Friday News Roundup — December 6, 2019
NATO at 70; Analyzing the Democratic Field; More Troops in the Middle East?; New Partnerships in the Pacific; Plus News You May Have Missed
Good morning, and, believe it or not, after today, there are only three more Fridays left in 2019. We hope our U.S. readers enjoyed a wonderful Thanksgiving holiday, and, hopefully, politics didn’t wade into too much of the dinner conversation.
This week in Washington, impeachment hearings progressed, as the attention turned to the House Judiciary Committee and Speaker Pelosi announced that the House would be pursuing impeachment charges. At the same time, President Trump was abroad at the NATO summit, where the 70th anniversary of the alliance was overshadowed with concerns about its future.
In this week’s roundup, Erica gives us a deeper dive into the dynamics of this NATO summit; Chris provides an update on the latest developments in the Democratic Primary; Joshua looks at a possible expansion of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf; Ethan covers the latest energy cooperation between Moscow and Beijing; and, as always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
Making NATO Great Again
Erica Ngoenha
This week, world leaders across the transatlantic community gathered in London to celebrate NATO’s 70th birthday. Undoubtedly, this summit will be remembered for the “hot mic” situation in which Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and a small gathering of fellow heads of state appeared to be mocking President Trump. But the controversy masks the relative success of the meeting which saw the accomplishment of a number of key objectives on increased spending and new military strategies. Despite the bumpy ride, the summit proved that if NATO can survive Trump’s often brutish tactics, the alliance may be better off for it. The conversations President Trump has provoked around defense spending and NATO’s relevancy have challenged the alliance, led by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, to make the case for its existence both in terms of resource management and strategic value. This introspective exercise will help ensure NATO’s long-term viability long after Trump leaves office.
Tensions were high coming into the summit given last year’s disastrous outing and French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments that NATO is “brain dead.” There were additional fears that President Erdogan would block new security plans against Russia because of support that fellow member states have been providing to its Kurdish foes in Syria. In the end, Trump defended NATO against Macron’s comments, a surprising reversal of roles, and Erdogan signed on to a new security deal for Eastern European countries vis a vis Russia. Despite the Trudeau incident, Trump declared the summit a success and claimed credit for the $130 billion in increased military spending by alliance partners.
This was far from the outcome that many observers expected. Even before he became president, Trump lambasted NATO as an obsolete organization. As president, he quickly threw the alliance into panic as he hedged on U.S. support of Article 5, the commitment to the common defense of all NATO member states, and threatened to pull out of the alliance completely. Trump has left NATO supporters around the world fearful that America’s interest in the decades-old alliance may be waning, much to Moscow’s benefit. But the criticisms Trump has aimed at NATO are not new or unique.
Even the most ardent supporters of the alliance acknowledge that the organization has struggled to find its footing and strategic purpose since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the alliance, which was primarily established to counter the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact, lacked a clear mission. NATO leaders struggled to articulate its relevance in the post-Cold War era. The September 11 attacks triggered the first ever invocation of Article 5 and led the military alliance into completely unfamiliar territory executing counterterrorism missions as part of the War in Afghanistan.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the alliance found renewed relevance in familiar territory, but it struggled to unite member states around a common cause. Countries in Southern Europe that considered terrorism and mass migration of refugees to be their primary security threats were reticent to divert resources and attention to countering Russian aggression. These tensions continue today and the question of strategic mission remains murky. President Macron’s critical comments were driven in part by a frustration that NATO does not have a strategic vision that meets today’s challenges.
For its own sustainability and longevity, both in terms of American support and operational relevance, NATO must reevaluate its mission and strategic priorities. It must do the hard work of sorting out tensions amongst member states to focus on areas of common interests. For the first time, we saw the summit tackle a substantive dialogue on the rise of China. NATO’s thinking and strategic planning must reflect the world it occupies today, not the Cold War dynamics that triggered its creation. Not only to placate President Trump, but to develop a long-term vision for its future.
It has taken an outsider, one who was not convinced about NATO’s utility, to force the organization to determined how to evolve to meet current threats and justify its existence. This process has opened the space for Macron to be frank in his criticism of NATO. While his criticism is chiefly aimed at President Trump’s actions, it nevertheless it forces the alliance to have difficult conversations about its future and the U.S. role in it. In fact, as part of the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit, member states have agreed to “set up a committee to reconsider the alliance’s broad strategic vision.”
President Trump’s influence has been chiefly felt on the topic of defense spending. The 2% spending mantra (the goal to ensure NATO allies dedicate 2% of their GDP to defense spending) has been repeated ad nauseam by previous U.S. administrations and members of Congress alike. While allies did make pledges in the latter years of the Obama administration for increased spending by 2024, progress has been slow. President Trump has hammered on this issue with a singular focus. And while his peers are right to point out that the 2% number should not be the only metric of success, there is bipartisan agreement amongst the American foreign policy establishment that European countries and Canada must do more.
In an interview with The Economist in which he made the now famous “brain dead” comment, Macron conceded this point and made the case that Europe must wake up to the reality that the United States is no longer interested in subsidizing Europe’s defense. He argued, “Europe was basically built to be the Americans’ junior partner. That was what lay behind the Marshall Plan from the beginning….But their position has shifted over the past 10 years, and it hasn’t only been the Trump administration.” Macron went on to note that the shift in thinking is a structural one within the United States, not just a feature of the Trump presidency.
Macron’s assessment is correct. After decades of costly wars in the Middle East and with the looming threat of an economically and militarily powerful China, the United States does not have the same appetite or ability to serve as the world’s “benevolent hegemon.” The Obama administration first signaled this change in outlook with the pivot to Asia. Obama believed that allies should do more to secure their own backyards and lessen the burden on the United States.
For Macron, this trend means that Europe must chart its own path on defense. While for some this raises fears of a parallel or competing defense project on the continent outside of the bounds of NATO, it is an important step in the right direction. What could be better for the alliance than a strengthening of capabilities across Europe?
The key for Secretary General Stoltenberg will be to capitalize on the momentum and cause for action created by Trump’s rhetoric without allowing his demeanor to permanently damage the bonds that hold the alliance together, an unenviable task given Trump’s unpredictable behavior. There is a very real threat that the divisions sewn by Trump’s actions could upend the entire project, but if NATO can manage to navigate these testy waters, it will come out of this episode better prepared to tackle current and future threats and ensure its own long-term survival. And for that, it will have Trump to thank.
Kamala’s Collapse
Chris Condon
Yes, it’s happening again: time for another update on the state of the 2020 Democratic primary. Over the past few months, we’ve done these periodically to take stock of the state of the race and the dynamics present in the Democratic Party. Compared to past iterations, however, there have been more changes of greater consequence since our last update. A fairly significant fluctuation in the number of candidates is emblematic of these changes.
First, some unusual candidates have jumped into the race just in the past month. After unequivocally declaring earlier in the year that he would not stand as a candidate for the nomination, former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick stepped into the race. He was met with crickets, his current polling average hovering around half a percent. Similarly, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg declared his candidacy after stating earlier in the year that there was no place for him in the Democratic primary. These two men seek to fill similar niches: relatively moderate, business-friendly Democrats who can capture the political center that they feel has been alienated by President Trump and the far left alike. You might be thinking that there’s already someone in the race that fills that niche: former Vice President Joe Biden.
Much hinges on the performance of Vice President Biden in the near future. It seems as if both Patrick and Bloomberg have made the calculation that Joe Biden will not be able to last through the end of the campaign, perhaps taken down by health issues or dwindling mental sharpness. While earlier in the year Biden seemed preordained as the Party’s best hope against Donald Trump, his abysmal performance in the debates may have been enough to convince prominent moderates that new voices were needed to counterbalance Warren and Sanders on the left. The Democratic base doesn’t seem to agree, however, with Deval Patrick hovering just above Marianne Williamson in the polls and Bloomberg narrowly beating out Andrew Yang despite spending millions of dollars out of his own pocket.
Opposite the small number of candidates entering the field, there has been a relatively large winnowing in the past two months. Democratic darling of the 2016 cycle Beto O’Rourke dropped out of the race after being met with a lukewarm response from the national Party base. Moderate candidates Congressman Tim Ryan and Montana Governor Steve Bullock also ended their candidacies, hovering below one percent in the polls for the duration of the campaign. All three of these candidates proposed a unifying direction for the party, driving towards the center to capture the more moderate elements of the electorate. With the dominance of Biden in that area early in the race and the declining popularity of centrist policy among the Democratic base, they were mostly doomed from the start.
Finally, we come to the peculiar case of California Senator Kamala Harris. Once heralded as an Obama-like figure who could bring together the wings of the party, she entered the race in third place behind Biden and Sanders. Following her lauded performance in the first Democratic debate (in which she sparred with Joe Biden over racial issues), she temporarily vaulted over Senator Sanders into second place with 15% support. After failing to respond to pointed attacks from Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard in the second debate and lackluster performances at the others, her poll numbers plummeted to between three and four percent. Despite this decline, pundits were shocked with Harris’ surprise announcement that her candidacy was ending. Since she was still at fifth place in the polls and had qualified for the December debate, many were left wondering why she withdrew with such haste.
Last week, the New York Times published a devastating piece detailing the many ways in which the Harris campaign had unraveled since it began. Unclear campaign leadership, poor organization, poor treatment of staff, and lackluster fundraising numbers all seemingly contributed to the decline. The Times has also written about what seemed like the biggest issue with the Senator’s campaign from the start: she didn’t know why she was running. Although Kamala rehearsed her talking points to respond when asked this question, it was still never clear where she stood on important issues. Was she a proud former prosecutor running to appeal to the moderate wing of the party, or was she a progressive newcomer who disavowed her “tough on crime” past? She struggled at various times to answer whether she supported single-payer health insurance and abolishing private insurance, and struggled with “Kamala is a cop” memes that sprouted up across social media.
Whatever the reasons in Kamala Harris’ mind were that compelled her to drop out, it is clear that candidates are not rewarded for acting like chameleons on principle. Although Elizabeth Warren doesn’t have that problem, she has fallen slightly in the polls since our last update. She had been polling ahead of Joe Biden for a short time, knocking him from frontrunner status temporarily and creating waves of media buzz. While at the top, she failed to garner much-needed endorsements and gradually slumped back to her former position just below Sanders. This is still nothing to sneeze at, and Senator Warren remains competitive in early states like Iowa and New Hampshire. If she can again perform well in the December debate, she may be able to recapture her momentum. There isn’t much to say about Bernie Sanders, aside from the fact that he continues to rake in campaign contributions and his support has remained remarkably steady since the spring.
With consistent numbers among the rest of the field, there are no other relevant changes to note. While Vice President Biden continues to lead the pack and his support seems resilient, there are still over two months until the Iowa Caucuses. Even once the primaries commence, current numbers indicate that Biden may have a difficult time in both Iowa and New Hampshire. If he performs poorly in both, he may start to see his heretofore loyal base of support dwindle. Much like 2016, this election is still anybody’s game.
Mullahs, Missiles, & Mobilization
Joshua Huminski
In the first week of December, officials from the White House disclosed that President Donald Trump was mulling sending 14,000 additional troops to the Middle East to counter Iran. This coincided with U.S. defense and intelligence officials reporting that the threat from Tehran had increased in recent weeks and reports that Iran was moving short-range ballistic missiles into Iraq.
If the troops do in fact go to the Middle East this would more than double the number of U.S. military personnel that have been sent to the since May. There has been some speculation as to the veracity of the 14,000 number with the Pentagon issuing a non-denial denial. A Pentagon spokesperson said that the Wall Street Journal report that originated the 14,000-troop number claim said that it was an “erroneous item” adding that “we haven’t made a decision to deploy an additional 14,000 troops.”
Regardless of whether the increase happens or not, the belief is that any increased material and personnel would present a more significant deterrent to Iran which, as of late, has been increasing bellicose. Most recently, in September, Iran is believed to have been behind a series of attacks against Saudi Arabian oil facilities.
Over the last two months in particular, the warnings that Iran may strike have steadily continued. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, the commander of U.S. Central Command, warned in late November that his “judgment is that it is very possible they will attack again” adding ‘it’s the trajectory and the direction that they’re on.”
Speaking to the intelligence, the officials would not say specifically what the threat entailed, but that “there has been consistent intelligence in the last several weeks.” Elaborating further, there has been movement of Iranian weapons and personnel that could be put in place for a potential attack against U.S. interests in the region.
Indeed, the New York Times reported that Iran was using the political chaos in Iraq to covertly move short-range ballistic missiles into the country. Using Shiite militias, according to Reuters, Tehran has been moving these missiles into Iraq since at least 2018. Reuters’ sources reported that Iran was also assisting its Iraq allies in manufacturing their own missiles.
What does the movement of the missiles mean?
That Iran is moving missiles in Iraq is not surprising. First, it offers Iran another means of retaliating in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack against Tehran or its proxies. A former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander said as much to Reuters: “We have bases like that in many places and Iraq is one of them. If America attacks us, our friends will attack America’s interests and its allies in the region.”
Short range ballistic missiles (such as the Zelzal, Fateh-110 and Zolfaqar) with a ranges of around roughly 200–700 kilometers would put Tel Aviv in range of the outskirts of Baghdad (with flashbacks of the Gulf War and the SCUDmissile threat). Equally, Saudi oil facilities would also be in range. Indeed, there remains some speculation as to the direction from which the drones and cruise missiles that struck the facilities in September originated, including possibly Iraq.
Second, and as with the Saudi strike, it offers Tehran a measure of deniability in the event an attack occurs. While the missiles will almost certainly carry Farsi markings and identifying features, as was seen in the September strikes, that alone is insufficient evidence of Iranian bellicosity.
Iraq’s political turmoil also aids Iran’s efforts to advance its own domestic interests. Iraq’s Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi announced that he would resign following two-months of domestic anti-government protests in response to government corruption and, ironically, Iranian-influence in Baghdad’s affairs.
What’s happening in the background?
Iran itself is reeling from what has been called the worst political unrest in nearly 40 years. Two weeks ago, the government announced a 50% increase in gas prices (and 300% for gas beyond ration limits) resulting in widespread turmoil, leading to at least 180 deaths (and possibly hundreds more, according to the New York Times). As a result of the protests, the government blocked nearly all of Iran’s already limited Internet access.
Unsurprisingly Ayatollah Khamenei blamed the protests on monarchists and opposition groups dedicated to destabilizing the Iranian government. In reality, the gas price hikes were merely a spark to an already flammable situation. The country is under increasing economic pressure due to the re-imposition of harsh economic sanctions after the U.S. withdrew from the nuclear agreement. This also follows increased regional pressure and pushback in Lebanon and Iraq against Iranian influence in both countries.
At the same time, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint letter to the United Nations Security Council alleging that Iran had violated a UN resolution preventing Tehran from developing nuclear capable ballistic missiles. Citing four cases specifically, the letter stated that “Iran’s developments of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and related technologies is inconsistent” with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear agreement.
Where to from here?
Tensions between Iran and the United States are nothing new. Iran’s increasing aggressiveness and demonstrations of capability by proxy are, however, of concern.
Attacking oil tankers at sea, launching drone/cruise missile strikes, moving missiles to Shiite militias, and increased support for Houthi rebels in Yemen all illustrate ways in which Tehran could strike out should it feel necessary.
Why might it do so? It could feel backed into a corner internationally and choose to signal its capabilities. Equally, it may attempt to do so to provide an external threat to offset internal instability — a rally-round-the-flag effect. Were the United States to launch a unilateral attack (unlikely, but not impossible), it would undoubtedly respond in kind with proxies and conventional forces. Indeed, much of the coverage of the increased tensions reported that U.S. officials noted that these intelligence reports are not a result of White House interference or attempts to shift attention away from the ongoing impeachment discussions.
Perhaps the greatest risk is in miscalculation. Iran seems intent on demonstrating that it has the capacity to inflict pain and push the boundary as far as possible, but where that boundary lays remains unknown. How far is too far? At the moment, striking Saudi oil facilities and shooting down remotely piloted aircraft has yet to provoke a substantial response. Reports indicate that President Trump authorized cyber operations in retaliation, but certainly nothing overt has yet occurred.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the President’s decision-making (perhaps strategic, by design), it is unclear what may trigger a response or initiate an action. With the number and diversity of pieces in play, internal and external pressures, and uncertainty surrounding the decision-making processes of both countries the possibility of escalation is very much real.
China Looks to Russia for Energy Security
Ethan Brown
This week, the National Security spotlight has focused on the tensions ahead of the NATO summit and barbs traded between Presidents Trump and Macron, not to mention a certain little “Rocket Man” continuing to incite instability ahead of a nuclear agreement timeline via “super large” rocket deployments and promises of a Christmas Gift for the US. Yet one incident with direct impact to US National Security flew under the proverbial radar- developments in the energy field of international affairs.
As the COP25 Climate conference (another headline-commandeering event) opened for discourse, China coincidentally took a step towards correcting its severe air pollution problem resultant of its dependency on coal energy in favor of the newly completed “Power of Siberia” natural gas pipeline. But this endeavor has little to do with China going green and far more to do with securing energy resources in order to support continued economic expansion.
If the “Siberia” tagline sounds worrisome, it should be. The gas pipeline covers a distance of somewhere between 3200km (1875 miles) and 8100km (5000 miles +/-), depending on which state-controlled news agency one subscribes to. As reported by Chinese state-run Xinhua, the pipeline will annually deliver 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas by 2024. When compared to the annual production of states elsewhere in the world, this number may not seem like much; the United States paced global competition in natural gas production to the tune of 831.8 Billion cubic meters. Indeed, the use of the Power of Siberia will only supplement about 10% of Chinese natural gas consumption, but the National Security implications will be covered in detail in the subsequent analysis.
The pipeline, which originates in the natural-gas laden region of Irkutsk, has provided the opportunity for increased development and integration between the two biggest US/EU rivals in global power brokerage. This pipeline signals the first in a new wave of energy cooperation and economic considerations as a result of a 30 year deal signed between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in May of 2014 (worth $400 Billion), but more infrastructural cooperation is anticipated. Supplemental to the pipeline itself, a massive construction project to bridge the Amur river is expected in the future to connect the Russian town of Blagoveshchensk and its Chinese counterpart just over the border, Heihe.
China: one merit for reducing coal energy usage (#climate), two demerits for throwing your towel in with the worlds #1 aggregator is mischief and discord.
How did we get here? Proximate factor: Ukraine. More elaborately, the Russian annexation of Crimea, which led to European states taking major steps to decrease reliance on Russian natural gas exports beginning in February of 2014. Again, the agreement between Moscow and Beijing was signed three months after this retraction by European customers as a means of retaliation for Russian expansionism and a push for greater EU energy independence. Objectively, Russia needed this deal (in addition to an aggressive press to reopen energy exportation with Europe) in order to prop up a flagging economy, reeling after years of sustained sanctions by the west. China merely sees this deal as another medium for its own designs on dominating the hemisphere.
The National Security implications of this endeavor between the West and Russia/China are evident in one domain at first glance: cooperation between two of the United States greatest threats. Addressing China in a trade and intellectual property war or curtailing Russia in a cyber conflict is one thing, facing an increasingly integrated relationship between the two is not a storm that United States can easily abide. And it’s not just an energy co-op; despite leaders from both states carefully avoiding the use of the word “ally”, recent collaboration on a missile-launch detection system, in addition to broader joint military exercises stemming from a security coordination agreement, signals a deeper integration which resets the threat calculus for the west.
There remains zero doubt on China’s long-term vision and objectives for economic dominance. Despite the Power of Siberia coming online, ExxonMobil announced its own 20 year natural gas export deal with China in April. This signifies that China cares not where it supplements energy demands from, so long as these engagements support the broader strategic initiative of economic expansion.
As a National Security consideration regarding the Exxon deal with China, policy makers in the West must note that this importing of US natural gas across oceans in a complicated and increasingly dynamic maritime situation in the South China sea versus piping fuel direct from neighboring Russian production fields highlights a delicate balancing act on the part of the US. As the trade wars rage on, upsetting diplomatic intercourse and fomenting isolation threatens to undermine our national security interests abroad.
This integration between Russia and China highlights the recent intensification of Chinese military capabilities: “growing energy demand is one driver of the Chinese military build-up to protect energy supply lines”, further demonstrative of Beijing’s designs on resetting the international order in the coming decades. Fortunately, the United States has enjoyed its own energy boom in recent fiscal years, which sets the conditions for the US to act on its stated goal to assure its own security and become a reliable international broker by promoting prosperity and reducing poverty abroad among partner nations via energy exports. As part of this strategy, support for Eastern European energy independence from the Kremlin becomes an area of focus, in an effort to ensure the balance of energy as a strategic power measurement doesn’t continue to favor China’s growing sphere of influence.
The views are of the author, and do not reflect the views, position, or policy of the U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense.
News You May Have Missed
Potato Shortage Looming?
Yoshi Heima
Potato farms in the United States and Canada are reporting a potential crop shortage due to excessively cold and wet weather. According to the US Department of Agriculture, domestic output this year will decrease by 6.1%, which is the lowest since 2010. Even Idaho, the top U.S. potato producer, is forecast to decline 5.5% in production. Among the nine states that grow potatoes, Idaho, Oregon, North Dakota, Colorado, and Maine all saw declines in their crop. If we are to believe concerns that supplies may not meet the outstanding demand for French Fries, get ready for Onion rings.
Huawei Challenges U.S. Government Ruling in Court
Yoshi Heima
Huawei has launched a legal challenge to a decision by U.S. regulators to classify it as a national security threat. According to Huawei’s chief legal officer, Song Liuping, “The U.S. government has never presented real evidence to show that Huawei is a national security threat. That’s because this evidence does not exist.” This is the second legal challenge from Huawei as it fights back against Trump administration, following the similar legal action, in May, which challenged a decision to ban U.S. government agencies from buying its products. This comes as Washington has been pressuring other nations to not allow Huawei to supply their own 5G telecoms infrastructure.
Frances Goes on Strike to Protest President Macron’s Reforms
Today, France is in the midst of day two of strikes protesting President Macron’s proposed reforms to consolidate 42 various public and private sector pensions schemes with a universal program. From lawyers to airline workers, vast segments of the French workforce have walked off the job, and some are threatening to continue striking until the government shelves its proposals.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.