The CSPC Dispatch — June 11, 2025
Welcome to the CSPC Dispatch!
This week, CSPC President & CEO Glenn Nye was featured on PBS Newshour, where he discussed the Center’s Quarter Millennial Project and talked about the project’s focus on innovation.
In this week’s CSPC Dispatch, Senior Fellow Jeanne Zaino discusses America’s upcoming 250th birthday and the necessity to both celebrate and think about essential reforms. CSPC’s Senior Fellow Jo-Anne Sears and Erin McLaughlin look at the current push to reform the defense acquisition process. Senior Fellow Hidetoshi Azuma, meanwhile, analyzes the increasingly difficult tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
As always, we hope you find the Dispatch informative and welcome your feedback on how we can continue to improve.
At 250, Honoring the Framers Means Reverence & Reform
By Jeanne Zaino
Signing of the United States Constitution with George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander Hamilton (left to right in the foreground), painting by Howard Chandler Christy.
“Government deficits, the spiraling imbalance of trade, inconsistencies in foreign policy, illegal immigration, unemployment, the decay of our cities, the abuse of the environment, the staggering cost of elections, and the piracy of special interest groups – these problems and a host of others have led thoughtful citizens to question whether our political system is capable of meeting the challenge of modern governance.” -Donald L. Robinson
This quote comes from someone that many people are likely not familiar with, Donald L. Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Government at Smith College. Listening to the litany of challenges Prof. Robinson laid out, everything from the deficit, trade, and foreign policy, to immigration, unemployment, environment, urban decay, cost of elections, and role of special interests, you might think he was speaking about problems we face in the U.S. today, but he wasn’t. He wrote this forty years ago in a book published in connection with the bicentennial of the US – the 200th anniversary of the Constitution.
That anniversary, like the upcoming semiquincentennial, was important for many reasons, including the fact that research shows interest in reforming our system peaks during periods like these, anniversaries or what we might think of as moments of civic renewal.
I quote here from a book by another political scientist, John R. Vile, whose work shows that, “most proposals for structural constitutional change… [occur] during two kinds of events: crises (or perceived crises) and constitutional anniversaries, or what one author has called ‘times of national reaffirmation.”
Both the 1987 bicentennial and upcoming 250th are examples of anniversaries which trigger renewed interest in reform and reform proposals, which many of us working in this space, as well as the American public overall, suggest in polls are much needed.
Among the crises Vile points to are the Civil War, WWII and the Civil Rights/Vietnam era, all of which also served as a catalyst for reform talk. The most recent is the January 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. As the events of that day unfolded live on television and via streaming platforms, the world expressed horror, outrage, and surprise. The cover of China Daily, for instance, read “World, business leaders shocked by violence in DC.” Current and former high-ranking public officials, like President George W. Bush, expressed “dismay and disbelief” at the “mayhem” which unfolded “at the seat of our Nation’s government.” In the aftermath we saw a spike in concern among the American public that democracy was under threat, a concern that continues to today. A recent NPR/PBS/Marist poll found that more than three-quarters (76%) of Americans feel that democracy is under threat. In the nine times this question has been asked since January 2021 the percentage of Americans who say democracy is under threat has not gone below 73% and at times has reached as high as 87%.
Since the subtitle of my book is “The case for rethinking Madisonian government,” it will come as no surprise that I have a keen interest in the type of reform these crises and anniversaries engender. Unfortunately, there is another reality those of us interested in reform must contend with and that is what usually happens in the aftermath of these crises and anniversaries. The further we get from these events the more likely we are to hear that the system held and, as a result, the less likely we are to engage in robust reform discussions, let alone move toward enacting reform. As Vile notes, while past anniversaries and crises have occasioned serious reform discussion, in each instance as the crisis abated and slipped further from memory, support for restructuring waned.
In keeping with the maxim, history may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, it comes as no surprise that we have seen a similar pattern in the wake of January 6. As time distanced us from the events of that day, there is a diminishing sense of urgency regarding the need for reform. On a recent anniversary of January 6, Christopher Tuttle of the Council of Foreign Relations wrote, “in the twenty-four months since rioters breached the U.S. Capitol, the capacity of the American system to overcome even the gravest challenges has quietly been on display.” Analogizing the American experiment to a ‘patient on life support,’ Tuttle concluded that while the “patient is still plagued with chronic illness… thanks to its natural defense mechanisms, the prognosis may not be as dire as some have warned.” He then asked whether those proposing ‘remedies’ for the American state are recommending “prescriptions” that are “too invasive”? Quoting Virgil’s Aeneid, Tuttle cautioned ‘aegrescit medendo’ the treatment may be worse than the disease.
Another example of this is what happened in the wake of Watergate. A decade after the crisis, interest in reform had faded so much that political scientist James Q. Wilson wrote of his ‘amusement’ at re-reading a 1974 essay by Charles Hardin which spoke of the government being in crisis and calling on ‘constitutional surgery’ to correct it. “The ‘crisis’ ended without any of these ‘cures,’” Wilson wrote, “Watergate was handled by the normal constitutional procedures—congressional investigations, criminal trials, and the prospect of impeachment—and the presidency and the president are once again in high repute.”
If history is any guide, then even if the upcoming anniversary (or God forbid next crisis) do engender talk of reform, over time interest will fade. This is unfortunate because unless we normalize reform talk and begin to act in a reasoned, methodical, and collegial way to fix what is ailing the nation, over time it will only become increasingly vulnerable.
The quote I started with from Robinson ends with the following: “We stand in awe of the wise men who framed the Constitution nearly two centuries ago, but as they themselves anticipated, changing circumstances demand a reassessment.” This is an apt description of where are today, the lucky beneficiaries of a system that the Framers said would need to be reassessed and revised over time by future generations; two-hundred and fifty years since the nation was founded, we have not yet made good on this but should.
Jeanne Sheehan Zaino is professor of Political Science and Senior Democracy Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. This piece draws on themes from her latest book, American Democracy in Crisis (Palgrave, 2025), and her Substack newsletter, The New Realist. It is the first in a series on reform marking the America’s Semiquincentennial.
Breaking Bureaucracy: A Historic Push to Reform Defense Acquisition
By Erin McLaughlin & Jo-Anne Sears
The Pentagon looking northeast with the Washington Monument in the distance. DoD photo by Master Sgt. Ken Hammond, U.S. Air Force.
For the United States military to remain the most capable and ready fighting force in the world, it requires an acquisition system that is fast, cost-effective, and responsive to warfighter operational needs. Yet for generations, the U.S. Department of Defense has struggled with an acquisition process that is slow, overly bureaucratic, and resistant to innovation. Despite multiple attempts at reform since the Cold War era, the system continues to lag behind the pace of technological advancement and modern warfare requirements.
The problems with defense acquisition are not new. In fact, critiques of the system date back to President Eisenhower, who warned of the growing influence and inefficiency of the military-industrial complex. Over the decades, presidents from both parties—including Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and now Donald Trump—have identified acquisition reform as a key national security imperative. And yet, reform efforts have often been overtaken by other political priorities, stymied by entrenched interests, or implemented without the sustained institutional knowledge or will to achieve meaningful change.
The Trump Administration has made acquisition reform a central pillar of its national defense strategy, using executive authority to drive immediate changes within the Department of Defense. On April 9, 2025, President Trump signed what is arguably the most consequential Executive Order in this effort: “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base.” This Executive Order mandates sweeping reforms aimed at cutting red tape, accelerating procurement timelines, and realigning acquisitions to better support the warfighter.
The EO requires the Pentagon to deliver an actionable reform plan within 60 days. This plan must prioritize commercial technologies, expand the use of Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs), implement policies from Rapid Capabilities Offices, and eliminate redundant functions through a top-to-bottom review of support roles. It also calls for the establishment of a Configuration Steering Board to manage acquisition risk and mandates a review of all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that are off track—programs that may now face termination. By day 120, the Department of Defense must overhaul the acquisition workforce and a full progress review is set for day 180.
Parallel to this executive push, Congress is taking legislative action to reinforce and codify acquisition reform. In December 2024, Senator Roger Wicker (R-Mississippi), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, introduced the FoRGED Act—a comprehensive effort to repeal outdated acquisition statutes, simplify pricing regulations, and enhance commercial contracting. The bill emphasizes performance-based design, strengthens the use of OTAs, and is viewed as a foundational blueprint for long-term statutory change. It is currently awaiting Senate markup.
Building on this momentum, on June 9, 2025, Representatives Mike Rogers of Alabama and Adam Smith of Washington state —Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee—introduced the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery (SPEED) Act. This bipartisan legislation mirrors many of the priorities in Trump’s EO and the FoRGED Act. It aims to align acquisition with warfighter outcomes, accelerate the requirements process, enhance innovation through commercial partnerships, strengthen the defense industrial base, and professionalize the acquisition workforce.
Together, these initiatives represent the most comprehensive executive-legislative alignment on acquisition reform in decades. If successfully implemented, this effort could finally overcome the inertia that has plagued past reform attempts. Trump’s EO creates immediate operational directives, while FoRGED and SPEED lay the legal and policy groundwork for sustainable, long-term change.
SPEED emphasizes outcomes that prioritize speed-to-need for the warfighter, mitigating risk by enabling faster adaptation and fielding capability. FoRGED addresses the foundational legal framework, clearing the statutory underbrush that has accumulated over decades. Trump’s EO requires near-term Pentagon compliance and serves as a catalyst for both initiatives, while also offering a roadmap that may inform future legislation.
However, success is not guaranteed. Trump’s Executive Orders do not carry the force of law and depend on internal DoD execution. Likewise, the final version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) must reconcile the differences between the House and Senate, which may delay or dilute reform measures. Furthermore, lasting implementation will require rigorous oversight, cultural change within the acquisition workforce, and sustained investment in training and resources.
Nevertheless, the convergence of executive orders and congressional legislation presents a rare opportunity to modernize the defense acquisition system. With the SPEED and FoRGED Acts serving as legislative bookends, and the Trump Administration providing executive urgency, this coordinated effort could finally deliver the streamlined, responsive, and innovative acquisition system the Department of Defense has long needed—and long lacked.
Looking ahead, the future of the FoRGED and SPEED Acts in the current Congress will depend on continued bipartisan momentum, successful reconciliation during the NDAA conference process, and sustained political will to prioritize acquisition reform amid competing legislative agendas. While both bills have strong sponsors and align with the Administration’s goals, their passage is not guaranteed. Key challenges include potential disagreements over the scope of regulatory rollbacks, jurisdictional turf battles, and broader partisan tensions as the election cycle intensifies. However, if congressional leadership can maintain focus on the shared objective of strengthening national defense through acquisition efficiency, and if the Department of Defense demonstrates real progress under the Trump EO directives, the legislative groundwork laid by FoRGED and SPEED could finally translate into durable, statutory reform. This Congress may yet prove to be the one that breaks the decades-long cycle of failed reform and sets a new standard for military procurement in the 21st century.
Erin McLaughlin is an intern at CSPC and a senior at Sewanee: The University of the South, majoring in politics and minoring in rhetoric. Jo-Anne Sears is a non-resident Senior Fellow at CSPC.
Japan’s Growing Difficulties Under Shigeru Ishiba
By Hidetoshi Azuma
As Japan reached the third anniversary of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s assassination on July 8, the nation found itself mired in a leadership crisis that threatens its economic vitality, diplomatic influence, and domestic stability. Under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who assumed office on October 1, 2024, Japanese politics has devolved into a governance paralyzed by indecision, factionalism, and an inability to uphold the bold vision that defined Abe’s tenure. Ishiba’s lackluster leadership, compounded by recent developments, such as President Donald Trump’s letter to him earlier this week announcing 25% tariffs on Japanese goods effective August 1, has deepened Japan’s woes, betraying Abe’s legacy in three short years and imperiling the nation’s future.
The Shadow of Abe’s Legacy
Shinzo Abe was a towering figure in Japanese politics, serving as the nation’s longest-serving prime minister and leaving an indelible mark through his economic and foreign policy initiatives. His “Abenomics” program—comprising monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms—aimed to jolt Japan out of decades of economic stagnation. Abroad, Abe repositioned Japan as a linchpin of the Indo-Pacific through the Quad framework and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, countering China’s growing assertiveness. His assassination during a campaign speech in Nara in 2022 left an unmistakable leadership vacuum which his successors, including Fumio Kishida and now Ishiba, have struggled to fill.
Abe’s legacy, while not without controversy, was defined by his ability to project strength and unity. Critics pointed to his nationalist leanings and ties to groups, such as the Nippon Kaigi and even the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church, accusing him of historical revisionism. Yet, his knack for coalition-building within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and his personal rapport with world leaders, most notably President Trump, enabled Japan to punch above its weight.
Shigeru Ishiba, a longtime LDP maverick, ascended to the premiership after almost four decades on the party’s fringes. Indeed, he was previously known as an “internal critic” within the LDP, and his proclivity for back-dealing led to irreparable rivalries with Abe and former Prime Minister Taro Aso. His accidental victory in the 2024 LDP leadership race was initially seen as a potential shift toward reform, with promises of regional revitalization and a less hawkish defense policy. However, less than a year into his tenure, Ishiba’s leadership has unraveled, marked by electoral miscalculations, economic drift, and, most significantly, a failure to navigate an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. The latest blow came with Trump’s tariff announcement, which underscores Ishiba’s inability to safeguard Japan’s interests on the world stage.
Ishiba’s Snap Election Debacle
Ishiba’s fateful decision to call a snap general election on October 27, 2024, was a catastrophic misstep that exposed his political naivety. Hoping to secure a mandate, he instead led the LDP-Komeito coalition to its second-worst electoral defeat in history, losing its House of
Representatives majority for the first time since 2009. The election was a referendum on Ishiba’s failure to address rising living costs, political scandals, and public disillusionment with the LDP’s entrenched power, particularly its ties to the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church.
Unlike Abe, who mastered the art of political timing and smoke-filled-room maneuverings in and around Nagatacho, Ishiba misjudged the public mood and the LDP’s weakened internal cohesion following the dissolution of its factions in early 2024. His campaign lacked a unifying vision, offering a patchwork of vague reform promises and a dubious proposal for an “Asian NATO” that was swiftly dismissed as impractical. The upshot was a hung parliament, forcing Ishiba to cobble together fragile alliances with minor parties. This electoral rout threatened his authority within the LDP in which former factions loyal to Abe’s legacy, led by figures like Sanae Takaichi, reemeerged to challenge his leadership.
Economic Stagnation and Policy Paralysis
Japan’s economy, already strained by inflation and a weakening yen, has suffered further under Ishiba’s incoherent policies. Abenomics, for all its mixed results, provided a clear framework for growth. Ishiba, however, has offered little beyond hackneyed promises. His appointment of Katsunobu Kato as the Minister of Finance was a nod to Abenomics but lacked the conviction to inspire markets, which reacted to Ishiba’s leadership win with a nearly 5% drop in the Nikkei.
Ishiba’s economic agenda, centered on regional revitalization and modest wage hikes, has failed to address structural challenges like Japan’s aging population and declining rural economies. His proposed handouts to counter rising prices are merely Band-Aid solutions, lacking the ambition of Abe’s reforms. Japan’s trade surplus with the United States, pegged at $68.5 billion annually, has become a flashpoint, particularly with Trump’s return to the White House.
On July 7, 2025, Trump sent a letter to Ishiba announcing a 25% tariff on all Japanese goods starting August 1, slightly up from the 24% reciprocal tariff set in April. The letter cited “longterm, and very persistent, Trade Deficits engendered by Japan’s Tariff, and Non Tariff, Policies and Trade Barriers.” This followed a breakdown in trade talks, despite Japan’s earlier optimism about securing exemptions. The tariffs, separate from existing 25% duties on autos and 50% on steel and aluminum, threaten to shave up to 0.8% off Japan’s economic growth, with some economists warning of a potential recession.
Ishiba’s response has been tepid. At a July 8 task force meeting, he called the tariffs “truly regrettable” and vowed to protect Japan’s industries, but his government has avoided concrete countermeasures. Japan’s chief trade negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, emphasized the auto sector’s importance, stating, “There’s no point striking a deal with the U.S. without an agreement on automobile tariffs.” Yet, with an Upper House election looming on July 20, Ishiba’s reluctance to make “easy concessions” risks prolonging economic uncertainty, especially as recent polls suggest the LDP may lose its upper chamber majority.
Diplomatic Drift and the Tariff Shock
Abe’s foreign policy was a masterclass in balancing assertiveness with diplomacy. His personal rapport with Trump during the latter’s first term secured a trade deal and a promise to avoid auto tariffs. Ishiba, by contrast, has struggled to replicate this chemistry. His February 7, 2025, White House meeting with Trump yielded pledges of $1 trillion in Japanese investment but no tariff relief. Trump’s subsequent tariff letter underscored Ishiba’s diplomatic shortcomings, with the U.S. president complaining that Japan “don’t take our cars, but we take MILLIONS of theirs.”
Ishiba’s broader foreign policy lacks coherence. His controversial “Asian NATO” proposal alienated allies, such as South Korea, while his reluctance to engage decisively with China and North Korea has left Japan vulnerable amid regional tensions. The tariff announcement has further isolated Japan, with Trump targeting 14 countries, including South Korea and Malaysia, with levies up to 40%. Ishiba’s April 7 phone call with Trump, where he urged reconsideration of the tariffs, produced no breakthroughs, with Japan’s status as the largest U.S. investor since 2019 failing to sway the U.S. administration.
The tariffs pose a direct challenge to Japan’s export-driven economy, particularly its auto industry, which employs millions and accounts for a significant share of GDP. Akazawa’s 40-minute call with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick on July 8 yielded only an agreement to “actively” continue talks, with no guarantee of concessions.
A Fractured LDP
Ishiba’s inability to unify the LDP has compounded his failures. His 2018 challenge to Abe, where he criticized Abenomics and Abe’s leadership, alienated the party’s conservatives. Sanae Takaichi, an Abe loyalist, narrowly lost to Ishiba in the 2024 leadership race and declined a cabinet post, signaling ongoing factional strife within the LDP. Ishiba’s cabinet, with only seven ministers possessing prior experience, reflects a lack of institutional depth, further undermining governance.
Ishiba’s growing difficulties are merely a symptom of the LDP’s long-term terminal decline. Founded in 1955 with covert U.S. support, the LDP served its original mandate of furnishing a bulwark against communism in Asia well throughout the Cold War, but the collapse of the Soviet Union set Japan’s ruling party hopefully adrift. Against this backdrop, Abe’s campaign slogan of “Ending the Post-WWII Regime” back in 2006 reflected his ambitious agenda of providing the LDP with a new mandate for the 21st century. His long tenure untimely failed to renew the LDP per se, despite his success in prolonging its inevitable decline.
Yet, Abe’s bromance with Trump unmistakably checked his US counterpart’s America First impulses, perhaps his most noteworthy accomplishment. His untimely assassination, however, derailed the LDP off that course. The upshot has been the LDP’s sudden, consequential pivot to the Left, leading to the rise of Ishiba, previously the party’s forgotten dissenter with little leadership experience.
The inconvenient truth is that Ishiba is presently the LDP’s best and brightest. After all, he survived both the power struggle at home and geopolitics abroad, leading to his victory in the party leadership election last year. This reality leaves two possibilities: the LDP’s renewal or devolution. If Abe could only delay the LDP’s terminal decline, who else could pull off its much-
needed rejuvenation? Ishiba may believe that he is up to this impossible task by recently throwing down the gauntlet to Trump with a cathartic howl: “This is a battle for our national interest. Don't you dare take us lightly!” His actual track records, however, appear to prove otherwise.
Without a course correction, Japan risks prolonged stagnation, dishonoring Abe’s legacy and ceding its global influence. The tariff deadline of August 1 looms as a critical test. Ishiba’s ability to secure a favorable trade deal, or at least mitigate the economic fallout, will determine whether he can salvage his premiership.
Hidetoshi Azuma is a Senior Fellow at CSPC.
CSPC in the News
What the U.S. has Accomplished in 250 years of Innovation and What’s Next
Originally published in PBS News on July 5, 2025:
The Center’s Quarter Millennial Project was highlighted on PBS News over the holiday weekend! John Yang from PBS News speaks with President & CEO Glenn Nye about the project’s focus on innovation and the importance of remembering our past to press forward. Watch the full segment here.
Is Trump Distancing Himself from Putin?
Originally published in ZDF on July 9, 2025:
Our SVP and Director of Policy Peter Sparding was featured this morning on ZDF, Germany’s national public broadcaster. He joined the program to discuss recent shifts in the U.S. administration’s tone toward Russia—and what they might signal for the future of transatlantic relations. Watch the full segment (in German) here.
NATO Pre-Summit Interview: Managing Trump’s Return, Defense Spending, and the Future of Transatlantic Security
Originally published in Berlingske on June 24, 2025:
As NATO met last week in The Hague, the alliance faced a pivotal moment. In a pre-summit interview with Berlingske, CSPC's Joshua Huminski discussed managing Trump’s return, defense spending, and the future of transatlantic security. Read the full article (in Danish) here.
The Next Iteration of NATO and the Forthcoming Hague Summit
Originally published in Diplomatic Courier on June 23, 2025:
In his latest piece for Diplomatic Courier, our SVP Joshua Huminski identifies the key internal and external pressures facing NATO—and how the upcoming summit offers an opportunity to build a stronger alliance, with a more European identity. Read the full article here.