The CSPC Dispatch - May 16 2025
Welcome to The CSPC Dispatch!
It has been a busy month so far at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC). Last week, CSPC hosted Reps. Salud Carbajal, D-CA., Troy Downing, R-Montana, Seth Moulton, D-Mass, and Jimmy Panetta, D-CA., for an off-the-record roundtable on Congressional perspectives on the trans-Atlantic relationship during the London Defence Conference in the United Kingdom (pictured to the right). Former Rep. Glenn Nye, CSPC’s president & CEO, moderated the discussions which covered congressional spending and legislative priorities, America’s engagement with NATO, and the future of continental defense.
Meanwhile, in this edition of the CSPC Dispatch, CSPC President Glenn Nye reflects on the life and recent passing of Joseph S. Nye Jr., an immensely influential American grand strategist. Senior Fellow James Kitfield ponders whether the Trump presidency is altogether unprecedented or just unusual? In other articles, Senior Fellow Hidetoshi Azuma reflects on the legacy of American foreign policy icons Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, who both recently passed away, and notes that they stand in for a bygone era of US-Japanese relations. Non-resident Senior Fellow Jo-Anne Sears breaks down the Trump administration’s strategic shifts and appointments at the Department of Defense ahead of midterm elections. Finally, in her first contribution for the Dispatch, CSPC Presidential Fellow Grace Yokitis urges a stronger focus on securing undersea cable networks, before it is too late.
As always, we hope you will find the newsletter useful and would be delighted to receive your feedback or thoughts on how we can improve going forward.
A tribute to Joseph S. Nye Jr.
By Glenn Nye
Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. (U.S. Army photo by Mr. Scott Davis)
America has lost one of its wisemen of international affairs. Joseph S. Nye Jr. was an unassuming man with a gentle demeanor, seemingly more comfortable in a fishing vest and jeans than a suit and tie. In the summer he could be found at the annual security forum of the Aspen Security Group, which he co-founded, strolling the bucolic grounds in the foothills of the Rockies, stopping to talk and share insights with the attendees, ever and always a teacher and mentor.
Yet behind the casual demeanor was one of the most influential grand strategists of the “American Century.” Joe Nye believed in the immense strength of America’s democratic values and example, and he spent a long and illustrious career nudging the nation to fulfill its promise as a superpower with a higher purpose. We at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress continue to embrace his singular vision, as we were fortunate to host him for conversations on American leadership related to his authorship of some seminal books on the topic.
Considered by many the dean of American political science, Nye led Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government for many years, and he served in senior positions in the State and Defense Departments in multiple presidential administrations. He also wrote important books on U.S. foreign policy, none more influential than his 2004 book, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.” The book coined the term “soft power,” and persuasively posited that American influence derived as much from tools such as diplomacy and foreign assistance, and core democratic values, as it did from military might.
“Seduction is always more effective than coercion,” Nye told an interviewer in 2005. “And many of our values, such as democracy, human rights and individual opportunity, are deeply seductive.”
The value that Nye himself placed in teaching and mentorship of a generation of rising policymakers, scholars and military officers stands out over his long career, as evidenced by the many tributes that have poured in since his recent passing. He was a key national issues mentor to many incoming members of Congress through his involvement with the freshman member orientation programs. I will never forget the honor of sitting next to him during my “class” orientation in 2009 and talking back through generations to our ancestral family connection. His perspectives on international relations, America’s role in the world, and the importance of leadership inspired the careers and approaches of many policy makers, including my own. America would be wise to carry his legacy forward.
Is the Trump Presidency Unprecedented?
By James Kitfield
President Donald Trump delivers the Commencement address at the graduation ceremony for the University of Alabama, Thursday, May 1, 2025, at Coleman Coliseum in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
There is an aphorism we are fond of at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC), often attributed to Mark Twain, that “History never repeats itself, but it often rhymes.” So when President Donald Trump recently passed his first one hundred days of his second term in office, it was natural to wonder whether the frenetic and often chaotic first few months of “Trump 2.0” were, as many observers argued, “unprecedented?”
After all, the Trump administration has already pardoned the January 6 rioters; declared a national emergency at the southern border that it insists supersedes due process; overturned birthright citizenship; taken a DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) “chain saw” to the federal government; targeted perceived enemies in higher education, blue-chip law firms, and the media; and, for good measure, launched a trade war against much of the rest of the world. Whew!
As it happened the Council on Foreign Relations, where I am a member, was wondering the same thing, so it recently convened a panel of historians and authors to offer a historical perspective on the Trump’ administration’s first one hundred days. The opinions of panelists are theirs alone, and their comments have been edited for length and clarity.
Trump 2.0 Is Norm Busting, But Not Altogether Unprecedented
The panelists generally agreed that the Trump administration is an unusual combination of 19th century political thought centered around populism and territorial expansionism, and more modern trends towards an ever-more powerful “Imperial Presidency.” President Donald Trump’s closest populist antecedent, whose portrait he has featured in the Oval Office, is probably President Andrew Jackson (1829-37), who raised tariffs, defied the courts and was the architect of the forced removal of American Indians from ancestral lands that became known as the “Trail of Tears.” Trump’s expansionist ambitions in coveting Greenland and the Panama Canal, and his oft-expressed desire to make Canada the “51st state,” trace back the expansionism of William McKinley (1987-1901), who Trump has also praised and who oversaw U.S. annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico.
In adopting the “unitary executive theory” which holds that the President has sole authority over all executive branch agencies, the Trump administration is the culmination of a steady trend in American politics of chief executives testing the outer limits of their power. “Basically from 1945 to the present, U.S. presidents have seized all sorts of authorities, to include autocratic control over trade, immigration, and issues of war and peace, that they were not intended to have” according to the Constitution, said Neall Ferguson, a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. “So the idea of greatly enhanced presidential power is far from new, and indeed, ‘The Imperial Presidency’ is a phrase often used to describe Richard Nixon (1969-74).”
An Administration of Billionaires Harkens Back to the “Gilded Age”
In shaping the administration, Trump has surrounded himself with at least a dozen billionaires, according to U.S. News & World Report, which reported that the net worth of these individuals in the administration as of April 30 amounted to at least $428 billion, or more than the GDP of 174 different countries. Then there is the world’s richest man, Elon Musk, the Tesla CEO who spent an estimated $250 million to help elect Trump, and has taken a metaphorical “chain saw” to the federal government from his perch leading the “Department of Government Efficiency” (which is not really a department at all).
“For an analogue for Elon Musk you have to go back in time to the ‘Gilded Age’ (1870s to 1900), and figures like [John D.] Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and [William Randolph] Hearst,” said Ferguson, referring to a period in history when rich industrialists and robber barons rubbed elbows with corrupt politicians in Washington, D.C., to the enrichment of both. “That’s what is so interesting about Trump, is the mixing of elements of 19th century populism and plutocracy.”
Trump Is No FDR
The modern standard for an activist first 100 days in an American presidency was set by Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), who assumed power at the height of the Great Depression, and used the crisis to immediately call Congress into a special session that produced an unprecedented fifteen major pieces of legislation. Roosevelt’s success in establishing a “New Deal” social safety net that included Social Security, for instance, is considered historic precisely because it has endured. By contrast, Trump mainly relied on an unprecedented 135 executive orders issued in his first 100 days, while in that timeframe Congress passed just six bills, the fewest of any president in the first 100 days in the last seven decades, according to TIME magazine.
“With the exception of foreign affairs, President Trump has accomplished very little with all of his executive orders that can’t be undone by the next president,” said H.W. Brands, a professor and history chair at the University of Texas, Austin. “Even if Trump is successful at shrinking the federal government, for instance, the courts could still block many of those orders, and the next president can rebuild what he has undone, assuming the American people want it back. So despite a lot of bluster, Trump has made very little imprint on the American system that will clearly be here in ten months, let alone ten years from now.”
Trump’s relegation of Congress to the sidelines is certainly remarkable, especially given that one nearly unprecedented aspect of his Presidency is his almost complete capture of the Republican Party.
“Until the court fights over Trump’s assertion of maximalist executive power are decided, it’s extremely hard to tell if it will be lasting,” Susan Glasser, a New Yorker columnist and co-author of “The Divider: Trump in the White House, 2017-2021, said on the CFR panel. “But he has shifted the relationship between the Presidency and Congress, enormously facilitated by what Trump calls his ‘hostile takeover’ and stranglehold on the Republican Party. His success in that fight, which no one thought was likely, is the precursor event to the current monumental contest between the Trump vision of the Presidency and how those opposing him in the courts view it.”
Trump’s Unprecedented Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy
With President Trump in the midst of an eventful overseas trip to the Middle East this week, it’s worth noting that there was general agreement on the CFR Panel that his impact on U.S. foreign policy could indeed prove lasting and without modern precedent. In a modern era characterized by America’s post-World War II rise as a global superpower, Presidents have enjoyed unusual influence and freedom of action overseas compared to their predecessors, Their role as commander-in-chief of the world’s most powerful military greatly enhances their ability to impact global events. Congress’ willingness to cede its constitutional authority to declare wars, last invoked after the 9/11 terrorist attacks nearly a quarter century ago, has greatly added to that outsized presidential power.
“Trump’s impact on foreign policy is different, because he has essentially said that the nation was stuck with this consensus since 1945 that the United States was going to carry the world on its back, and it turns out that status quo was very brittle,” said Brands, history chair at the University of Texas. In just a few months, he noted, Trump has upended the expectations other nations had in terms of U.S. foreign policy and security guarantees.
“Other nations that had the expectation that U.S. presidents will all value past commitments, and that they can rely on the United States to the extent that they don’t need their own independent foreign and defense policies, like Germany and Japan, are now hearing from the White House that we’re not interested in defending the rest of the world,” said Brands. “When U.S. voters elect a president who insists he wants to make Canada the 51st state, I’m not sure you can ever get back that trust.”
Trump’s use of tariffs to launch a global trade war is another example of nearly unfettered presidential power over foreign policy, wielded in an unprecedented way.
“All of these twist and turns whereby the global economy has been upended by a single person, who could well cause a global recession, I don’t see any script for that in America’s past,” said Glasser. There are antecedents, she noted, but Trump alone is writing the current script. “And there doesn’t seem to be any editor that can make changes. So I don’t think we’ve ever seen one person cause that level of uncertainty and chaos in terms of U.S. relations with all other nations.”
James Kitfield is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a three-time recipient of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense.
The False Promise of the US-Japan Friendship
by Hidetoshi Azuma
The recent passing of Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, the two peerless titans of the US-Japan relationship, have cast a spotlight on the intricate and often imbalanced dynamics of this critical alliance. Armitage, a former Deputy Secretary of State, and Nye, the Harvard professor who coined the term “soft power,” were not just influential voices but architects of a bilateral relationship that has shaped the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape for decades. Their demise, mourned widely in both Washington and Tokyo, offers a rare opportunity to critically examine Japan’s long-standing reliance on a small cadre of so-called American “Japan hands” for strategic guidance on the country’s security policy. While their contributions to the US-Japan alliance, frequently touted as “friendship,” were undeniable, this dependency has distorted Japan’s agency, perpetuated a culture of deference to Washington’s will, and hindered the emergence of a truly equitable alliance. The US-Japan alliance, often hailed as a cornerstone of global stability, must evolve to fulfill its unrealized potential beyond the facade of friendship Armitage and Nye painstakingly nurtured over so many years.
For over two decades, Armitage and Nye wielded unparalleled influence through their co-authored Armitage-Nye Reports, a series of policy blueprints that outlined the trajectory of the US-Japan alliance. Beginning in 2000, these reports urged Japan to embrace collective self-defense, deepen military integration with the United States, and adopt a more assertive global posture. The 2024 report, one of their final contributions, reiterated calls for a restructured command system, effectively subordinating Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to a US-led framework. This vision, while framed as a means to strengthen the alliance, has consistently prioritized American strategic interests—often at the expense of Japan’s autonomy. The recommendations have been less about empowering Japan and more about aligning its capabilities with Washington’s priorities, particularly in countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
This peculiar dynamic is not merely academic; it has tangible consequences for Japan’s national identity and sovereignty. The Japanese political and bureaucratic elite, many of whom studied at American institutions or were mentored by select American Japan hands, including Armitage and Nye, have internalized a worldview that equates Japan’s security with near-total alignment with the US. In Japan, there has been a persistent view of this phenomenon as the work of “Japan handlers,” a term that captures the perception of American experts as gatekeepers who shape Tokyo’s decision-making. This reliance has fostered a culture of deference, where Japan’s strategic choices are often filtered through the lens of what Washington deems acceptable. For instance, Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), which committed to doubling defense spending and acquiring counterstrike capabilities, was widely seen as a response to the then-US President Joe Biden rather than a purely domestic initiative by Tokyo.
The cost of this dependency is profound. Japan, despite being the world’s fourth-largest economy and a technological powerhouse, struggles to articulate an independent strategic vision. Its defense policies, while increasingly robust, are often framed as merely ancillary to US objectives rather than as expressions of Japan’s own priorities. This was evident in the 2023 decision to revise the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which emphasized joint operations under the US command. Such arrangements, while enhancing interoperability, risk reducing Japan’s SDF to a supporting role in its own defense—a far cry from the sovereignty so proudly proclaimed by Japan’s US-drafted post-war constitution.
Moreover, Japan’s overreliance on American expertise has delayed the development of a self-reliant defense ecosystem. Unlike nations such as India or France, which have cultivated indigenous defense industries, Japan remains heavily dependent on US technology and systems, from F-35 jets to Aegis missile defense platforms. This dependency not only limits Japan’s strategic flexibility but also reinforces the perception that its security is inseparable from American goodwill. The Armitage-Nye Reports, while advocating for a stronger Japanese military, rarely addressed the need for Japan to build its own defense industrial base, a critical oversight that underscores the limits of their vision.
The passing of Armitage and Nye, mourned as the end of an era, should prompt Japan to reclaim ownership of its foreign and defense policies. Their deaths have sparked tributes that highlight their role in stabilizing the alliance during turbulent times, such as the post-Cold War realignment of the US Forces in Japan (USFJ) or the response to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Yet, stability at the cost of autonomy is a hollow victory, if not even defeatism. Japan’s leaders must now prioritize domestic debates over national priorities, engaging a broader range of voices—scholars, citizens, and regional partners—to define its greater share of burden in the alliance. This shift is not about rejecting the US-Japan alliance but about rebalancing it to reflect Japan’s unique perspective as an Asian power with deep historical and cultural ties to the region.
The US, too, bears responsibility for perpetuating this imbalance. By relying on a small group of Japan experts, Washington has cultivated a one-dimensional view of the alliance, often overlooking Japan’s diverse political and cultural currents. The State Department and the Pentagon, for instance, frequently consult the same network of Japan hands, many of whom share similar ideological leanings and institutional affiliations. This echo chamber has marginalized alternative perspectives, most notably former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitious, yet controversial agenda of forging peace with Russia, which even incurred the ire of the then-US President Barack Obama. A true partnership would encourage Japan to chart its own course, even when it diverges from US preferences. For example, Japan’s longstanding special relationship with Burma could be a significant counterweight against China’s growing clout in the Southeast Asian country embroiled in a bloody civil war under its military government since 2021. Yet, such unorthodox thinking would immediately incur a backlash from Washington’s ivory tower of Japan hands, essentially punishing even the slightest deviation from the established bilateral dogma. Fearing such a reaction, Tokyo continues to seek alignment with Washington in earnest even at the expense of independent thinking.
Critics of this view might argue that Armitage and Nye’s guidance was indispensable in navigating a complex global landscape. Without their mentorship, Japan might have struggled to adapt to emerging threats, such as China’s growing assertiveness or North Korea’s missile tests. Their reports, after all, helped modernize the alliance, enabling joint exercises and intelligence-sharing that have bolstered regional security. Yet this argument ignores the opportunity cost of Japan’s diminished agency in the US-Japan alliance. A Japan that defers to American experts is less likely to innovate diplomatically or take risks that reflect its unique position as a bridge between East and West. The alliance’s strength lies not in uniformity but in the diversity of perspectives that Japan can bring to the table.
The US-Japan friendship, while vital, has been oversold as a model of mutual empowerment. In reality, it is a relationship marred by an imbalance of influence, rooted in Japan’s overreliance on a handful of American gatekeepers. This dynamic is not unique to Armitage and Nye; it reflects a broader pattern of Japan seeking validation from external voices, a legacy of its post-WWII defeatism under American occupation. Breaking this cycle requires courage from Japan’s leaders to trust their own instincts and invest in homegrown expertise.
The alliance’s future depends on its ability to evolve. Japan must assert its sovereignty, not by distancing itself from the US but by contributing to the partnership as an equal. This means investing in its defense capabilities, diversifying its diplomatic engagements, and cultivating a national discourse that prioritizes Japan’s interests above all else. For the US, it means stepping back from the role of a paternalistic mentor and embracing Japan as a co-leader in addressing global challenges, particularly China.
The legacies of Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye are complex, marked by both achievement and limitation. Their vision helped sustain the US-Japan alliance through decades of change, and their deeds were undoubtedly patriotic. Yet, they also reinforced a dependency that Japan can no longer afford.
Beyond the small circle of Washington’s Japan hands, the emerging new American global posture under President Donald J. Trump’s second presidency looks to consign their legacies into the dustbin of history once and for all. Indeed, Armitage and Nye were faithful servants of the decaying technocracy invented by President Woodrow Wilson and formalized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the previous century. Their engagement with Japan epitomized the quintessential administrative approach consisting of top-down management of a military alliance.
History is the ultimate judge of the legacies of Armitage and Nye and may even be unkind to their deeds. Trump now reigns over Washington, eclipsing the last vestiges of the dying technocracy from the previous century. The facade of the US-Japan friendship, carefully administered by Armitage and Nye for decades, ultimately failed to fundamentally change Japan’s security dependence on the US. While Washington and Tokyo continue to mourn their passing, they simultaneously find themselves having to envision a new chapter for the bilateral alliance—one where Japan’s voice is not filtered through a handful of American experts but amplified by its own confidence and clarity of purpose. If Washington puts America First, Tokyo must put Japan First above all else, including even the US. Only then can the US-Japan partnership live up to its promise as a force for global stability and prosperity as envisioned by General Douglas MacArthur in his farewell address to the Nation in 1951.
Hidetoshi Azuma is a Senior Fellow at CSPC.
The Trump Administration and the Department of Defense: Political Appointments, Restructuring, and Strategic Shifts
By jo-anne Sears
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth hosts a teleconference from the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., April 2, 2025. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)
As of mid-May 2025, the Department of Defense (DoD) under President Donald Trump’s second administration has undergone a sweeping transformation. Driven by a desire to reduce bureaucracy and pivot toward strategic priorities such as an emphasis on the space domain and the Indo-Pacific, the administration’s approach to political appointments within the DoD reflects an intense focus on efficiency and an uncurrent of moving out quickly prior to the mid-term elections when the president’s party historically has lost one or both houses of Congress.
Civilian and Military Leadership Overhaul
The appointment of Fox News weekend anchor and National Guardsman, Princeton educated Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense signaled the beginning of a bold restructuring of military leadership. Confirmed by a narrow 51–50 Senate vote, Hegseth has launched a campaign dubbed “Less Generals, More GIs” aimed at eliminating over 120 high-ranking officer billets, including nine four-star generals, in order to decentralize military decision-making and reduce what he characterizes as entrenched bureaucracy.
Supporting Hegseth in the administration is Steve Feinberg, a billionaire financier and a trusted confidant of former President Trump, who has been confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Feinberg brings a wealth of experience from his background in private equity and his previous role as chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board during Trump’s first term. While his appointment has raised questions and sparked discussions, particularly regarding his private-sector ties, supporters highlight his extensive expertise in business and security matters. Some critics have expressed concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the role of private-sector influence in military decision-making, but others argue that his unique perspective could be an asset in navigating complex defense challenges and enhancing efficiency within the department. The broader conversation surrounding his appointment reflects ongoing debates about the intersection of government and business in defense policy and strategy.
In a significant departure from established military tradition, retired Lieutenant General Dan Caine was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, succeeding General Charles Q. Brown Jr. The decision to select Caine, who retired as a three-star general, marks a break from the usual seniority-based process that typically sees the most senior active-duty officer ascend to the position. Caine, a former leader in Air Force special operations and cyber strategy, had retired years before being appointed, which raised eyebrows given the tradition of promoting senior active-duty officers with long-standing military careers. His appointment reflects a shift in the administration’s approach to military leadership, prioritizing a broader range of experience and perspectives over the conventional seniority hierarchy. While some military analysts and members of Congress have questioned the decision, citing concerns over potential disruptions to the continuity of leadership within the Joint Chiefs, others have praised the move as an opportunity to bring in a leader with fresh insights and an independent approach, particularly at a time when the military faces increasingly complex challenges in both conventional and cyber warfare.
Strategic Realignment Policy Shifts
The administration has taken decisive and strategic steps to reorient defense priorities, with a particular focus on countering the growing influence and military expansion of China. A key player in this shift is Elbridge Colby, a highly regarded strategist with a deep understanding of global security dynamics. Now serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Colby is spearheading efforts to redirect military resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the epicenter of geopolitical competition. One of the central aspects of this reorientation is the strengthening of existing alliances in East Asia, including enhancing military cooperation and fostering closer ties with nations such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The administration is also intensifying its pressure on Taiwan to bolster its own defense capabilities, urging the island nation to significantly increase its defense spending in order to ensure its deterrence against potential aggression. This multifaceted approach reflects a long-term commitment to maintaining stability and security in the region, while actively preparing for the challenges posed by an assertive China.
New Administration’s Primary Goal – Peace through Strength:
Donald Trump has often portrayed himself as a dealmaker committed to avoiding endless wars and promoting global stability through strong, transactional diplomacy. Throughout his political career, he has emphasized a desire to bring American troops home, reduce foreign entanglements, and pursue peace through strength. Trump has repeatedly stated that he prefers negotiation over military intervention, claiming he could resolve complex conflicts quickly if given the chance. His approach tends to focus on personal diplomacy with world leaders and leveraging economic and political pressure rather than relying on traditional alliances or long-term military commitments. While critics question the consistency and outcomes of his peace strategies, Trump continues to position himself as a leader who prioritizes peace and national interest above global policing.
Civilian Service Secretaries: Business Over Battlefield
In keeping with the administration’s broader agenda, the three service secretaries confirmed by the Senate represent a mix of private-sector experience, and, in one case, deep technical expertise:
Secretary of the Army: Daniel P. Driscoll
Daniel P. Driscoll, a corporate attorney based in North Carolina, was confirmed as Secretary of the Army in February 2025 by a Senate vote of 66–28. Notably, Driscoll has no prior military service, which drew some criticism during the confirmation process. However, he has been a vocal proponent of integrating commercial technologies into Army operations and overhauling the military procurement process to reduce bureaucratic delays and increase agility. His legal background and experience in corporate compliance are seen as assets in navigating complex defense contracting environments. In addition to his Army role, Driscoll is currently serving as the acting Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) following the removal of Kash Patel—an unusual dual appointment that has raised questions about potential conflicts and divided focus.
Secretary of the Navy: John Phelan
Confirmed in March 2025 by a 62–30 vote, John Phelan is a businessman and private equity investor with no direct background in defense or naval affairs. His appointment was part of the administration’s broader push to bring private-sector efficiency into military departments. Phelan has prioritized budget reductions, administrative restructuring, and improving supply chain management within the Navy and Marine Corps. Supporters praise his efforts to impose financial discipline, while critics—including several retired admirals—warn that his limited understanding of naval operations could impede strategic decision-making, particularly in an era of rising maritime tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
Secretary of the Air Force: Troy Meink
Troy Meink, confirmed in May 2025 by a bipartisan vote of 74–25, brings nearly four decades of experience to his role, including service as a KC-135 tanker navigator and extensive leadership within the Air Force’s space and intelligence programs. Before his appointment, Meink served in senior roles at the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force’s space acquisition offices, shaping the nation’s satellite and surveillance architecture. Now overseeing both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force, Meink’s selection reflects the administration’s strategic emphasis on space as a critical domain for national security. His tenure is expected to focus on modernizing space capabilities, strengthening cyber defense integration, and advancing joint operations across air and orbital domains.
Summary:
The Trump administration’s approach to the Department of Defense in 2025 is emblematic of its broader goals: dismantling perceived bureaucratic inertia, installing trusted leadership, and integrating private-sector practices into public governance. While proponents argue these moves bring efficiency, accountability, and strategic focus, critics warn they risk undermining long-standing civil-military norms, reducing institutional memory, and politicizing the armed forces. The long-term implications for military readiness, global posture, and defense governance remain uncertain and are likely to shape debate for years to come.
This approach extends beyond just the personnel reshuffling at the Pentagon. It reflects a broader trend in political appointments, where individuals from business, industry, and political circles with limited military backgrounds are increasingly tapped to lead the Department of Defense. These appointments signal a departure from the traditional model of career military officers and civilian experts, opting instead for leaders who may be more aligned with the administration's political vision and business-oriented ethos. In doing so, the Trump administration seeks to align defense policy with its larger economic and geopolitical agenda, emphasizing cost-effectiveness, operational agility, and a confrontational stance toward traditional military establishments.
Critics of these appointments argue that by favoring political loyalty over experience and expertise, the administration is compromising the apolitical and professional nature of the military. The infusion of political appointees—often with ties to the business world—into the ranks of the Pentagon risks exacerbating concerns about the erosion of civilian control over the military and the potential for defense policy to be shaped by corporate interests rather than national security imperatives. Moreover, these appointments could lead to a disconnect between military leadership and the institutional knowledge necessary for navigating complex, global security challenges.
While supporters contend that this "outsider" approach may drive innovation and efficiency, its broader impact on the military’s ability to win wars and deter aggression remains unclear. In the long term, the success or failure of these appointments will likely influence not only defense policy but also the future relationship between the military, the political establishment, and the private sector. The evolving dynamics of political appointments in defense leadership will continue to be a critical focal point, influencing not just military doctrine but the broader trajectory of American governance and its role in global security.
Jo-Anne Sears is a non-resident Senior Fellow at CSPC.
Secure the Undersea Cable Network Before Its Vulnerability is “Written in Blood”
By Grace Yokitis
Undersea cable at the Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii in 2015. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Charles E. White/Released)
There is a common phrase often used in Coast Guard circles, especially in the “vessel regulation” community: “Written in blood.” The figure of speech refers to a policy change that emerges from a high-impact disaster to ensure that similar disasters do not occur in the future. The irony is that too often positive change only occurs after an incident has inflicted serious harm.
The growing threat to undersea cables that are foundational to the function of modern societies has already been “written in blood.” In fact, there have been so many repeated attacks in recent years on underwater power and telecom cables in Europe that earlier this year NATO launched the new “Baltic Sentry” mission. The mission involves increased surveillance by maritime patrol aircraft, warships and drones of the Russian “shadow fleet” – ships of opaque ownership that carry embargoed Russian oil – that are suspected in attacks on undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. NATO chief Mark Rutte said earlier this year that there was “reason for grave concern” over the resulting damage to infrastructure and communications, promising that the alliance would respond assertively to future incidents with actions that include the boarding and potential seizure of suspected vessels.
Given the high stakes involved, it is past time that Congress acts to protect undersea cables that transmit 99% of internet traffic and are utilized by every private and public sector in America, to include trillions of dollars in transactions and encrypted diplomatic communications. Because of the importance of undersea cables, lawmakers should start by passing The Undersea Cable Security and Protection Act (UCSP). Rep. August Lee Pfluger, R-TX, a member of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, introduced the UCSP in the 118th Congress to “safeguard this indispensable infrastructure”.
The legislation would create an interagency working group to analyze undersea cable integrity and security. That analysis would include an in-depth evaluation of the current operational environment for subsea cables, including threats of sabotage and the undersea surveillance capabilities of foreign states. Importantly, the report also recommends improvements in security for both the undersea cable network and cable landing stations. The interagency task force would also address one of the biggest issues impacting oversight of the undersea cable network – the lack of coordination among the large number of U.S. governmental stakeholders.
For instance, just about all government agencies, military as well as civilian, are invested in the successful function of undersea cables. However, there is no single lead agency to ensure multiagency coordination, and thus no common strategy for ensuring undersea cable security in mission areas like permitting, maintenance, and defense. The interagency working group would thus include representatives from seven federal-level stakeholders, with the potential for adding other government entities if they are determined to “materially assist in the activities of the interagency working group”.
The Department of Homeland Security is a logical choice to lead the task force because of its strengths as an umbrella organization for multiple agencies with different responsibilities for a common mission, including border patrol, emergency management and maritime security. This coordination function would perfectly fit the mission of ensuring the security of the critical infrastructure of undersea cables.
To date the United States has been fortunate in avoiding a major communications breakdown that would result from an undersea cable failure. But the vulnerability of that subsea cable infrastructure to sabotage by malign actors has now been well established. It would be a dereliction of duty were Congress to ignore those warnings, and wait until that vulnerability is “written in blood.”
Grace Yokitis is a 2024-2025 CSPC Presidential Fellow and student at the United States Coast Guard Academy. The views expressed are hers alone, and should not be construed as those of the U.S. Coast Guard.
CSPC In the news
The FCC Move that Could Shut Down China’s Backdoor Access to U.S. Telecom Infrastructure
By andy Keiser
Originally published by National Security Institute in the SCIF on May 7, 2025:
In response to the growing infiltration of Chinese-backed telecommunications firms, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) — under the decisive leadership of Chairman Brendan Carr — is establishing a dedicated Council on National Security to safeguard U.S. networks and confront foreign technological threats head-on.
Read Andy Keiser’s full analysis here.
James Kitfield on National Public Radio’s 1A Program: Friday News Roundup, International edition
Originally published in National Public Radio on May 9, 2025:
James Kitfield (Senior Fellow at CSPC) appeared alongside Amy Mackinnon (Intelligence Reporter at Politico), and Gregg Carlstrom (Middle East correspondent for The Economist) to discuss the latest news abroad including tensions between Pakistan and India, Israel’s war in Gaza, and peace talks in Ukraine.