Friday News Roundup — January 10, 2020
An Update on Virginia Gerrymandering Reform; Looking at the Strike on Soleimani from Multiple Angles; Parsing Presidential War Powers; plus News You May Have Missed
Good Friday morning from Washington, D.C., and 2020 greetings from all of us at CSPC in this, the first roundup of the new year. It has been a tumultuous week, with most attention focused on Iran following growing tensions culminating in the U.S. strike killing Iranian IRGC General Qasem Suleimani and the Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases in Iraq.
This week’s roundup covers a wide range of issues created by the strike on Suleimani, as Dan provides a strategic overview while Joshua takes a deep dive into the decision to carry out the strike and the aftermath. Ethan covers the capabilities of the IRGC and the Quds Force, while Chris looks at the legal and constitutional questions raised. Before all that, however, we open with a brief update on the status of gerrymandering reform efforts in Virginia, as the Commonwealth’s General Assembly, now in Democratic hands, has started its 2020 session.
As always, we wrap with news you may have missed, and this week, we welcome our new intern, Wyatt Newsome, from the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill. Keep an eye out for his news and opinion contributions in the coming weeks!
The Status of Gerrymandering Reform in Virginia
Last year, the Virginia General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a constitutional amendment to curtail political gerrymandering. The amendment would create an independent redistricting commission, a body independent of the state legislature, to conduct congressional redistricting without political motivations in mind. While Democrats in the General Assembly universally supported the amendment last year, some have begun to waiver in their support, asserting that the amendment contains flaws that were only recently brought to their attention. Many suspect that the true motivation behind the retraction of support is the Democrats’ newly won majority in the General Assembly — if Democrats pass the amendment again this year, they will forfeit their power to gerrymander in the upcoming redistricting process following the 2020 census.
While there are Democrats whose support is wavering, many Democrats in the General Assembly intend to finish the job of gerrymandering reform. Senators Louise Lucas (D-Portsmouth) and Mamie Locke (D-Hampton) recently introduced enabling legislation that would set additional rules around the redistricting process, augmenting the text of the amendment and addressing some of its limited flaws. The amendment itself has also been endorsed by a broad and deep coalition of individuals and organizations across Virginia and DC, a list of which can be found here. Since Republicans are likely to vote for the amendment this year to prevent a Democratic gerrymander after the 2020 census, it is likely that the amendment will pass with continued public pressure and effort on the part of supporters.
The World, Post-Soleimani
Dan Mahaffee
Very rarely in history does a moment occur that will be seen as a clear dividing line in the historical narrative. While it is often hard to see when it is taking place, the strike that killed Qasem Soleimani may very well be one of those moments.
First, it is very important to understand the role Soleimani played. Dexter Filkins’ 2013 piece about Soleimani in The New Yorker remains one of the best long reads about his life and impact as leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Soleimani could be best described as a combination of Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and CIA director, all in one person. Throughout the region, he was the point person for projecting Iranian power and fomenting the proxy conflicts between the U.S. and allied forces and Iran and its allies. From Lebanon to Yemen, Iraq to Syria, and beyond, Soleimani and the IRGC regularly demonstrated how Iran was able to use its well-honed asymmetric capabilities to counter the technological and economic advantages of the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.
In the region, it remains to be seen what impact his death will have. While the strike did bring the U.S. and Iran ever closer to open conflict, the strike on Soleimani and the retaliatory ballistic missile strikes against U.S. bases in Iraq appear to have brought about a return to largely the status quo. While the prospects of a full scale war have diminished, the proxy conflict between Washington and Tehran will remain.
While Iran has likely demonstrated the scope of its overt retaliation — missile strikes that should not be considered “misses” by any stretch of the imagination — covert and cyber conflicts remain. Looking at the past methods employed by Iran, anything ranging from cyberattacks to physical attacks or kidnapping of U.S. military personnel, diplomats, intelligence agents, or even civilians such as tourists or NGO workers remains of concern. While the Iranians would likely avoid an attack on U.S. soil, given the retaliation that might provoke, we cannot assume that the threat remains focused on the Middle East, as the Iranians, or Iranian-linked groups, have carried out attacks from Buenos Aires to Bulgaria to Bangkok.
On a strategic level, the future of the nuclear deal and the future of the Iranian nuclear program remain in doubt as well. While the nuclear deal remains hanging by a thread, I’m sure the Ayatollahs note the difference in outcome for Kim Jong-Un compared to Saddam Hussein and Mommar Qaddafi. While President Trump may vow that Iran will never have nuclear weapons, their incentives for them have grown.
At home, the aftermath revealed that our politics is now entirely dominated by whether one is aligned pro-or-anti-Trump, and nuance is dead. I’d imagine that many believe the world is a better place less one Qasem Soleimani, yet can also be concerned that the Trump administration is acting hastily without full consideration of the consequences. It can be acknowledged that the U.S. alone had the capability and the intelligence to carry out the strike, and hurriedly, while also acknowledging that the aftermath would require support from allies and partners. We can be skeptical of being further bogged down in the region, while also recognizing that total disengagement only empowers our adversaries. We can be wary of Iran and believe that all elements of national power should be brought to bear against the regime, while also believing that course of action is subject to Congressional oversight and approval.
Finally, there is the matter of trust. In a world of what some describe as “post-factual, or what Ed Luce of The Financial Times called “post-literate” politics, it can seem old-fashioned to believe that facts matter, or that credibility is earned penny but lost by the pound. However, underpinning the concept of American leadership—and indeed our exceptionalism—is that need for not only the American people, but indeed the entire world, to clearly understand U.S. interests and our course of action. That in turn builds the trust that allows us to build alliances and coalitions, while also demonstrating the cost of choosing conflict with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, from Black Hawk Down to Iraqi WMDs to Obama’s “Red Line” in Syria, that credibility has been chipped away. Again, depending on political perspective, some will say that President Trump has shaken up the moribund alliances, while others will argue that he has shaken vital institutions to their bedrock.
Either way, we are now at the international crisis that will test this administration, and we will see what value our current credibility has in the global marketplace for influence. Key in this will be Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Judging from his influence in national security decision-making and relationship with the president, he may be one of the most consequential Secretaries of State since Henry Kissinger. He is also becoming the very public face of this foreign policy. At a time when we are in a global competition for influence, this is a key test of this administration. Whether it’s the justification for the strike or the broader strategy or doctrine that the administration believes for the region, there is more to be gained by clearly communicating this to the American people and the world. Such credibility is also going to be important as the investigation continues into what increasingly looks, based on Western intelligence, like the tragic downing of the Ukrainian 737 during its takeoff from Iran.
Be it U.S.-Iran relations, the future of U.S. forces in Iraq, broader regional dynamics, the future of American global power, or the impact on our domestic politics — from the 2020 race to the debate over presidential war powers — many unresolved questions remain. While the answers will continue to unfold over the coming days and weeks, it is clear that January 3, 2020, is a historic turning point.
Soleimani — Why Now and What Next?
Joshua C. Huminski
On 3 January, the United States struck and killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Qods Force. Designated a terrorist by the United States and Israel in 2011 (the Qods Force was designated a terrorist organization in April 2019) he was the driving force behind Iran’s covert foreign policy, intelligence activities and program of influence throughout the Middle East and further afield.
Why Now?
Soleimani was a well-known quantity in the Middle East who increasingly travelled without concern or fear. This, despite the fact that the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia would very much liked to have him removed from the equation.
According to reports, he became “complacent” and felt he was “untouchable”. The United States, as aforementioned, designated him as a terrorist and the Qods Force as a terrorist organization, but then did not act. His operational security appears to have become much more relaxed, flying in and out of Baghdad International Airport and touring battlefield sites with frequent photos, not something for which he was previously known.
Undoubtedly the United States was actively tracking him, knowing his movements in and around the region, but until early January, the authorization for his killing had not been granted. So, what changed?
As discussed below, the Administration is putting forward the argument that there was an imminent threat. The immediate trigger for this current situation was the death of an American contractor in Iraq, American retaliation against the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for the attack, and subsequent Iranian-sponsored attacks against the American embassy in Baghdad.
What was the objective?
The argument, at the moment, is that Soleimani’s killing disrupted “imminent” attacks. The Pentagon said he was “actively developing plans” to attack U.S. diplomats and servicemembers in Iraq. According to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, “The intelligence assessment made clear that no action — allowing Soleimani to continue his plotting and his planning, his terror campaign — created more risk than taking the action that we took last week.”
With any intelligence assessment there is uncertainty and disagreement. This situation is no different. For their part, many Congressional Democrats are expressing doubt over the veracity of the threat and the rationale for acting.
Removing Soleimani from the battlefield at the tactical level is certainly to be welcomed. He was responsible for the deaths of countless Americans in Iraq, thousands of civilians throughout the Middle East as a result of his execution of Iranian foreign policy, and represented the spear tip of Tehran’s effort to undermine American interests and regional stability.
That said, does removing him from the equation disrupt or merely delay Iranian activity? Or, alternatively, does it lead to an escalation or acceleration. Answering this question is fraught with peril. It is unclear what the threat was and, as aforementioned, how imminent it was. Killing Soleimani is almost certain to give Tehran a moment of pause in its calculus, but does it ultimately dissuade it from acting or reacting? Likely not.
But was it a strategic success and will it deter Iran? This question remains to be answered, as is the question of whether it was the best course of action full stop.
How will Iran Respond?
The immediate response from Iran consisted of a series of missile strikes against U.S. targets in Iraq — Iraqi bases on which U.S. personnel were stationed. According to the Department of Defense, Iran launched “more than a dozen” ballistic missiles at bases in Ain al-Assad and in Irbil. The strikes did not result in any U.S. casualties and, from preliminary reporting, were apparently highly telegraphed.
According to report, Iran informed Iraq that the attacks were coming and according to President Trump, the U.S. detected the launch well before the missiles impacted their targets.
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of Iran said on Twitter, “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense under Article 51 of UN Charter.” He added, “We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.”
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for his part, was less enthusiastic about the response noting that, “the U.S. “received a slap in the face last night,” but “What is important is that the corruptive presence of the U.S. in this region must end.”
While it appears, for the moment, that the tensions with Iran may be subsiding and that they tit for tat response may have ended, that does not rule out future responses.
At conventional level, Iran does not compare to the United States. This is, however, not the point. Iran’s influence throughout the region, its innumerable proxy forces and allies, and its unconventional capabilities mean that it still possesses a potent threat to U.S. personnel, interests, and allies.
Tehran could increase tensions in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and conduct operations against Israel via Hezbollah. Most easily, Iran could escalate tensions in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, stoking protests against the United States or again attacking its Embassy and outlying facilities.
Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding resolution (backed by Shiite politicians) urging Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi to rescind Iraq’s 2014 invitation to U.S. forces to fight the Islamic State, a move that would expel U.S. troops from that country.
President Trump, in response, threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq and deliver a bill for America’s involvement. According to the President, “We have a very extraordinarily expensive air base that’s there. It cost billions of dollars to build…We’re not leaving unless they pay us back for it.”
Iran has threatened in the past to close the Strait of Hormuz and strangle shipping of oil out of the Persian Gulf. This would, in turn, cause oil prices to increase dramatically — oil prices did rise immediately following Soleimani’s death. Shutting down the Strait would be counterproductive and adversely affect Iran itself, but could also be caused merely by introducing doubt and uncertainty into the safe transit of the passage. Sea mines, cruise missiles, small boat swarms and other tactics would achieve similar effects as conventional blockades.
Iran has also demonstrated a proclivity and increasingly capable cyber activities. Attacking Western critical infrastructure nodes such as electrical grids, financial institutions, or telecommunications platforms would not be beyond the realm of possibility.
How will the United States Respond to Iran’s Response?
Prior to the ballistic missile strikes, President Trump tweeted: “Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have……targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats.”
Secretary of State Pompeo said the strike “was aimed at disrupting that plot, disrupting further aggression and we hope, setting the conditions for de-escalation as well.”
As a precautionary measure against Iranian attacks, the United States stood down anti-Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq. A statement issued by the coalition command said “We remain resolute as partners of the government of Iraq and the Iraqi people that have welcomed us into their country to help defeat ISIS.” It added, “We remain ready to return our full attention and efforts back to our shared goal of ensuring the lasting defeat of Daesh [the Islamic name for ISIS].” Indeed, a temporary beneficiary of the current focus on Iran and force protection may well be the Islamic State.
At the same time, the United States sent 750 members of the Immediate Reaction Force of the 82nd Airborne Division to join 100 Marines in Baghdad who were sent to reinforce the Embassy following the protests. Another 3,500 members of the 82nd were sent to the Middle East as well. “The brigade will deploy to Kuwait as an appropriate and precautionary action in response to increased threat levels against U.S. personnel and facilities, and will assist in reconstituting the reserve,” according to a statement by the Department of Defense.
Based on President Trump’s White House address, it appears that Washington is climbing off of the escalation ladder. The President did say that additional sanctions are being imposed on Tehran in response, but thus far it does not appear there will be future retaliation.
This is, of course, based on the state of play at the time of this writing. Future responses or actions by Iran could result in additional retaliation.
America as a Paper Tiger?
Recent history, America’s vacillation on the international stage, and the apparent unwillingness of Washington to respond to provocation could, perhaps, have suggested to Iran and others that it was a paper tiger. Despite public proclamations to the contrary, the administration has been fairly restrained in its use of military force.
True, the rules of engagement were loosened in Afghanistan and decision-making authority devolved to local commanders, but in practice, aside from raids by Special Operations Forces such as against the Islamic State leader al-Baghdadi and others, the United States has not taken significant military action. Iran’s behavior in the Middle East, its attacks against tankers in the Persian Gulf, its shooting down of an American Remotely Piloted Vehicle (nee UAV), and its attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure were met with mild responses, at best.
Tehran (and others) could have believed that the United States was all talk and no action. This could, perhaps, explain some of the shock in the international community. To be sure, the killing of Soleimani is in and of itself surprising, but the fact that the United States would take such a bold action, especially after its quiescence in this and the previous administration, likely shook those that expected more of the same in the wake of the attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Intel Profile: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Ethan Brown
Profile: General Qasem Soleimani’s Quds Force
Name: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Expeditionary Quds Force / “Pasdaran” (Persian: “Guards”)
Operational Dates: 1979-Present (Revolutionary Guards Force) 1988-Present (Unilateral Internal/External Military component, the “Quds” force)
Background
History
Rising from the turmoil of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was among the initial groups jockeying for power in the wake of the Shah Mohammed Pahlavi’s descent from power. In the vacuum of government afforded stability, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini grew in influence, amassing clerical, institutional and military support. His revolutionary movement ultimately rose to power on the backs of a broad people’s movement. The Revolutionary Guard amalgamated from the masses as a means of consolidating the ideological revolution and protecting the Ayatollah, who achieved a theocratic republic under the concept of velayat-e faqih, or “guardianship of the jurist”. The original mission of the IRGC was to prevent a repeat of the 1953 coup d’état by insulating the Ayatollah from external threats within the geographic borders of Iran.
As 1980 gave rise to the Iran-Iraq war, the IRGC underwent a rapid and intense institutionalization, parallel to the conventional Iranian military. Like the conventional military, the IRGC possesses ground, air and naval forces, however the ‘air’ component of the IRGC exclusively deals with the Iranian ballistic missile program. Additionally, the IRGC is responsible for a rapid mobilize Bajir paramilitary force of 600,000, and a cyber warfare component, dedicated to espionage and propaganda distribution.
Rise of the Quds
As the IRGC became fully engaged in the Iran-Iraq war, its expeditionary Quds force quickly rose to prominence within the IRGC, becoming the de facto foreign affairs component of the Iranian regime. During the 1980–1988 conflict and beyond, the Quds sponsored armed groups outside of its borders in order to secure Iranian influence throughout the broader Middle East. The scope of the IRGCs operations, and particularly the external/international activity of the Quds force, was noted by a IRGC founding member to be “[unlike] any other organization in any other country [are] the Revolutionary Guards. It’s something like the Communist Party, the KGB, a business complex, and the mafia”.
Early in the rise of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the Quds force a protectorate of the revolution, permanently setting the Quds on a path for internal primacy and a political role in shaping Iran’s future. Under the constitution, the Pasdaran was formally declared a separate but equal component to the Iranian military, dedicated to various roles including:
Battling counterrevolutionaries in every domestic form
Promoting revolutionary ideology throughout the IRGC and the broader domestic populace
Defense against foreign influence within the geographic borders of Iran
Supporting “liberation movements” abroad under the direction of the religious authority of the revolution leader (the Ayatollah)
This formal declaration was not without its challenges, as the IRGC and its Quds Special Forces were a few among many groups lobbying for assertion and control in the new republic. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Qods was directly responsible for quelling Kurdish, Turkmen, and Baluch uprisings, in addition to former Khomeini-loyalist groups who split from the government in attempts to undermine the revolutionary regime. Over the following decades, the IRGC and its Quds component became the prominent force in suppressing any and all forms of dissent through a broadening and comprehensive social, institutional, and ideological expansion.
At present, the relationship between the Ayatollah and the IRGC, particularly with the Quds force, is exceptionally symbiotic and politically expedient for Khomeini. He has regularly appointed Pasdaran members significant political roles in order to offset constitutional limits to his power, further fomenting the profound domestic and external reach of the Quds.
Scope of Operations: Clandestine, Economic, Cyber & Terror Sponsorship
The Pasdaran can be linked to nearly every headline grabbing terror group throughout the broader Middle East region. In addition to a comprehensive campaign to assure domestic dominance by the authoritarian Khomeini regime, the Quds force, led by General Qasem Soleimani since 1998, aided a wide variety of proxy forces abroad in order to promote Iranian influence. In Syria, during the Arab Spring 2011 uprisings, Quds force operatives were dispatched from Tehran to suppress the protest movement, first as tactics and strategy advisors but quickly becoming directly involved in combat.
Iran has played a dangerous game in plying both sides of the Afghanistan conflict throughout its 18-year saga, openly supporting economic projects to the Afghan government, while covertly providing weapons (mortars, ammunition and plastic explosives) and other significant resources to the Taliban. This includes a reported exchange of highly sophisticated Russian-made SA-14 Gremlin surface-to-air shoulder fired missiles in 2009. As if to underscore the influence of Iran and the role of its operations in Afghanistan, IRGC forces can be openly seen in the Iranian consulate in Herat Province, one of the few ‘stable’ regions in Afghanistan.
Under the pressure of international sanctions, the IRGC has made hay in the export of Iranian oil, primarily for the purposes of personal gain by IRGC leadership. Through extraordinary outreach, “private energy exchange” programs, and good old-fashioned smuggling, the IRGC have managed to offset sanctions to the tune of billions of dollars. This in direct opposition to Iranian parliamentary outcry, clearly demonstrating the increasing prominence of the IRGC and shrinking role of President Hassan Rouhani’s administration.
The IRGC possess a robust and developing cyber-warfare capability, one whose reach has affected the US in recent years. These cyber-attacks have included DDoS targeting of the US financial sector and infrastructural disruption in 2013, civil hacking of a Las Vegas corporation in 2014, and an intellectual property cyber-theft campaign in over one hundred US academic institutions in 2017. These attacks, nearly all of which have been attributed to the IRGC by US government reporting, contained sophisticated cyber methodologies including credential dumps, ‘powershell’ and user execution malware, remote file copying, and a variety of simpler ‘phishing’ techniques.
Explosively Formed Penetrators
Most notable to western consumers of this analysis may be the IRGC direct involvement with operations conducted against US and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the clandestine arm of the Quds Special Forces is responsible for the proliferation of lethal and highly effective Improvised Explosive Device (IED) technology to Shiite militias targeting western forces in Iraq. These advanced IEDs included the horrific and extremely effective explosively formed penetrator (EFP) configuration, specifically designed to defeat US and coalition anti-IED armor.
The EFP is an explosive fired conical implement similar to a plastique shaped charge, super-heating the copper conical face into a molten bullet traveling over 6500 feet per second, or roughly 6 times the speed of sound. The materials and training on utilizing these devices in locales like Sadr City, Kirkuk, Fallujah and southern Afghanistan claimed over a thousand US casualties in Iraq alone, and were directly provided to insurgent forces by Quds operatives. When coalition forces became more adept at identifying EFP placement, the Quds operators disseminating the devices helped disguise the charges in foam bricks to look like normal curbs and walls, making them harder to locate and presenting a new threat to dismounted forces. As mine-clearing and explosive ordinance capabilities adapted to circumvent the threat via the Rhino thermal trigger system and other innovations, again the Quds operatives improved the design by increasing the range and geometry of the devices, distributing CD-ROMs with instructions on the construction, placement, and design options to increase lethality.
January 7, 2020
On the night of January 7, 2020, around 5:30PM (EST), the IRGC Air Forces component launched a barrage of guided missiles at Iraqi bases, thankfully resulting in no reported casualties. The IRGC has claimed responsibility for the missile strikes through state media channels and directly attribute the attack as vengeance for the death of General Soleimani.
Several of the missiles were reported on various unclassified intelligence outlets on Twitter to have dudded or failed to reach their targets. Regardless of the potential fail rate of the ballistic missiles when deliberately targeting a location, IRGC capabilities should be carefully noted, as multiple Trump administration officials believe the missiles which did successfully complete flight patterns but missed significant targets was done on purpose. The IRGC does not possess any aircraft as an “air force,” thus the entirety of their “air” inventory and R & D is in its ballistic missile program.
The act to target bases containing US and coalition troops and deliberately miss the housing of those personnel is indicative of a robust and advanced weapons inventory, capable of precision strikes and supported by a reliable intelligence reporting footprint- one that can easily be attributed to the Quds-managed insurgent networks inside Iraq. Thus, the IRGC and its clandestine Quds component are unquestionably a highly capable, complicated and dangerous power broker in the Middle East, responsible for the lion’s share of unrest and turmoil.
The views are of the author, and do not reflect the views, position, or policy of the U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense.
War Powers and the Constitution
Chris Condon
This week, the world was shocked to learn that the Trump administration had ordered the killing of Qasem Soleimani, a major but controversial figure in the Iranian military leadership. Conducted via drone strike, the killing was followed by statements of support from the president’s own party, but was met with either uneasiness or outrage from the international community. Even Democrats in Congress responded negatively to the attack, asserting that President Trump stepped far beyond his constitutional ability to make war by approving the strike. Following a closed-door briefing from senior military officials to members of the U.S. Senate claiming that the strike was permitted despite a lack of congressional approval, Senators Mike Lee and Rand Paul announced their support for a new Democratic initiative to limit the president’s war powers.
While other aspects of the Soleimani fiasco will be covered in this edition of the News Roundup, I’d like to take a step back and consider a broader question: what exactly are war powers? Do they even exist?
War and the military in general are two things that the Constitution mentions multiple times, indicating that the founders believed them to be extremely important subjects in the scheme of the federal government (by contrast, the word “education” is not mentioned). In Article I, the framers give Congress the explicit power to both “raise and support Armies” and “declare War.” It later goes on to delegate to the president the role of commander-in-chief, stating “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” (emphasis added). While the founders anticipated that a singular chief executive would be inclined toward war in case of international disputes, they required congressional approval of and ultimate control over military action to rein in the president’s most consequential foreign policy power.
In the early years of the republic, every war fought by the United States was preceded by a congressional declaration of war. The War of 1812, America’s first war, was largely driven by congressional furor rather than the desire of the president (President James Madison was actually reluctant to prosecute the war). Although war presidents after Madison were generally more inclined to support the wars they presided over (starting with James K. Polk and the Mexican War), they were extremely reluctant to commence military action without the approval of Congress. Even President Franklin Roosevelt, whose proclivity for untethered displays of executive power is now famous, sought a congressional declaration of war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Beginning with the decision of President Truman to intervene in the Korean War without congressional authorization, however, everything changed.
The Second World War was the last conflict for which Congress provided a declaration of war. Major, large-scale conflicts such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Afghanistan War have been conducted under the umbrella of the president’s inherent “war powers.” In essence, the executive Office of Legal Counsel has argued in the modern era that it is well within the president’s power to conduct military action without congressional approval if it would benefit the national interests of the United States. If that sounds nebulous and ill-defined to you, you are certainly not alone. Congress has tended to agree, a sentiment which they expressed in 1973 with the now-famous War Powers Resolution. Essentially, the act requires the president to inform Congress within 48 hours of using military force abroad, and bans the commander-in-chief from keeping forces abroad for more than 60 days without a congressional authorization of the use of military force (AUMF) or a declaration of war.
Although the WPR was meant to severely limit the president’s ability to make war in the wake of vehement public outcry against the Vietnam War, the executive branch found a way to ignore the chief purpose of the legislation as it is wont to do. Every president since Richard Nixon has asserted that the War Powers Resolution itself is unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers by interfering in the business of the executive branch. In truth, history indicates that the executive has violated the separation of powers for over 60 years by conducting years-long military conflicts without a single congressional declaration of war as the Constitution clearly requires. By continuing this tradition, President Trump stands among those that contribute the the ever-growing threat to our republic that is runaway presidential power.
AUMFs are a related question that bears some consideration in this context. Authorizations for the use of military force are a rather nebulous mechanism by which Congress has provided their consent for military action since the Quasi-war with France under President John Adams. The Constitution makes no mention of them whatsoever, but Congress has used them as an alternative to constitutionally-mandated declarations of war to authorize strictly limited military action for a very specific purpose, rather than authorizing a full-scale war with the stroke of a pen. They were also used for purely defensive purposes for decades, including the Quasi-War and repelling Indian tribes on the American frontier. As Senator Mike Lee stated earlier in the week, it is insulting for the Trump administration (and the Obama administration before it) to assert that the 2001 AUMF against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks (absurdly broad in itself) applies to the killing of Qasem Soleimani.
Arguing that the president possesses special “war powers” that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution only adds to the dangerous trend of runaway executive power. Our founding documents provide clearly delineated instructions on the state’s most solemn responsibility, preserving the security of the people against foreign enemies. While the president does hold a great deal of power in his role of commander-in-chief once Congress explicitly authorizes him to take action through a declaration of war, we must not allow this power to leach further outside of its constitutional container than it already has.
News You May Have Missed
Ending His Campaign, Julian Castro Endorses Elizabeth Warren
Wyatt Newsome
Former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julian Cástro endorsed Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren for president on Monday, just four days after suspending his own campaign. Cástro is one of the first high-profile presidential candidates to drop out and later make an endorsement, and his endorsement of Warren comes at a time when her support is dwindling in favor of Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders and Mayor Pete Buttigeg. Cástro was one of the more liberal candidates in the field as well as the only Latino, and focused much of the political conversation around immigration reform, forcing many candidates to take a stance on the issue of decriminalizing border crossings.
United Methodist Church Moving to Split over LGBT Rights
Wyatt Newsome
After months of internal conflict over LGBT rights, the United Methodist Church has introduced a proposal to split. If passed in May 2020, the bill will allow a “traditionalist” sect of the church to form their own denomination, which would keep the current UMC ban on same-sex marriages and ordained LGBT clergy. The conflict culminated after a vote in February 2019 where 53% of UMC leaders voted to support the current ban. The bill also contains a provision to provide $25 million to the new traditionalist denomination, and also reserves $39 million for marginalized racial groups. The conflict not only reflects a political and religious culture war in the United States, but also social and ideological differences on the worldwide stage.
After Negotiations, Spanish Premier Forms Minority Coalition Government
Wyatt Newsome
This week, Pedro Sánchez of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) was approved as Prime Minister. The PSOE entered into a coalition government with the far-left party Unidas Podemos, making the leftist government the first time that Spain has had a coalition government since the 1970’s. However, the coalition was still left 21 votes short of a majority, meaning that the coalition had to join with smaller parties to pass Sánchez’s induction as Prime Minister. Notably, the coalition cooperated with Catalonian separatist parties, who are hoping that the new government will allow a vote on independence in the region. As with elsewhere in Europe, the recent election also saw the success of a far-right nationalist party, in this case Vox, which placed third by number of seats won.
The views of authors are their own, and not that of CSPC.