Friday News Roundup — May 13, 2022
Welcome to this week’s Friday the 13th weekly news roundup. There is much to be discussed this week, ranging from bombshell news that five leading Republican House lawmakers were subpoenaed to appear before the January 6 Committee to rising market and economic turmoil. As part of its ongoing investigation into the events of the insurrection, the House January 6 Committee subpoenaed House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy; House Judiciary Ranking Member Jim Jordan; and Representatives Mo Brooks, Andy Biggs, and Scott Perry. By moving forward in its investigation in this way, the Committee has forced House Republican leadership to wrestle with what precedent they seek to set for the next Congress, especially if Republicans regain control of the chamber. Given Republican promises to open a slew of special investigations into Hunter Biden and other issues of particular interest to the party, how they react to the January 6 Committee subpoenas could have a significant influence on their own potential future investigations.
As the news of the delivery of subpoenas to leading Republicans roiled Washington, it is the economy that matters in the midterms. Disruptions related to baby formula shortages and ongoing challenges with inflation made news around the country. After the recall of baby formula produced in a Michigan plant operated by Abbott Laboratories began to exacerbate formula supply chain challenges, shortages began to crop up this week across the United States. A mass sell-off of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin this week as well as the Federal Reserve’s—led by a newly reconfirmed and now hawkish Jerome Powell—continuing struggle to rein in growing inflation has driven speculation of deeper economic instability and worsening sentiments. Policymakers in the White House and Congress have begun to realize the optics of these challenges, which become all the more urgent in the lead-up to November.
On Saturday, the Diplomatic Courier published Joshua C. Huminski’s (the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs) review of Gideon Rachman’s “The Age of the Strongman”. The FT’s global affairs columnist reflected on the new era of authoritarianism sweeping the world, exploring the rise of these behaviors in places as diverse as Great Britain, Russia, the Philippines, India, and more. It would have been even better had Rachman sat with the conditions that led to the rise of the strongmen, but it is a welcome read nonetheless.
In The Hill, Ethan writes about how aid to Ukraine, while needed, is no substitute for a larger grand strategy for Russia and U.S. and European interests.
Today, CSPC hosted The Wall Street Journal’s Erich Schwartzel to discuss his new book “Red Carpet: Hollywood, China & the Global Battle for Cultural Supremacy”. The video for this discussion will be live on CSPC’s YouTube page next week, but you can read Joshua C. Huminski’s Diplomatic Courier review, here.
The video of last week’s discussion between Huminski and Dr. Jade McGlynn and Dr. Ben Noble on Russia’s politics, propaganda, and memory is now live.
In this week’s roundup, Veera discusses Finland and Sweden’s monumental steps taken together to join the NATO alliance. Wes examines how Russia commemorated Victory Day on May 9, and what clues, if any, can be discerned on the future course of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dan writes about how China continues to adapt to Russia’s invasion and the lessons it has drawn from it thus far. Ethan analyzes the United States Marine Corps’ 2030 force design. Finally, Hidetoshi caps this week’s roundup with a discussion of Japan’s economic security laws in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Finland and Sweden´s historic step to NATO
Veera Parko
This week, history is in the making as Finland and Sweden finalize steps to join NATO. Finland will make the internal formal decision on Sunday at a meeting of the President and the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, followed by a parliamentary debate. Sweden will likely follow suit on Monday. On Friday, Sweden released a parliamentary report stating that the country´s NATO membership would “raise the threshold for military conflicts and thus have a deterrent effect in northern Europe.” Finland and Sweden will most likely officially communicate to NATO their willingness to join the Alliance sometime next week. They will probably do it in a coordinated way.
The shift from militarily non-aligned EU member states to prospective NATO members has been, frankly, momentous as well as unprecedented. It is fair to say that before Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, no one could have predicted Finland’s President and Prime Minister´s joint statement on May 12, concluding that “Finland must apply for NATO membership without delay.” However, it should be noted that at least for Finland, the option to join NATO has been under discussion ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
Over the years, the “NATO option” has given Finland leverage to position itself pragmatically between the West and its Eastern neighbor. Both Finland and Sweden’s close cooperation with the Alliance, strong bilateral ties to important allies such as the UK and the United States has ensured that the option to join NATO has been a credible one. It was Russia’s attack on Ukraine and a historic shift in public opinion (now over 70 per cent of Finns are for membership) that made that option a reality — very quickly.
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave Finland and Sweden´s NATO cooperation a clear boost, for example joint exercises and cooperation on hybrid threats, but it was the war in Ukraine that finally pushed the two Nordic neighbors over the edge. As Alexander Stubb, Finland’s former Prime Minister, put it in an op-ed on May 11: “The ninth enlargement of NATO since its foundation in 1949 will go down as Vladimir Putin’s enlargement. Without Russia’s attack on Ukraine it would not have happened.” Finnish President Sauli Niinistö also made it clear that it was Vladimir Putin’s Russia´s clear lack of respect for its neighbors´ right to make their own security decisions that made Finland reassess its foreign and security policy doctrine of non-alignment. “You caused this. Look in the mirror”, Niinistö said on May 11. This choice of words was something quite rare from a Finnish President — clearly, the time for extremely careful statements on Russia is over.
Not unexpectedly, the Russian Foreign Ministry said, in response to Helsinki´s May 12 announcement, that Finland´s accession to NATO would “pose a threat to Russia’s security” and that Finland would face “military-technical” and other consequences. Finland has stated, quite openly, that the country is prepared for Russia´s response, whichever form it would take — cyber or hybrid influencing or even military measures. Many European countries immediately expressed strong support for the bid. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on May 12 that Finland would be warmly welcomed into NATO, and the accession process would be “smooth and swift”.Nevertheless, national ratification processes will take their own time in NATO countries, including the United States. Maybe not that surprisingly, Turkey´s President Erdogan said on Friday that Turkey was “not favourable” to Finland and Sweden´s NATO membership — a sign that the need for diplomatic efforts will continue throughout the process.
NATO´s Article 5 security guarantees will not kick in until the two Nordic countries are full members. In the meantime, Finland and Sweden have sought security assurances during their time “in the grey zone” before full membership. Indeed, it seems Finland and Sweden will have interim security assurances from their Western allies. On May 10, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson traveled to Stockholm and Helsinki to sign bilateral political declarations on mutual security assurances. At the same time, Nordic defence ministers released a joint statement indicating further deepening their defence cooperation. And it should not be forgotten that the European Union has a mutual defense clause enshrined in its basic treaties.
It should be noted that as a NATO member, it is likely that Finland´s policy towards Russia will remain pragmatic. The 830 miles of border between the countries will not disappear. Indeed, President Niinistö indicated on Friday that he would call President Putin to “discuss the changed situation”. Finnish NATO membership was long in the making, but the fundamental change in European security landscape on February 24 made the decision possible, in record time. For Sweden, the change is an even more fundamental one — military non-alignment has long been an integral part of Swedish political identity.
In contrast to past decades, Finland and Sweden now see NATO as the best way to maximize their own security. In turn, the two countries would no doubt be net positive security providers for the Alliance. They are democratic, stable societies with longstanding international partnerships, considerable defense investments and capabilities, as well as robust preparedness systems and resilient citizens willing to defend their country. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the Alliance will gain more security for the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions. Let us hope that this historic week will also bring about even stronger transatlantic cooperation between the Nordic countries and the United States — certainly something to look forward to.
Victory Day Without Victory: Russia’s 2022 Victory Day Celebrations
Wesley Culp
As has become tradition in Russia during the Putin era, large celebrations and military parades were held across Russia on May 9. The holiday, referred to as Victory Day in the Russian-speaking world, commemorates the official surrender of the Nazi German government to the Allied powers in the Second World War.
Even as Russian troops in Ukraine have struggled to produce significant victories in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, this year’s Victory Day celebrations proceeded in a mostly routine way. External speculation that President Vladimir Putin or the Russian government were planning to use Victory Day to call for a general mobilization of the Russian economy and population to support the war effort or to declare victory in the invasion did not come to pass. By not speaking directly about mobilization, Putin left the door open for taking such a measure in the future if the Kremlin deems it appropriate.
President Putin’s address provided frustratingly elusive clues about how the Kremlin’s approach to the war in Ukraine may or may not evolve. The consistent theme of Putin’s speech was a repetition of the justification for Russia’s invasion. Lamenting that Russia’s supposedly earnest attempts to discuss “security guarantees” were rebuffed by Ukraine and the West, Putin reiterated his claim that Russia’s invasion was entirely justified and appropriate. In keeping with previous Kremlin messaging on the war, the Russian president attempted to draw clear parallels between Russian troops and Russian-backed separatist militias currently fighting in Ukraine with historical heroes of Russia who fought in and around Ukraine. These included figures such as the Red Army commander Nikolai Vatutin, who spearheaded Soviet war efforts in Ukraine during the Second World War, Aleksei Brusilov, who led some of the final operations of the Imperial Russian Army in Ukraine in the First World War, Pyotr Rumyantsev, who governed what is now Ukraine under Catherine the Great, and even Kievan Rus’ leaders such as Sviatoslav or Vladimir Monomakh, among others. Putin even went as far as to claim without basis that American veterans of the Second World War had supposedly been prevented from participating in Russia’s Victory Day celebrations.
Moscow’s Victory Day parade proceeded much as it did in previous years. This year’s parade featured 11,000 personnel and 131 pieces of military equipment, a small decrease from last year’s numbers. However, the planned flyover of military aircraft was canceled last minute on the grounds of bad weather conditions, which would have included 62 military aircraft and 15 helicopters. As in previous years, similar military parades were held all across Russia, from Murmansk in the Arctic, the city of Saratov on the Volga River, to the city of Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East. However, certain military equipment currently in use in Ukraine was notably missing from local parades compared to celebrations in previous years.
Russia’s interpretation of Victory Day was also used as a tool to demonstrate the control of Russian occupation authorities in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine under Moscow’s control. In the larger cities of southern Ukraine under Russian control such as Kherson, Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, Russian-installed occupation authorities organized processions on the holiday, including “Immortal Regiment” commemorations. “Immortal Regiment” processions are structured around individuals carrying pictures of relatives who fought for the Soviets in the Second World War and are one of the most distinctive elements of how the war is commemorated in Russia and in other Russian-speaking populations. Russia’s ruling “United Russia” party further claimed that this year’s commemoration of Victory Day was the first time in years that the holiday had been allowed to be celebrated in cities like Mariupol, despite the fact that commemorations were organized by local Ukrainian authorities as recently as last year.
The organization of events surrounding the commemoration of Victory Day in Ukraine is particularly notable as “military-civilian administrations” set up in occupied cities of Ukraine such as Kherson have reportedly begun to take steps to facilitate their annexation into Russia. Given the central importance of Second World War memory in the national mythos of Putin-era Russia, attempts to use the holiday as a means to help integrate the parts of Ukraine already under Russian control must include the use of war memory. President Putin’s redoubling of justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and identification of the war with previous historical feats practically guarantees that Russia’s leadership is fully invested in achieving a favorable outcome in the conflict, despite setbacks.
As noted by U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines in hertestimony before the Senate Armed Services committee, Russia’s leadership likely intends to deepen its offensive in Ukraine in the coming months. Russia’s May 9 Victory Day commemorations were a key element of Moscow’s attempts to dig in for a longer-term conflict, which the Kremlin continues to think is both justified and of critical importance.
China’s Post-Ukraine Pathway
Dan Mahaffee
Russia’s failures in Ukraine have come at an inauspicious time for Beijing. Putin may have delayed the invasion of Ukraine so that it would come after the Beijing Winter Olympics, and the Xi-Putin “no-limits friendship” remains a solid axis of autocracy. Xi Jinping’s continued grip on the reins of power is, in many ways, designed to emulate the autocracy that Putin created — and one empowered with the advanced technology and brute force of the Chinese security state. Still, Russia’s stalled campaign — coming at the same time as Xi has doubled down on highly-disruptive zero-covid lockdowns — adds to the sense of discontent within China at a time when Xi hoped for a smooth path to his unprecedented third term. While it’s wishful thinking to imagine a sudden shift in China’s policies — or even Xi leaving power — it is increasingly clear that China finds itself at a crossroads in the relationship with the west.
First, it is important to consider how China is learning lessons from Russia’s experience in Ukraine. China has long studied Russia, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union, to guide its own political decision-making and keep the CCP in power. Furthermore, the long-time similarity in defense doctrine and kit made the Red Army a natural partner and real-world analogue for some of the PLA. In the strictly military sense, David Finkelstein from CNA has provided an excellent breakdown in his piece “Beijing’s Ukrainian Battle Lab” of the various aspects, but one that I think is worth noting is the emphasis on sustainment and surprise. Like many analysts, the Chinese are likely taken aback at the trouble that Russia is having sustaining operations near its border, but it will also likely note how existing NATO infrastructure has made it easier for the west to support Ukraine. While the United States does have existing Indo-Pacific basing and infrastructure, transpacific sustainment of forces for any prolonged time will be a major logistical challenge — one that we are ill-equipped to sustain.
The element of surprise, as Finkelstein and others note, is vital to Chinese military strategy. Russia’s invasion was long telegraphed by western intelligence and their own protracted build up. Realizing this, a conflict over Taiwan might not have such a long lead-time like we saw with Ukraine. At the intersection of logistics and surprise, it is therefore unsurprising that we now see Chinese ballistic missile forces practicing precision ballistic missile strikes on targets simulating docked ships. Russia’s slow, relatively limited first assault — and resulting failure — could be telling China that the opening of any conflict with the west requires a ballistic coup de main that destroys U.S. and allied fleets in their harbors.
Beyond the military lessons, Beijing is also focusing on domestic security on two key fronts: the continuing crackdown on dissent and technological/economic decoupling from the west. Moscow’s failure to control the information domain is another reminder for Beijing of the importance of their apparatuses for censorship and societal control. Having (s)elected “Beijing loyalist” and career security official John Lee for the next Hong Kong chief executive, Beijing’s crackdown on the territory is continuing, if not accelerating, as authorities also arrested 90-year old Catholic Cardinal Joseph Zen, the former archbishop of Hong Kong, under the draconian new security laws.
As Russia has also struggled to supply its forces with high-tech armamentsdue to shortages in semiconductors and other advanced components, Beijing will also be redoubling its efforts at technological self-sufficiency and control over financial mechanisms. On the technological front, it is important to note that Beijing has mandated the removal of all foreign PC technology from government and state-owned enterprises — effectively requiring the replacement of an estimated 50 million computers and massively boosting demand for the entire domestic IT supply chain.
However, despite these steps towards further division, there are increasingly voices questioning this course. Certainly, there is more room for critique of Xi based on the growing upheaval caused by the zero-covid policy, and Russia policy is no different. Though it was quickly censored — no shock there — the comments of the former Chinese ambassador to Ukraine, Gao Yusheng, were telling in terms of how some Chinese are seeing the reality of the war. Reliable China-watchers are suggesting that these remarks are gaining traction among some decision-makers concerned about China’s alignment with Russia and the threat of a broader breach with the west and the political and economic consequences that would entail.
Amb. Gao’s remarks are worth reading in their entirety, as he notes that Russia has failed at sustaining high tech war and that its status as a superpower is questionable — but perhaps what is most important is his recognition that the invasion of Ukraine marked whatever the post-Cold War order might have been, and that a global realignment is underway.
Currently, China is choosing a path to continue its alignment with Russia, and pull away from the globalized world. As we have documented before in these pages, that means that China will have to choose between its political and economic goals. What is ultimately in China’s interest? It is on its path to superpower status, but does it want to join Russia in isolation or continue on a prosperous path as a global economic engine? As we continue to crack down on Russia and assist Ukraine, we can make it clear to China the cost of its current pariah path, but we also have to present an alternative, a detente, as China reaches its post-Ukraine crossroads.
USMC ‘Force Design 2030’ revision focused on Reconnaissance
Ethan Brown
The United States Marine Corps has undergone a profound evolution since the waning years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for good reason. The drastic overhaul of America’s premier expeditionary force went into high gear under the purview of Marine Commandant General David Berger, outlined by his ‘Force Design 2030’ mission statement and manifested in a variety of critical changes since the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The original BLUF (bottom line up front, military lingo at its finest) from the Commandants first draft states:
A certain degree of institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is hard. I want to be clear up front: our force design is a work in progress…we have come to a clearer understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that require additional analysis.
We’ve already seen how Gen. Berger’s Marines have become lighter, more mobile, and more amphibious-centric by removing heavy armor from the Corps inventory. Further, the ability to deploy the new Marine Littoral Regiment as a new-day island hopping shock force has once again stirred the collective soul of the Marine Corps; yours truly once foolishly told a colleague here at the CSPC that I believed amphibious warfare was a moot capability, and in a shocking reveal, I stand corrected. Of course, the Marines are genetically tied to the Navy to get to and from its combat arenas, and the latter is struggling to get its Marine-infiltration up to par in terms of island seizures, but that is a topic for another day.
So finally, the lede of this article: recent changes to the Marine Corps force concept. While Marine DNA is and will always be speed, surprise and violence of action — shock warfare at its finest — the Commandant and his team of strategy experts also recognize the critical necessity for stealth and screening, which prompts the recent revisions to the Force Design 2030 concept: increased investment in forward reconnaissance on austere operational locales.
Forward recon is a simple, but incredibly difficult endeavor to do successfully. Simply, it requires that highly mobile ground troops move into enemy-held or denied areas in order to provide battlefield data, reporting on enemy maneuvers and capabilities, and under the right circumstances, first-strike or first-strike guidance on critical nodes of the adversary (depots, logistics, command and control centers, and other high-payoff targets). “Lethality” has become the main buzzword floating about DoD circles for years now, something on the lines of ‘no kidding’ when labeling things the defense department should be good at. But the Marines are taking this to a whole new degree of fundamental planning. Per the Commandant: “we began three years ago heavily focused on lethality, which remains important, [but] now coming to the fore is the importance of hider/finder, reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance, screening/counter-screening, whatever term you’d like to use — the importance of winning that upfront and always”. Winning the mobility and sensor vulnerability component is where recon makes its hay, which is why the Corps has doubled-down on this initiative to ensure it retains that capability.
Reconnaissance takes on a new significance in the post-GWOT era. In those preceding decades, recon fed into the Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze-Disseminate (F3EAD) targeting cycle of counter-insurgency, which was built around dismantling terror networks and often devoted extensive resources — military and intelligence — towards isolating individual persons or collection devices. With the Corps firmly focused on competition with Chinese rivals across the expanse of the South Pacific, that type of targeting is no longer tenable. Rather, the gambit switches to having forward-staged, self-sustaining personnel who can maneuver within the adversaries’ denied zone, and execute the find-finish-disseminate cycle unilaterally. This then is the crux of the Corps revisions to date: “Marines will intentionally disrupt the plans of these potential adversaries and defines Stand-in Forces (SIF) as small but lethal forces, designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth”, Gen. Berger went on to further point to these advanced forces enabling the broader swath of fleet capabilities in terms of strike, counter-recon and maneuver on the open waves.
Whereas the GWOT era of recon occurred in a dominated, non-contested environment, the challenge for the Corps lies in those forward elements not having overhead, organic air and space capabilities like ISR and signals collection on hand or on call, meaning they cannot rely (in this paradigm) on sensors from the fleet writ large or the joint force. The goal is to shorten the kill chain so that these forward elements are the first-strike capability, and hardened communications, loitering munitions and other outsized organic fires systems, and sustained maneuverability are the three key drivers in this gambit.
Those three pillars are easier said than achieved certainly, which is why the Corps is ruthlessly assessing its current capability gaps in terms of fires, command and control, and counter-denial systems that would otherwise hamstring a forward staged element in a restricted environment. This also requires that those point forces adapt to operating with reduced signatures (radio signals, electronic systems, etc) which can easily tip off a competent adversary like China whose signals collection vastly exceeds what the DoD is currently fielding.
But the Corps leaders and strategic thinkers are aware of the challenges, and the 2022 revision makes no exceptions in critical analysis of where and how the Marines have to get better, leaner, more efficient, and less dependent on big-fleet sustainment in order to achieve this goal. “It’s factual; there’s no emotion, there’s no hypothesis”, this is the new focal point of the Marines shaping themselves to compete in denied zones, and the ability to operate within the bubble and perform high-payoff capabilities such as this new forward reconnaissance is a worthwhile endeavor.
Enter Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act
Hidetoshi Azuma
As Russia’s war in Ukraine has categorically reaffirmed the raison d’etre of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US-Japan alliance also recently entered the new phase of its historical evolution when Tokyo enacted the highly-anticipated Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) earlier this week. ESPA has been years in the making guided by the incumbent Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida and his allies. Although largely reflecting Kishida’s unique economic philosophy, the new legislation is an important milestone in boosting Japan’s economic security. While the scope of ESPA remains narrow with considerable challenges to its implementation, the present geopolitical dynamics driven primarily by Russia’s renewed aggression paradoxically augur well for the future of Japan’s economic security policy.
ESPA looks to have a far-reaching impact on the Japanese economy under the banner of economic security. ESPA revolves around the following four pillars: 1) bolstering supply chain security; 2) boosting critical infrastructure defense; 3) promoting public-private partnerships in research and development (R&D) of advanced technologies; and 4) enforcing secret patents. While Kishida rightly billed ESPA as the initial phase of his economic security agenda, the real significance of the legislation is that it provides the Japanese government with sweeping authority to intervene in the economy in general. Indeed, ESPA provides Tokyo with various carrots and sticks to enforce economic security, ranging from government subsidies for target sectors to penalties against violators of secret patent regulations. For the first time in its postwar history, the Japanese government has now acquired unprecedented arbitrary power over its economy for the putative aim of boosting the country’s economic security.
Such an interventionist approach to economics inherent in ESPA is largely a product of the thinking unique to Kishida and his allies in Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In fact, economic security is virtually synonymous with Kishida and his administration, which pledged to replace neo-liberal economics with its quasi-Keynesian “new capitalism” focused on the redistribution of wealth through selective government interventions. Kishida’s “new capitalism” agenda is a throwback to Tokyo’s postwar economic reconstruction policy in the 1950s and 60s led by the key progenitors of his Kochi-Kai faction, such as the former prime minister Hayato Ikeda. Indeed, Kishida even emulated Ikeda’s signature “Income-Doubling Plan” by unveiling his “Doubling Asset-based Incomes Plan” in London last week.
Likewise, the origin of Kishida’s economic security agenda also reflects his peculiar economics. Although the former US president Donald Trump’s trade war with China became a catalyst for spurring the domestic discourse on the emerging US-China geotechnology competition around 2017, one of Kishida’s party allies, the former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) Akira Amari,chiefly led the internal efforts to craft an economic security policy. Amari’s associates, Professor Toshifumi Kokubun of Musashino University and the METI official Toshihiko Fujii, played the central role in shaping ESPA but found themselves embroiled in a series of scandals alleging their suspected abuse of the economic security agenda for personal gains. While the allegation of their complicity awaits further investigation, their impact on ESPA is undeniable and largely explains the new legislation’s narrow focus on the security of industrial bases. In fact, such a focus has traditionally been within the purview of the METI, and the economic ministry’s interventionist role in Japan’s domestic economy only corroborated Kishida’s quasi-Keynesian economics and his signature economic security policy.
Therefore, Kishida’s economic security agenda began mostly as an exercise of his own economic idiosyncrasy rather than strategy. As a result, it is fundamentally a product of inference focused on the identification of perceived vulnerabilities for a policy rather than deduction based on a larger strategic framework. Obviously, inherent in such an intellectual approach are personal biases, including Kishida’s own economic philosophy as well as the METI’s institutional predilection for interventionism, leading to the narrow focus of ESPA. Moreover, ESPA or Kishida’s economic security as a whole fundamentally lacks the understanding of military logistics. Indeed, postwar Japan’s post-WWII economic miracle emerged in the context of the US military’s continued forward deployment, which required a robust Japanese economy supporting Washington’s Cold War strategy. In other words, as long as the US-Japan alliance perpetuates, Japan’s economy remains inextricable from Washington’s military strategy for winning future wars.
In fact, Tokyo’s disregard for military logistics in its economic security policy emerged as a major cause for concern for Washington. Indeed, it was a crucial perception gap in the alliance, impeding the very implementation of Kishida’s economic security agenda, let alone bilateral cooperation. The upshot was the Japanese business community’s fierce resistance to Tokyo’s economic security agenda due to its entrenched interests in the Chinese market. Washington’s solution has been to apply external pressure on Japan to goad the country into accepting economic security as a part of the US-Japan alliance. Washington’s efforts have been successful so far as the US president Joe Biden successfully struck a deal with Kishida to launch the US-Japan 2+2 dialogue on economy in January 2022. Biden’s ambassador in Tokyo, Ambassador Rahm Emanuel, has been specifically entrusted with the mission of promoting economic security by leveraging his signature pugnacity for diplomacy and has been making steady progress in courting Corporate Japan into acquising in Washington’s strategy.
Therefore, the future of Japan’s economic security policy remained highly uncertain when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. The spectacle of Russia’s naked aggression in Ukraine fundamentally upended Tokyo’s perspective on national security in general and created a renewed sense of urgency for revamping Japan’s economic security. Tokyo fired the opening salvo when it abandoned the long-standing policy of rapprochement with Russia and imposed the most severe set of anti-Russian economic sanctions ever introduced by the country. It further increased the pressure on Russia in April by expelling Russian diplomats suspected of espionage, particularly economic espionage, in Japan. The emerging upshot is Tokyo’s accidental exercise of its nascent economic statecraft, a necessary experience as muscle memory for countering China’s economic security challenges.
To be sure, Japan’s anti-Russian economic measures are far from perfect, but present optimism for the future. For example, despite the Group of Seven (G7) decision to terminate hydrocarbon imports from Russia, Tokyo made an exemption for its gas projects in Sakhalin ostensibly for fear of losing a major geoeconomic stronghold to China. Such a decision makes little sense when Russia itself has been actively seeking decoupling from the rules-based order and casts doubt on the seriousness of Japan’s declared solidarity with other democracies. Nonetheless, Tokyo’s recalcitrance over Sakhalin is more an anomaly than a rule and reflects its temporary fear of incurring untold economic damage on its contractors.
Once again, Russia has emerged as a historical wake-up call for Japan’s national security policy, including Kishida’s economic security agenda. While Russia’s renewed aggression did not influence the enactment of ESPA or Kishida’s economic security policy at large, the spectacle of Ukraine’s ongoing plight has driven home many in Tokyo the importance of economic security. ESPA remains narrow in scope and contains serious impediments to its implementation especially in cooperation with the US, but its enactment is a watershed moment in Japan’s economic security policy. As Tokyo gains experience in wielding its economic statecraft now bolstered by ESPA, the future domestic discourse in Japan must focus on enhancing the new legislation with an eye to China and the defense of the rules-based order increasingly under siege by the global rise of authoritarianism.
News You May Have Missed
Sri Lanka Prime Minister Resigns Amidst Ongoing Unrest
On May 9, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahindra Rajapaksa resigned as ongoing protests over the country’s economic downturn roiled the country. In the past few years, the Indian Ocean island country has been beset by an inflationary crisis, debt default, and cost of living increases, in large part due to the economic mismanagementof the country by Mahindra Rajapaksa and his brother, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Mahindra Rajapaksa’s precarious position had been dramatically undermined after a group of Rajapaksa supporters who attended a rally in Colombo went on a rampage against opposition protesters, enraging opponents of the embattled Prime Minister. With the legitimacy of his government called into question, Mahindra Rajapaksa was left no choice but to resign. Following his brother’s resignation, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister. Wickremesinghe had previously served as Prime Minister three previous times and is the leader of the United National Party, which is one of Sri Lanka’s major parties.
International Investigation into Honeymoon Assassination of Paraguayan Prosecutor
Authorities from Colombia and Paraguay are being joined by agents of the U.S. DEA in investigating the slaying of high profile anti-corruption and organized crime prosecutor Marcelo Pecci, who was shot dead on a resort beach by two gunmen on a small boat or jetski. Pecci, 45, was with Claudia Aguilera, a journalist and his wife, on the final day of their honeymoon on Tuesday when the gunmen struck. Just two hours earlier, she had posted on social media that they were expecting a child. Police say that it is likely the assassination had to do with Pecci’s role in the international team arresting dozens and seizing millions from a cocaine trafficking and money laundering ring spanning South America and Europe.
French Couple Arrested by Iranian Authorities
Foreign ministry officials in Paris have confirmed that two French citizens are being detained after going missing while on vacation in Iran. The Iranian intelligence ministry said on Wednesday that it had arrested two Europeans for planning support for protests and provocations. While French officials did not identify the two, the head of a French teachers’ union has said that an employee and her husband are missing. The arrest comes as teachers and educators in Iran had taken to the streets earlier in the month demanding better pay, improved working conditions, and the release of other colleagues detained by security services. In recent years, dozens of foreign nationals — many with dual foreign-Iranian citizenship — have been arrested by Iranian authorities as bargaining chips in various negotiations.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.