Friday News Roundup - September 22, 2023

This past week marked the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the annual gathering of leaders and diplomats from the 193 member nations of the U.N., a touchstone diplomatic event that serves each year as an opportunity to take stock and assess the condition of the rules-based international order. As befitting a world beset by unprecedented climate disasters, record-breaking temperatures, historic refugee flows and the greatest number of violent conflicts since the end of World War II, the general consensus was that the international order is dangerously unstable, with more chaos and great power confrontation likely to come.

"Drop by drop, the poison of war is infecting our world," U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in opening UNGA, and who was to argue? For an organization established in 1945 at the end of World War II specifically to avoid the kind of disastrous conflicts that ravaged humanity in the first half of the 20th Century, even the UNGA roster of attendees spoke to the dark clouds gathering over the geopolitical landscape.

While 145 heads of state attended UNGA, leaders of four of the five veto-wielding, permanent members (P-5) of the U.N. Security Council — Britain, France, Russia and China — were conspicuously absent. Of the P-5 leaders, only President Joe Biden of the United States bothered to address the diplomatic gathering in person. Of course, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely feared his potential reception, as the International Criminal Court has issued a warrant for his arrest for war crimes associated with his invasion and attempted dismemberment of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy did address the General Assembly before traveling from New York to Washington, D.C. later in the week for visits to Capitol Hill and the White House. With President Biden’s request to Congress for an additional $24 billion package of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine hanging on the knife’s edge in a budget showdown, Zelenskyy’s message to Congress was blunt:  “If we don’t get the aid, we will lose the war,”  Zelensky told a meeting of U.S. senators.

This week also witnessed Attorney General Merrick Garland sparring with House Republicans in a testy hearing focused on the Department of Justice’s (DoJ) investigations into former President Donald Trump and presidential son Hunter Biden, a preview of the fireworks that are likely to be on display in the coming Republican impeachment inquiry of President Biden. Garland pushed back strongly on Republican charges that his DoJ has gone easy on Hunter Biden and too hard on Trump. Garland reminded lawmakers that he is not President Biden’s lawyer, but neither is he Congress’ prosecutor. 

This week Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, reviewed “Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West” by Maximilian Hess. Focusing on Russia’s efforts to develop resiliency in the face of Western sanctions, Hess details how Moscow sought to de-couple itself from the Western financial system and insulate itself from future economic pressure, thus setting the stage for its expanded war against Ukraine. CSPC is hosting Hess on Thursday, 28 September at 0930 ET for an in-person discussion

CSPC Senior Fellow Ethan Brown analyzes the recent loss of a Marine Corps F-35 stealth fighter, which went missing for 24 hours before a debris field was discovered at its crash site. That incident comes on the heels of two other recent Marine Corps aircraft losses - both fatal - pointing to a possible systematic problem involving insufficient readiness and maintenance budgets.

CSPC Visiting Fellow Veera Parko examines Poland’s recent surprise decision not to supply any more weapons to Ukraine. Poland’s decision relates to a dispute over Ukrainian grain exports to some of its European Union neighbors, who fear a flood of grain will lower domestic prices and hurt farmers in advance of an upcoming election. 

CSPC Presidential Fellows alumni Matthew Trout and Blaine Ravert analyze recent steps Congress has taken to try and claw back its war powers. Earlier this year the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the 2002 AUMF, for instance, which authorized the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which fell in 2003. The Senate’s effort was an important step to reassert constitutional authority, they note, especially given that the 2002 AUMF had been stretched by dubious interpretations almost beyond recognition. They argue that any serious attempt to reclaim Congress’ constitutional authority to declare wars, however, will have to address flaws inherent in the War Powers Resolution itself. 


Missing Stealth Jet Highlights USMC Readiness Concerns

Ethan Brown

In one of the year’s more fascinating and bizarre military incidents, a U.S. Marine Corps F-35 Lightning Stealth fighter went missing for more than 24 hours last week, prompting a Corps-wide stand-down of the fighter inventory and a widespread search across South Carolina to locate the debris of the aircraft, valued at approximately $100 million. The jet was eventually located Northwest of the city of Charleston, near Lakes Moultrie and Marion, approximately two hours north of Joint Base Charleston from where the fighter jet took off.

Most importantly, the pilot (whose name has not yet been released by the Marine Corps Public Affairs) safely ejected, and was discharged from a local hospital Tuesday with no serious injuries. While a $100 million aircraft has tangible value, and it is one of the United States’ most impactful and capable weapons of war, the real value of such a tool is still dependent on its pilot, who is among the most highly-trained and specially selected human assets in the entire DoD inventory.

The incident certainly fomented consternation on the polity side of the issue as well, with Congresswoman Nancy Mace (R-SC) posting to social media the query “How in the hell do you lose an F-35? How is there not a tracking device and we’re asking the public to what, find a jet and turn it in?”

Tongue-in-cheek notwithstanding, the politicization of a military incident in such a manner is more than disingenuous and hardly appropriate for the seriousness of the situation, which bears further scrutiny but hardly moves the needle on the issue of our nation's military becoming a chip for scoring political points.

The facts of the incident are as follows: the 5th-gen fighter took off from JB-Charleston, and at approximately 1,000 feet, the pilot identified a technical problem with the aircraft (which has not been disclosed as the incident remains under investigation). Immediately after, the pilot ejected from the aircraft, ultimately landing in the backyard of an unsuspecting Carolinian resident. The jet continued to fly (it is indeed capable of flying itself to a surprising degree of efficiency and endurance), and somehow ended up at its resting place where Marine Corps investigators have advised local residents to avoid the debris while they collect the remains and begin the lengthy and rigorous investigation process. This incident is categorized as a Class-A Aviation mishap, which by DoD regulations is defined as “when there’s more than $2 million in damage to the aircraft, the aircraft is destroyed, or its pilot or crew are killed or permanently, totally disabled.”

The Marines have had a rough quarter in terms of Aviation mishaps, with two other incidents predating the F-35 loss. On August 24th, an F/A-18 Super Hornet went down near San Diego, and the next week during a Combined Exercise with Australian defense forces, a MV-22B Osprey rotary wing aircraft crashed during maneuvers. The Hornet Pilot, and three Marines aboard the Osprey all lost their lives. All three incidents meet the Class-A mishap criteria, and highlight an unfortunate reality which the Corps contends with and has been for much of their history: funding allocations that are well below the comparative budget growth of the other service branches. More on that shortly.

First, to answer the Rep. Mace’s question about losing the F-35: the aircraft is the most advanced technical marvel ever to fly, and every facet of the airframe is built for the purpose of stealth. It is already known that a technical issue occurred, and the highly sensitive nature and classification of the platforms capabilities means that release of any such data, even to elected officials who aren’t part of the read-on and compartmentalized information requirements, is prohibited. Further, the aircraft, as previously mentioned, can indeed fly itself and operates near-autonomously by design; every F-35 on earth is connected to the others through the Multi-Function Data Link (MFDL) for battlefield awareness and multi-sensor queuing and flight patterning. But when something goes wrong with any of the complex avionics, flight control and reporting systems, as happened with this heretofore unprecedented event, no one knows how this might unfold. And until the exhaustive investigation is complete (the results of which will be carefully screened before public release), no one will have answers. Making this a point of political grandstanding is hardly an appropriate gesture for an elected leader.

The other issues related to this event includes the other Class-A mishaps (not believed to be connected to the F-35 crash), the funding challenges faced by the Corps over the last few budget cycles, and the longstanding concerns of compromise of sensitive material on the F-35 itself. Just last year, Lockheed-Martin suspended deliveries of the F-35 due to alloys made in China being installed on the aircraft. In 2019, a Chinese-owned company was responsible for crafting core performance circuit boards which had been installed on American and U.K. F-35s, prompting another reactive response in the supply chain concerns. Further, budget contractions dating back to 2021, 2020, and 2019, could be rearing their ugly head for the Corps in terms of readiness and force capacity. Those contractions to the force are adherent to the “Force Design 2030” which envisioned and is pursuing a smaller, more mobile and adaptive force, but budget cuts manifest in myriad ways, including maintenance and operations capacity. 

As noted above, the outcome of the investigations will likely provide limited insight into this tragic string of incidents for the Corps, and the human cost looms darkly above any concerns about equipment or materials compromised. But the challenge facing the force is likely far more complicated than a simple aircraft crash. Of particular concern is any security compromise to the F-35’s software writ large; in which case it wouldn’t simply be limited to the USMC fleet, but could compromise every F-35 across the global force, leaving the network susceptible to being hacked by a competent adversary.

Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress

PolAnd Halts Weapons Supply to Ukraine Amid Grain Dispute

Veera Parko

On Thursday September 21, Poland announced it would not supply any more weapons to Ukraine. The decision has surprised many observers, as Poland has been one of the most avid supporters in terms of providing robust military aid to Ukraine since the start of the war. Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki explained the decision as Poland needing to focus more on modernizing its own military. In concrete terms, the announcement will only have a marginal effect: Poland has already supplied Ukraine with considerable military aid (around 3 billion euros so far), including tanks and fighter jets. It is also worth noting that previously agreed transfers of weapons to Ukraine will still go forward as planned. Diplomatically, however, the situation between the two neighbors looks more complicated. In Poland, some comments by politicians are likely fueled by parliamentary elections on October 15.

Poland´s decision relates to the dispute over grain exports between Ukraine and some of its EU neighbor countries (in addition to Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). Ukraine's neighbors have been worried about large quantities of Ukrainian grain entering their markets and lowering domestic grain prices, hurting the livelihood of farmers. The European Union´s temporary ban on imports of grain from Ukraine into these countries ended on September 15, but Hungary, Slovakia and Poland have kept the ban in place despite the EU´s wishes and trade rules. At the United Nations General Assembly this week, Ukraine's President Zelenskyi seemed to refer to the grain dispute, blaming “some of our friends in Europe” for playing out “solidarity in a political theater,” adding that the countries are helping “set a stage to a Moscow actor”. Poland responded by summoning the Ukrainian ambassador in Warsaw.

National politics certainly plays a role in Poland’s announcement because of the upcoming election. In Poland, many of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party’s constituents live in the countryside, where the price of Ukrainian grain is felt the most. Poland has also been on the news recently because of a scandal involving Polish officials worldwide handing out visas to the Schengen area in exchange for bribes.

The diplomatic and trade dispute between Ukraine and one of its firmest supporters raises questions about the effect of the prolonged war in Ukraine on national politics and Western consensus on support for Ukraine more generally. If disputes between Ukraine and its allies are not settled swiftly, the unity of Western aid to Ukraine – and the message sent to Russia – could be undermined. At the same time, Poland is facing a balancing act many European countries close to Ukraine and Russia are up against: maintaining sufficient support – including popular support - for Ukraine, while also investing in one’s own national defense and economic prosperity.

 Veera Parko is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress

War Powers Reform: Taking Back Congress’ Authority to Declare War

 Matthew Trout & Blaine Ravert

On January 3, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered a drone strike to kill Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Forces. The strike against a senior military leader of a foreign power with which the United States was not at war was launched without specific congressional approval, and it raised a host of legal as well as strategic issues regarding the nearly two decade old 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) Against Iraq. The lethal attack represented a unilateral use of force with the potential for unintended escalation, and it was undertaken at the discretion of the White House without congressional approval despite Congress’s constitutional prerogative in declaring war. Nor were such strikes unique to the Trump administration.  

Despite congressional efforts to prevent such unilateral uses of lethal force, including through the passage of the post-Vietnam 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR), presidents from both parties have resorted to deadly force without congressional approval. Rapid advances in technology and the nature of warfare are also increasing the president’s dominance in the use of force calculus by shrinking reaction times and making it easier to circumvent the legislative requirements of the WPR.  While Congress has flexed its powers to authorize large scale conflicts such as the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, new emerging technologies and the U.S. military’s use of “proxy forces” as “surrogates” makes the lack of oversight of smaller scale conflicts increasingly problematic. And as Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, the Congressional authorizations for America’s longest-ever wars have no logical sunset clauses.

Congress is finally taking steps to correct this dangerous imbalance. Earlier this year the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the 2002 AUMF, for instance, which authorized the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which fell in 2003. The Senate’s effort was an important step to reassert constitutional authority, especially given that the 2002 AUMF had been stretched by dubious interpretations almost beyond recognition. Any serious attempt to reclaim Congress’ constitutional authority to declare wars, however, will have to address flaws inherent in the War Powers Resolution itself.  

There are two substantive problems with the WPR. The first is broad and overly ambiguous language, most notably the term “hostilities,” which has been expansively interpreted under the “nature, scope, and duration” test developed by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel. Any effective reform to the WPR must clarify and narrow this language.

Even more importantly, the WPR established a 60-day period for the president and Congress to jointly agree to the use of deadly force under agreed upon circumstances. In practice, however, presidents have interpreted this time window and its limitations on their actions so expansively as to make unilateral uses of force almost routine. This is especially true given that strikes enabled by new military technologies such as unmanned drones can occur in hours or even minutes, as can the threats they are intended to counter.

Given this extremely elastic interpretation of the WPR by commanders-in-chief from both parties, and a threat environment that often prioritizes rapid uses of force, we believe that addressing the 60-day clock is imperative to meaningful war powers reform. While some proposed reforms would simply shorten the time-frame for agreed upon action, we judge them insufficient. The core issue is timing.

Two recent bills proposed in Congress offer a stronger framework for addressing the “clock question.” The National Security Powers Act of 2021, for instance, limits presidential authority to conduct strikes without prior congressional authorization to cases in which there is a “concrete, specific, and immediate threat” which does not allow time for congressional authorization. Additionally, within one week of initiating hostilities – which the act redefines as using lethal force – the president would need to submit a request to Congress for “specific statutory authorization” to continue. Congress then would have 20 days to approve the request, or else funding for the operations would automatically end. The president would also be required to submit a hostilities report every 30 days while operations continue. The National Security Reforms and Accountability Act would implement similar measures.

These reforms would require presidents to explain their actions to Congress while facing the threat of automatic funding cut offs. Additionally, by limiting the circumstances under which presidents can commit unilateral action, the bills could help restrain presidential action against threats which are not clearly articulated or established. 

In addition, Congress has other tools at its disposal. Congress could raise the political stakes of unilateral presidential action, for instance, by passing resolutions rejecting overly expansive interpretations of the president’s Article II powers as commander-in-chief. In order to further address quick unilateral “one off” strikes, Congress could also pass a resolution reiterating that such strikes are in fact covered by the law. 

Advocates who argue that Congress has unnecessarily surrendered its Constitutionally-mandated war powers have long focused on the presidential prerogative to interpret laws as the most significant obstacle to meaningful reform. Congress must recognize that the Founders also passed down strong tools to the legislative branch. What’s required is that Congress summon the collective will to put these tools to use. 

Matthew Trout and Blaine Ravert are alumni of the Center’s Presidential Fellows Program. They represented Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri in the 2022-23 and 2021-22 cohorts, respectively.

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Turkey Stalls Sweden’s NATO Membership

By Julian Mancillas

On Monday September 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan created new uncertainty concerning Sweden’s entrance into NATO by stating that the Turkish parliament is not ready to ratify Sweden’s accession into the military bloc. The president argued that despite Sweden amending its constitution and laws to be stronger on terrorism,, “terrorists” were still continuing to hold ant-Turkish rallies in Stockholm. “My parliament doesn’t view this issue positively, they aren’t ready to ratify Sweden’s accession protocol,” Erdogan said. This refusal to move forward with Sweden’s admittance into NATO contradicts a joint statement Turkey and Sweden released in July at the NATO summit in Vilnius, in which Turkey agreed to move ahead with Sweden’s accession protocol when parliament convenes again in the fall. Erdogan also insists that the United States move forward with the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey before ratification occurs, arguing that the United States shouldn’t tie the planes to Swedish admission into NATO. 

Sweden on the other hand maintains that the Vilnius statement is not up for discussion. Anna Erhardt, spokeswoman for the Swedish foreign minister said that “The agreement is still valid and there will be no new elements added.” NATO itself remains confident that Turkey will accept Sweden’s accession this October, with General Secretary Jen Stoltenberg stating "I expect that when the Turkish parliament reconvenes later this autumn the ratification will happen.” Hungary, the only other NATO ally yet to ratify Sweden’s membership, has signaled that it will back Swedish accession once Turkey is ready to do so.

Julian Mancillas is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress

Governor of Okinawa Speaks Out Against U.S. Bases

By Kory Yueh

In recent decades, the military relationship between the United States and Japan has been one of strong cooperation against Chinese expansion efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. Alas, a major component of this joint venture, the positioning of U.S. military forces on Japanese territory, has been largely centered on the island of Okinawa–a policy that dates back to the end of World War II, causing major tensions between Japanese officials, Okinawan residents, and American military forces. Denny Tamaki, the current governor of Okinawa Prefecture, has spoken out at a UN summit in Geneva this past Monday to rally international support against American military bases, and development of future bases on the island.  He argued that the development and maintenance of U.S. military outposts “threatens [global] peace and prevents equal participation in decision making,” and implored regional actors to pursue diplomatic channels instead of military strong-arming. The Okinawan governor was followed by Japan’s representative at the UN Summit, Takahashi Shinya, who countered that “the presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa is based on geopolitical reasons and Japan’s security needs, and is not based on any discriminatory intent.” 

Calls for Taiwanese Sovereignty at the United Nations

By Kory Yueh

On the first day of the annual United Nations General Debate, world leaders delivered speeches, and articulated their expectations and hopes for the international body on issues ranging from the Russo-Ukrainian war, famine, natural disasters, and climate change. One issue in particular stood out from the rest, however, originating from the likes of Paraguay, Guatemala, and Palua. Those nations’ political leaders stood together and called for recognizing Taiwan’s inclusion into the United Nations as a fully-fledged member. The President of Palau, Surangel Whipps Jr., remarked on how Taiwan has consistently been “unjustly excluded from U.N. processes, despite its remarkable leadership and innovative solutions.” Separately, the Guatemalan president Alejandro Giammetti Falla,also rallied to Taiwan’s support: “How can it be that in the midst of the 21st century, this organization keeps a country like Taiwan outside its doors? [...] We have kept the Taiwanese citizens from having a voice that is represented in this organization.” On this pivotal platform of international relations, the 78th Session demonstrated that despite the risk of Chinese retaliation, the island-state of Taiwan retains some supporters within the United Nations. 

Kory Yueh is a student intern at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. 

The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.

Ben Pickert