Friday News Roundup — July 10, 2020
Putin Resets the Clock; Protecting International Students & Universities; FY21 NDAA; SCOTUS; Back to School?; 5G in the U.S. & Europe
We all hope that you had a safe and happy Independence Day holiday weekend, and we’re happy to be back wishing you all the best this Friday morning. Over the past two weeks, the challenge of safely reopening the economy while preventing and containing the spread of COVID has become increasingly clear. Spiking cases across southern states and parts of the west have some questioning the outlook for both public health and economic recovery. Attention now turns to how schools will safely reopen — as that shows signs of becoming a partisan issue.
On the foreign policy front, the resurgence of great power competition was made clear as the headlines tracked stories about Russian bounties on U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan while the creeping end to Hong Kong’s autonomy reached a sudden, authoritarian crescendo.
At CSPC, in The Diplomatic Courier, Joshua reviewed Nina Jankowicz’s latest work, “How to Lose the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of Conflict.” Ms. Jankowicz will be joining us for a virtual discussion about her book on Thursday, July 23rd, at 11:00 a.m., EDT.
This week’s roundup features a team firing on all cylinders. Joshua starts off with an update on Russia from Putin’s extended grip on power, to the Afghanistan bounties, to the latest on their COVID pandemic response. Michael calls out the administration for its approach to universities and international students. Ethan breaks down the FY21 NDAA. Chris looks at the SCOTUS decisions on Trump’s taxes. Danielle addresses the debate over reopening schools in New York City. Dan looks at the state of 5G competition post-COVID, while Maria joins the team with an analysis of how Europe is approaching 5G as skepticism of China grows. Once you get through all of that, we wrap, as always, with news you may have missed.
Putin’s Electoral Pantomime & Russian Bounties
Joshua C. Huminski
Russia’s constitutional referendum, unsurprisingly, resulted in a victory for President Vladimir Putin. After seven days of voting nearly 78% of Russians voted to reset Putin’s term limits to zero, allowing him another two six-year terms, potentially seeing him in office through 2036. Independent observers allege, however, widespread fraud even by Russian standards.
The head of Golos, a non-governmental organization, said “The falsification that was found yesterday, it was the national record since the fall of the Soviet Union.” Russia held the vote with many of the typical safeguards absent and, as a result, both turnout and votes approving the constitutional changes were artificially inflated. The pantomime of a free and fair election reached its apogee when copies of the newly approved constitution appeared in bookstores before the vote was over.
If the end result was known, why bother having the vote at all? Both houses of Russia’s parliament approved the constitutional changes, but Putin needed the façade of popular approval for the changes that will see him in power until he is over 80 years old. Putin’s authority rests on the perception of popular support even as much as the people pretend that their votes actually matter.
In a speech before the closing of the polls, Putin affirmed that he would stand by the people’s decision (even if it really wasn’t their decision), saying, “I’ll reiterate my position, it is clear, unchanging and absolutely firm: the updated text of the Constitution, all proposed amendments will come into force only with your approval, with your support.”
The pomp and circumstance, propaganda, and election rigging suggested that Putin felt in a weaker position that he perhaps would have in earlier months.
His final speech before the closing of the polls took place against the backdrop of a Great Patriotic War memorial and the vote began shortly after the Covid-delayed military parade commemorating the end of the War.
The propaganda came from across Russian elite society, but focused predominantly on pension protection, family values, and honoring the military fallen, instead of the key change — extending Putin’s tenure. Those that went to the polls could either vote for Putin’s continued presidency or they could vote against honoring the heroes of the Great Patriotic War as the poll was a yes-or-no package deal with some 200 amendments. A crafty if cynical move by Putin to ensure he got the result he wanted.
The New York Times reported that Russian social media influencers were also sought to support Putin and the referendum by mentioning both in their posts. Many interviewed indicated they turned down the offer fearing that it would hurt their brand as Putin’s support among millennials and Gen Z, once a strong base, is eroding, falling from 86% in 2017 to just 51% in May 2020.
Putin’s standing in Russia is down across the board, not just amongst the 18–24-year-old votes. In December 2017 his approval rating stood at 81% overall but fell to 59% by late Spring of this year. Trust in Putin is down, according to a state polling agency, to 28% — down from nearly 50% two years ago.
While Putin got the result he wanted and has the option to stay in power through 2036, the way in which he won shows less a strong leader and one who is insecure in his position. He still needs public legitimacy, but felt that this was far from guaranteed and any sign of weakness or a poor performance at the poll could undermine his fragile position.
Covid hit Russia particularly hard and his handling of the crisis left much to be desired. That, combined with the economic downturn as a result of falling energy prices, is straining the social contract in Russia — stay out of politics and accept marginal constraints on political freedom in exchange for continued economic growth and a better life. Putin is able to ensure the former, but is having a hard time delivering the latter.
Afghanistan Bounties
Where Putin has consistently appeared to be on the offensive is internationally. At the end of June, the New York Times broke a report that alleged the GRU — Russian military intelligence — was paying “bounties” to the Taliban for U.S. servicemembers killed in Afghanistan. The source of the underlying intelligence remains, its quality, and its accuracy, at the time of this writing, remains unclear. Reports suggested that financial transfers from the GRU to Taliban-linked accounts were identified, along with an Afghan businessman who served as a middleman for the transactions.
What President Trump knew and when, and what actions, if any, were taken in response will undoubtedly be parsed in the coming days. While the White House denied that the president and vice president knew, it seemed not to deny the veracity of the intelligence.
For its part, Russia strongly denied any such bounty program existed. Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan and a former ambassador in Kabul, dismissed the allegations as “outright lies” generated by “forces in the United States who don’t want to leave Afghanistan and want to justify their own failures.”
For its part, the Taliban — to whom the bounties were allegedly paid — denied the allegations saying, “These kinds of deals with the Russian intelligence agency are baseless — our target killings and assassinations were ongoing in years before, and we did it on our own resources.” The spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, added “that changed after our deal with the Americans, and their lives are secure and we don’t attack them.”
At a tactical level, the Taliban needs little additional incentive to target Americans. While Taliban attacks on American troops are substantially down after the signing of the nominal peace agreement, attacks on the Afghan security forces have increased dramatically. The Taliban has no wish to see the United States remain, but it is here where the diverging interests may be a source of Russian exploitation. Of course, the Taliban is not a monolithic movement and payment could certainly have been made to one faction or another.
Strategically, the Russian government would like nothing more than to see the United States continue to be tied down in Afghanistan. The argument being that with the United States focused on Afghanistan, Washington would be less likely to interfere in Syria, Ukraine, or Libya. Other commentators suggested that this could be “payback” for a clash between Russia-backed Wagner private military contractors and U.S. Special Operations Forces in Syria in 2018 that resulted in significant Wagner casualties. Others suggested this is analogous to the U.S. backing of the mujahedeen in the 1980s against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
Given the internal dynamics, and competing and often overlapping missions of Russia’s intelligence agencies, it is possible that this was a locally originated and operated mission, not one coordinated with or approved by Moscow.
In any case, this fits within the preconceived vision of Russia as a malign international actor. “Of course Russia would do this” is the easiest refrain. If nothing else, the news is placing the White House in a particularly complicated position, which equally is in Moscow’s interest.
Russia & Covid
Putin used the Great Patriotic War commemoration parade to declare victory over Covid saying “the dignity with which you, the citizens of Russia, have passed through the most dangerous phase of the epidemic,” adding “We are driving the virus back.” He cautioned, however, “We are still in for a rough ride. We have yet to nip it in the bud. But the end is in sight. We can soon return to normal life.”
How soon that return happens is very much up in the air. Mikhail Murashko, Russia’s health minister, warned that a return to “normal” life in Russia would not take place until at least February 2021. The Federal Air Transport Agency extended its ban on international flights from Russia through 1 August. Moscow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin announced the lifting of a number of restrictions including the rescinding of the mandatory mask requirement in the capital.
These decisions and measures take place against a backdrop of declining, but still high, daily infection counts. As of 9 July, Russia reported 707,000 cases with nearly 11,000 deaths. Questions continue about the accuracy of the Covid infection and death rates with critics saying authorities are under-reporting the rates to play down the crisis.
Putin is keen to get the country back to some measure of normalcy to make good on his end of the social contract discussed above. Lockdowns, quarantines, and economic restrictions, however sensible, take a significant toll on his ability to deliver prosperity — or be seen to deliver prosperity — to the Russian people. It also undercuts his appearance as a decisive, “wartime” leader. His initial handling of the crisis seemed at odds with his carefully curated image.
He devolved much of the decision-making to the governors, laying the blame for restrictions and quarantines at their feet, while not empowering them to make the decisions necessary to manage the crisis. Any poor performance was their fault, but any successes were the result of his decisive actions. Indeed, as written earlier in the Friday News Analysis, he seemed more like a bored monarch than a man-in-charge.
New Rule on International Students Is Hostage Taking
Michael Stecher
Colleges and universities in the United States are on the horns of a dilemma. These higher education institutions (HEIs) are trying to plan for a fall semester when COVID-19 will likely still be spreading around the country. If they open their campuses, it is a virtual certainty that students will become infected, breaching the tacit pledge that HEIs will work to protect their students from undue harm. Most of them are not optimized for distance learning either — financially or pedagogically — so an all-remote course of study would be a real challenge. Students also do not want to give up the experience of on-campus learning, especially at the prices they are expected to pay for a degree.
The Trump administration has a dog in this fight: they would like schools to be open to help the president’s reelection campaign and are prepared to cause grievous harm to HEIs if they are closed. On Monday, the Student and Exchange Visitor Program at the Department of Homeland Security announced that, unless the institutions that host these students offer in-person courses and international students enroll in them, they will be subject to immigration enforcement action and potential deportation. At a time when it would be nice to have Washington on their side, the administration is threatening a major source of funding in order to bend HEIs to their will. If they do not host in-person classes this fall, the Trump administration is saying (not exactly subtly), DHS will hurt hundreds of thousands of students, potentially put institutions out of business, and damage the U.S. higher education system for years to come, all for a talking point.
Under normal circumstances, students are not allowed to take more than one course online and receive student visas. As a matter of policy, this makes sense; online learning can take place anywhere. In March, when HEIs closed their doors, SEVP issued guidance that waived that requirement and said that this would be in effect “for the duration of the emergency.” The emergency is not over, but agencies are normally well within their rights to change their policies. This policy change, however, will cause serious harms if enforced and it is not clear that the administration has thought seriously about those effects.
More than 90% of international students at U.S. HEIs stayed in the country after their campuses closed, rather than risk challenges returning in the fall. If they are enrolled at institutions that have to be online-only for health and safety reasons, it is probably too late for them to transfer to another institution; they will have to return home at a time when international travel is expensive and fraught with danger. When they get home, many live in countries where time zones make synchronous study extremely difficult or broadband access challenges prevent them from attending classes over Zoom. The largest place of origin for international students is China, whose nightmarish, authoritarian social control policies would make study in many different fields impossible. In response to these challenges, many students will withdraw and competitive institutions in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere will be the primary beneficiaries.
International students are an increasingly important part of the U.S. higher education landscape. As of the 2018/19 academic year, there were nearly 1.1 million students in the United States on student visas, a record high, according to the Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange. The money they spent to study in the United States contributed roughly $45 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 450,000 jobs — roughly 27,500 jobs in Pennsylvania, 5,300 in Wisconsin, 16,500 in Florida, 9,000 in North Carolina, and around the same in Arizona, just to pick 5 states for no important reason. International students are also an important revenue stream for HEIs. The average U.S. student receives 31% of the cost of their education in the form of grants and scholarships, according to Sallie Mae’s “How America Pays for College” report; for international students, nearly 80% are primarily funded by personal or family savings or current employment.
Too much of the public discourse about U.S. higher education assumes that most HEIs are like Harvard, with endowments so large that they have nearly unlimited financial flexibility. In reality, most U.S. students and most international students attend institutions that live much closer to the financial edge. There were 13,324 international students at Arizona State last year and 7,121 at SUNY Buffalo. There were 3,638 at the University of Central Missouri and 406 at Macalester College. The pandemic is already putting strain on institutions, threatening to cut them off from a major funding source right now is threatening them with insolvency.
In a lawsuit filed by Harvard and MIT against DHS, the plaintiffs make similar claims and argue that the government has violated the Administrative Procedure Act in announcing this rule change without considering the harms involved, failing to offer a compelling basis for the policy, or allowing for a public comment period. I am persuaded by their argument and suspect that the courts will be too — as in its attempt to overturn DACA and insert a question about citizenship into the 2020 Census, the courts found that the Trump administration failed to demonstrate its compliance with the APA.
The United States has the best higher education system in the world, but it is not an American birthright. If international students cannot study in the United States — or even if the process to come here to study becomes too onerous or subject to fits of capricious maladministration — they will go elsewhere. U.S. institutions would become less competitive, dynamic places, and we would all be worse off for it. This is a hostage situation and we need to resolve it quickly.
FY2021 NDAA reaches the Senate floor: Amendment highlights
Ethan Brown
Recent days have brought to bear the 60th consecutive iteration of Congress “providing for the common defense”, by passing its National Defense Authorization Act for the coming fiscal year (2021). The bill was passed in its congressional committees, appearing this week before the Senate floor for consideration by the full senate. After typical partisan drama, hand-wringing, and many a clause-driven, pet-project laden journey, we have arrived at the next phase of the $740.5 billion policy process.
Rather than conjecture or high-mindedness and theorizing about strategic implications for the bill, this analysis will consist of highlighting some of the interesting minutiae for this bill, whose annually predictable increase in spending appears to be the only truly bipartisan commonality in a divisive congressional body. But even a bipartisan tradition like defense spending is not without its turf wars, as the following will reveal.
Geospatial Imagery Intelligence: NRO/NGA & commercial integration
The National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO, is one of the most highly classified and isolated intelligence agencies under the Office for the Directorate of National Intelligence. Chartered with designing, building, and sustaining America’s intelligence satellites, the NRO conducts surveillance and imagery-based reconnaissance of the most sensitive locales on earth in support of the broader intelligence community and the department of defense. Similarly, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) conducts exploitation and analysis of available imagery for the purpose of equipping policy and military leaders, and even emergency first responders with accurate, timely intelligence on geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Simply, the NRO obtains imagery, geodetic datums, and multi-spectral data and provides the same to the IC/DoD writ large. While the NGA interprets and disseminates various mediums of the GEOINT for consumption and application to the same swath of customers.
Developing imagery data and intelligence is far more complex (and expensive) than scrolling through google earth™ might imply in our data driven world. In order to do so, the NRO has relied on its own pot of money appropriated into the National and Military Intelligence Programs (NIP/MIP) at the discretion of the Undersecretary of Defense. The NGA obtains its funding through a variety of federal grants, through its validated geospatial business consortium, and various government partnerships.
What amendment SA 2138 (authored by Sen. Ted Cruz of TX) requires of the NRO and NGA is to “leverage, to the maximum extent practicable, the capabilities of United States industry, including through the use of commercial geospatial-intelligence services and acquisition of commercial satellite imagery”. This amendment portends a “whole of government” approach as dictated by the current administration, albeit regarding a small, but significant item of national security interest, which is the GEOINT development challenge in a rapidly changing global environment.
Which ships to build?
HASC appropriators opted to fund a $2.5 billion Virginia-class attack submarine which had been removed by the Office of Management & Budget in February in the original White House NDAA proposal. Consternation was all but guaranteed as the bill arrived to the Senate armed services body, whose funding breakdown included $398 million as a de facto down payment, but hardly the full financial commitment to beefing up the submariner fleet. Rather, the GOP-led SASC laid out a $908 million pool to fund Indo-PACOM themed destroyers and amphibious assault ships. Of course, the haranguing between these congressional bodies will ultimately be dictated by the determination of the Senate Appropriations Committee (led by ranking member Sen. Jack Reed [RI-D], a longtime submarine enthusiast).
What both congressional chambers are striving for is reaching a fleet inventory of 355 ships by the year 2035, which still won’t reach the prolific sea-faring heights of China’s PLA Navy’s goal of 420-ship fleet by the same year. But whether to build more, cheaper ships on the argument of quantity threatens to delay firepower, modernization and technological superiority on the quality side of the debate — which means delaying production of the next-generation Columbia-class submarine. It’s a much bigger, stealthier, and faster submarine, which will also be a critical component in modernizing the nuclear triad.
The debate is underlined by a striking, concerning reality: the feedback provided to policy makers coming from out the Pentagon — the “fleet force planning” body under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is predominantly US Army personnel. Generally, Army people shouldn’t strategize for the Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and vice versa. That is the great vulnerability of the GWOT-fueled ‘Joint-Force’ mindset. While the collective DoD has done a tremendous job over the past two decades adapting and fusing to meet the global threat of violent extremism, it has overtaken the reality that certain facets of the DoD are myopically independent of collectivism. This is coming from an author who spent 11 years in nothing but “Joint” environments. But at the end of the day, no amount of joint-ness explains Army dictating Navy strategy; so this will be fascinating watching how the legislators shake out which ships get funded.
Nuke Budget squabble amidst a lack of transparency
In an attempt to make this as easily consumable as possible: the HASC wants to block Department of Energy use of funds by the DoD’s Nuclear Weapons Council, to develop the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) budget. Senate lawmakers, in a heretofore unprecedented move, are pushing to give the DoD’s nuke weapons oversight mechanism more power in dictating the development of its nuclear weapons capability through the amendment dubbed Section 1652. The rub, not readily apparent in this elevator pitch, is Senate legislators led by SASC chair Jim Inhofe (R-OK) is to give the military, not elected-civilian leaders, more say in where/how nuclear weapons are developed (by rearranging who pushes the taxpayer money where).
Much legalese credits Section 1652 to Extant 10 USC 179 (d)(10), which outlines the responsibilities and provisions of operations for the Nuclear Security Council — which keeps the DoE and DoD players in this debate on even footing. However, the compromise made to keep this provision intact going to the Senate floor still tips the scales of nuclear development funding in favor of the military side of the issue — keeping veto authority with the Nuclear Weapons Council for any NNSA budget before it arrived at the Energy Secretary’s desk for approval on its way to the OMB.
Cybersecurity taken seriously
Sen. Angus King (I-VT), has opted an amendment to review the status of the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as it applies to U.S. cybersecurity, where resources and increased budgets may be applied, and to identify vulnerabilities to the national security architecture- public and private. CISA is criminally under-supported, as is the broader cybersecurity paradigm when considered in the domains of conflict.
It just so happens that the DoD digitized supply-chain security compliance program, the CMMC, came online in January as a means of protecting the logistic systems for the military. It is fully migrated and incorporates the full spectrum of contractors and subcontractors tied to the military supply chain- heavily dependent on cybersecurity. That this component (a review of CISAs capabilities and the broader Defense cyber architecture) is only an amendment to the NDAA speaks volumes about the sad state of affairs in congress when addressing cyber vulnerabilities across public and private sector mediums tied to the national defense construct.
SCOTUS Handles the Financials
Chris Condon
This week was a highly anticipated one for Supreme Court watchers. As the summer rolled on, the Court came closer and closer to the end of their term, and did what they are often wont to: they saved their most consequential decisions for last. Trump v. Vance and Trump v. Mazars are two such cases, both involving the sought-after personal tax returns of President Trump. The first arises from New York City, where District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. seeks to subpoena the president’s financial records as part of a criminal investigation. The second deals with Congress’ ability to subpoena a president’s personal financial records as part of the legislative process. Since the seemingly similar cases were decided differently, it is worth examining each in greater detail.
Last year, three House committees issued separate subpoenas to various banks and accounting firms seeking information on the president’s financial dealings. President Trump took immediate legal action against the financial institutions in a personal capacity to curb the subpoenas. Citing their power to investigate to determine appropriate legislative action, the House asserts that they must be able to examine the records to determine whether reform is necessary to presidential financial disclosure regulations. The Trump legal team, for their part, argues that Congress is overstepping their constitutional limits and interfering with the business of the chief executive for political reasons. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the seven-justice majority in Trump v. Mazars, embodied the caution for which he has come to be known. Rather than wading into the question of whether the subpoena in question falls under Congress’ legislative duties, Chief Justice Roberts decided the case on institutional grounds.
In a sense, Roberts chastised both sides for bringing this case all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the past, Roberts argued, the political branches have always been able to come to some kind of agreement when Congress seeks personal presidential information. The political tension of the moment has bled into the judiciary, with highly politicized brawls being fought in federal courts rather than on Capitol Hill where they belong. Regardless, no compromise was made and the issue came before the High Court, and the Chief Justice was forced to engage in a balancing act as he has had to do increasingly often. In essence, the opinion he wrote detailed the failure of lower courts to adequately consider the delicate federal balance of powers in granting wholesale blessings to the congressional subpoenas. While he did not make a judgement whether the subpoenas themselves were constitutionally permitted, he disallowed them from being enforced before lower courts reconsider the issue with an eye toward the separation of powers.
Chief Justice Roberts’ 7–2 (the same majority as Mazars) opinion in Trump v. Vance was less ambiguous in its judgement. In this case, the New York District Attorney sought to enforce a Grand Jury subpoena of the president’s financial records held by his accounting firm, Mazars USA. President Trump, filing a lawsuit to halt compliance by his accountants, argued that submitting to investigation by state authorities would illegally impede his ability to perform his presidential duties. The district attorney’s office argues that while it is impermissible to legally penalize the president for actions he takes within the scope of his official duties, his private affairs that took place before his presidency do not fall under this protective umbrella. They also specified that the president was not being criminally prosecuted at this time, but rather the District Attorney was only conducting an investigation that required little personal involvement from President Trump himself.
The majority ruled in favor of District Attorney Vance. Chief Justice Roberts dedicated a chunk at the beginning of his opinion to an example made particularly relevant by the recent release of Hamilton: the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason. When the former Vice President was charged with treason for conspiring to invade Mexico with a private army near the end of the Jefferson administration, noted Burr adversary Thomas Jefferson dedicated much effort to ensuring a conviction. In the course of his trial, Burr sought to acquire letters from the Governor of the Louisiana Territory to Jefferson to bolster his case. President Jefferson refused, citing both the distraction caused by the inconvenience of complying with a subpoena and the fact that the letters may contain sensitive government secrets. Riding circuit, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this argument, stating that the equal application of justice requires that participation in criminal proceedings not depend on the stature of the individual in question.
Although many hoped that this week would settle the question of the president’s tax returns, we have had no such luck. The law often defies simple answers, and cases involving politically charged environments only amplify complications that may arise. What is clear from these decisions is that presidential claims of blanket immunity from any sort of investigation, congressional or criminal, is patently false. In order for the justice system and Congress to conduct their duties effectively, it is sometimes necessary to investigate all manner of people, even presidents. In our system, no one is above the law.
NYC Public Schools Plans for Fall 2020
Danielle Anjeh
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced plans for the operation of the 1,800 New York City public schools this fall. The population of roughly 1.1 million students have been taught remotely through online courses since mid-March when schools were indefinitely shut down due to the outbreak of COVID-19. Mayor de Blasio announced that students will continue to study through a hybrid of in-person courses and online instruction. The plan outlines that students will attend their classes one to three days out of the week and that the classes that had 30 students would be decreased down to 12 people, including the teachers.
In conjunction with this, masks must be worn at all times to reduce the risk of the virus spreading. Hand sanitizer and disinfecting wipes will also be granted to each school, and buildings will be disinfected routinely each night. The heating and air conditioning systems are being improved and reconfigured to improve ventilation.
It is estimated that most schools can accommodate at least half the student body while honoring 6-foot social distancing protocol and could have in-person classes 2 to 3 days a week. Lower-capacity schools would allow in-person instruction 1 to 2 days a week. Mayor de Blasio wants plans published to determine the best schedules for students by August. New York City is not the only big city to implement a hybrid in-person and remote learning model for the upcoming school year. Officials say that the lower-density classrooms and staggered schedules are potentially the best chance at lessening the spread of the virus.
However, Mayor de Blasio’s proposal is still subject to change as Governor Andrew Cuomo has the final decision on the state’s school reopening protocol. New York City is currently in Phase 3 of reopening, and cases have deceased but the situation changes day-by-day. Important stakeholder groups, including the powerful United Federation of Teachers union have expressed apprehension vis-à-vis this decision announced by the mayor. Some teachers are expected to retire rather than risk teaching in the new environment.
The implications of this decision are numerous and many questions remain. School buildings give students the opportunity for free internet connection to get assignments completed, as well as printers and access to books. School provides students with two hot meals a day and shelter for at least eight hours a day. These aspects may appear small, but to the number of children that do not have stable home lives or living situations, this has an enormous impact. NYC public schools staying remote serves as a large issue to the children who may not have the resources to get the most out of their education. What is being done for them? What is the necessary mandate that must be enforced to make sure that, regardless of the online instruction, these students are getting the absolute most out of their education?
Second, when classes are conducted remotely, children must be left at home to their own devices if their parents have to go to their jobs. A large number of children have parents working in the service sector and childcare is extremely expensive. How will these parents manage this new hurdle of getting their children properly taken care of and going to work? This decision dramatically affects the economy and daily motion of life in New York City, as parents make the difficult decision between staying home or working. Will there be policies set out by the city to help parents manage these issues or will they have to get by on their own?
Race and class exacerbate these issues. Lower-income and working-class families in New York — especially those of color — with non-flexible jobs do not have the option not to go to work. Working a rigorous work schedule each day puts food on the table and pays the bills and the lack of daily custodial child care undermines that. We cannot fail this country’s young children of color, and these inequalities could only intensify if their schooling is lackluster and underequipped.
These conditions are out of the control of parents in New York’s public school system and the city must help provide the resources to the families and their children. These resources can be offered in libraries, community centers, and after-school programs that give the children access to the resources they need for their schooling, otherwise, they will be unjustly behind.
Both Mayor de Blasio and Governor Andrew Cuomo must consider the numerous aspects at play when making the final decision regarding school operation in the fall. They must be cognizant of the racial and wealth inequalities that may hinder students from having a seat at the table and provide them the equity to level the playing field. The decision must also account for the large student population of homeless school children that rely on school for their shelter and seek to issue a mandate that puts stable roofs over their heads during these unsafe times.
How 5G Competition is Key to the Future beyond COVID
Dan Mahaffee
In thinking of how we rebuild and re-shape society in a post-pandemic world, investments in 5G deployment and continued innovation are of vital importance. The shift in our reliance on digital technology has been accelerated. How we work, learn, play, and care for ourselves creates new needs for reliable, consistent connectivity. While COVID has accelerated these digital demands, we also stand on the verge of revolutionary changes in connectivity for wide swaths of the economy that have previously been unnetworked. Deploying 5G is key for the first mover advantage for unlocking future innovations, yet the importance of this technology makes its security of vital concern. Our national interest in continued innovation leadership must be a key consideration as domestic policies for 5G investments are built, while at the same time guiding a careful, strategic approach to the international competition for technology leadership.
The COVID pandemic reshaped how we rely upon digital connectivity. Be it working or learning remotely, family milestones via Zoom, telemedicine checkups, or streaming and gaming to pass the time, it is clear that every American needs reliable internet access. Our digital divides have always been unacceptable, and the pandemic has made clear how low-income, exurban, and rural communities need improved network coverage. 5G is a key part of the long-term solution for ensuring widespread, high-speed, wireless access. Investments in 5G should be a key part of any considerations of stimulus or infrastructure plan.
Beyond an avenue for the digital connectivity Americans need, 5G leadership is key to maintaining leadership in a range of other fields. The United States led in 4G technologies, and the smartphone app based ecosystem that changed how we work, communicate, and interact with the world have been key to the continued strength and innovation leadership of Silicon Valley and the U.S. tech sector writ large. Beyond faster connections for media, content, and gaming, the industrial and commercial networking by 5G will transform fields such as transportation, agriculture, and manufacturing. Being first to deploy widespread 5G connectivity is a vital first step for future innovation in these vital fields and harnessing the data that 5G-connected systems provide.
Both our connectivity needs and the revolutionary potential of 5G technology make clear the importance of 5G innovation leadership. The importance of this technology as the future digital connective tissue of our society makes clear the importance of U.S. and allied leadership in the R&D, manufacturing, deployment, and innovative use of 5G networks. The geopolitical competition is most heated when it comes to hardware, but Open RAN or vRAN technology can foster a more competitive landscape. The tie up of NEC and NTT in Japan demonstrates how companies are taking a different look at entering, or re-entering, the 5G field. At the same time, getting allies on-side about a shared approach to 5G is tricky, as Maria’s following analysis in this roundup about 5G in Europe demonstrates.
At the same time, as the geopolitical tensions between the United States and China continue to grow, the complicated interdependence is a challenge as policymakers address bipartisan concerns about China’s record on human rights, the future of the trade relationship, the fate of Hong Kong, and increasingly assertive diplomatic and military policies. U.S. technology companies vital for innovation leadership find themselves in the crossfire of the back-and-forth between Washington and Beijing over advanced technologies. U.S. companies, unlike their subsidized Chinese competitors, need revenue to ensure continued R&D. U.S. companies revenue from China is at risk as tensions grow.
Closer to home, as we’ve previously discussed, policy changes related to skilled worker visas and student visas threaten the access to talent needed for innovation leadership. Counterproductive policies that are meant to limit adversaries’ access to sensitive technology information end up preventing U.S. firms’ participation in crafting future international standards. Soft power still matters even if competition is in silicon domains.
For 5G competition, domestic policies must focus on the needed investments to get 5G deployed and let entrepreneurs, tinkerers, and innovators build the innovation ecosystem for the next generation of digital connectivity. Working with our partners and private sector innovators, let’s build a more competitive 5G playing field by embracing new technology approaches and innovative standards. Finally, when addressing the challenge of increased geopolitical competition and the threat of our adversaries, the strategic approach requires us to address the exigence of our adversaries’ legitimate security challenges, along with the long-term importance of innovation leadership.
Europe’s Fragmented 5G Approach & Geotech Uncertainty
Maria Hatzisavvas Damsgaard
The relationship between the EU and China is developing across an uncertain political and economic landscape, during a prospective reshuffling of global decision-making. Exactly what does this mean for 5G rollout in Europe and why should it matter? The importance of 5G has become more common knowledge, but transparency and cohesive measures are lacking in the EU’s approach towards cooperation with China in the 5G realm. While the United States relies on its diverse and largely-independent private sector and China on its state-backed, socially-credited enterprises, the EU has a less clear approach in the 5G rollout race and an unclear posture towards the Huawei 5G dependency narrative.
While 2019 marked a year of U.S.-led discussions of a de-facto EU Huawei ban, early 2020 EU measures followed the UK’s example and merely recommended member states to limit high-risk 5G vendors for critical and sensitive functions through the EU toolbox on Secure 5G networks. Without a coordinated stance on how to protect European 5G infrastructure, countries have led different approaches in their domestic 5G industries. Countries like Poland, Sweden, Estonia, Romania, Denmark, Latvia, Czech Republic, and Greece opted to not cooperate with telecommunications giant Huawei, while Germany and France have accepted investments from the company, and there are already signed contracts for construction of 5G infrastructure in European neighbors like Iceland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Most recently Huawei pledged to build a $225 million 5G radio equipment production hub in France and signed a deal to supply less-sensitive radio access networks to Telefonica’s SA’s German unit — all while confirming the newly approved £1 billion Huawei Cambridge research center opening in 2021.
Though European leaders repeatedly claim that human rights are important and that democratic leadership is superior to any other type of rule, there is less of a consensus on the economic standards of the Sino-European relationship. Should the obvious and fundamental EU-China political divergences on issues like state intervention, surveillance, and human rights have anything to do with granting Chinese businesses access to the European 5G market? An unequal European response on the two pillars of the China — EU relationship, namely the economic and the political, is furthering an already decentralized European stance towards China. The major contradiction between hot economics and cold politics will be most visible in the decisions made by dispersed EU members, as these are left on their own to risk-assess foreign 5G players with investment visions in Europe.
As an increasingly China-reliant Germany is embarking on its presidency of the EU Council, member countries are left wondering what type of leadership the EU economic heavyweight will take on 5G. While Germany’s pre-pandemic to-do list included the subjects of green economy, digitalization, migration policy, and the relationship with the UK and China, the presidency will most likely pivot towards crisis-management of the consequences of the pandemic rather than dealing with coordinating EU’s 5G investment screening measures. Earlier this year, Merkel and her Christian Democratic-led bloc squabbled on a German Huawei ban that Merkel came to reject, while releasing a rulebook for 5G network security in Germany. Merkel’s fear of retaliatory measures from China comes as no surprise as Germany is heavily reliant on China as an export market. The economic dependence is explicit in regards to Germany’s automotive industry with automaker giants like Volkswagen, Daimler and BMS attributing large portions of their sales revenue to the Chinese market. This dependency became picturesquely evident back in 2018, when Merkel went for a driverless Volkswagen trip with Premier Keqiang, followed bynews that Huawei would be providing the AI backbone of Volkswagen’s Audi’s autonomous vehicles launching in 2021.
Though some European countries may not see a completely secure 5G network outweigh the perceived gains of a Huawei-aided 5G rollout, the question arises on whether the Huawei 5G dependency narrative is justifiable or if strong alternatives exist. Big players like Ericsson and Nokia are hoping to meet future 5G needs, but blame regulatory policies for Europe’s tag-along role in 5G rollout. Similarly, the companies attribute a lower European 5G investment scheme on short life-span of spectrum licenses and a lower average revenue per user, leaving EU countries fragile to large-scale investments from a state-capitalist success story. Ahead of negotiations of the 2020 EU-China Joint Investment Agreement, pusingfor investment liberalization by eliminating investor restrictions in the respective markets, the EU must consider the implications the agreement will have on 5G in Europe. Unless a balanced, stricter and “whole-of-EU” approach heavily influences the expected agreement signing, a continued dispersed EU will face a serious 5G legitimacy crisis in the eyes of its allies. Not only would the union face serious competition from, and dependence on, Chinese companies in critical infrastructure sectors but also unparalleled risks of economic spillovers from distortions in China’s economic and political system.
News You May Have Missed
Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s President, tests positive for coronavirus
Nick Schroeder
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro tested positive for coronavirus after calling the virus only a “little flu” in the past. Bolsonaro has been a vocal critic of setting curfews as well as other preventive measures against coronavirus, but his tone changed considerably after catching it. Bolsonaro warned against the dangers for people above the age of 65 but doubled down on his beliefs that the chances of coronavirus being lethal to younger people are close to zero and that the economy should remain open. Finally, Bolsonaro deflected some of the potential criticism he could receive by emphasizing that no country has been able to prevent coronavirus deaths.
President Trump Meets with Mexico’s President to Celebrate New Trade Agreement, Despite Criticism
Emily Stone
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador travelled to Washington, D.C. to meet with President Trump on Wednesday, despite Mexican diplomats and other officials urging him not to due to health risks and the history of disparaging remarks Trump has made against Mexico. The purpose of the meeting was to celebrate the revised North American Free Trade Agreement — now known as the USMCA — adopted by the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, however, opted out of attending the meeting, likely due to Coronavirus-related concerns. López Obrador has stated that the meeting is important to the relationship between the US and Mexico, as he feels that Trump’s discourse towards Mexico has improved recently, and wants to express gratitude for “the U.S. government’s respectful treatment of us.” Critics warn that President Trump is using the meeting for his own political agenda (at the expense of undermining Mexico’s interests), while supporters believe it’s an important step in solidifying a good economic relationship between the two countries.
EU Expecting Slower Economic Recovery
Maria Hatzisavvas Damsgaard
On July 7, the European Commission published its Summer 2020 Economic Forecast concluding that the euro zone will contract significantly beyond what was previously expected. The revised estimate follows a renewed assessment of the slow lifting of lockdown measures’ impact on member state economies. The forecast notes that the increasing infection rates in the U.S., among other places, have “deteriorated the global outlook and is expected to act as a drag on the European economy,” while acknowledging that the yet-to-be-adopted Next Generation EU recovery plan, von der Leyen’s first annual budget proposal, may significantly impact the baseline in 2021.
UK Offers Citizenship to Hong Kong BNO Passport-Holders
Maria Hatzisavvas Damsgaard
Following China’s “Safeguarding National Security” law enacted on June 30th 2020 that criminalized nonviolent protests, Prime Minister Boris Johnson extends a hand to Hong Kong natives. The Chinese national security law was implemented on the day Hong Kong was handed over to China 23 years ago, leading the UK to offer Hong Kong citizens eligibility for British National Overseas (BNO) passports, a six-year path to citizenship as well as the right to live, work and study in the UK. The Chinese Ambassador to Britain hopes the UK will “reconsider their position,” and says China is waiting on the details of the offer to consider the appropriate response.
The views of authors are their own, and not that of CSPC.