Friday News Roundup — June 23, 2023
Friday greetings from Washington as a busy stretch gives way to two weeks of recess around Independence Day. For Republicans, there are tensions in the caucus but also celebration — or begrudging acknowledgment depending on the viewpoint — that Speaker Kevin McCarthy, (R-CA), has navigated several crises ranging from his very speakership to the debt ceiling deal. How the dissatisfaction over deal making and the Hunter Biden plea deal impact the desire to delve into Biden family dealings going forward this summer will tell us much about the fate of key autumn legislative deadlines and the party’s message for 2024. For Democrats the challenge remains how to balance highlighting Biden administration accomplishments with continued focus on swing voters’ dislike of Trump and anger over Hobbs — and much is out of their control when it comes to inflation versus soft landing versus recession.
Despite all this, inside Washington, the summer may be defined less by partisanship and more by House versus Senate feelings on appropriations. Ethan Brown covers the first steps on defense approps. While GOP House appropriators have come in at FY22 levels below the debt ceiling deal caps, Senators continue to fume over any spending caps at all. Sens. Patty Murray (D-WA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) presaged supplemental spending for defense and national security. Punchbowl News reported Sen. Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) more pointed remarks about the spending caps, “Don’t tell me you’re a China hawk if you negotiated this deal…because you just sunk the Navy.”
Hawks and doves alike were looking towards Beijing this week as Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials. Dan Mahaffee covers this in further detail, looking at how continuing dialogue and business with China will remain part of a tenser relationship.
Back in Washington both the White House and Congress rolled out the red carpet for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a state visit, state dinner, and address to a joint meeting. Erica Ngoenha leads off with further analysis in this week’s roundup.
Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, reviewed “Surviving to Drive” by Guenther Steiner, the team principal of Haas F1 racing team. A look at the 2022 season, Steiner’s diary offers insights into the geopolitical and environmental challenges facing the growing global racing circuit.
Huminski also offered his thoughts for the Council on Geostrategy’s “Big Ask” about the UK-US Atlantic Declaration and what it means for ‘de-risking’ efforts.
On Monday for the Diplomatic Courier, Ethan Brown outlined a possible roadmap for the successful endstate in Ukraine, noting that strategic ambiguity by both Kyiv and Moscow have made such efforts to date difficult, begging the question “Tell me how this ends.”
In the forthcoming book “Crown, Cloak and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth II,” co-authors Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich pull back the curtain on that most secret of all secret handshakes. The Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) recently hosted an on-the-record book talk with Cormac, a Professor of International Relations specializing in secret intelligence and covert action at the University of Nottingham in England. CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield summarizes that discussion.
Elise Mizerak provides an update on how the U.S. and allies are addressing China’s “debt diplomacy” and Hidetoshi Azuma also provides the latest details on Prime Minister Kishida’s political decisions in Tokyo.
As a final publishing note, we will return on the 7th of July — enjoy your Independence Day holiday!
Mr. Modi Comes To Washington
Erica Ngoenha
PM Modi addresses the Joint Meeting of Congress (C-SPAN screenshot)
Washington rolled out the red carpet for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi this week. The White House and Congress tag-teamed to deliver a memorable visit, hosting a state dinner, just the third of the Biden presidency, and inviting Modi to address a joint meeting of Congress. Officials and observers on both sides are framing the visit as a new beginning.
The pomp surrounding the trip was a dramatic change in circumstances for Modi who was previously banned from the United States as a result of deadly ethnic riots that erupted during his time as chief minister of Gujarat state. The reversal epitomizes a wider shift in the relationship which, for decades, had been defined by mistrust and false starts. In recent years, as India’s global presence has grown and its relationship with China deteriorated over renewed deadly border clashes, the United States has leveraged these developments to seek deeper integration in light of its own competition with China.
The two countries now cooperate on a host of issues ranging from emerging technologies to global health. Announcements, timed with the visit, of new joint initiatives on critical minerals, advanced telecommunications, and space exploration, to name a few, open the door for even stronger collaboration moving forward.
Despite these welcomed advances in the relationship, U.S. policymakers should be clear-eyed about the nature and limits of a partnership with New Delhi. Historical irritants remain. Significant policy differences, including concerns about India’s democratic backsliding and frustrations regarding its continued links to Russia, have not disappeared. More pressingly, the two countries have divergent geopolitical aspirations.
The United States is focused on enhancing cooperation with allies and partners as a bulwark in its competition with China. Policymakers see India as a key piece of that puzzle. The U.S. government has reoriented its foreign policy both figuratively and literally to emphasize India’s role, pivoting from an “Asian” to “Indo-Pacific” policy orientation. The Trump administration revived the Quad, which counts India as one of four partners, and President Biden has included India in his administration’s major international economic initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. In a major coup for Modi, the White House announced a deal this week to begin manufacturing F414 jet engines in India, marking the first time that the U.S. grants production access to a non-treaty ally.
While India has welcomed a new era of trust and cooperation with the United States, it has simultaneously emphasized its willingness to work with a variety of partners, even those who hold competing interests. This begs the question, does India share America’s vision for a 21st century global order or is it leveraging Sino-American competition to its own advantage?
India is poised to emerge as a key beneficiary of U.S. economic decoupling with China. As the United States aims to diversify its supply chains, and leans on friendly powers to do the same, India, now the world’s most populous country, looks to be a natural choice. Apple is opening new production facilities in India, Micron announced that it will follow suit, and Elon Musk hinted at Tesla’s foray into the Indian market after meeting with Prime Minister Modi this week.
Thus far, these burgeoning ties have not translated to strategic alignment on a variety of U.S. priorities. In the most glaring example, the Indian government has refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and continues to be a top consumer of Russian oil despite U.S. protests and sanctions.
India has a history of charting its own path in international affairs. It was a leader of the non-aligned movement in the Cold War, but sought closer relationships with both the Soviet Union and America when those partnerships suited its needs. New Delhi’s flexible approach to foreign policy continues today. While building closer ties with the United States and other western allies, India remains an active participant in BRICS, a grouping of non-western nations which includes Russia and China. In a recent interview with the Economist, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar offered illuminating remarks, “You have an India which is looking at multiple opportunities across multiple geographies, often polities which have contradictory interests. And it is trying to advance on all fronts.”
The United States and India need not be perfectly aligned to have a productive partnership, but the U.S. risks overestimating the strength of its relationship with India. One U.S. official recently declared the U.S.-India relationship to be, “the most important bilateral relationship with the United States on the global stage.” By contrast, in the same Economist interview, Foreign Minister Jaishankar quipped “we would like to have multiple choices” when responding to a question about European and American criticism of India’s ongoing ties with Russia.
For now, the U.S.-India relationship is still a marriage of convenience. The United States should respond accordingly. Whether the relationship can develop into something more will largely depend on New Delhi’s vision of the future.
Engagement in an Era of China Competition
Dan Mahaffee
Secretary Blinken speaks in Beijing — State Department YouTube (Author’s Screenshot)
While U.S.-China competition has deepened across geopolitical and technological contests, our interdependence becomes even clearer. Tensions in one area are balanced by the need for dialogue and commerce — though the rhetoric is frostier and business increasingly seeks alternatives. What we saw with Secretary of State Blinken’s visit to China, including a reception by Xi Jinping, shows the importance and limits of engagement with Beijing. In the context of other diplomatic meetings, including Chinese officials in Berlin and Modi’s visit to Washington, we again see how our allies, partners, and other political and private sector leaders have to navigate U.S.-China engagement and tension. How we deal with this China competition requires us to rethink and reshape how we engage and do business with China.
First, there is no binary where you can isolate or fully decouple from China, short of the severance that would happen in an unthinkable conflict. Now, as we de-risk or hedge our engagement or supply chain options, it also strains the benefits that whole economies, multinational companies, and individual consumers have seen from an era of globalization where security or redundancy took a back seat to low-costs and efficiency. In other areas, we also tolerated a reliance on foreign suppliers to avoid the environmental and labor impact at home. While these will inevitably reshape supply chains, there are outstanding questions about how much support governments can continue to provide and at what point consumers will balk at the higher costs. Beyond the commercial questions, there are the shared global challenges of climate, pandemic preparedness, etc. that require some level of Sino-American cooperation to address.
Therefore, how can we understand the shape of engagement with China acknowledging the new competitive reality? With diplomacy, it is again a reminder that diplomacy is a tool of national power as well as the practical avenue for defusing tensions with an adversary. The anecdote from Blinken’s Beijing meeting, as reported by David Ignatius, is revealing:
[A]fter Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, delivered a catalogue of grievances against the United States. Blinken is said to have listened politely and then responded: “Mister Minister, I want to come back in the next life and work for a country that does nothing wrong.”
Wang’s response? He laughed. It seemed a moment of accommodation, when the leading diplomats of the world’s two most powerful nations accepted that each has serious concerns about the other’s behavior but they have no choice for now but to coexist.
They’re rivals, but they can also talk like adults.
In how we trade and do business with China, we have to understand the novel dynamic of a security rivalry with a critical economic partner — something that has not existed in our history since the early Republic’s rivalry and trade with the British Empire. We are embarking on a range of economic and industrial policies as a response, but the various trade and export control tools are there, but need modernization and strategic utilization for this challenge. For the private sector, there is also the need for reliable and consistent rules of the road for doing business.
Creating a red-yellow-green light model for doing business with China could be just the answer. “Red” areas would be technologies or investments related to advanced technologies or solely military technologies — much of what we have already focused on in terms of export controls and a focus on advanced semiconductors, AI, 5G/6G, quantum computing, and other critical technologies. Export controls, outbound investment review, and other restrictions could be focused here. Beyond that there would be the “yellow” area of dual use technologies (which would require verification and transparency around end use), or investments/data transfers that are ultimately permissible but still warrant caution due to Chinese laws regarding national security, human rights risks, or other vulnerabilities due to the lack of due process or rule of law in China. Here the emphasis would not be on restriction, but frank dialogue between policymakers, security experts, and the private sector on the risk and benefits of this business. The final “green” light would be the fields so commoditized or basic that the only security risks are overdependence on one supplier. For both allies and private sector players, this makes a clearer approach to engagement with China.
Acknowledging the security and technological competition alongside the economic interdependence is a reminder to policymakers in both countries of how neither side could really prevail in a conflict. Both the United States and China are dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductor factories. Neither can afford to lose Taiwan, but what would be the cost of “winning” a Taiwan conflict? Our economies would come to a screeching halt with an economic conflict, let alone a real one. Therefore, while the traditional tools of military deterrence will continue to apply, the diplomatic and economic playbook and toolbox become all the more important in how we address this competition.
The first dose of 2024 Defense-spending intrigue
Ethan Brown
Photo By: Air Force Staff Sgt. Brittany A. Chase, DOD
As I’ve mentioned in previous coverage of the National Defense Authorization Act drafting, the defense spending bill is often one of the rare bipartisan efforts on Capitol Hill. Spending on national defense is one of the few things both major parties can agree on, albeit both sides can be expected to use the voluminous monstrosity to sneak in appropriations for pet projects.
Next year’s defense spending bill already lumbers through the floors of various congressional committee chambers, including last week when the defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations office advanced the current draft of the bill. Based on the snippets of data sneaking out on what this initial draft contains, the following analysis overviews the apparent defense priorities for the upcoming year, an election year of course which always makes this cycle, in a word, volatile.
The wavetop data points: The bill in draft represents a 3.6%, or $28.71 billion over FY23s proposed bill. The President’s initial proposed defense bill was actually $285.87 million less than discretionary allotments proposed by the defense subcommittee. Of course there are the big ticket items: nuclear tried funding, private and venture capital investment and diversification of the defense industrial base, next-gen aerial systems, and an expansion of artificial intelligence testing, development, and fielding. Some of the more explicit details however, are telling and fascinating in the first draft.
First item of note: congressional democrats have accused the GOP of timidity when it comes to Chinese Communist threats and defense policy (something that wasn’t on my natsec policy bingo card). In the current draft of the bill, lawmakers from the aforementioned defense panel of the Senate appropriations committee are seeking an additional $1.9 billion (in the presently $826 billion request) for multi-year munitions procurement from defense manufacturers. The Pentagon requested multi-year procurement authorities in its FY2024 budget request back in March, something normally reserved for large items (like aircraft and ships), so this is not normally affiliated with line items as “small” as weapons systems. This was also a recommendation by the House’s China Competition Committee in order to offset shortages in munitions stockpiles by signaling a long-term increased demand and thus initiate boosted production capacity. House Republicans did not support the $1.9bn in the draft, leading to the criticism from their counterparts in both chambers, although the bill itself did advance from the committee hall along party lines and key GOP congressional leaders signaled the possibility of including the increased discretionary funds at a later floor vote or other version of the bill.
Next, and quite fascinating for its impact on strategic resource allocation, Mexico would be transitioned from USNORTHCOM to USSOUTHCOM. This is an interesting proposal as it would align responsibility for that state under the Senior Command billet charged with overseas operations, as opposed to the current construct where Mexico defense policies and security operations are under the umbrella of domestic security by Title X forces. Those forces in question under USNORTHCOM address major strategic threats, as well as counter-terror operations and other potential destabilizing factors inherent in securing the sovereignty of the United States. This is a little different than overseas missions that are more closely aligned with offensive operations against strategic and operational-level threats. Quite simply, what this could well signal is an increased offensive stance against the drug cartels which represent a major threat to U.S. border security. This analysis is not suggesting the plot of the Sicario movies coming to life (which is absolutely a legitimate possibility still, and likely not too far from a non-fiction theme), but more likely, a renewed and increased effort along the lines of the Mérida Initiative dating back to 2008. The theater transition is set forth in the draft bill to “enable better coordination and prioritization,” which could very well mean more offensive efforts by U.S. military forces to enable Mexican authorities to deal with this deadly threat to regional security.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the defense bill echoes the partisan sentiments of bagging on the ‘other team’ in the White House by using defense bills as a soundboard for party politicking. The draft bill “makes historic investment in security cooperation funding for Taiwan…rejecting the Biden Administration’s inadequate shipbuilding plan by preventing 4 ships from early retirement.” With China competition becoming an increased defense priority, even amidst the fragility of European security during the Ukraine War, the role of the Navy has become ever more important as defense money goes into the Indo-Pacific theater of operations. It’s no secret that the maritime fleet has seen better days, and the current spending bill would authorize the purchase of nine new ships, while retiring 11, including at least five Cruisers which have reached their 35-year service life. The reality of ship management and ship building has become a volatile issue in congress, with lawmakers aiming for a far more active oversight role in the building and maintenance of the Navy’s fleet. But this provision demonstrates that partisan politics are not spared from the typically bipartisan defense spending bill, which indicates how fragile and critical sourcing the military for future confrontations and ongoing competition is.
Those three items were the most noteworthy of the bill’s current state, and of course, it’s only June, meaning the final version of this bill is roughly a dozen rewrites from appearing on the President’s desk for signature. But these teasers show that the future defense spending arena for the upcoming fiscal year is going to be fascinating to watch.
The British Royals and the Secret Service
James Kitfield
SIS Building, London — Wikimedia Commons Photo
Few witnesses will forget the opening ceremony of the 2012 London Olympic Games, when the late Queen Elizabeth II and Agent 007 James Bond (played by Daniel Craig) took a helicopter ride before she appeared to hurl herself out the door and float into the Olympic Stadium on a Union Jack parachute. The skit was hilarious and showed Queen Elizabeth’s playful side, but there was more reality in the seemingly close relationship between Great Britain’s Monarch and Secret Service than casual observers realized.
In the forthcoming book “Crown, Cloak and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth II,” co-authors Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich pull back the curtain on that most secret of all secret handshakes. The Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) recently hosted an on-the-record book talk with Cormac, a Professor of International Relations specializing in secret intelligence and covert action at the University of Nottingham in England. The two co-authors also published “Spying and the Crown: The Secret Relationship Between British Intelligence and the Royals.”
“At one time I myself thought that British Kings and Queens were primarily focused on cutting ribbons and ceremonial events, but I found that the British Royal Family and the British Intelligence Services have had a very close relationship going back hundreds of years, especially during colonialism when Britain maintained a global empire not only through military power, but also through a lot of skullduggery,” said Cormac. “Queen Victoria [who ruled from 1837–1901 — editor’s note] not only was a major intelligence consumer, for instance, but she also had her own intelligence network among the royal families spread throughout Europe.”
Back in 1880 a new foreign secretary was being introduced to Queen Victoria, for instance, and she explained the unusual nature of the relationship. “In essence she told him, ‘If you need really good intelligence, don’t go to the cabinet — come to me. And if you have really good sources, don’t go to the cabinet, come to me,’” said Cormac. “So Victoria was running her own intelligence agency for a very long time.”
Though the relationship between the British Monarchy and Intelligence Services became more informal in modern times, the tradition of a close relationship continued into the post-World War II era. “The late Queen Elizabeth II probably knew more secrets than anyone in Britain because she started reading classified materials and being briefed on intelligence matters going back to the early 1950s,” said Cormac. “So she was an incredible repository of knowledge about intelligence matters.”
Nor was the modern Royal Family simply passive consumers of intelligence. According to Cormac, Queen Elizabeth II tried but failed to get the British government to offer asylum to the exiled Shah of Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. She was also reportedly enlisted by the government to try and cultivate a personal relationship with an Iraqi princess who was publicly saying disparaging things about the British monarchy.
The tradition of establishing a close relationship between Buckingham Palace and the British Intelligence Services MI5 (domestic intelligence) and MI6 (foreign intelligence) was also reportedly passed down from Queen Elizabeth II to her son and grandson, the current King and Prince of Wales, respectively.
“When he was Prince of Wales, King Charles III was a patron of the intelligence services and he regularly visited MI6 headquarters and gave out awards to intelligence agencies behind closed doors for serving with distinction,” said Cormac. “Prince William has worked with MI5 and MI6 essentially as an intern, sitting in on intelligence briefings and even going on an undercover patrol. So the British Monarchy remains more involved in intelligence matters than most people realize.”
Combating China’s “Debt Diplomacy”
Elise Mizerak
Wikimedia Commons Map of the BRI
On June 14, the House Foreign Affairs Committee heard from officials from the State Department, Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), and the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in an effort to better understand the U.S. response to China’s “coercive” Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through the program China offers loans to developing countries to complete infrastructure projects, often with unfavorable conditions. The United States and other countries have criticized BRI as “debt diplomacy” that leaves many developing countries with unsustainable levels of debt and infrastructure projects that lack oversight and accountability and are often rife with corruption.
Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX), and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY), spoke in frustrated tones as they both asserted that the United States is losing this economic battle with China. Representatives from both parties asked officials how they can better convey to developing countries that U.S. infrastructure development investments are ultimately more valuable than those offered by China. First and foremost the United States simply needs to “show up” in these developing countries, as the State Department’s Assistant Secretary Geoffrey Pyatt asserted: “China is a partner of necessity, not a partner of choice.” Too often the United States lacks adequate presence in developing countries such as Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), he said, leaving them to adopt BRI-funded projects.
The United States’ primary response to China’s Belt and Road program has been the Trump administration’s establishment of the Development Finance Corporation, which responds to the infrastructure needs of developing countries through foreign direct investments from private industry. As opposed to the BRI loans, which often stipulate the hiring of Chinese construction companies and flout human rights protections such as child labor laws, the DFC ensures that projects help the local labor force develop valuable skills. Besides contributing to the success of private American businesses, DFC projects must also meet environmental regulations and promote social and economic growth in developing countries.
In theory, the DFC, paired with the efforts of the State Department and the Foreign Commercial Service, should offer an attractive alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. A chronic lack of adequate funding, however, complicates the United States’ ability to compete with China. Beijing spends roughly $110 million sending trade officers to global market fairs, for instance, while the United States only spends an estimated $5–7 million on similar efforts. With so few trade officers on the frontlines, it’s difficult for the DFC and the FCS to adequately track emerging investment opportunities in developing countries.
The Foreign Affairs Committee hearing underscored the challenges facing the United States in its geopolitical competition with China, but lawmakers and witnesses offered possible solutions to counter the U.S. shortcomings in terms of foreign assistance. For instance, each of the witnesses emphasized the value of collaboration with like-minded partners. Such partnerships alert U.S. officials to prospective projects, allowing them to work with allies in an effort to collectively outbid China. That is exactly what happened when the United States collaborated with Australia and Japan to upgrade a 5G network in Papua Guinea. To further diversify critical mineral supply chains beyond China, Ranking Members Meeks suggested that the United States make critical minerals agreements more inclusive despite the strict guidelines for manufacturing outlined in the Inflation Reduction Act.
Despite the bipartisan emphasis on better meeting global infrastructure needs, Ranking Member Meeks noted that some Republicans are proposing a 31% reduction in the foreign assistance budget. He stressed that the United States needs to invest more money in diplomacy if it truly wants to remain competitive with China on the global stage. If China continues to show up in developing countries offering sizable infrastructure loans, countries that have no viable alternative will grasp them regardless of the poor reputation of the Belt and Road program. Going forward it is thus critical that Congress allocates adequate funding to government agencies such as the FCS and the DFC in order to successfully counter China’s “debt diplomacy.”
Fumio Kishida’s Crippled Premiership
Hidetoshi Azuma
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida appears distraught after an attempt on his life in April 2023 (Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s last-minute decision to abort his snap election agenda on June 15 has already exacted considerable damage on his declining support rate. Earlier this week, his support rate dropped by 12 percent, reaching 35 percent for the first time since March. While Kishida’s support rate has been unremarkable compared to his predecessors’, such as the former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s, it achieved an extraordinary recovery beginning this year, demonstrating a text-book resilience curve when shown on a graph. Indeed, Kishida’s resurrection from the abyss of the 20% support rate earlier this year was inextricable from the spectacle of his global leadership spannning from Kyiv to his hometown of Hiroshima at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in May. Following the G7 summit, however, he grew indecisive and allowed external events to undo the painstaking recovery achieved for the last six months.
The upshot so far has been Kishida’s uncertain fate further compounded by the accelerating decline of his own ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Indeed, the growing conservative exodus from the LDP now appears inexorable, leading to the emerging redistribution of power away from the ruling party. Kishida’s decision to approve the controversial LGBT legislation last week proved to be a watershed moment of his tenure, potentially ushering in the beginning of his downfall. Indeed, his appearance of subordination to the US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel’s pressure on the LGBT legislation left an indelible impression on the predominantly conservative constituents of the LDP. In other words, the LDP has essentially lost legitimacy among its core ideological supporters and is effectively on life support propped up by its regional electoral organizations designed to be mobilized for collecting group votes across Japan.
In the short term, the emerging trajectory in Tokyo does not signify an immediate end to Kishdia’s premiership. Indeed, despite his crippled premiership, he virtually remains unrivaled within the LDP while the Opposition is still unable to mount a credible challenge to the LDP. What will likely transpire until the next LDP presidential election in 2024 is Kishida’s last-ditch efforts to maintain his premiership by exploiting the prime minister’s exclusive power to dissolve the Diet. While such a privilege may allow him to disrupt any emerging opposition to his premiership, it would also ironically threaten the LDP itself as the conservative exodus accelerates in earnest. In short, Kishida now finds himself in an inescapable dilemma of having to choose irreparable damage to the LDP with a snap election or a slow, yet certain demise of his own fate by waiting idly for the inevitable.
News you might have missed
Update on Ukraine´s progress towards EU membership
On June 22, the European Commission provided an update on the progress of Ukraine in its bid to become a member of the European Union. A year ago, Ukraine and Moldova were given official candidate country status, and Ukraine has been hoping for a decision of EU member states to open official accession talks by the end of the year. The oral update delivered at an EU ministerial meeting in Sweden concluded that Ukraine has fulfilled 2 of the 7 requirements for accession talks to begin: the establishment of two high-level judicial bodies and aligning legislation on the media sector with EU law.
The report further states that Ukraine has made good progress on reforms of the judicial sector (selection of judges for the Constitutional Court). However, in four sectors, Ukraine has only made some progress: the fight against corruption, the prevention of money laundering, mitigation of excessive influence by oligarchs, and the protection of national minorities. For further reading on Ukraine’s EU aspirations, see this excellent analysis by Politico.
Australia Introduces New Critical Mineral Strategy
On June 20, Australia revealed a new critical minerals strategy to build domestic capabilities in critical minerals processing, and to “de-risk” Australian production. The strategy aims to move Australia up the critical minerals “value chain,” and create diverse, resilient and sustainable supply chains “through strong and secure international partnerships” that “link Australian projects into the markets of our allies and partners.” In an attempt to become a “renewable superpower,” Australia aims to be a significant producer of critical minerals by 2030. Australia is currently a leading producer of lithium and battery minerals for several automotive companies, and it has 81 critical minerals projects worth A$42 billion (Australian dollars). The new strategy would include A$500 million for resource projects on top of A$6 billion already allocated for production of renewables and low-emission technologies. The strategy aims to attract investment from “likeminded partners,” although Australian developers remain concerned about securing adequate investment to cover the high costs of production. Regardless of these concerns, the strategy helps address a domestic skills shortage in mining, automotive, and manufacturing industries.
United Nations Human Rights High Commissioner Requests Monitoring Access in China and India
On June 19, the United Nations Human Rights High Commissioner Volker Türk expressed interest in expanding U.N. human rights offices to China and India. Türk began his proposal by encouraging greater human rights cooperation in nations such as Syria, Iran, Israel, and Russia. Human rights are one of four essential pillars of the U.N. mission, he noted, but it receives only four percent of the general budget. Therefore Türk called for doubling his office’s budget for global monitoring– a proposition that may be difficult to achieve due to several countries opposing increased scrutiny. Additionally, adding a human rights office in China is likely to prove challenging given that simply arranging a high commissioner visit required years of negotiation. Regardless, the U.N. Human Rights Council remains committed to monitoring ongoing allegations of Chinese mistreatment against Uyghur Muslims– abuses that have been denied by Beijing. Türk also requested that the United States improve racial tensions and pass human rights treaties.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.