relationship. On August 19, 2025, Modi met with Beijing’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi, hailing steady progress in bilateral ties, and last weekend he travelled to China and met with President Xi Jinping himself.
Today, India’s foreign policy continues to generate skepticism in the United States, even while U.S. policies and pressures are perceived in India as unwelcoming and coercive. On that current trajectory, the U.S.-Indian relationship nurtured by multiple administrations will thus continue to unravel. The 2024 Indian American Attitudes Survey (IAAS), for instance, found that while 47% of Indian Americans see India progressing on the right track under Modi’s leadership, they remain deeply unsettled about U.S.–India ties in Trump’s second term.
Can U.S.–India relations recover? A planned Modi-Trump meeting might ease some tensions if successful, but deeper disputes over Russia and Pakistan are sure to persist. Ultimately, the resilience of the U.S.–India relationship is likely to hinge less on tariffs or sanctions, and more on education, diaspora networks, and shared democratic and cultural values. In other words, soft power – and not its counterpart of tariff threats and economic coercion -- may ultimately determine whether this pivotal partnership endures.
Sitara Gupta is an intern at CSPC and recent graduate of the University of California, Berkeley.
CSPC IN THE NEWS
Innovating America’s Democracy Is Our Tradition and Our Responsibility
Originally published in the Fulcrum on July 31st, 2025:
CSPC President & CEO Glenn Nye reflects on our nation's long history of reform and innovation, and issues a timely call to action. Glenn also shares our recently launched Democracy Innovation Timeline, now live on our website as part of our Quarter Millennial Project.
Read the full article here.
Fault Lines Podcast: COLD FRONT DIPLOMACY
Originally published by the National Security Institute on August 11th 2025:
An insightful conversation from the Fault Lines Podcast featuring our SVP Joshua Huminski and NSI’s Martha Miller on “Cold Front Diplomacy: Trump, Putin, and the Ukraine Question.”
Listen to the full podcast here.
Joshua Huminski on Trump’s Preliminary talks with Zelensky Ahead of the Meeting with Putin
Originally published on News Nation on August 13th 2025:
SVP of National Security and Intelligence, Joshua Huminski joined NewsNation to discuss preliminary talks with Zelensky, the potential path to peace, and the impact of sanctions.
Watch the full clip here.
Joshua Huminski on the Trump-PUTIN SUMMIT
Originally published on Scripps News on August 15th 2025:
SVP of National Security and Intelligence, Joshua Huminski, joined Scripps News to share insights on the Trump-Putin summit and its implications for Ukraine and Europe.
Watch the full clip here.
Joshua Huminski on the Trump-Zelensky Meeting
Originally published on NewsNation on August 18th 2025:
SVP for National Security and Intelligence Joshua Huminski joined NewsNation to discuss today's Trump-Zelensky meeting at the White House with European leaders.
Watch the full clip here.
The Principle of Uncertainty
Originally published in Internationale Politik on August 18th, 2025:
In an essay for the German Council on Foreign Relation’s “Internationale Politik”, CSPC Senior Vice President Peter Sparding takes a look at the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach to the Middle East in the first 8 months of the term.
How To End Gerrymandering: Reformers Debate Retaliation, Representation, and Redistricting Reform
Originally published in The Fulcrum on September 4th, 2025:
The debate over partisan redistricting has intensified across the country following the recent gerrymandering battles. The Fulcrum invited leading voices to weigh in on the civic and strategic dimensions of redistricting. Among those featured was our President & CEO, Glenn Nye, who emphasized that America must break free from the cycle of partisan gerrymandering before reaching the point of no return.
Read the full article here.
James Kitfield on NPR’s 1a: Friday NEws Roundup
James Kitfield will appear this morning on NPR’s 1A Program in their Friday News Roundup during the International Hour. Tune in between 11am-12pm here or your local NPR station.