The CSPC Dispatch - APR. 18 2025
Welcome to The CSPC Dispatch!
As if any readers needed reminding, the past fortnight has confirmed once again that there are no more slow news weeks in America.
The Trump administration’s imposition, withdrawal and reintroduction of various tariffs at differing levels have continued at a dizzying pace, roiling stock markets and the global economy. The administration’s determination to test the boundaries of executive power has similarly led to numerous dramatic ups and downs in the courts in the past week, with the Supreme Court announcing that it will hear arguments in the coming weeks on President Trump’s executive order ending birthright citizenship, and a federal appeals court green lighting an investigation of whether the administration violated a court order by refusing to “facilitate” the release of a Maryland man mistakenly sent to a max-prison in El Salvador. For good measure, this week the president also threatened to fire Jerome Powell, the supposedly independent chairman of the Federal Reserve, for failing to cut interest rates. “If I want him out, he’ll be out of there real fast,” Trump warned during an Oval Office presser.
This week in the Dispatch, Senior Fellow James Kitfield looks at a series of White House executive orders intended to revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base, focusing on an ambitious blueprint for “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance.” It’s a much-needed effort to revive a U.S. shipbuilding industry that has all but collapsed in the post-Cold War era, and it builds on recent bipartisan legislation proposed on Capitol Hill.
With the Trump administration having recently reopened talks with Iran about its suspected nuclear weapons program, CSPC’s Caleb Mann examines the long, tortured history of deception and distrust that underlies past nuclear diplomacy between the two nations. In this emerging era of “America First” foreign and trade policy and the reshoring of manufacturing jobs into the United States, CSPC’s Bridget Peach analyzes the uncertain future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act trade pact. CSPC Senior Democracy Fellow Jeanne Sheehan Zaino offers a memoriam for South African Playwright Athol Fugard, considered by some critics as one of the most important playwrights of the 20th Century.
As always, we hope that you will find the newsletter useful and would be delighted to receive your feedback or thoughts on how we can improve going forward.
A Trump Administration Strategy for Revitalizing U.S. Shipbuilding
By James Kitfield
President Donald J. Trump delivers remarks at Naval Air Station Norfolk Pier 8, Saturday, March 28, 2020, prior to the departure of the USNS Comfort. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
To date the Trump administration’s global trade war targeting friend and foe alike has played out like a chaotic tariff tit-for-tat in search of a coherent strategy. The White House’s most recent barrage of threatened tariffs has at least focused on China and the world’s second-largest economy. If the administration’s goal is to counter Beijing’s aggressive mercantilism, bullying behavior towards neighbors and massive defense buildup of both conventional and nuclear weapons, that alone would be a worthy and legacy-defining achievement for any presidency.
Yet preparing that battlespace by alienating close allies in Asia and Europe with threats and tariffs, and bullying our own neighbors such as Canada and Mexico, is the opposite of strategic. In fact, it greatly increases the risk of failure in what amounts to a bold attempt to recalibrate the rules of the U.S.-led, global economic order.
Though the news was largely lost in the recent tariff chaos and stomach-churning swings in global stock markets, the White House last week quietly issued three executive orders that did reflect a carefully calibrated strategy for reforming the U.S. industrial base. The first would streamline a Pentagon defense acquisition system currently in a straitjacket of bureaucratic red tape. The second would supercharge U.S. arms exports to allies by cutting regulation and increasing cooperation between the U.S. government and industry. The third and arguably most ambitious executive order, “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” aims to “revitalize and rebuild domestic maritime industries and workforce to promote national security and economic prosperity.”
Books and lengthy reports have and will continue to be written detailing the challenges inherent in each of these urgently-needed reforms, including CSPC’s own recent in-depth analysis “The Gathering Storm: A Moonshot for National Defense Readiness.” To understand the rapidly growing threat driving the need for reform, and the major impediments to success, let’s consider that executive order to revitalize the American maritime industry.
U.S. Shipbuilding Collapse
After the end of the Cold War thirty-five years ago, the U.S. and Chinese industrial bases, to include defense manufacturing, trended in opposite directions. U.S. defense spending on procurement fell 44 percent, for instance, and the number of major prime defense contractors shrank from 51 to just 5. As a direct result of those steep cuts the United States lost more than a third (36 percent) of its manufacturing workforce, representing more than 7 million manufacturing jobs. Meanwhile, after China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, it averaged double digit annual growth during the next decade plus. Flush with export cash and manufacturing muscle, Beijing has embarked on the largest and most rapid military buildup in modern history.
Today, as the Pentagon attempts to keep pace with China’s defense buildup in order to maintain deterrence, the repercussions of that economic transformation are becoming especially clear in the maritime industrial base. Beijing already boasts not only the world’s largest navy, but also shipbuilding capacity roughly 230 times that of the United States. U.S. Navy intelligence estimates that just one of China’s ten major shipyards has more capacity that all U.S. shipyards combined.
“After decades of neglect and declining competitiveness, the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry has virtually collapsed,” concluded a recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder, the report found, has produced more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 alone than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II.
While the continental United States has long enjoyed the relative protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, that protection and the ability to project military power are profoundly degraded if China rules shipbuilding, and thus potentially the seas. That dominance is already being felt by key U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. These neighbors of China are increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s bullying behavior and illegal claim over the entire South China Sea, along with contested island chains.
To reverse those trends and reestablish the United States as a dominant maritime power, the White House executive order would begin by establishing a multiagency “Maritime Action Plan” that coordinates the efforts of the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, Labor and Homeland Security, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. That effort alone speaks to the complexity of the challenge ahead.
To encourage new investments in the maritime industrial base, the executive order would leverage Defense Production Act authorities to increase federal investments and incentivize private capital investments in shipyards and maritime supply chains. Importantly, it would also expand education and training opportunities and modernize the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy to address a critical shortage in the current maritime workforce.
That shortage was highlighted last year when General Dynamic’s Electric Boat shipyard announced that it was slowing production of new Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines and Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines because of unanticipated supply chain issues and late deliveries by subcomponent suppliers, delaying the submarine programs by at least 12 to 16 months.
Congressional SHIPS Act
The White House’s “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” executive order also helpfully complements the bipartisan “Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security (SHIPS) for America Act introduced in December 2024, which proposes financial incentives – to include loan guarantees and tax credits – to encourage commercial production at U.S. shipyards. The SHIPS Act also envisions establishing a “Strategic Commercial Fleet” of U.S.-built and flagged vessels manned by U.S. crews.
Somewhat surprisingly given the Trump administration’s brusque treatment of close allies to date, the White House’s executive order also directs relevant U.S. departments to engage with allies and partner governments, especially major shipbuilding countries like South Korea and Japan, to help coordinate shipbuilding efforts and shift global demand away from Chinese shipyards. Currently, CSIS estimates that foreign firms purchased 75 percent of the commercial output from China’s dual-use (commercial and military) shipyards.
“By emphasizing working with allies and partners to counter China’s dominance in the maritime sector and investing in U.S. shipbuilding capacity, the [White House’s] executive order doubles down on rigorous engagements by U.S. Navy leadership to explore partnerships between the United States and allies in Japan and South Korea on naval shipbuilding,” the recent CSIS analysis concluded. “These partnerships will be critical for building back both commercial and military shipbuilding in the United States.”
James Kitfield is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and principal author of the recent CSPC report “The Gathering Storm: A Moonshot for National Defense Readiness.”
In Memoriam: South African Playwright Athol Fugard
By Jeanne Zaino
The Fugard Theatre in Cape Town is housed in an old converted church.
Last month, the world lost one of the most important playwrights of the 20th Century. A native of South Africa, Athol Fugard is best remembered for introducing audiences to the horrors of apartheid and racial segregation via numerous works spanning seven decades. His plays include “Master Harold and the Boys,” “Blood Knot,” “Hello and Goodbye,” “Boesman and Lena,” “Sizwe Banzi is Dead,” “The Island,” “My Children, My Africa,” and “Valley Song,” among many others.
On Fugard’s death, at age 92, I published a memoriam in News24, one of South Africa’s leading newspapers, entitled “Letters to Athol Fugard.” As a young man, Fugard acted in, directed, wrote for and ran a multiracial theater in South Africa – a subversive act in itself at the time which, in addition to other acts of resistance, resulted in a governmental crackdown that forced him to seek venues for his work overseas. He found receptive audiences in the West.
In the memoriam I recount meeting Fugard in New York after the off-Broadway premier of “The Road to Mecca” which starred Yvonne Bryceland and Amy Irving. I continued corresponding with Fugard over the years, and he offered a good deal of encouragement at critical times in my career. As I wrote in News24, around the turn of the century Fugard was the subject of much criticism and speculation regarding whether he could find his voice in a post-apartheid world. As one critic told The New York Times, “He's been an absolutely staunch pioneer, a complete trend setter, but he lost his bearings.”
While best known for exposing the world to the “torments of apartheid,” Fugard’s plays – both before and after the birth of the “Rainbow nation” - are not overtly political, nor is his genius rooted solely in his anger and outrage over apartheid. Instead, what made him a compelling playwright and relevant to international audiences, many of whom had never visited his beloved South Africa, was his ability to tell compelling stories about the hardships, struggles, and triumphs of average people and his uncanny ability to make their humanity, suffering, and achievements matter to audiences around the world.
For my full memoriam of this extraordinary writer and man, please see my News24 article here.
Jeanne Sheehan Zaino is a Political Science & International Studies Professor at Iona University, and Senior Democracy Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC).
U.S. - Iran Nuclear Talks: A Tortured History of Deception and Distrust
By Caleb mann
Tea Party Patriots STOP THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL RALLY on the US Capitol West Lawn in Washington DC on Wednesday morning, 9 September 2015 by Elvert Barnes Protest Photography
The destabilizing prospect of Iran’s revolutionary, theocratic regime possessing the world’s most destructive weapon has served as a geopolitical stressor in the Middle East for nearly half a century. Changing diplomatic policies, hard-hitting sanctions, military threats and multilateral negotiations have all been tried in attempts to deter the Islamic Republic from its atomic pursuits. Despite Iran’s insistence that it only seeks peaceful nuclear technology, deeply held Western suspicions towards Iran’s true nuclear ambitions have left the two sides locked in a decades-long game of tug of war.
In the years since the United States pulled out of the Iran Nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, tensions between Washington and Tehran have continued to rise. Now, as Iran stands closer than ever to the bomb, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, after years of refusal, has agreed to restart nuclear negotiations with the United States. Successful talks will require overcoming a long history of deception and distrust. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, an initiative intended to promote peaceful nuclear technology, announced a partnership with Iran in 1957. Ten years later, Iran opened the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which housed an American-made five-megawatt reactor. In 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), subjecting all nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification inspections.
In 1974, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi announced his vision of building 20 nuclear power reactors before the turn of the century. This spurred massive Western investment in constructing reactors in Iran. That same year, the Shah asserted that Iran was not interested in developing nuclear weapons, but that if other countries continued to proliferate, Iran might reconsider. An investigation conducted by the CIA confirmed the assessment that Iran would likely try developing nuclear weapons if other regional countries such as India and Pakistan continued their own pursuit.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution culminated in the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, marking the end of Iran’s pro-western monarchy, international investment in Iran’s nuclear program almost completely ended. Within months the United States cut off all shipments of uranium and pressured foreign businesses to pull out of their contracts with the Iranian government.
The revolution also thrust Iran into political and economic turmoil, largely halting Iran’s nuclear progress. Revolutionary Leaders such as the first Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, originally opposed nuclear development, believing that nuclear technology was not only costly, but also would force Iranian dependence on the West, contradicting the revolutionary pillar of “esteghlal” (meaning independence).
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iranian territory, which sought to capitalize on Tehran’s internal strife, kicked off an eight-year conflict that consumed Iran’s resources and attention. Though fears of Iraq's use of chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) inspired Tehran’s ambitions of nuclear capability, crippling strikes on infrastructure by the Iraqi Air Force made progress difficult. To make international cooperation even less accessible, the United States designated Iran as a state-sponsor of terror in 1984, unleashing rigorous sanctions.
As the war began to wind down in the late 1980s, Iran sought a series of international partnerships to once again advance their nuclear program. In 1993, a deal struck with Argentina led to the first foreign shipment of uranium was delivered to Iran. The uranium was enriched within limits set by the NPT but raised international suspicion. Russia also provided critical support, in signing a deal to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear plant that was half-built and abandoned by a German company following the revolution.
A report made public in 2002 revealed the existence of two undisclosed nuclear facilities under construction in Iran. The IAEA immediately sought to investigate, concluding in late 2003 that Iran had shown a “pattern of concealment” in its many breaches of NPT protocols. Shortly after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) sought to open diplomatic channels with Iran to once again discuss its nuclear program. The talks resulted in Iran signing the Additional Protocol, which outlined certain IAEA provisions and safeguards. In return, Iran would receive modern technology and have their nuclear rights under the NPT recognized. Iran reneged on their agreement to allow IAEA inspection, however, announcing the first successful enrichment of uranium in 2006. In response, the IAEA voted to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Security Council then approved UNSC Resolution 1696, calling for the end of Iran’s enrichment program. Iran refused the legally binding mandate, resulting in the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1737, which hit Iran with sanctions for its non-compliance.
The Security Council’s sanctions, expanded in 2008 and 2010 due to the discovery of yet another clandestine nuclear facility, dealt severe blows to Iran’s economy. The election of the relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani in June of 2013, and the mounting internal pressures created by international sanctions, finally brought Iran back to the negotiating table. Talks between Iran and the United States, Great Britain, China, Germany, France, and Russia (known as the P5+1) began in 2011, with all members of the P5+1 viewing a nuclear-capable Iran as a threat to regional and global security.
In late 2013, President Barack Obama contacted President Rouhani. This marked the highest level of contact between the two nations in decades. At negotiations in Geneva, the P5+1 and Iran announced the JCPOA, complete with a detailed framework and implementation phase. After years of negotiations, and nearly two more years of implementation and adoption, the JCPOA went into effect on January 16, 2016.
The JCPOA was a landmark accord that imposed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. The deal mandated that Iran abandon weapons development, cap uranium enrichment well below weapons-grade levels, and allow the IAEA “unfettered” access to all nuclear sites. However, the Iran Nuclear Deal, as it came to be known in the media, was extremely divisive in the United States. Many lawmakers were distrustful of Iran and their alleged commitment to the deal. Congressional Republicans pointed towards the JCPOA’s “sunset clauses” that ended some of the mandatory compliance measures, and the deal’s failure to address Iran’s support for regional terrorist groups as glaring security risks.
The IAEA confirmed Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA up to 2019. Even before taking office, President Donald Trump was a vocal critic of the deal, calling it one of the “worst deals in U.S. history. In 2018, President Trump unilaterally pulled the United States out of the JCPOA, citing the deal’s blatant failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, the regime’s funding of terrorist groups, and the obvious security risks posed by the sunset clause.
Tensions escalated quickly as the Trump administration enacted a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. Economic sanctions were quickly reimposed, and the administration went as far as designating Iran’s national military as a foreign terrorist organization. After a drone strike authorized by President Trump killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Iran announced they would no longer follow JCPOA guidelines.
Trump would leave office in 2021 without having reestablished nuclear talks. The Biden administration, to signal an openness to rejoining the JCPOA, repealed several Trump-era sanctions. Despite President Biden’s eagerness to make a deal, Iran’s increased and secretive nuclear activity, and the election of conservative President Ebrahim Raisi, stalled negotiations.
Upon his return to the White House, President Trump sent Ayatollah Khamenei a letter seeking to resume talks. Iran’s Supreme Leader initially rejected the offer, condemning America’s desire for dominance. However, Trump’s Special Envoy, Steve Witkoff announced Iran’s openness to begin talks just weeks later.
The first round of negotiations between the United States and Iran was held in Oman in early April. The two sides described the meeting as constructive, but no breakthroughs were made. While Iran is seeking to keep the talks strictly nuclear in scope, the Trump administration wants to address broader issues such as regional security. As the second round of talks is set to take place soon in Rome, both sides remain rhetorically far apart and seemingly unwilling to compromise.
What has changed profoundly in this round of nuclear negotiations is the war between Israel and Iranian terrorist proxies instigated by the October 7th attacks in 2023. That conflict has resulted in the widespread destruction of Iran’s “axis of resistance” (especially Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah). The regional instability has thus resulted in the first direct military attacks between Israel and Iran, and the destruction of several critical air defenses protecting Iran’s nuclear facilities. With Israel reportedly eager to eradicate Iran’s nuclear program by any means, including robust military action, the Trump administration has decidedly much more leverage in try to convince Tehran to step back. Whether Iran agrees may well determine if the Middle East is soon engulfed in an ever wider and more destructive war.
Caleb Mann is an intern at CSPC and junior at Virginia Tech majoring in History with a minor in Political Science.
Africa Hangs in the Balance in U.S. Trade Wars
By Bridget Peach
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivers opening remarks at the 2012 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Forum to mark Global Economic Statecraft Day at the U.S. Department if State in Washington, D.C. on June 14, 2012. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]
Last week’s House Ways and Means Committee hearing with U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer revealed that even amidst the confusion surrounding the Trump administration’s trade policy, bipartisan support remains for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Chairman Jason Smith, R-MO, and Rep. Gwen Moore, D-WI, both voiced continued support for AGOA, and urged that trade preferences with Africa be continued in part because of their importance to national security. In this emerging era of “America First” foreign policy and the reshoring of manufacturing jobs into the United States, however, the future of tariff exceptions for 32 countries in Africa remains very much in doubt.
President Bill Clinton originally signed AGOA into law back on May 18, 2000, just five years after the world transitioned from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO). During the transition, the United States sought to establish more normal trade relations with Africa after a long history of emergency relief-based relationships. Seventy-six cosponsors introduced the measure as a part of the larger Trade and Development Act of 2000. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, “AGOA provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products, in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are eligible for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences program.” Eligibility requires African countries to comply with human rights and development standards set by the United States, while also embracing market-based economies. Of the 49 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, 32 currently qualify for AGOA’s duty-free access to the U.S. market. The 15 African nations that do not qualify face issues ranging from political violence to human rights abuses.
Congressional support for AGOA stems primarily from two interests, both rooted in building more stable and mutually beneficial relations with African countries: developing more sustainable economies and lifting more people out of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, and combatting Chinese and Russian influence throughout the region. The act was thus designed to boost trade and open markets. In the first eight years of the act, for instance, African exports to the United States skyrocketed to $86.1 billion, and it is credited with creating 300,000 jobs across the sub-Saharan region. According to Rosa Whitaker, the first U.S. Assistant Trade Representative for Africa who helped initiate AGOA, the act has is also very cost-effective for the United States. By solidifying U.S.-African economic relations, the act has helped stem concerted Chinese and Russian attempts to spread their influence on the African continent to the detriment of U.S. national security.
AGOA has faced a variety of criticisms, however, relating to its rules of eligibility and impact on domestic suppliers. In 2015, the Obama administration removed Swaziland from the list of eligible countries covered by the act, for instance, citing a lack of workers’ rights and suppression of peaceful protests in the country. The Biden administration removed Ethiopia, Uganda, Niger, and Gabon from exporting through AGOA. In both cases critics noted that the exclusions punished African workers far more than targeted governments. The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA), a lobbying organization consisting of U.S.-based producers and workers, also opposes AGOA based on the argument that it undermines domestic suppliers.
Currently the African Growth and Opportunity Act is set to expire in September of this year, and its future remains clouded. On what he called “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump enacted sweeping reciprocal tariffs on AGOA countries, targeting some of the primary industries that sustain sub-Saharan economies and calling into question the fundamental tenets of the act.
In July, the next AGOA Forum is set to take place in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of Africa’s more developed cities that many see as a bellwether for the continent’s continued development and future. Unless a reauthorization of AGOA occurs before July, the forum may be one of the last opportunities to bring attention to the importance of the act and the urgency of its renewal. If Congress were to abandon AGOA, Beijing is surely waiting in the wings to fill the economic vacuum, having already strengthened its trade ties and strategic position in Africa.
Bridget Peach is an intern at CSPC and junior at the University of Georgia majoring in International Affairs and Russian.
CSPC In the news
SCIFs can’t protect national security from unauthorized wireless devices
By andy Keiser
Originally published in the Washington Examiner on April 8, 2025:
The recent unauthorized disclosure of military operations from a private group chat has reinforced the argument that such discussions should only occur within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. And while that may be true, it raises a critical question: how secure are SCIFs, really?
Like the one I worked at in the House Intelligence Committee, many government facilities, including SCIFs and Special Access Program Facilities, have “No Electronic Device” policies and signs to protect the nation’s secrets.
The policy exists because electronic devices such as smartphones, smartwatches, laptops, tablets, headsets, and other devices can be used to exfiltrate voice, photos, video, and data to unsecured areas, including possible adversaries.
However, there is no technical monitoring for the presence of unauthorized electronic devices in more than 90% of the federal facilities where electronic devices are not allowed, and the policy requiring such monitoring is not funded and, therefore, ineffective. This means that only a small fraction of American government SCIFs and SAPFs currently have Wireless Intrusion Detection systems deployed. In those rare areas where monitoring for electronic devices is in place, and even when the employees know that monitoring is happening, thousands of electronic devices are interdicted every year using WIDS systems. Read the full article here.
Latest CSPC Report
Integrated Deterrence in a Time of Upheaval
Spring 2025
The Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) is pleased to release its latest report “Integrated Deterrence in a Time of Upheaval”.
The United States finds itself in a new and challenging geopolitical norm—Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has seen conflict return to the European continent; the People’s Republic of China continues to desire the recapture of Taiwan; additional tensions with Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the partnerships between all of these countries are introducing new complications to long-held and long-understood strategic dynamics, most notably deterrence.
Over the last nine months, working with the British Embassy Washington, British Defence Staff, and UK Strategic Command, the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress convened a robust and diverse group of experts from government, military, intelligence community, and academic, and key diplomatic partners to discuss how the changing geopolitical landscape and technological environment is transforming aspects of deterrence, yet fundamental commonalities with past experiences remain.
This report captures the high-level thematic elements of what is a lively and active discussion on what deterrence means in the light of new actors, new alignments amongst existing actors, and new technologies.
To read the full report, click here.
