Friday News Roundup – June 2, 2023

Greetings from Washington, D.C., where this week has been all about bringing the debt ceiling deal to fruition. The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 passed the House on Wednesday 314–117 and the Senate on late Thursday night 63–36. The debt ceiling is suspended until January 1, 2025. On January 2nd, the debt limit will automatically jump to what has been spent by then. To accomplish this: non-defense spending for for FY2024 is capped at $704 billion, excluding VA healthcare spending; defense spending will be limited to $886 billion; spending caps are enforced for two years and then non-binding for another four, for future Congresses to decide; the measure rescinds unspent coronavirus funds and IRS funding, while also reallocating $20 billion given to the IRS to other domestic programs; the legislation adds work requirements to SNAP and TANF programs; the student loan repayment pause ends in April; and environmental review for energy and other infrastructure is sped up — with specific legislation addressing the Mountain Valley pipeline between Virginia and West Virginia.

For those following D.C. “inside baseball” more closely, the legislation also will require executive “pay-go” for the costs of regulatory changes greater than $100 million, but there are plenty of caveats for the OMB Director to exempt rule changes from this requirement. Provisions in the legislation also incentivize a timely process for passing the dozen annual budget bills, lest 1% penalties be applied to the spending caps.

Negotiations were hastened and the deadline became clearer when Secretary Yellen revealed Monday to be the “X-date.” Despite the sound and fury of some, the House moved bipartisanly to pass the legislation. Once deals were made regarding ultimately-unsuccessful amendment votes and the successfully-gained promise of a later-in-the-year opportunity for supplemental funding for defense and Ukraine beyond above the $886 billion cap, the Senate moved with a rapidity for which the chamber is not often known.

In the end, this is a classic Washington compromise: each side has victories to claim and blame for the other side. Ultimately, the negotiators focused on getting the deal done, knowing the real consequences for political posturing. Be relieved that a deal is done, but do not forget that this was a self-made crisis and deeper questions about the national debt and deficits remain unresolved.

This week in Defense One CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield criticized the holds on military nominations and reminded readers of the importance of diversity in the military.

Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed “Russia’s War” by Dr. Jade McGlynn for the Diplomatic Courier. A look at how the Russian public views Moscow’s war against Ukraine, the book shows the both the challenges and importance of understanding–but not accepting–this view to ensure a lasting peace for Kyiv. CSPC hosted Dr. McGlynn last week for an in-person book event.

Huminski also hosted Dr. Sam Ramani, author of “Russia in Africa” for a virtual book event, a video of which will be on CSPC’s YouTube page, soon.

In this week’s Roundup, Robert Gerber tries his hand at ranked choice voting and muses on the Indo-Pacific supply chain announcement. Ethan Brown covers the DOD cyber strategy, and Cara Arnoldi looks at Ugandan laws threatening the death penalty for the LGBT. Hidetoshi Azuma analyzes Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s snap election agenda amidst his ongoing family-related scandal.

IPEF Takes a Step Toward Supply Chain Cooperation

Robert W. Gerber

Singapore? No, Detroit! Photo from wallpaperaccess.com

The United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) met in Detroit on May 27 and announced the “substantial conclusion” of an agreement related to supply chains. The proposal, which still needs member states’ domestic approval and legal review, creates three new coordination bodies: a Supply Chain Council, that appears to be a forum for information sharing and policy coordination; a Crisis Response Network; and Labor Rights Advisory Board with a mechanism to examine facility-specific labor allegations. The U.S. Department of Commerce called the Detroit announcement a “landmark agreement” and a “major achievement.”

Critics have called the proposal a “framework within a framework” that lacks real commitments. They would be correct that this “substantially concluded agreement” is short on substance. However, it could still be a worthwhile step for several reasons. The proposal should be viewed as a signal to private sector investors that a set of like-minded governments will lend political support to efforts that establish trading channels and partnerships for materials that are deemed critical or for which there is only a single source. Secondly, this proposal could serve as a platform for the future removal of trade barriers, including binding commitments by governments. Third, the Detroit agreement has bothered the PRC government, whose state-run media called the proposal “discriminatory” and “nothing but a trojan horse” that seeks to isolate China. Beijing seems to suddenly be concerned about a process it has tried to downplay over the past year. The Indian government said they expected the pact would help bring new manufacturing facilities to India and strengthen that country’s role in global supply chains.

There is certainly much more work to be done on this and the other three IPEF pillars if negotiators are to meet their end of the year deadline. Consensus will be tricky because this is a diverse group that includes the United States, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Biden Administration’s insistence on pushing labor union-first policies in all four IPEF pillars will make it harder for IPEF partners to agree to binding text, and may force the Administration to make significant compromises. U.S. negotiators also have to ensure interoperability between IPEF supply chain commitments, G7 joint statements, and APEC declarations — which is not an easy task. Finally, IPEF’s supply chain resilience provisions need to be interoperable with the critical mineral agreements that the United States has signed with Japan and hopes to reach with the European Union.

DoD Cyber Strategy says a lot without saying much

Ethan Brown

This week, the Pentagon related its revised 2023 Cyber Defense Strategy to Congress — the classified version, not for us common folk — but the public-release fact sheet provides indicators portending the unclassified cyber strategy, which gives enough fodder for critique of the DoD’s envisage of cyber operations.

The current strategy is based on revisions to the existing ethos of cyber operations after compiled lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On brand, the illegal ‘special military operation’ was initiated by prolific cyber offensives against Ukraine, proving the efficacy of the cyber domain in modern conventional warfare. A key narrative point here is that cyber, once restricted to unconventional and MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) for countering non-state and gray zone aggressive actors, is now a mainstream tool in the contest between states. That remains, seemingly, the missing reality and factoid from the revised strategy on U.S. cyber operations, as the analysis will dig into later.

The new strategy fact sheet shows a vision which consists of four pillars, replicating the organizational outline found in the National Defense Strategy from last year: Defend the nation, Prepare to fight and win the Nation’s wars, Protect the cyber domain with allies and partners, and build enduring advantages in cyberspace.

Not exactly a comprehensive strategy, though some additional bits can be gleaned from the fact sheet.

The fact sheet and corresponding strategy point to four tiered threat actors: China first, Russia second, Iran-North Korea-Violent Extremist Organizations third, and transnational criminal organizations in fourth. This model is viable, and rightfully abstains from the passions of the moment where Russia, though certainly a persistent and credible threat in cyber as well as multiplicitous other domains, is not the significance of long-term threats to U.S. security as the increasing risk emanating from Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party is most certainly observing the Ukraine conflict and the role of cyber operations between those antagonists, and is adapting its cyber capabilities as well.

Russia remains a distinct threat to the rules-based order by utilizing cyber operations, and has shown no qualms about overt, explicit actions aimed at destabilizing the United States and partners through such attacks. These include the Colonial Pipeline cyber malware attack that directly impacted American energy infrastructure in 2021, and a recently uncovered (and interdicted) cyberespionage campaign led by the FSB against public and private infrastructure. There is little doubt that Russia is highly competent in carrying out comprehensive cyber operations that are a threat to US and allied stability. But the key point here, and a misstep in crafting defense strategy, is that those efforts — sometimes by design, sometimes errantly — are those which Moscow conducts overtly as a means of demonstrating power, reach, and explicit capability.

Beijing is far likelier to employ its growing, comprehensive cyber capabilities in a ulterior, clandestine and far more difficult to trace, interdict, and defeat methodology. Again, lessons from Ukraine are that overt, directed and concentrated cyber operations (like DDoS barrages, spoofing, and infiltration of networks for corrosive or malware-based attacks) become far easier for defender attribution, reverse-engineering of code, and thus, preventative measures in the cyber paradigm.

In short, whereas Moscow relies on attributable methods more often than not to carry out its cyber operations, Beijing can reliably utilize far more complex, challenging, and wide-reaching methods of conducting cyber disruption in ways that could be far more damaging, more difficult to detect and interdict, and thus prevent in the future cyber domain. Simply, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ministries which organize and direct cyber operations — such as the Public and State Security Ministries — do not stovepipe or centralize their hacking protocols, preferring to diversify tools, operatives, and mechanisms from a variety of resources. These include hacker banks and entire units within the PLA (like the ones who hacked US Navy telecommunications this week), of “Byzantine Condor” fame, to non-state contracted entities and mercenary groups employed or cajoled by the CCP to conduct its cyber bidding for money or other profit, like ATP41 and the Volt-Typhoon group.

Of course, Iran and North Korea deserve mention for their cyber prowess too, though the former focuses its cyber prowess towards regional objectives and the latter employs cyber as a means of circumventing international sanctions, both remain credible threats in their own right. I strongly recommend “The Lazarus Heist” podcast from the BBC, which has been unveiling DPRK cyber extortion for years now.

So we’ve established the tiered threats, and how prolific Beijing and Moscow have been in their efforts to employ comprehensive and complex cyber tools, what then to say about the updated US DoD strategy for cyber?

For one thing, the strategy reflects a decidedly preventative, defensive stance: research and increase awareness on threats (this should long-ago have been a priority national security issue for public improvement and sustainment), improving interagency data-sharing, and “investing in the Joint Force’s cyber resilience.” The strategy also calls for an increase to the train-organize-equip of cyber forces.

That all briefs well, but the simple reality is that this strategy is a great deal of buzzwording without explicit ways and means of contending with the threat. Sure, this is an unclassified fact-sheet and not the detailed road-map provided to Congress under classified safeguards, but the public release of such information is always a misstep in American public policy — a chance to overtly signal to adversaries what we are doing to defeat them, and our commitment to deterring their efforts below the threshold of war.

Organizing cyber operations under the defense enterprise has been a slog of uncertainty, inter-agencyism, and tribalized resource hoarding that has set back American cyber capability for too many years. On one hand, cyber remained a highly-secretive capability that was usefully obscured and utilized under the most severe and critical of circumstances, a la the nuclear force (though obviously with different connotations)…think Stuxnet in Iran in 2010. But the ability to conduct cyber operations remains bogged under dual-hatting between the Cyber Command and the secretive National Security Agency, a position poised to get a new boss as General Paul Nakasone prepares to step down after skillfully leading the enterprise since 2018.

Simply, the US cyber ecosystem is vastly complicated, with intelligence, defense, and private industry all grasping tightly to various components, and the greater strategy/doctrine/policy has yet to unify, align, or vector these assorted entities into a capable functioning body that reflects just how critical cyber operations are in the 21st century of state competition and conflict. Though we think of cyber as 0’s and 1’s scrawling across screens in dim bunkers, it has tangible, kinetic potential on the battlefield; in today’s combat arenas, cyber is both the shield and the sword. It’s a role I suggested almost three years ago that should be taken up and led under Title X authorities inherent to the Space Force whose responsibilities include the hardware and networks wherein cyber warfare exists. Though such arguments were lost in the shuffle of policy analysis. It’s a position I defend remains a viable alternative to the vague, uncoordinated, and unclear buzzwording that permeates the renewed strategy now.

In summary, the ‘new’ strategy isn’t much of a strategy, it’s buzzword that brief well and provide latitude on what precisely the DoD is doing/will do to ensure cyber efficacy, but if the unclassified fact-sheet is any indicator, US cyber strategy remains behind that of our adversaries because the defense and national security enterprise still does not appreciate the critical role cyber warfare plays in modern state competition.

Arlington Virginia Tries Out Ranked Choice Voting in an Open Primary

Robert W. Gerber

Arlington became the first municipality in Virginia to offer ranked choice voting (RCV) in an election. Early voting is underway for the June 20 Democratic primary for State Senate, House of Delegates, Sheriff, and County Board. In the race for County Board, voters can rank their top three choices among six candidates. Arlington is a heavily “blue” county but any eligible voter regardless of party affiliation can vote in the Democratic primary. Virginia Republicans were the first in the state to use ranked choice voting to pick their nominee in the last gubernatorial election.

The Virginia legislature passed a measure in 2020 that opened the door to ranked choice voting statewide and the number of states that offer RCV options is growing. RCV is not without its detractors. But RCV has been shown to produce more civility in campaigns, increase opportunities for moderate candidates, and save resources by eliminating runoffs. In some cases it has spurred increased voter participation. Arlington County conducted an information campaign — online and at the polling station — to help voters understand the new ballot and the system for tallying results. In this author’s opinion, this effort has resulted in a process that voters will find easy to participate in, especially when combined with early voting and an “open” primary. Other municipalities and states will be looking at Arlington to inform their own RCV adoption efforts.

Ugandan President Approves Death Penalty Against LGBTQ+ “Serial Offenders”

Cara Arnoldi

On May 29, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed a strict anti-LGBTQ+ bill, despite condemnation from western countries and human rights organizations. Like in many African countries, same-sex relations in Uganda are illegal, and punishable up to life imprisonment, but this law approves further consequences in certain situations. This bill criminalizes sex education for the gay community, supports “rehabilitation”/conversation therapy, and reaffirms a 20-year sentence for promoting homosexuality. Additionally, the law allows the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” (sex with a minor, sex while HIV positive, and incest), as well as capital punishment for those who repeatedly engage in same-sex relations.

Independent United Nations Human Rights Council-appointed experts issued a statement condemning Museveni’s actions, citing a violation of Article Six of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.S. President Joe Biden followed this sentiment, stating the bill is “a tragic violation of universal human rights,” and promising sanctions and other restrictions to “anyone involved in serious human rights abuses or corruption.” Uganda stands to lose billions of dollars from foreign investors and donors, and also faces the displeasure of several human rights and activist groups.

Ugandan LGBTQ+ activist Henry Mukiibi fears vigilantism: “We are going to be tortured…people have been waiting for the bill to be signed and then they will work on us. We are going to die.” The Ugandan Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum filed a complaint and sought to take a petition to the constitutional court. Additionally, several citizens and much of the LGBTQ+ community prepare to challenge this law in the Ugandan legal system on the basis of discrimination, says human rights lawyer Nicholas Opiyo.

Despite this condemnation, many also worry about the law’s implications for healthcare initiatives in Uganda and the region. The new bill does not distinguish between purposeful and accidental transmission of HIV, and bears no exception based on unaware status of HIV. With the new law in place, those who are unaware of their HIV status could face the death penalty for transmitting HIV to their sexual partners. Several HIV/AIDS organizations, such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, condemn the lack of exception and note that this puts anti-HIV initiatives at a disadvantage.

Additionally, many fear that other African countries, such as neighboring Kenya, will follow in pursuit of their own anti-LGBTQ+ legislation. Kenyan member of parliament George Kaluma praised Museveni, tweeting, “What a leader we’ve got in Africa!” Kaluma submitted an anti-LGBTQ+ bill in April, stating, “Kenya is following [Uganda] in this endeavor to save humanity.” South African filmmaker Lerato boldly states, “We can liken this to apartheid if not worse.”

Gaming Fumio Kishida’s Snap Election Agenda

Hidetoshi Azuma

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida receives a standing ovation on occasion of his designation to premiership at the National Diet on October 4, 2021 (Photo Credit: The Office of the Prime Minister of Japan)

The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida appears to be in an inescapable crisis. Having successfully showcased the spectacle of global democratic unity at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in his hometown of Hiroshima, Kishida initially sought to further consolidate his increasing support rate by holding a snap election later this summer. Indeed, another supermajority by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) followed by Kishida’s reelection as the LDP president in 2024 would undoubtedly secure his long tenure. Instead, he found himself beleaguered at home amid the growing public outcry ironically caused by a media revelation of the faux pas by his own son, Shotaro Kishida, while in public office. While Kishida Jr. subsequently tendered resignation after caving in to the mounting public criticisms, the Japanese premier’s fate now increasingly looks uncertain. Indeed, the pressure also comes from his factional rival, the former prime minister Yoshihide Suga, who leads the anti-Kishida coalition within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Despite this seeming plight, Kishida in fact has not abandoned his snap election agenda and could pull off the impossible against all odds.

While the ongoing scandal is certainly embarrassing for Kishida, it is far from posing an existential threat to Kishida’s political fate. Indeed, scandals are so commonplace in Japan that they are virtually an inherent part of political life in Japan. As a result, the Japanese public is accustomed to scandals and usually shrugs them off with the passage of time. Historical Japanese prime ministers have successfully weathered even the most embarrassing of scandals, and Kishida is no exception. Indeed, he demonstrated extraordinary resilience in the face of the cult-related scandal which even shook the foundation of the LDP’s power and led to multiple resignations of his cabinet members last year. The current scandal involved his son taking family photos inside the Prime Minister’s Residence while in official capacity. Although unmistakably embarrassing, it was merely a tale of another obsessive father desperately trying to protect his prodigal son. As the revelation of the LDP’s suspicious ties to the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church, is now largely forgotten, Kishida’s family affair would eventually fade away as fodder for tabloid articles.

The real damage done as a result of the ongoing scandal is the shifting balance of power within the LDP. Kishida’s immediate predecessor, Suga, stands to gain the most from the current scandal as he increasingly musters internal support for his anti-Kishida coalition. Suga has emerged as a kingmaker absorbing the disaffected elements alienated by Kishida and his allies as a result of the former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s assassination last summer and the subsequent cult scandal. In other words, Suga is increasingly on the verge of drawing the largest Abe faction to his camp virtually allied with other non-mainstream forces, such as the Nikai faction led by Japan’s top China hand, Toshihiro Nikai, the Komeito Party, and the Japan Restoration Party. Therefore, the former prime minister has essentially been waging a protracted war against Kishida, and time undoubtedly favors him given his growing clout over the incumbent’s rivals.

Against this backdrop, Kishida finds himself increasingly engulfed by Suga’s growing internal influence. The choice is stark for Kishida: either delay a general election and succumb to Suga’s challenge or hold a snap election this summer against all odds and hope for the best. His situation is truly a dilemma in which neither option is ideal. Yet, what is certain is the timing of the LDP presidential election scheduled in September 2024 shortly before the US presidential election in November. The US presidential election has historically been an important factor in influencing domestic Japanese politics. For example, the former US president Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 unmistakably became a boon for Abe’s reelection in 2018, especially after the two leaders demonstrated a solid personal bond. In this sense, the unpredictable nature of domestic US politics would present the imperative of winning the September 2024 LDP presidential election at all costs if Kishida were to enjoy political longevity regardless of who takes the Oval Office from January 2025. A key condition for fulfilling such an imperative would be an increase in the number of Kishida’s allies in the House of Representatives and a weaker Opposition.

In other words, the only choice for Kishida’s survival, let alone longevity, would be to hold a snap election later this summer despite the seeming odds against him. For now, the potential benefits of a snap election in the next few months would far outweigh those of delaying it. Indeed, given the substantial damage done on the Abe faction caused by the cult scandal last year, the slain prime minister’s allies would most likely suffer significant losses of Lower House seats. Such a scenario would in turn undermine Suga’s growing internal influence. By contrast, delaying a snap election would accord few benefits, if at all. Indeed, Kishida would remain in power until next September barring illness or other acts of God. Yet, he would most likely have to yield his power to Suga’s expanding clout by next September.

Kishida appears to be aware of his own circumstances. First, he was unusually swift in accepting his son’s offer of resignation. Kishida Jr. had been the object of public criticisms virtually since his first day in office, and his father had invariably protected him whenever in trouble. By contrast, the Japanese prime minister appeared to be trying to be decisive in setting the family affair this time. Indeed, his perceived decisiveness even led Yuichiro Tamaki, the leader of the National Democratic Party and Kishida’s major ally in the Opposition, to uncannily call the act “a necessary step toward a snap election.” Second, Kishida has been attending numerous LDP meetings which usually do not require the prime minister’s presence. His attendance in the LDP’s internal meeting for secretaries, in particular, led to widespread speculations on an impending snap election.

Kishida is known in Tokyo for surprises. Indeed, no one expected him to become a prime minister when he won the LDP presidential election in September 2021. His top patron, the former prime minister Taro Aso, even remarked that Kishida used to be “an unreliable man” in his recent speech. Meanwhile, Aso also attributed “Japan’s rising international status” to Kishida’s leadership. Indeed, Japan has undergone fundamental transformations under the incumbent premier in just over one year, especially in security normalization, culminating in the decision to double Tokyo’s defense spending by 2027. He truly accomplished the impossible in such a short span of time, even rivaling Abe’s towering legacy. Kishida is not a visionary but a facilitator guided by his patrons, including Aso. He rose to premiership on his patrons’ guidance. Now they are increasingly leaning towards a snap election. Holding a snap election later this summer would likely signify a reversal of fortune for Kishida and could even allow him to deliver a surprise attack on his rivals. Perhaps, such a surprise would be a much-needed imperative for the Japanese leader when the global demand for Japan only grew after the successful conclusion of the G7 summit last month.

News You May Have Missed

Off-the-cuff remark by Nigerian president sparks fuel panic

In his inaugural address, 71-year old Nigerian President Bola Tinubu looked away from the teleprompter and said “the fuel subsidy is gone.” This sparked a rush to gas stations in Nigeria, as motorists feared the prospect of higher fuel prices. Some stations hiked prices, while others closed amidst the onslaught — adding to panic buying. Oil-rich Nigeria has plenty of crude but little refining capacity, so the government has long subsidized the price of imported gasoline. The incoming administration sought to clarify that the subsidy would be lifted in June, in line with the previous government’s budget.

U.S. Air Force dismisses claim of “User-Killing-AI” as “anecdotal”

At a recent conference in London, USAF Col. Tucker “Cinco” Hamilton spoke of a simulated test where an AI-platform attacked its operator — this happening once the AI realized operator-placed constraints on the AI limited the AI’s ability to destroy its assigned targets. In this instance, the AI required a “go/no-go” command from the human operator, and the AI saw this as a constraint that required destruction to more efficiently complete its mission. These comments went viral, and the Royal Aeronautical Society, who hosted the conference, posted a follow-up statement from Col. Hamilton indicated the remarks were anecdotal and reflected a common “thought experiment”, a set of misspoken comments taken out of context rather than the disclosure of any specific test. U.S Air Force officials also issued their denials, “The Department of the Air Force has not conducted any such AI-drone simulations and remains committed to ethical and responsible use of AI technology,” said Air Force spokesperson Ann Stefanek.

No compromise on the horizon in the midst of rising tensions in Northern Kosovo

On May 29, violence erupted in response to Kosovo authorities installing ethnic Albanian mayors in Northern Kosovo, the part of the country with the highest concentration of ethnic Serbs. Demonstrators injured a number of NATO peacekeepers during the protests. While ethnic Serbs could have participated in the election, they collectively decided to boycott local elections due to their ongoing grievances with the Kosovo government — namely, the government’s inaction towards the Serbs’ demand for their own, autonomous territory in Kosovo. When asked at the summit about the nature of the unrest, Kosovo President Osmani attributed the violence to Serbia’s refusal to accept Kosovo’s declaration of independence back in 2008, in addition to President Vuric’s fervent support of criminal gang activity in Northern Kosovo. Vuric, conversely, praised the protest as a means to promote the removal of ethnic Albanians from their mayoral seats. During their time in Bulboaca, Moldova, for the European Summit, both presidents plan to meet independently with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to discuss strategies for suppressing violence. However, the two presidents have not expressed interest in engaging in a one-on-one conversation during the conference.

Seoul rectracts evacuation order after failed North Korean satellite launch

On May 31, residents of South Korea’s capital Seoul received a “wartime alert” on their phones, urging them to prepare for evacuation. The reason was a failed attempt by neighboring North Korea to launch a reconnaissance satellite into space. After the first message, an actual evacuation order was also issued. In the end, the alert was called back by South Korean authorities 10 minutes later, after the North Korean rocket had landed in the Yellow Sea. The launch also triggered missile warnings in Japan. The government of South Korea has been criticized over its decision to issue an evacuation order and then rectrating it as a false alarm. Arguably, false alarms might lead to erosion of public trust in authorities’ emergency communications — something absolutely essential in today’s volatile security environment.

The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.

Guest UserJune 7, 2023