Friday News Roundup - August 11, 2023
Friday greetings from Washington, D.C., where the major news stories of the week are the supplemental spending request from the White House for $40 billion—$24 billion for Ukraine, $12 billion for U.S. disaster relief, and the rest for border security and counter-fentanyl efforts. This adds to the already complex dynamic leading to the September 30th appropriations deadline and the differences between the parties and the chambers on spending levels and priorities.
The White House released its executive order on outbound investment review, where (after a one-year comment period), the Treasury Department will prohibit select outbound U.S. investment in certain Chinese firms working in quantum technologies, advanced semiconductors, and AI, as well requiring firms to notify the government of some investments in less-advanced semiconductor production in China. Allies, notably the UK, are now considering whether to match the U.S. standards, Industry is waiting to comment and learn more about the scope while China hawks call the measures weak—noting the one-year wait and the “selects, certains, and somes” when they had wanted more immediate and sweeping action.
Last week, CSPC released the 2022-2023 Fellows Review, an anthology of research papers produced by the Center’s Presidential Fellows. The talented college and university students that make up the annual Fellowship cohort spend 9 months diving into topics related to the presidency and Congress. The best of their research is coalesced into the Review. We encourage you to explore their work on topics ranging from U.S. foreign policy to electoral politics.
In updates from our Presidential Fellows Alumni, Sarath Ganji writes in The New Republic about the role of sovereign wealth funds in Qatar's arsenal of influence across D.C. (following their recent purchase of a stake in the Wizards and Capitals).
In this week’s roundup, CSPC Senior Fellow James Kitfield summarizes a recent discussion CSPC hosted with Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges on the situation in Ukraine. Ethan Brown decries the hold on military promotions and its impact on the force. Hidetoshi Azuma covers the debate in Japan over defending Taiwan prompted by a politician’s remarks. Ryan Bender looks at the CHIPS Act one year on, parsing out what could be next.
Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret): “The Russian Position in Ukraine is Fragile”
By James Kitfield, CSPC Senior Fellow
Special Forces of the Security Service of Ukraine "Alpha" operators in Kupiansk, liberated from Russian army during the Ukrainian breakthrough in Kharkiv region in September 2022
Recently the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress (CSPC) hosted retired Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodge, the former commander of the United States Army Europe, for an on-the record discussion of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The following excerpts have been edited for length and clarity.
On Washington’s Support for Ukraine
I’ve been impressed with what the Biden Administration has done in support of Ukraine, but that effort is missing the most important element – identification of the wished-for strategic outcome. Recall that after nearly 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan, the United States never really had a clearly defined objective. I’m afraid we’re in a similar place in Ukraine today. When President Biden says we’re behind Ukraine for as long as it takes, it begs the question: as long as what takes? I realize that President Biden literally has the weight of world on his shoulders, but the administration has been reluctant to say that they want Ukraine to win this war. If they confirmed that, I think it could happen this year. The inability of Russian forces to conduct combined arms operations has been widely documented. They have an incoherent command structure that lacks a joint commander that owns the battlespace. Their separate branches like the Russian army and navy hate each other. Since the beginning of the invasion the Russian military has not been able to present a coherent strategic approach to the war, or the logistics to sustain it. So I think Russia’s position in Ukraine is fragile, and it could collapse if we really wanted it to.
On U.S. Objectives in Ukraine
Based on the Biden Administration’s actions and comments, I believe they have three main objectives. Number one is to avoid an exchange of nuclear weapons with Russia, to the point that we will do almost anything to avoid it. That causes us to continually deter ourselves and stop short of doing what we should to support Ukraine’s victory. When President Biden says there will be “no World War III,” that gives oxygen to the Kremlin. At the same time I am not an administration critic. I think the Biden team has done a great job of keeping 50 nations together in support of Ukraine. That’s an incredible achievement.
I think the Biden Administration’s second objective is to make sure that Ukraine doesn’t lose this war. They don’t want Ukraine to be overrun by the Russians, and they keep saying that our goal is for the Ukrainians to have the strongest possible position when talks begin to end the war. But they don’t want to say what becomes of Crimea, which is decisive. Asking the Ukrainians to give up Crimea is like asking the United States to give up California or Florida for the sake of peace.
I think the administration’s third objective is to keep China from more overtly supporting Russia’s war. Beijing doesn’t want to see Russia collapse, not out of any love for Russia, but because [Chinese leader] Xi Jinping doesn’t want to the world to see another autocracy collapse.
On the Slow Pace of the Ukrainian Counter-Offensive
It’s obvious that the Ukrainian counter-offensive is not advancing at the speed that all of us hoped for, and that’s probably because we had unrealistic expectations. I get frustrated when I see Pentagon officials or German officials criticize Ukraine for not taking full advantage of the weapons we have given them. That’s unhelpful. The fact is that the Ukrainian forces are having to adapt. The Russians to their credit didn’t waste the last nine months. The have laid minefields and other layered defenses that are having an effect on the battlefield. Having said that, most of the Ukrainian armored brigades have not been committed to the fight yet, and that’s wise. The Ukrainians haven’t fully developed or identified the places where they hope to achieve a breakthrough. U.S. forces have been forced to adapt similarly to enemy defenses in every engagement from the Civil War to the Normandy invasion. And I think the Ukrainians adaptation so far is the correct one.
On Ukraine’s Critical Needs
First off, the only advantage the Russians have is mass in terms of artillery and soldiers. The best way to neutralize that advantage is to give the Ukrainians the capability to take out the Russian military’s headquarters and logistics infrastructure. If they can do that it doesn’t matter how many soldiers the Russians have. Especially given the Russian military’s top-down culture, going after their headquarters elements is critical. After that the Ukrainians need to target fuel and ammunition depots.
So if I could fix one thing it would be to fly planeloads of U.S. ATACMS (MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems) with a 190-mile range to Ukraine that would enable the Ukrainian military to strike Russian headquarters and logistics hubs from a longer range. That would make the Russian position in Crimea untenable, and force Russia to reposition its Black Sea fleet much further to the east. So if I could get one weapon into the hands of the Ukrainians, it would be the ATACMS.
Abusing military promotions for political gain
Congressional grandstanding reaches a new low with Sen. Tuberville’s actions opposing DoD abortion policy
Ethan Brown
A few weeks ago, I examined the linkages between defense appropriations and sticking points in an increasingly partisan issue: the military. As congress has moved into its August break (the lone chance to let some politicking dust settle) one of those sticking points reached a new low when Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) continued to hold hostage congressional approvals for senior military promotions. The act does not necessarily affect American National Security interests, but has far greater and expansive effects: once again, our apolitical military has become a politicized tool. In the words of Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT), speaking to reporters and as recounted in The Hill, “I think everybody’s been hoping that Sen. Tuberville would back down, and I think we have to come to the conclusion that this is not happening and that he is prepared to burn the military down.”
Let’s examine the issue in some detail. Going back to February, Sen. Tuberville began blocking the appointment of senior officer assumptions, those flag officer positions (usually the four-star variety) which require congressional confirmation. Three members of the Joint Chiefs, including Chairman Mark Milley and Air Force Chief CQ Brown, will see the terms of their current positions end this month. That leaves key positions at the mercy of Sen. Tuberville’s political maneuvering going unfilled. Earlier this summer, there were over 270 key promotions and advancements for key military leaders awaiting congressional confirmation, and that number grows with each month. (Side note, this does not impact standard military promotions across the core of the force, and merely impacts senior positions. Regular promotions in the DoD are an altogether distinctly tragic and disconcerting affair).
The rationale for this suspension of advancing ready leaders stems from the forced inclusion of the Hyde Amendment justification to military funding. The amendment prohibits the use of federal funding for abortion. This issue is complicated for the military, who--until this year's proposed National Defense Authorization Act passed with barely enough votes in the House--remain entitled to leave and pay for traveling outside of their current duty station in order to pursue abortions if they should decide. For example, Sen. Tuberville’s home state of Alabama has some of the nations most strict abortion laws, but also hosts six military bases. Under current legislation enacted last summer, any service member stationed in Alabama is entitled to travel outside of the state--with earned pay and on leave--for an abortion. Abortion rights are a particularly volatile issue on the GOP side of discourse, with other House actors at risk of other gambits over the issue, which could include a government shutdown.
While the House passed the bill with those entitlements still intact, it is all but certain to be dead-on-arrival due to Senator Tubervilles staunch opposition to DoD abortion policy. It should be noted that the House version of the bill received four Democratic votes in support of the current version of the bill, while four Republicans opposed the bill. This will prompt continued predictable confrontation within the Senate, where Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) stated that there would be a supplemental version of the Defense spending bill, but Tuberville’s hostage-taking of military promotion confirmations will loom large regardless of concessions made between the parties and chambers.
With regards to the confirmations, such hearings are far too laborious for Senators to stand-to on every single posting and service member. These confirmations are typically conferred in batches and groups as promotions dictate, keeping the overall time-consuming affair to a minimum. As of this writing, there are over 850 senior military personnel whose careers are being directly impacted by the holdup. That includes the one’s whom Tuberville’s hold prevents from assuming key positions, as well as the next-in-lines promoting to replace those senior-most officers. These include the NSA director/CyberCom chief, Fleet Admirals for the Pacific theaters 5th and 7th fleets, and Northern Command’s top officer (NORTHCOM being all of North America). To quell any panics, those positions that either are, or will soon be vacant, will be occupied by assorted “Vice-X” personnel, the consummate number 2’s across all of these commands, but such accession protocols are hardly a posture of stability and security at a time when adversaries abroad are waiting for the slightest chink in the American suit of armor to manifest. Which makes this ordeal such an odd hill-to-die-on for China Hawk Senator Tuberville. While the delay in appointing senior-military posts doesn't necessarily impact the day-to-day tactical operations of national defense, this political posturing to the world certainly doesn’t enable it either.
Not all GOP are in lockstep with Tuberville’s actions either, and this includes Senate Republican leader McConnell of Kentucky, who recently began opposing the measure. How long this drags on remains to be seen, hinging largely on if concessions can be made in a bipartisan fashion in both chambers.
The greatest impact of this issue--and it is an incredibly delicate and difficult issue, far more than a simple ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ protocol--is that once again, the US military is caught in the political crossfire. This, too, is an unfortunate and recurring theme that is party-agnostic, and one that bodes ill for the future of our national defense and service members.
Japan’s Will to Fight
Hidetoshi Azuma
The former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso delivers an election speech in Tokyo, Japan in 2021 (Photo Credit: Wikimedia)
The former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso caused quite a stir both at home and abroad by calling for Japan’s “will to fight” while in Taiwan on August 8. Given his reputation as a populist firebrand and Japan’s recent evolution in national security doctrine, Aso’s controversial remark was in fact unsurprising. Yet, it could risk unintended consequences defying his original intent. Indeed, while he intended to preach the need for joint deterrence against China with the US as well as Taiwan, the narrow emphasis on Japan’s “will to fight” could inadvertently prove detrimental in the event of a real war absent a clear theory of victory for Japan itself. After all, Washington’s strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan overshadows Japan’s lingering security dependence on the US. In other words, although Aso’s clarion call for Japan’s combat readiness was undoubtedly a much-needed political wake-up call given the country’s decades-long slumber induced by its post-WWII pacifism, what is truly at stake is the country’s will to power beyond the immediate imperative of deterring China’s looming aggression over Taiwan.
Aso’s de facto incitement for war in Taiwan earlier this week was merely one of many of his political stunts throughout his career. He is arguably Japan’s most preeminent political princeling whose stellar ancestry includes one of the founding fathers of Meiji Japan, Toshimitsu Okubo, and the former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida, who forged post-WWII Japan’s alliance with the US. Thanks largely to his unrivaled political power at home, he enjoys the unique privilege of publicly breaking many of postwar Japan’s security taboos. For example, his geostrategic vision, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, unveiled in 2006 laid the foundation for what later became the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Having supported the former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s long tenure in the 2010s, Aso is now Tokyo’s foremost kingmaker guiding the incumbent prime minister Fumio Kishida’s administration. Indeed, Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine beginning in February 2022 led the former premier to declare Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido “Russia’s next target” and a potential war over Taiwan “a Japanese contingency.” In other words, Aso invariably plays the bad cop to aid the incumbent prime minister perennially constrained by postwar Japan’s pacifism.
Beyond domestic politics, Aso’s remark in Taiwan does reflect the current reality of Japan’s evolving national security doctrine. While Tokyo has been consistently shedding its pacifism enshrined in the US-drafted constitution through legal reinterpretations ever since the early 1950s, it accelerated its security normalization with unprecedented speed following Russia’s launch of an expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Indeed, the Kishida administration achieved a fundamental overhaul of its national security policy last year, culminating in its new national security and defense doctrines and a major defense budget increase to be effective from 2027. The real significance of Japan’s latest national security doctrine is that the country now possesses counter-strike capabilities, Tokyo’s political euphemism for both first and second strike capabilities. In other words, Tokyo has finally accomplished a major breakthrough in acquiring and using offensive capabilities masquerading as defensive through subtle reinterpretations of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. In fact, with the 2015 security legislation now effective, Japan can, in theory, both legally and doctrinarilly enter wars even by launching surprise attacks. Since Aso played an indispensable role in guiding Tokyo’s national security policy reform for decades, his statement reflected his confidence in his own accomplishment.
Yet, what is crucially missing from Aso’s newfound jingoism is a theory of victory for Japan. Indeed, Aso’s zeal for Japan’s “will to fight” was ultimately about boosting deterrence with the US in hopes of jointly preventing China’s aggression over Taiwan. In other words, the underlying assumption is that the US would fight alongside Japan in the event of a Taiwan contingency. In such a scenario, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) would essentially act as an auxiliary force aiding the US military. Indeed, the JSDF still fundamentally remains the de facto auxiliary force supporting the US military’s forward presence in Asia, the raison d'etre which originally emerged during the Korean War. Therefore, as long as the US remains committed to regional security, Japan could remain rest assured of the prospect of prevailing in an actual conflict over Taiwan. In this sense, Tokyo’s tacit theory of victory, if any, is fundamentally contingent on Washington’s will alone and borders on wishful thinking.
The uncomfortable truth, however, is that Washington’s official policy toward Taiwan continues to espouse strategic ambiguity, threatening the very validity of such a theory, if not a hope. In other words, Japan now finds itself forced to conceive of its own theory of victory independent of the US. Indeed, Beijing’s doctrine of unrestricted warfare suggests numerous scenarios beyond the traditional paradigm of war envisaged by the US-Japan Security Treaty, potentially leaving Japan fighting alone without the US. For example, Tokyo would likely consider a Beijing-sponsored armed insurrection aimed at a regime change in Taipei to pose an “existential threat to Japan’s survival”, an important criterion justifying the use of force by Japan as proposed by the 2015 security legislation. However, the US may not share the same perception as Tokyo’s, and absent a direct attack on the Japanese territories, Washington may withhold a military intervention. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley insinuated the possibility of applying to Taiwan Washington’s strategy of leading from behind with logistical support to Ukraine during the Senate Arms Services Committee hearing in April 2022. Milley’s insinuation suggests that the US military’s non-involvement in a Taiwan contingency is a veritable option on the table for Washington.
Of course, Tokyo is not blind to this emerging reality in Washington. In fact, skepticism over Washington’s security commitment to Japan, let alone Taiwan, is nowadays widely palpable across Tokyo. For example, Kishida himself has repeatedly declared since last year that “East Asia could become the next Ukraine tomorrow” as a subtle jab at Washington’s perceived isolationism. Aso himself shares such skepticism, but happens to be the only Japanese politician powerful enough not to fret over potential blacklashes from either Japan’s pacifist population or even Washington with his signature intrepidity. Indeed, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was quick to acknowledge Aso’s Taiwan statement as “in line with the party’s official policy.” In this sense, Aso’s latest political stunt was merely a continuation of Tokyo’s public relations efforts to convince Washington of the need to fight together over Taiwan. Regardless of its effectiveness, it undoubtedly generated global media attention since no previous Japanese leaders since 1945 had publicly called to arms.
Nonetheless, absent a clear theory of victory for Japan itself, Aso’s security zealotry could prove hollow despite his best efforts. In this respect, what is needed now is Japan’s will to power beyond the unimaginative Cold War-era routine of expecting American involvement. Japan’s geopolitical environment in 2023 is eerily similar to its imperial forebear’s in 1893 when Imperial Japan found itself increasingly overshadowed by the imperial ambitions of Qing Dynasty China and Imperial Russia simultaneously in Asia. By 1905, Imperial Japan had achieved the virtually impossible feat of defeating both China and Russia, acquiring Taiwan and Korea in the process. No one in Japan in 1893 thought that such a feat would be possible. Yet, the rising empire had unrivaled will to power, spawning vivid geopolitical imaginations which enabled it to confront the seeming impossible. Imperial Japan in 1893 had no allies and was in a hopeless, lonely lot. Perhaps, being left fighting alone for Taiwan’s troubled fate may be the only cure for postwar Japan’s lingering pacifism.
CHIPS one year in, a strong start in need of a follow-up
Ryan Bender
President Biden signing the CHIPS and Science Act. August 8, 2022. (Photo credit: Wikimedia.)
This Wednesday marked the one year anniversary of the CHIPS and Science Act. This act, meant to promote American independence in the manufacturing of semiconductor chips, provides the Commerce Department with over $50 billion in funding to invest in the manufacturing and research and development of semiconductors.
Riding the wave of the initial announcement, tech companies have announced over 50 new projects across the United States. These projects total over $200 billion. They seek to improve current semiconductor manufacturing facilities, create new manufacturing facilities, and improve adjacent industries that provide materials or support semiconductor production.
Given this strong first push for domestic production, it is now up to the Department of Commerce to follow through by providing funding. The department is working with a force of 140 employees to evaluate over 460 statements of interest from around the country. The first rollout of funding is expected to begin by the end of 2023. This is an important deadline as many companies are relying on CHIPS Act funding to begin construction.
Though CHIPS has provided an effective spark for restarting semiconductor manufacturing in the US, it leaves much to be desired. Morris Chang, the founder of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), called the legislation “a good start” when asked by then Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) during her trip to Taiwan in August, 2022. So far the CHIPS and Science Act has done an effective job at incentivizing the creation of new projects in the U.S., but, as Chang points out, the nation will need continued investment as well as improving costs and workforce development. Chang doubts that the United States is fully committed to this effort.
Creating a domestic chip manufacturing capability in the U.S. is certainly not cheap. For instance, TSMC, the global leader in advanced semiconductors, promised a $40 million project to improve production in Phoenix, Arizona. TSMC estimates that construction of their Arizona facilities will cost between three and four times as much as it would cost to produce in Taiwan. Furthermore, the U.S. workforce is still lacking in the skilled labor needed to operate these plants. The same TSMC facility in Arizona delayed projected chip output from 2024 to 2025, for instance, due to a worker shortage. According to a Semiconductor Industry Association report, job demand in the U.S. is expected to grow from 345,000 to 450,000 jobs by 2030. However, 67,000 of these new positions risk going unfilled at current university degree output rates.
Fortunately, the semiconductor industry is still committed to increased domestic production within the United States, and TSMC has stood by its Arizona project. With 65 percent of TSMC customers residing inside the U.S., executives understand that the demand exists for increased domestic production with governmental support. However, the current political schedule and Congressional make-up make new investment in the industry unlikely in the short term. With a far-right House and the 2024 election on the horizon, any chance of a federal follow-up will likely have to wait until after the 2024 election has concluded.
Without further federal measures, the U.S. government and its partners must make the most of CHIPS to prove its commitment to the semiconductor manufacturing industry. To secure benefits in the long run, universities, corporations, and state governments will have to demonstrate that federal support is both effective and in high demand.
So far, these partners have strong shown signs of meeting the challenge. For instance, Purdue University has launched a $100 million program to create a tech hub, hire new faculty, and offer new semiconductor degree programs. Additionally, the rising demand within the industry has caused a massive increase in recruitment. According to Handshake, firms are looking to appeal to younger talent by offering 40.5 percent more internship positions than the year before. Even at the state and local level, Arizona officials are working around the clock to demonstrate their state’s capabilities while enticing the semiconductor industry with funding and subsidies.
The next steps for the government and industry are to strengthen this reciprocal relationship, justifying another round of federal funding. For the federal government, this means continuing a smooth rollout of CHIPS funding and effectively establishing a research and development hub through the creation of the National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC). The NSTC can serve as the starting block for firms to pool their ideas and create intellectual property of their own. At the same time, universities must increase the relevant programs they offer, and strike an effective balance between training students for both manufacturing and design roles. States can also help by boosting the workforce through community colleges, and supporting proposed manufacturing projects.
Over the next few years, it’s imperative that the industry makes full use of the CHIPS Act funding in order to justify another round of federal support. The industry can also highlight important areas that the legislation did not cover, such as semiconductor design and workforce development, which are historic U.S. strengths. The critical effort to return America to a dominant position in the semiconductor industry requires a careful balance between government support and free market principles, with a common goal of leading in both the design and manufacture of cutting-edge microchips that will serve as the building blocks of tomorrow’s knowledge economy.
News you may have missed:
Ukraine announces “humanitarian corridor” for ships stuck in Black Sea ports
Ukrainian vessels are testing the waters for the first time since Russia eradicated the Black Sea Grain Initiative. With the assistance of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Ukrainian navy created this corridor for ships that did not earn immunity through the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In order to maintain transparency and assure enemies that the port will not be used for war purposes, the Ukrainian navy plans to install cameras in the ports and ships moving through the corridor. Sixty commercial ships have been stuck in Ukrainian ports unable to travel due to threats from Russia. At the beginning of the war, Russia asserted that it would view any vessels in the Black Sea as potential threats and attack them accordingly. The Black Sea Grain Initiative issued immunity to some vessels who exported grain from Ukraine, often supporting the World Food Program. However, Russia pulled out of this program this past July, citing unfair sanctions from the West on their own agricultural exports. This month, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan will talk with Kremlin officials and aspires to convince Moscow to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Without Russia’s cooperation, vessels are reluctant to enter the Black Sea out of fear of attacks from the Russian navy.
Poland seeks to reinforce border with Belarus amid tensions
In recent weeks, Poland has aimed to strengthen its border security with neighboring country Belarus amid heightened tensions related to Wagner mercenaries in Belarus. On August 9, Poland announced the deployment of up to 2,000 troops to reinforce the border.
In response to Poland´s deployment decision, Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu said the deployment was linked to the “militarization” of Poland and to new threats of Russia having “multiplied in the western and northwestern strategic directions” due to NATO countries’ strong military support to Ukraine.
Last week, Polish Prime Minister accused Wagner troops stationed in Belarus trying to destabilize NATO and carry out acts of sabotage and other “provocations and intrigues”. Earlier, tensions were further heightened when two Belarusian military helicopters entered Polish air space, interpreted by Warsaw as a deliberate provocation.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.