Friday News Roundup — December 8, 2023
Greetings from Washington. The last two days have been especially notable for the GOP, with former House Speaker Kevin McCarthy announcing his exit from Congress, and last night’s Republican primary debate in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
In reflection of these significant events, this week for the Friday News Roundup, Dan Mahaffee provides an update from Japan about how American political uncertainty affects our relationships with allies and partners.
Also this week, CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield writes about Vladmir Putin’s withdrawal from the New START treaty, and its implications for global nuclear security.
CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield will appear on National Public Radio’s 1A Friday News Roundup, International Hour (WAMU, 88.5 fm) this morning with fellow expert commentators David Rennie of the Economist, and Nancy Youssef of the Wall Street Journal.
As we approach the end of the year, as a reminder, news you may have missed will resume in 2024.
American Political Uncertainty Weighs on Allies
By Dan Mahaffee
Greetings from Tokyo, where I have been meeting this week with Japanese political and business leaders. In many ways Japan is a model ally partner, with deep military cooperation enshrined in the U.S.-Japan security treaty dating back to 1960 — and to the postwar American occupation before then. In recent years, the U.S.-Japan relationship has also deepened in the important area of economic security, as both nations realized the importance of the geotech competition. With growing global tensions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, Japan has embarked upon a military buildup of its own, while also expanding defense cooperation beyond the United States to other like-minded partners — e.g. the recent agreement reached by Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom to develop a next-generation fighter jet.
While these developments are cause for optimism about the future of U.S.-Japan cooperation and the integration of like-minded allies and partners, the mood of uncertainty and concern about U.S. global leadership was remarkable. Notwithstanding this week’s seeming collapse of negotiations around aid for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and the U.S. southern border, there is a broader sense that U.S. leadership is being weakened by political uncertainty and an increasingly isolationist element in the American body politic. Allies are seeking to do more, and demonstrate that they are true partners of the United States, and not “freeloaders”, but they also fear that our politics and the 2024 election will mean the United States will turn away from the world.
Yes, a large amount of that concern comes from the prospect of a second Trump presidency. Questions remain about how he might see our allies and partners. His rhetoric has largely focused on revenge for the 2020 election. What limited comments on foreign policy have largely revolved around dealmaking with strongmen like Putin and Xi. However, focusing entirely on Trump also fails to acknowledge the ongoing dysfunction in our politics, the legislative process — and the resulting inability to act in areas like trade policy, deeper defense-industrial cooperation, and other alliance-strengthening measures.
I also recognize that many of our allies do not understand the domestic political and economic problems that many Americans face ranging from perceptions of economic well-being at a time of higher interest rates and inflation, as well as concerns about crime in our cities, failing education systems, and an insecure southern border. Turning our back on the world is not the solution to those problems, and we risk losing the advantages of a global system that previous generations of American leaders built, often from the sacrifice of our servicemembers.
Our allies will not wait for us to get our house in order. The example of the Anglo-Italo-Japanese fighter jet demonstrates how our restrictions for defense technology transfer — and protectionism around defense production — hamper cross-border defense production at a time when free countries need any and all production capacity. Economic efforts like the CPTPP have gone along without us, and the failure of the IPEF trade pillar means that many in the Indo-Pacific region will look for alternative economic arrangements — or move towards playing the United States and China against each other for their own benefit.
It would be easy for Americans to throw up their hands at a world beset by instability and uncertainty, but the last time we heeded the siren call of isolationism we were rudely shocked out of it. What occurred in history this week is not lost on me as I visit Japan, but the example of the U.S.-Japan alliance today shows how partnerships — and the institutions and resources that underpin them — promote cooperation and American leadership. Strengthening these ties, not turning our back on the world, will be what makes us safer and more prosperous.
Dan Mahaffee is a CSPC Senior Vice President and Director of Policy
New Three-Way Nuclear Arms Race
By James Kitfield
The past year has seen the worst tensions among nuclear powers in a generation. After recklessly threatening Western powers with nuclear weapons if they dared intervene in Moscow’s illegal war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin formally suspended his nation’s participation in the New START treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms treaty between Russia and the United States. As President Joe Biden has noted, the prospect of Armageddon has darkened the counsels of the major powers for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In a recent report, the Defense Department also warned that China has greatly exceeded past projections of the size of its nuclear arsenal, fielding more than 500 nuclear warheads in a major expansion that has Beijing on pace to deploying more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, and 1,500 by 2035, bringing it for the first time on par with the arsenals of the United States and Russia.
At an Aspen Security Forum this week in Washington, D.C., Air Force General Anthony Cotton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command with stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons triad, discussed the changing strategic environment with New York Times National Security Correspondent David Sanger. Gen. Cotton’s comments have been edited for clarity and length.
On the difference between today’s rapidly evolving strategic environment and the Cold War.
Gen. Cotton: Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States has never had two near-peer nuclear competitors. We’re seeing that now for the first time. So I don’t really like the Cold War analogy and terminology, because I don’t want folks to automatically revert to how we solved that problem [of nuclear deterrence] when we had only had one peer in terms of nuclear weapons [in the former Soviet Union]. Another big difference is that during the Cold War era, we never relied on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations in economic terms. Now with a potential adversary like China, there is economic interdependence, not only for the United States but also our allies.
On the rapid and largely unforeseen growth in the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
Gen. Cotton: Back in 2015 when I commanded the U.S. ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) force, I actually was pretty satisfied [with the nuclear weapons balance]. The United States was well on its way towards modernizing the nuclear triad based on what we observed in the geopolitical environment in around the 2010 timeframe. At that time China articulated a nuclear doctrine of maintaining just a “minimum deterrent force.” Since then we’ve seen a rapid rise in terms of China building out its nuclear force, to include mobile and ground-launched ICBMs. That sounds very different from a “minimum deterrent force.” I wish I knew why China made that decision, but that is what we’re working against today.
On how China’s rapid acquisition of nuclear forces changes Strategic Command’s deterrent posture and doctrine.
Gen. Cotton: As the commander of U.S. Strategic Command I look at the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review [for guidance]. It allows us to look and see if our strategy and numbers [of nuclear weapons] still work in terms of being able to present the President of the United States with options to meet his objectives. So we’re actually reconsidering that now at STRATCOM to ensure that we continue to hold an advantage even with two peer nuclear competitors. The nuclear stockpile is what it is, but my job is to present potential effects that achieve our national goals based on the current stockpile.
On intelligence that Russia was seriously considering using a tactical nuclear weapon inside Ukraine in 2022, and how that impacted U.S. nuclear strategy.
Gen. Cotton: When we talk about “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons, what that means is all nuclear weapons that are not covered in the New START Treaty [limiting strategic, long-range weapons to 1,500 deployed warheads]. The Russians currently have roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons. And that threat from Russia to use them did drive the conversation down to dining room tables in peoples’ homes — raising questions such as what is the definition of “strategic deterrence”? That is an issue that not many people paid attention to over the past 25 years, even though it’s foundational to our national security. Now people are talking about it again in forums like this.
On the impact of a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China.
Gen. Cotton: When people talk about the transactional partnership between Russia and China, it drives home the point that the United States doesn’t have transactional relationships — we have allies and partners. One thing we at STRATCOM have done to reassure our allies is have one of our nuclear submarines make a port call in South Korea [for the first time in decades], and we also flew a B-52 bomber to Seoul [South Korea] for the first time in a very long time. The deterrence factor in that was enhanced by the fact that off each wing of that B-52 bomber, you had fighter aircraft from Japan and South Korea. I think that was a confidence-building measure that sent a powerful message. So I was proud of my air and naval components at STRATCOM for putting that together.
James Kitfield is a Senior Fellow at CSPC