Friday News Roundup - October 20, 2023

217. For House Republicans, the question remains: who can reach that number? This week we have seen no clear answer as Reps. Steve Scalise (R-LA) and Jim Jordan (R-OH) have both been nominated by the House Republican Conference, but Scalise dropped out and Jordan has come up short in two votes. A plan to empower Speaker Pro Tempore Patrick McHenry (R-NC) was promptly torpedoed in what was reportedly an acrimonious caucus meeting. Meanwhile the House remained frozen as President Biden addressed the nation last night, following his visit to the Middle East war zone and meeting with Israeli leaders. In his address he discussed the dangers to democracies and the importance of standing with Israel and Ukraine. Senate leaders are moving on a package to assist Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan, along with additional funds for the southern border. Responding to these geopolitical crises will first require Republicans to solve the political crisis of their own making.

In geotech developments this week, the Biden administration announced expanded restrictions on the export of AI chips to China, and China has responded with export restrictions on forms of graphite used in batteries—especially electric vehicles. China also feted international leaders at its Belt and Road Initiative Forum, with Vladmir Putin and Hungary’s Viktor Orban among those in attendance. 

This week CSPC Mike Rogers Center Director Joshua Huminski wrote for the UK Council on Geostrategy on how support for Ukraine can be maintained.

CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield appeared on the National Public Radio 1A Program for its  Friday News Roundup this week to discuss President Biden’s historic trip to Israel in a time of war, the meeting this week between Chinese and Russian leaders, and Ukraine’s first use of newly delivered US ATACMS long range missiles, and much more. 

In this week’s roundup, Ethan Brown evaluates the AUMF proposals coming as tensions increase in the Middle East. Kory Yueh appraises the three fronts on which the United States faces growing threats. Rob Gerber looks at how climate finance fits in with decarbonization goals. Veera Parker examines the death of two Swedish nationals in a terrorist attack in Brussels.

Israel’s crisis and American War Powers: A new American AUMF is not a panacea for Middle East strife

Ethan Brown

It has taken far too many years, and too many motions in the halls of the American congress to finally repeal the 2002 Iraq Authorization for the Use of Military Force, a national security tool which four American presidents have abused over the duration of the Global War on Terror (more on that shortly).

In response to the unfolding and compounding crisis in Israel, congressional lawmakers have already leaned forward in drafting a new AUMF, specifically for the purpose of targeting Iranian proxies emanating from Lebanon (Hezbollah), who have taken advantage of Israel’s current predicament after the sudden Hamas attack last week. The bill’s author, Representative Mike McCaul (R-TX), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, justified the pre-emptive legislation in order to deter escalation of Iranian proxies, telling Defense News that “it’s something we have to prepare for if Hezbollah does get involved, the (Biden) administration does not have authorization to hit any Iranian proxies. So, whether it is Hezbollah, Hamas, these military Shi’a proxies in Iraq -- they don’t have authorization under U.S. law to attack.”

There are multiple perspectives to consider here, but all portend increased risk, not to mention the inevitable abuse of executive power that is likely to come with such a move. First, the bill is not yet under consideration for a floor vote, nor is it even likely to appear in committee deliberations, Rep. McCaul has merely begun drafting the bill; a political “break glass in case of…” scenario. It offers some use in demonstrating American resolve to support Israel and ensure that Iran does not seize upon the lucrative opportunity presented by the crisis. Tehran is invariably not above upending Middle Eastern stability to advance their own regional hegemonic ambitions, and any opportunity to cause Israel harm fits within their strategic calculus. For political showmanship, it serves a purpose. To a certain extent, moving the 6th Fleet’s Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group to the Eastern Mediterranean provides little in the way of demonstrative power if those warships and air power capabilities provide little tooth in addition to the bark.

But the greater issue lies not in the demonstrative and political showmaking, but in the potential abuses of power such a bill provides to the American executive. This isn’t intended to be a sensationalist rhetorical statement, but the concern resides in the precedent already established by previous AUMFs whose initial scope was indeed narrow, but with plenty of vague and open-ended terminology allowing for the continual expansion of executive powers for war-making uses.

Under President Obama, the threat of the Islamic State was readily employed to justify a quick expansion to the codified deterrence concept of the 2001 AUMF, this coming after the limits of that original authorization had been used to justify his covert drone war in Pakistan in the preceding seven years. The Trump administrations most notable use of the AUMF authorization was the airstrike on Iranian General Qassim Souleimani in January 2020, based on the assertion that the Iranian Qods leader presented a direct and imminent threat to US forces in Iraq at the time of the strike. While Soleimani was both a monster, a murderer, and easily one of the most evil creatures to walk across the Levant during his life, there was never any legally established precedent or mandate that authorized the Trump presidency to target and then kill him (self-defense doesn’t hold up as a counterpoint here; he would have had to literally been executing an attack or lethal act against US forces before self-defense would apply). And for the Biden administration, while it has voiced support for the repeal of the 2001 AUMF, it has made no bones about abusing its expansive powers just as the preceding presidencies have done, and did so against Iranian proxies to boot.

So long as even tangential assimilation to the original mandate could be achieved, the AUMF has been stretched to support an expanded war powers act to be used by the executive branch. Congress has been allowing this abuse of powers to continue for nigh on twenty years now, and had begun the positive shift towards regaining its most solemn of duties: declaring and sustaining legitimate wars against aggression.

So the point here is, while the overt gesturing of a GOP lawmaker drafting a AUMF to target Iranian forces may be little more than showmanship so as to genuinely deter Iran in this ongoing crisis, any actual substantive efforts to implement a Iran-focused AUMF is all but certain to expand the risks and conflict in the Middle East, rather than deter it. With a Biden administration which as already used the sweeping lack of clarity from a twenty-year old precedent to target the vague and obscure Iranian (or al-Qaida/Taliban/Al Shabaab/AQAR/AQIS/AQIS/AQIM and “other non-state associated forces”) boogeymen in boundaryless hinterlands, how wide would the net be cast when the executive now has a congressional hall-pass to target anything it can remotely ascribe as Iranian proxies? While Hamas is distinct in the complex Middle Easter power dynamic, and credibly is acting on its own accord which is how Israel was caught off guard by the mass attack last week, targeting Iranian proxies who are not directly connected to this newest conflict in Gaza is not deterrence, it’s escalation, one which is apparently already on the table of options being discussed by the Biden White House, before any AUMF exists.

If the US congress is salivating over starting a new war in the Middle East (since our last foray there was so successful), penning and passing a new AUMF for the vague and limitless concept of “proxies” would be a fine place to start.

America and its Cerberus: A Crisis on Three Fronts

By Kory Yueh

In the Greek mythos, Cerberus is the monstrous, three-headed dog that guards the gates of Hades itself. With lashing teeth and a rageful temper, his fury was found fit to be the spirit that would prevent souls from exiting–much less entering. But for Hercules, overcoming Cerberus and his three heads was to be his twelfth labor. Despite his formidable strength, Hercules had to be cautious because of a caveat which forbade him from using his weapons, and to capture Cerberus alive. The warrior pressed onward, knowing that his strategy to overcome Cerberus would require more than just brawn and power alone. 

Beyond the pages of mythology, this analogy has now taken root in the United States confronting its own version of Cerberus and his three heads: the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan with a looming China, Ukraine with its persistent defense against an aggressive Russian invasion, and most recently, a geopolitical crisis in the Middle East with infuriated allies and atrocities across Israel and Gaza. But similar to Hercules, despite all of its weapons and power, this multifaceted Cerberus cannot be resolved with brute force alone. In fact, right as President Biden was departing Washington D.C. to Israel, Jordan officials canceled the highly anticipated summit between Arab allies and President Biden in response to a bombed hospital in Gaza. If anything, American support of Israel in its attack on Gaza has only heightened tensions in the region, most notably Iran. The deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups to deter Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah is yet another indication of the glass dome surrounding the Middle East, merely waiting to shatter. The humanitarian crisis, involving millions of Palestinian refugees, was also another prominent issue which has caused the international Muslim community to condemn the United States and Israel.

This escalation in international tension reflects a sense of urgency in the Biden administration as analysts rightfully interpret this to be the opening of a third front. At the time of this writing, President Biden is expected to request $100 billion to reinforce Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel. Alas, Republican legislators have been criticizing the Biden administration for continued Ukraine aid. The Republican Party’s inner turmoil—especially with regards to its Speaker situation—was more nuanced than stopping aid for fiscal reasons. Rep. John Curtis (R-Ut.) questioned the Biden administration on its goals for Ukraine aid, saying “I support continued funding for [Ukraine’s] efforts, but these are basic questions any organization would ask [...] To continue spending Utahn taxpayer dollars, Congress must receive assurances to these questions.” These sentiments were shared by other Republicans who collectively agree that the government remains indecisive on what warrants an end to U.S. investment in Ukraine. 

Still, the Biden administration remains tattered on both sides of the aisle with regards to its foreign policy decisions. In recent days, Democrat lawmakers have also vocalized their opposition for U.S. support to Israel. Rep. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) submitted a resolution demanding the administration to call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza in lieu of the humanitarian crisis unfolding. The growing complexity of the crisis in Israel and Gaza has only added to the monumental list of trials that the Biden administration must act upon with urgency in the coming weeks. The isolationist factions of the Republican Party and the restraining forces of the Democrats have combined to be a noticeably difficult obstacle course for the administration to navigate. In what should be a time of unity, the United States continues to be viciously divided, and its delayed humanitarian response to the Gaza Strip has only opened it to stronger criticism from allies and enemies alike. 

While the United States struggles to support its allies, the Russian and Chinese have only continued to enhance their relations in Beijing on Wednesday. The international summit, gathering leaders of the Global South who benefited from China’s Belt & Road Initiative, was not insulated from discussing the Middle East situation. President Putin remarked, “We discussed in detail the situation in the Middle East. I informed Chairman Xi about the situation that is developing in Ukraine [...] All these external factors [have] common threats, and they strengthen Russian-Chinese interaction.” In this gathering, it is easy to assume that their stronger cooperation will capitalize on America’s distraction with the Middle East, a crisis which has only thinned out America’s resources and weakened its foreign policy position.  In this ploy, it is worth noting that Russia, in its isolation, has been proactively building security cooperation with many countries traditionally hostile to the United States: Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, Iran, and now more explicitly, China. This “axis of the sanctioned” illustrates an increasingly divided international order which will force the United States to rely more heavily on its allies to oppose them. It is also a deeper reflection of a world where a coalition to oppose the United States will only gather more momentum, cultivating a future international arena that will amplify pressure on American foreign policy.

Beyond the Middle East and Ukraine which are developing issues, China has continued to expand its operations within the South China Sea in its efforts to strongarm its neighbors. In recent months, the Chinese military has only escalated in its efforts to secure control over disputed waters, leading to heightened tensions with the likes of Vietnam and the Philippines. The Pentagon has even released footage of Chinese interceptions of U.S. aircraft in the past two years, referring to these increasing interactions as a display of what experts have labeled “concerning, risky, and aggressive.” Although the Chinese government has yet to condemn Hamas explicitly over the recent crisis in the Middle East, it is to be expected that President Xi will take this opportunity to test American commitments to the Indo-Pacific. 

 If one were to refer back to the story of Hercules in his twelfth labor, one would recall that the demigod was ultimately able to restrain Cerberus after a difficult struggle, incapacitating his three heads in a fearsome battle and wrestling him to be shown to the man who instructed Cerberus to be seized. Before the crisis in Gaza, the United States was still facing a complex geopolitical dilemma in Russia and Ukraine. Now that the incident has spiraled, the United States continues to apply pressure on the gaping wound, and the haste of the administration’s decisive motion for a $100 billion aid package to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, demonstrates that this segment of world history is not to be taken lightly. If there were any nation in the world that could feasibly attempt to overcome three heads, it would be the United States—but even then, with all of its resources and allies, the Biden administration has a responsibility to navigate the coming battles with tact, decisiveness, and pragmatism. Any action short of these qualities would cost the United States dearly, and the outcomes in which the United States fails in any of these three theaters would be of severe detriment to the U.S. position within the global order for years to come. 

This trial that the United States faces carries the same lessons as the mythos of Hercules. It is not about one’s arsenal of weaponry—it is about one’s ability to react strategically, methodically, and decisively. The onus is upon the Biden administration to do so diligently without escalating tensions to that of a third world war.

Reaching Climate Goals is All About the Money – Or Is It?

Robert W. Gerber, CSPC Senior Fellow

Photo: Vatnajökull, Iceland (Author)

The 28th session of the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC - COP28) begins November 30 in Abu Dhabi. In addition to a “global stocktaking” exercise of where things stand on global greenhouse gas reductions and a warming planet, the agenda will put heavy focus on “climate finance” issues, i.e., the need to mobilize funding for green energy transition, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and adaptation to the realities of climate change. The problem is that much of the discussion will surround how to increase the flow of money from developed countries to developing countries.

Since its inception the United Nations has divided itself between two artificial groups of developed and developing countries (known as the G77). There is a long tradition of the latter group – which includes the Gulf States, Singapore, and occasionally China – appealing for increased aid flows and technology transfer from non-G77 countries. The  UNFCCC is the latest stage for this type of demand based on the argument that developing countries did not cause the climate crisis yet bear the costs of its impact. There will be a lot of debate at COP28 about achieving a global commitment of $100 billion for climate finance as well as the concept of “loss and damage” - which is akin to a compensation account for countries disproportionately impacted by climate change. We will undoubtedly see the PRC take an active role on the side of developing countries, capitalizing on the opportunity to drive a wedge between the so-called developed countries and the “Global South.”

We need to look at this debate through a lens of realism. First, the $100 billion is meant to encompass a mobilization of all financing, including private sector financing. Second, a focus on transfer of dollars or euros or pounds to the global south is a foil that creates space for inaction on the behalf of developing and middle income country governments. Third, there is growing demand for electricity worldwide; new power generation and transmission infrastructure need to come on line. It is better to build sustainable or renewable systems, rather than via new fossil fuels including coal. But countries like China are continuing to build coal fired power plants and plan to do so well into the future. In other words, it is not simply a question of money, but political will and choices.

There are a number of existing global climate finance mechanisms including the UN’s Green Climate Fund and the World Bank’s Clean Technology Funds that can be made more accessible. Furthermore, in many developing countries there is money available – it’s just not being mobilized because of political risk or regulatory barriers. (Note: The World Bank and the U.S. government have active financing instruments that address political risk.)  Innovative finance mechanisms including green bonds, carbon credits, and carbon markets should be developed and deployed. These are, in the words of a White House official, “the single biggest missing ingredient” in helping countries meet climate goals. Developing countries could also make significant improvements in their emissions by adopting industry and vehicle air quality standards like low sulfur diesel and catalytic converters, which we take for granted in the United States and Europe.

Countries need to look at green energy investment in terms of its return on investment: e.g. its impact on the health of populations, energy security, jobs, and innovation.  The United States has taken significant steps toward a greener energy/lower emission future via the tax credits embedded in the so-called Inflation Reduction Act. The Act has sparked a surge in investments in battery factories, hydrogen, and solar production in the United States. In fact, other governments have criticized the Act for its success in attracting foreign investment. The fact is that the United States could go to zero-carbon footprint and the world would still not meet its climate goals because of lack of progress in the PRC, India, and other large emitters. Sadly, we will hear more diplomats at COP28 talk about the $100 billion and how to transfer more funds to the Global South rather than how they plan to invest in their own green energy/low emissions future.

Terrorist attack against Swedes in Brussels

Veera Parko

On Monday October 16, a gunman attacked and shot dead two Swedish citizens and injured a third in Belgium’s capital Brussels. The victims were on their way to a football match between Swedish and Belgian national teams, and at least one of the victims was wearing a fan jersey in the colors of the Swedish flag. The gunman – a Tunisian national who was in Belgium illegally - was killed by Belgian police on Tuesday. Authorities believe that the attacker was inspired by the Islamic State (IS) to commit the killings, and had spent time in Sweden. After the incident, a statement by a person claiming to be the assailant was posted on social media, mentioning the victims’ Swedish nationality as a motive for the attack. Belgium’s terror threat level was raised to the highest level on Monday, and residents were advised to work from home and to exercise caution.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Belgian authorities have been accused of intelligence shortcomings and a failure to return the attacker to his home country after his application for asylum was denied in 2020. For many, the incident brought back memories of the horrific terrorist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 and 2016, raising fears that Europe might be on the verge of experiencing another surge of terrorist violence.

As for NATO invitee Sweden, the country raised its official terror threat level this summer, after a series of Quran burning protests and an online disinformation campaign accusing Swedish social services of kidnapping Muslim children. While the Brussels attack’s direct links to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain unclear, Swedish officials and politicians have repeatedly warned of a targeted threat against Sweden or its citizens by terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Quada. Many European countries are now concerned over a potential uptick in extremist violence in Europe – for Sweden, tragically, fears of threats turning into real-life attacks were realized on Monday.

News You May Have Missed

Day 600: Russian Invasion Wanes in Strength Against Strategic Ukrainian City in the East. 

Kory Yueh

Above: A bombed out, abandoned apartment in Ukraine.

As the world pivots to focus its attention on the Gaza Strip and Israel, the war in Ukraine continues. A days-long effort by Russian forces to storm the strategic city of Adviivka has begun showing signs of faltering, according to Kyiv officials on Monday. In the 24 hours leading up to the announcement, Ukrainian forces had repelled 15 attacks from four directions across the city, a substantial reduction from the 60 attacks per day that the Russians had been launching the previous week. This reduction of pressure suggests that Russian momentum has begun to grind to a halt, offering the Ukrainians some respite across their frontlines. The Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, suggested that this new stage of Russia's campaign was necessary in lieu of incoming winter conditions which would heavily restrict military activity on both sides. Despite fierce Ukrainian resistance, the question of how long they can fight is a persistent one. On Sunday, the U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that the Biden Administration would consult Congress for a combined aid package for Israel and Ukraine that is worth more than $2 billion. It remains to be seen how this aid package would be received in the divided and paralyzed House which, at the time of this writing, lacks a Speaker. 

Don’t Mess with the Mama Bear — Grazer Wins Popular Fat Bear Contest in Alaska National Park

Kory Yueh

Above: A brown bear angling for salmon in Alaska. 

Beyond the chaotic maelstrom of international relations, a bear of titanic proportions has won a landslide popularity contest in Alaska’s Katmai National Park and Reserve. This annual contest drew more than 1.3 million votes from across the country and the world, celebrating the presence of brown bears that now live within the Alaskan Peninsula. Consuming exorbitant amounts of salmon to pack up pounds for the upcoming winter, these fur-ious bears have also developed strong impressions on their spectating audiences. Grazer, the winner in question, was known by park officials as “one of the best anglers” in the preserve. With an established reputation as well, she raised two successful litters of cubs to repopulate the reserve. Fortunately, because of the government shutdown’s postponement via a CR bill, park officials were able to count the number of votes for this year’s contest. Had the government shut down, the intense anticipation for a winning bear would have certainly ended in an unbearably anticlimactic fashion.  

Kory Yueh is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.

South Korea targets firms building Taiwanese naval submarines in fear of Chinese retaliation

Julian Mancillas

On September 28th, 2023 Taiwan unveiled its first ever domestically built submarine marking a significant increase in the self-governed island democracy’s military capabilities in the face of growing tensions with Beijing. The submarine, called the Haikun is capable of carrying U.S. made MK48 torpedoes, which according to former U.S. Navy submarine commander Tom Shugart means the Haikun “can strike with very little warning, and they're deliberately designed to break ships in half." However, this improvement to Taiwan’s arsenal has raised some concerns in the South Korean government which charged multiple Korean marine technology firms such as SI Innotec, Keumha Naval Technology (KHNT), and S2&K for violating trade laws by assisting in the development of the Taiwanese submarine program. South Korean authorities fear that Korean companies providing military exports and technological assistance to Taiwan could invite Chinese economic retaliation. Such fear is not unwarranted as China has taken similar measures before in 2017 after the installation of the U.S. THAAD missile system in South Korea. As a result at least one of the South Korean technology firms, SI Innotec has been accused of violating South Korea’s Foreign Trade Act which requires the approval of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) to transfer strategic goods abroad for “military use”. In the future it will be interesting to see how South Korea attempts to maintain economic relations with Beijing while continuing to secretly provide support to Taiwan.

Philippines' demands China cease offensive actions in the South China Sea

Julian Mancillas

On October 16th, 2023 the Philippines demanded that China stop “dangerous and offensive” actions in the South China Sea citing an incident last week when a Chinese naval vessel shadowed and attempted to cut off a Filipino navy ship from resupplying at the Thitu island outpost. According to Philippines armed forces chief Romeo Brawner, the Chinese vessel came within 350 yards of the Filipino ship as it approached Thitu island which is considered the most strategically important base that the Philippines has in the South China Sea. For its part China claims sovereignty over Thitu island which it calls Zhongye island and defends its navy’s actions. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning even stated at a press conference that the Philippines occupation of the island was illegal and that “It is reasonable and lawful for Chinese warships to patrol the waters near Zhongye Island.” The number of similar incidents and maritime disputes in the region has grown at a rapid rate in recent years as China works to militarize islands in the area and enforce their claim of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. With the new Filipino government under President Ferdinand Marcos seeking closer ties to the United States it is unlikely that ties between Beijing and Manila will improve in the short term.

Julian Mancillas is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.

The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.