IN HARM’S WAY:
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION

A Policy Dialogue

at

The George Bush Presidential Library
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Center for the Study of the Presidency

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Foreword

For over two centuries, the geographic good fortune of wide oceans and prudent diplomacy insulated America from enemies and potential adversaries. Even during the Cold War, the challenges to U.S. security and interests were highly linear and well defined. Indeed, during this period and despite the catastrophe in Vietnam, U.S. Presidents consistently and successfully engaged America’s allies to influence and shape the global strategic environment and to constrain America’s adversaries.

Following the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment changed rapidly and dramatically: Failing Third World states, the resurgence of ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of advanced missile technologies among rogue nations, and the increase in – and changing nature of – terrorism. Moreover, as the sheer number of threats to U.S. security has mounted, so too has their complexity. A growing number of ethnic and humanitarian tragedies demand international attention and, sometimes, intervention. The United States has intervened militarily 39 times in more than 30 countries since 1989, compared to only 10 times (including Korea and Vietnam) in the 40 years of the Cold War.¹ No fact speaks more eloquently to the great difficulty of shaping the global strategic environment.

Each new administration brings with it renewed hope. Unfortunately, most Presidents consider themselves exempt from past failures. Filled with electoral hubris, each expects to overshadow the accomplishments of his predecessor. Few pay close attention to the hard lessons of experience: How a Presidency can go wrong, and how it attains greatness.

Because the current U.S. national security structures and decision-making processes built during the Cold War are outdated and inadequate to meet the challenges of tomorrow, a major objective of the next President must be to avoid miscalculations and miscommunications that have plagued us in interventions from Korea to Kosovo. Furthermore, a growing number of experts believe that a fundamental “strategic reformation” of national security structures and processes is needed if the U.S. is to use effectively its preponderant political, economic, and military power.

¹ This figure represents only combat operations and thus does not include a large number of military operations such as counter-narcotics efforts, training deployments, non-combat evacuations and others.
Failure to engage in such reform will be costly. Because we have failed to adapt our military and diplomatic cultures to new strategic realities, our freedom of action is constrained and national options are not fully employed. Too often we fail to prevent conflicts from emerging and, once engaged, suffer the danger of squandering our vital national resources on protracted conflicts where U.S. interests are unclear and outcomes are uncertain. In short, we increasingly find ourselves in a reactive posture and may already have lost the art of shaping the strategic environment.

In response to these concerns, the Center for the Study of the Presidency recently convened noted Presidential scholars and seasoned experts in diplomacy, history, and military strategy to examine Presidential decision-making during past U.S. military interventions and to discuss the use of preventive diplomacy as an alternative strategy. The goal was twofold: To distill key lessons learned that the President-Elect might turn to in deciding when, how, and why to employ military force to protect U.S. interests; and to strengthen the mechanisms and resources for integrated diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict whenever possible.

In short, this volume identifies the core principles of U.S. military intervention and suggests preventive diplomacy and defense strategies for this new era. We hope that the dialogue beginning *In Harm’s Way: Intervention and Prevention* helps build an institutional memory that the new President might draw upon in times of crisis, and that the White House, Congress, and the national security community engage in a fundamental strategic reformation, comparable to the Truman-Eisenhower initiative that prepared us for the Cold War.

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Intervention Case Study Briefs
1. If the orchestrated employment of all elements of national power is used to influence and
deter adverse developments or aggression, the use of force will not be necessary. A
number of our interventions, beginning with the Korean War, have come about through
failure to use such power in advance:
   - When three years of economic sanctions and negotiations failed to bring about the
   peaceful resolution of the Haiti crisis, the UN authorized the use of force in 1994 to
   remove General Raoul Cedras from power and restore Haiti’s constitutional
government. President Clinton authorized a final negotiating effort by former President
   Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
   Colin Powell. At the same time, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were deployed
to intervene militarily in the event that the final diplomatic initiative failed. Only when
   U.S. military forces were poised to enter Haiti did Cedras accept UN terms. (Kovach)
   - In the words of Sun Tsu, “The perfect battle is the one that does not have to be fought.”
The Cold War in Europe was won without a shot being fired. (Abshire)

2. The President and his advisors must clearly define and communicate U.S. interests.
   Miscommunication often leads to miscalculation and conflict:
   - On January 14, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech at the National Press
   Club omitted the Republic of Korea from the security perimeter vital to the defense of
   U.S. interests in Asia. North Korea and China incorrectly interpreted this omission as
   tacit U.S. disinterest in the Korean Peninsula, and North Korean forces attacked South
   Korea five months later. (Williamson)
   - Ambiguous U.S. diplomatic communiqués may have inadvertently led Saddam Hussein
to miscalculate that the U.S. would not respond militarily to the Iraqi annexation of
   Kuwait. Some experts, however, argue that Iraq would not have taken seriously a
categorical warning against an attack in July 1990 anyway. In any event, on August 2,
1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, setting the stage for the Gulf War. (Kitfield)

3. The President needs adequate anticipation and warning of an emerging crisis in order to
   influence events and employ elements of national power short of military force. An
   effective early warning system increases the time available to develop and refine options
   for successful military intervention:
   - On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy was shown satellite reconnaissance photos of
   the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. This warning provided President
   Kennedy the critical time he needed to examine options and strengthen his negotiating
position, and ultimately, to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis through negotiations rather than military force. (Pfiffner, Case Study)

- Because of misread intelligence indicators, the U.S. miscalculated Japan’s intentions to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, thus catching U.S. defenses by surprise.

4. A President must forge and maintain strong personal bonds with Congress and America’s allies to create unity of effort. These relationships are a powerful foundation on which to build in times of crisis:
   - During the prelude to both the Gulf War and NATO military operations against Yugoslavia, Presidents Bush and Clinton worked closely with Congress, the UN, and allies to ensure broad international support for U.S. military intervention. In both cases, the Presidents gained Congressional support for the use of force and were thus able to build favorable public support. (Warshaw)
   - America’s close relationship with Japan helped guarantee coalition success in the Gulf War. Although the Japanese could not commit combat troops, Japan was the single largest monetary contributor to coalition operations.

5. The White House must be organized to manage crises—and to engage in long-range thinking, so that contingency plans can be developed in advance of a conflict:
   - To develop better long-range planning, President Eisenhower’s unique national security structure included the appointment of two assistants, one to manage operations and the other to focus on long-range strategy and contingency planning. Subsequent Presidents combined these roles in the position of the national security advisor. Unfortunately, U.S. engagement in numerous crises that do not directly threaten vital U.S. interests has distracted many national security advisors from focusing on the longer-range and more important planning. (Bowie Case Study, Abshire)

6. A national consensus on the role of the U.S. military in the world is of utmost and primary importance:
   - There must be a bipartisan element. (Pickering)
   - “American military presence abroad does not equal intervention” (Pickering), but U.S. leadership abroad is necessary for protecting American interests and maintaining global stability. (Bush, Hunter) “Today’s leaders must choose whether to lead or whether to pretend that the U.S.’s prosperity does not depend increasingly on international engagement.” (Pickering)
   - Because it is difficult to define our post-Cold War enemies, we should not expect our actions or leadership to generate consensus the way the Soviet Union did. (Schlesinger) Consensus building will be more complex and require a more significant involvement of private business, international organizations and the UN Security Council in particular, as well as alliances. (Hamre, Oakley, Abshire)

**ON INTERVENTION**

1. To engage the U.S. in future military interventions and define their scope, the President should satisfy criteria from two primary, and at times co-existing, approaches:
Restrictive, which argues that a major power’s role is to keep the international system stable by focusing on protecting its vital interests. Seven criteria should be met before intervening on the basis of the restrictive principle (Haass):
(a) force must be used as an instrument of last resort
(b) vital interests must be at stake
(c) The President should secure strong Congressional and public support
(d) The President must secure strong international support
(e) The President and Defense agencies must be confident in the operation’s success
(f) Rules of engagement should be based on “force protection” – i.e., U.S. leaders must believe in and prepare to keep human casualties to a minimum

Active, which argues for redefining norms and expectations by broadening the ground for intervention to include wider national interests, including humanitarian, economic, and other concerns (Hehir, Haass):
(a) U.S. interventions must involve other states to obtain international legitimacy and for burden-sharing
(b) U.S. interventions must be grounded in a broad definition of purpose and must accomplish more than solely saving human life.
(c) U.S. interventions must be well-planned beforehand to ensure a great probability of success.

2. Further criteria can be used to define the nature of threats, as well as articulate priorities (Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense (Brookings Institution Press, 1999)):
   • **A-list**: “…threats to U.S. survival of the kind and scale that the Soviet Union presented during the Cold War.”
   • **B-list**: “…imminent threats to U.S. interests, but not to the survival or way of life of Americans.”
   • **C-list**: “…Kosovos, Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and Haitis that compose [a list] of important contingencies that directly affect U.S. security, but do not directly threaten U.S. interests.”

3. The full panoply of national power must be considered — military intervention is but one tool among many to realize and preserve national interests:
   • “Whether it is the A-, B-, or the C-list, the strategic game remains prevention, deterrance, and shaping.” (Abshire)
   • “…You have to ask yourself beforehand the likely outcome of using force. Is it likely to get you more than it costs you?” (Haass)
   • “We have to be wary of overusing the military when other tools look like they may do the job.” (Haass)
   • “Strength plus preparedness plus friendship equals American prosperity and security.” (Pickering) The coordinated use of untapped financial, diplomatic, and other tools protects American prosperity and security better than other means against most 21st century threats and challenges. (Oakley, Weintraub, Pickering, Hehir, Abshire)
4. **How to intervene is as important as the decision to intervene, and must be based upon a realistic assessment of the relationship between means and ends:**

- The missions and objectives must be clearly defined. (Bush, Haass, Abshire)
- Alliances and multilateral/coalition-based interventions can generate legitimacy and support. (Oakley, Hunter, Haass)
- Exit strategies ought not give way to exit dates. (Haass, Hehir)
- A strategy of attrition should be avoided and a strategy of agility employed. (Abshire)
- A decision-making model is the “1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis.” President Eisenhower applied the following clear requirements for deciding whether to intervene militarily (Abshire):
  a. Indigenous support
  b. Allied support
  c. Congressional support
  d. Unanimous assurance by the Joint Chiefs that we can be effective. Also, assurance about the means to act with agility: to get in successfully and exit safely. These conditions were not met and Eisenhower refrained from intervention.

5. **In developing an intervention strategy, the President must factor in the 24-hour media cycle which shape domestic and international public opinion. In addition, he must strive to establish rapport with key media members from the outset of an intervention:**

- Television images of widespread starvation in Somalia had a decisive influence on shaping U.S. sentiment in support of intervention. U.S. and international public opinion favoring intervention in Bosnia increased dramatically when the media reported the existence of Omarska and other concentration camps. (Kovach)
- Conversely, television images of U.S. soldiers killed in Somalia created strong public opinion demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country. President Clinton had not made any efforts to prepare the media, Congress, and the public for the possibility of U.S. casualties in Somalia. (Duffy)
- Humanitarian crises will become more common in the future as international contingencies continue to rise. As television further sensitizes the American public to humanitarian catastrophes, the President will have to weigh options and consider new alternatives to force while preserving U.S. leadership abroad. (Hehir)

6. **In the-post Cold War era, alliances may take on new roles and be a more integral part of military operations. Alliances not only lend legitimacy, but efficacy as well:**

- “Political management of the alliance in the UN before, during, and in the period following the use of force is imperative.” (Pickering)
- Alliances can take an untraditional form by seeking cooperation from regional, rather than international, entities. In future hotspots, this under-explored potential will become more useful. (Haas, Pickering, Streeb)

7. **To diminish the burden on U.S. forces, the President should actively encourage the UN, NATO, and other regional security organizations and allies to increase their capabilities and willingness to assume leadership roles in future interventions:**
• When political and economic anarchy recently threatened peace and stability in Indonesia and the surrounding region, President Clinton supported strongly Australia’s role as the leader in peacekeeping operations. In such circumstances, the U.S. can continue to provide political leadership and unique military core competencies – strategic air- and sea-lift, intelligence, and logistics support – without committing troops to combat operations. (Hunter, Pickering, Abshire)

8. When multilateral support and coalitions are not politically or militarily feasible, the United States must be willing and able to use force unilaterally when its vital interests are threatened and other elements of national power have been exhausted:

• Following several months of sanctions and the threat of military force, President Bush – despite regional and international criticism – ordered military intervention in Panama in 1989 to protect U.S. lives and property, restore the elected government, and bring General Manuel Noriega to justice. (Hatheway, Case Study)

• Believing prior approval from the Organization of American States (OAS) would not be forthcoming, President Johnson sought retroactive approval for U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Despite the eventual approval by the OAS, unilateral U.S. military action undermined international support for the policy. Post-intervention, President Johnson received broad OAS support.

ON PREVENTION

1. The information technology revolution has advanced our military’s “crown jewels:” The capability to establish information dominance, situation awareness, and sustained power projection. The importance of defense R&D in the Armed Forces cannot be overstated: It is diminishing rapidly, thus eliminating valuable options:

• The driving force of advances in technological innovation—funding from the federal government—is on a sharp decline with a thirty percent reduction over the past six years and additional projected declines in the years ahead.

• Increasingly the opportunities to find new avenues of deterrence and information dominance will be out of reach.

2. “Every President and every Presidential administration in the last five decades made serious miscalculations that have caused international crises, or contributed to their aggravation....” (Williamson):

• A clear message to an A-level threat could be misinterpreted by secondary or tertiary entities: A President must closely examine how traditional diplomacy’s “ripple effects” can, in this increasingly interconnected world, exacerbate smaller contingencies into full-fledged conflict.

• Intelligence is the first line of defense and ought to remain unpolticized in its assessment: Early warning should not fall on deaf ears if the facts are undesirable.

• The U.S. also can exploit the untapped potential of providing early warning: Historically, much conflict is brought about by others misinterpreting our sometimes ambiguous stance or intentions, which can itself trigger conflict.

• If conflict is imminent, a President should never rule out options for applying force, and should avoid commenting publicly on any imposed limitations.
3. **Post-Cold War realities shed light on U.S. vulnerabilities, demand a different approach to our national security defense investments:**
   - “… We have never been so strong and so vulnerable at the same time. In the history of conflict, good strategists go for vulnerabilities and not matching strength.” (Abshire)
   - The next President will have to consider, along with modern U.S. strengths, the hidden weaknesses in our critical infrastructure. (Carter)
   - New attention to *asymmetrical* threats from hackers and bio-terrorists require changes not just in our point of view, but also changes in our system. (Abshire, Carter)
   - The Congressional Budget Office issued a report this year indicating a severe resource-to-deployment mismatch. CBO said that a $50 billion increase in funding is needed to sustain the present quality and level of military presence abroad, or, under current funding levels, we would be forced to cut military forces by 25 percent.

4. **Current methods of preventive diplomacy have proven ineffective or weak amidst the changing priorities of the post-Cold War world:**
   - Nuclear deterrence is no longer an effective means to end A-list or B-list crises. (Abshire, Haass, Hamre, Oakley)
   - “Special envoys, presidential speeches, and jawboning once the crisis erupts cannot replace systematic, intelligent, long-term attention and material assistance.” (Oakley)
   - “[Except for South Africa,] in none of the major cases involving economic sanctions has the U.S. achieved its objectives.” (Oakley)

5. **21st-century American foreign policy has suffered a debilitating shift to a reactive posture as expectations to act rise and resources dwindle in an increasingly complex strategic environment:**
   - “A problem for the United States foreign policy is summarized by Pogo: ‘We have met the enemy and he is us.’” (Schlesinger)
   - “Today, the U.S. risks squandering its predominant position in the world and the incumbent ability to shape events, markets, and politics because it is not adequately funding its diplomacy and the defense necessary to back it up and ensure its success.” (Pickering)
   - In 1948, the ratio of resource allocation to defense and diplomacy was 2:1; since 1990 it has shifted to 16:1.
   - Public Diplomacy is “atrophying in the face of budget constraints, short-term crisis diplomacy, and traditional State Department culture of government-to-government relations.” If not reinvigorated, this trend would result in “loss of national assets…developed since President Eisenhower, and a dangerous failure to recognize the potential and the needs for [overall] diplomacy in the 21st century.” (Zorthian and Burnett, Case Study)
   - “So for that next President of the United States, whoever he may be, we would advise him to start with formulating a conception of the United States’ role in the
world. At the moment, the United States tends willy nilly to react to external and internal stimuli.” (Schlesinger)

6. In order to actively prevent conflicts and reduce military engagement, a wider range of considerations beyond conventional diplomacy must be pursued:
   • “The embassies overseas do not have very many economic officers or political officers abroad, and they are the ones who bring you… an understanding of what your policies might be and how your policies can be matched to the realities of the country in question and the capability of pulling together the Department of Commerce, the Special Trade Representative, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, and all the others….” (Oakley)
   • “… conflict is better prevented in countries achieving meaningful economic growth than in those that are retrogressing.” (Weintraub)

7. U.S. support of alternatives to government-directed prevention can prove to be an integral and effective preventive diplomacy tool:
   • “NGOs are more grass-roots focused. They are more capable of getting people within the country involved in trying to seek a solution to their own problems.” “[However,] one thing is almost always certain: NGOs have little capacity to implement. They have to fall back on governments to provide the means to do that.” (Streeb)
   • “Where the NGOs will need to be called up is in the prevention stages….” (Streeb)
   • Effective multilateral efforts to prevent conflict must be realistic when considering the receptivity of conventional solutions by the conflicting parties. “The real issue [in UN efficacy] is the balance of calculations between the potentially warring sides, which may be susceptible to political resolution or may not be.” (Bolton)
The following proposal reflects an extensive exchange of views during formal and informal meetings at the Bush Library, the Kennedy School of Government, Capitol Hill, and the Center’s Washington offices. Participants in the seminars, conferences, and discussions included former national security advisors, cabinet members, and current campaign policy advisors, members of Congress and their expert staff, nation-wide conferences, seminars, and specialized task groups.
“PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGIC REFORMATION”

PREPARED BY DAVID ABSHIRE

The transition and “first hundred days” of an Administration offer a historic opportunity for the new President to undertake a bold initiative for the re-constitution of U.S. strategy and institutional reform. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower conducted strategic reassessments and rebuilt the U.S. national security apparatus as they moved the nation from a hot World War II to the Cold War. Although we have shifted from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period, we have failed to carry out a comparable reassessment and renewal.

Institutions, policies, political support, and operational procedures all need reconstructing to match the challenges of the post-Cold War era, or the resulting problems will grow worse. In addition to our institutional mismatch, there is a mismatch between U.S. strategy and resources. For example, in 1948, the ratio of resource allocation to defense and diplomacy was 2:1; since 1990 it has shifted to 16:1. Recently, the Congressional Budget Office warned that at under the current spending levels we must cut our forces abroad by 25 percent, or Congress and the President must appropriate an additional $50 billion per year to fill the gap. This figure does not include missile defense or defense of the homeland. In the words of Lincoln: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present…. As our case is new, we must think anew.”

**Historical Precedents**

President Truman created the instruments that eventually won the Cold War — the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. One strategy document, NSC 68, identified 1954 as a year of “maximum danger.”

President Eisenhower, however, believed we were in for the “long haul” and needed a new strategy and a new structure to make Truman’s institutions work. Eisenhower conducted a broad reappraisal, which served as the basis for a grand strategy that went far beyond traditional military and even diplomatic considerations. Eisenhower took into account economic issues and the formation of agencies for the propagation of democratic ideals, such as USIA and radio broadcasts for people under authoritarian rule.

A precedent for today, President Eisenhower mounted his “Solarium Exercise” in the initial months as Commander-in-Chief, convening three competing task forces to examine different Cold War strategies and resources: the first on containment, the second on “drawing a line” globally on Soviet expansionism, and the third on “roll back” of Soviet power.

Despite subsequent variations, the core elements of the emerging strategy guided the U.S. pursuit of the Cold War until the Soviet Union’s collapse. A similar strategic exercise today could address near- and long-term contingencies adapted to post-Cold War realities.
Presidential Action Now: The Need For Strategic Reassessment

What is needed is a Strategic Reassessment – led by the President – that incorporates Congressional participation and support. This Reassessment should go beyond the campaign 2000 debate, which primarily focused on military readiness and comparative strength. These are important issues, yet readiness is relatively solvable if the requisite resources are appropriated. Rather, this Reassessment raises deeper structural and operational issues regarding U.S. strategy-making and execution of policy to include new items on the agenda such as asymmetrical threats. The goal should be nothing less than a better grand strategy for the wise and coherent use of America’s preponderant power in the 21st century.

The President should immediately commission a task force outside the Executive’s bureaucracy to oversee a major Strategic Reassessment of the full range of our national interests, current commitments, capabilities, options, and vulnerabilities. The groups of experts and practitioners the President will convene, however, must reflect the complexities of the world we face by incorporating a variety of experts as well as the leaders in the private sector.

Today, the strategic environment is far more complicated than in the past. National security cannot be narrowly defined, for it includes missile proliferation and defense, business, homeland defense, the technological revolution of the cyber world, volatile international finance, biotech, demographic, and other developments.

The President’s task force would produce an overall Strategic Assessment that becomes a document to help drive reform of a compartmentalized government by showing how we are clinging to outdated priorities and domestic interests, and not shoring up new vulnerabilities or building true agility in a 21st century world that demands it. For in the future, opponents will not attack our strengths, but our weaknesses.

Therefore, a central question we should ask is: What do we net against? In the Cold War, we netted against the Soviet Union. Today, the greatest enemy of strategic coherence is the way we have organized the conduct of our foreign policy and national security affairs, particularly the way we have compartmentalized the Executive and Legislative branches. Our system of integration is outdated, even “broken,” and cannot meet a wide spectrum of new challenges.

Strategic Reformation and Reorganization

Experts have debated whether either good people or a good organization is more important, but good people in a faulty system will not succeed. This is why the new President should lead an initiative to reexamine and transform an inadequate national security system, as President Eisenhower so ably did in 1953.

The overall goals of the Strategic Reformation should be to:

1. Add an anticipatory component to the national security structure that is both long-term and truly strategic in capability. Eisenhower reorganized the National Security Council (NSC) structure to have two components: An Operations Coordinating Board and a separate Planning Board that was free of the crises of the moment and focused on looking
ahead. Today, the NSC is not organized to have even the forward strategic planning that Eisenhower’s Council had. There are two feasible and effective options:

(a) The bold option would be to broaden and transform the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) (a Board which reports to the President and which all Presidents but one have maintained) into what may be called a President’s Strategic Advisory Board.

i. The most effective structure would be to make the Vice President of the United States the Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Board. A Deputy Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Board could assume a chief liaison role with Congress to aid in building a national security consensus. Membership on the Strategic Advisory Board would especially include people outside of government as PFIAB currently does, as well as within.

Drawing on the primary anticipatory role of the Strategic Advisory Board, a select number of private sector leaders, experienced CEOs from the Information Technology, biotechnology, and the finance/investment banking fields could be appointed as members on a part time basis or as needed. Additionally, a number of former top government officials and seasoned geostrategists could well complement the work of the private sector leaders.

To aid their anticipatory capabilities, individuals from the Intelligence Community (most likely the Deputy DCI or the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council), the Joint Chiefs (the Deputy Chairman or the “J5” for strategic plans), the Departments of State (Director of Intelligence and Research and the Director of Policy Planning), Defense (Undersecretary for Policy and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency), and Treasury (Undersecretary for International Affairs), as well as the President’s Science Advisor should also become members of the Strategic Advisory Board.

ii. A less preferred variation would be to have a Chairman appointed, other than the Vice President, to serve full time or, as the current PFIAB operates, part-time.

Some former National Security Advisors have expressed concern that the Vice President as Chair of the Strategic Advisory Board would: (i) Encroach upon the National Security Advisor; (ii) Add layering; or(iii) At times put a Vice President at odds with the President. These arguments for a less bold approach can be addressed in several ways:

i. The National Security Advisor cannot have the breadth of approach and time needed to reach out of the traditional box to encompass the new, longer-range spectrum of opportunities, risks, and contingencies, for example, of a more borderless world of international finance, cyber, and other terrorist trends beyond the scope of the NSC staff.

ii. PFIAB has been in existence under all Presidents but one. It is well established, and this bolder proposal transforms and broadens it, but does not create a new body.
iii. The Strategic Advisory Board is just that: **Advisory and anticipatory.** It looks at longer-term trends and contingencies, and is not related to immediate crises or policies. If in this capacity the Strategic Advisory Board’s findings or analysis break existing mindsets or assumptions, the President should hear about these findings.

(b) A more modest option would be to add a “strategic group” to the current National Security Council staff as President Eisenhower did. While a step forward, we would argue that this addition, adequate in 1953, would be inadequate today when developments in the private sector have become so dominant.

2. **Reinvigorate the State Department as a Strategic Instrument:**

   *The State Department is in a perilous position in terms of financial support and flight of talent.*

   (a) A reformed and renewed State Department should be presented to funders on Capitol Hill as a key element for prevention of conflict, for avoiding miscalculation and miscommunication, and better shaping the strategic environment. The President should ensure that the new roles of diplomacy adequately address the multiplicity and depth of new contingencies that include prevention, deterrence, and peacekeeping. OMB should report to the Hill a strategic budget that includes State Department activities and initiatives.

   The Departments of State and Defense, and other relevant institutions, should be sensitized to the experience that *miscalculation* and *miscommunication* have led to conflict as they have from Korea to Kosovo. These historically overlooked causes must be studied in-depth at the Foreign Service Institute, the war colleges, and other suitable national institutions, for their lessons to be learned and applied.

   (b) **The Policy Planning Staff should be reconstituted as separate from operations, crises, and speech writing.** In needs to be returned to the prestige of the days of Nitze and Kennan.

   (c) **Greater emphasis must be placed on the Department’s regional bureaus to effectively pull together the Assistant Secretaries of State, reconstruct the greatly reduced AID function, and involve the private sector.** Regional bureaus should be synergized with CINCs as noted below.

   (d) The State Department must be strengthened to be a better public communicator. The Secretary of State, as the President’s chief diplomat, is the lead communicator and is responsible for forming and shaping public opinion – at home and abroad.

   (e) **The reformed State Department needs to include a much stronger capability to integrate business, finance, and technology, and these elements need to be inculcated into Foreign Service culture.**
3. Overcome a Crippling Compartmentalization in U.S. Military Affairs:

(a) The proposed reforms in Joint Vision 2020, the National Defense Panel findings, and the Defense Science Board Study of 1989-99 are inadequately implemented. These can be driven only by a Presidential initiative to reform the entire national security process, with Congressional cooperation. Roles and missions must be reviewed.

(b) There must be better coordination of the Unified Commands (organized under regional commanders-in-chief or CINCs) with our regional diplomacy and the State Department’s regional Assistant Secretaries of State. This should incorporate the Joint Chiefs, such as J2 (intelligence) and J5 (strategic plans), the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, the President’s Science Advisor, military education, civil-military relations, and encourage more in-depth and long-term contingency planning. Regional Assistant Secretaries of State and CINCs should have similar geographical jurisdiction.

4. Accelerate the Innovation Revolution (IR) by Fostering Robust Research and Development (R&D) that will:

(a) Define R&D’s operational requirements in terms of their “final destination.” Outline the strategic demands of future wars and the capabilities needed so that scientific discoveries may evolve into fielded systems by 2020-2030.

(b) Establish a new organizational military R&D structure. Instead of the current compartmentalized one, useful military R&D needs to accommodate the pursuit of joint technologies with the broadest and greatest potential for all the Armed Services. The new structure must allow for other Government agencies’ innovations to easily flow in and be used by the Services.

(c) Make national laboratories the central ground for the scientists to meet the demands of our most experienced war-fighters. Attracting and retaining scientific talent that will interface with the war-fighters is one of the best ways to ensure technological breakthroughs that are needed to shape future war fighting.

(d) Establish a better framework between the national laboratories and the military to rapidly incorporate novel technologies into our strategy, organizations, and systems. To achieve such a result, both the military and the laboratories must share in all product development decisions from the initial design to the final outcome.

5. Reform the Intelligence Community (IC) to Make it More Anticipatory:

(a) The IC needs to reduce or better coordinate its various agencies, increase human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, increase pro-active public diplomacy and information dominance, better analyze gathered information, and better verify its products.

(b) This reform should allow the intelligence community to have a much greater impact on policy-making. Under these proposals, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) would
have direct and frequent access to the President, and provide increased control and accountability over appointments and allocation of resources within the IC. An initial step in any reform would be to address the jurisdictional problems of the various intelligence entities, particularly between the CIA and the FBI.

6. **Resources Need to Be Better Tied to Accountability Among Properly Funded Counter-terrorism Institutions:**

   (a) Our counter-terrorism efforts are compartmentalized among 40 departments and agencies, 11 Congressional committees and subcommittees, and are underfunded. The President and Congress should marry resources and accountability to jointly consolidate old institutions, and create new, unified ones, as well as establish an authority to speak for this community and agree on a national plan of action.

   Executive-Legislative cooperation is key to reconstituting a strategic consensus as we move into the 21st century. That is why a Presidentially-mandated Strategic Reassessment must be a national reassessment done by the Executive, but hopefully drawing an informal consensus from the Legislative branch.

   If the President initiates the Strategic Reformation and breaks down the compartmentalization of the Executive branch, he could encourage Congress to constitute a Joint Strategic Committee, which would help alleviate Congressional compartmentalization and could aid in the development of strategic coherence in spending for national security programs. Such a joint national security committee was recommended in 1976 by the (Murphy) Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and several bills have been introduced to implement the Murphy Commission’s suggestions. Like the Joint Economic Committee, such a Joint Strategic Committee would have no authorizing or appropriating authority, and its members would represent related existing committees.

   Justice Robert Jackson’s dictum amply describes the above intent: “The power of the sovereign is maximized when the Legislative acts together with the Executive.” What is a Constitutional principle is an even more important strategic principle. Unity of action is the first principle of a successful strategy, and our national strategic vision must begin in the mind of the President.
INTERVENTION
“KEY ISSUES AND CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES”

DAVID ABSHIRE

I want to explain how this conference on interventions fits into the overall Report to the President-Elect, which we plan to present after the year 2000 election.

The Center for the Study of the Presidency will do a succinct report for the new President-Elect to build an institutional memory of past successes and failures in Presidential leadership. Our attempt at reconstructing the Presidency for the 21st century will focus on the art and character of Presidential leadership by examining the decision-making process on both key, but select domestic and global issues, and the implementation of key policies.

This is not another transition study. To quote that great scholar on the Presidency and leadership, James McGregor Burns, after reviewing our proposal, said: “I like particularly the emphasis on not what a President should do, but how a President should do what he wishes to do.”

For this particular conference we have developed an outline of the principal Cold War and post-Cold War interventions going back to Korea in 1950. We have also listed the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954, when President Eisenhower decided not to intervene.

Ironically, of all the potential interventions, this was the crisis where a President most clearly set out in advance specifics that had to be met before he would act:

- indigenous support
- allied support
- Congressional support
- public support
- assurance that this crisis was a part of a larger Communist strategy
- and lastly, that there were means to act with agility, get in, be militarily successful, and exit.

But the true significance is not so much the decision not to intervene, but the fact that a clear conceptual framework was established in advance. There was no piecemeal decision-making and gradualism as occurred in most of the remainder of the Vietnam build up.

**Dramatic Increase in Post-Cold War U.S. Military Involvement**

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many have hoped to produce a more stable world order. In place of those hopes, however, a new world disorder has arisen. Symptomatic of this is the fact that the United States has intervened 39 times in more than 30 countries since 1989, compared to only 10 times in the 40 years of Cold War, including Korea and Vietnam. Increasingly we have been thrown into a reactive mode where we lose our freedom of action and simply respond to events.
By contrast, in our Cold War strategy, despite the Vietnam catastrophe, we ultimately shaped the larger strategic environment, rather than simply reacting to it. Without firing a shot in Europe, we won the Cold War battle with the Soviet Union, and it dissolved. The great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu would have labeled this his perfect victory: winning without battle.

We did have interventions in other parts of the Third World during the Cold War. As in the case of Eisenhower’s 1954 decision about Vietnam, those decisions were driven by a larger grand strategy of national interest designed to hold a line against the Communists. Some of those interventions were far more successful than others, but the criteria for acting were clear even though the assumptions and means, especially in the Vietnam War, were flawed.

**Intervention Criteria and Strategic Challenges**

Today, it is hard to have a clear measure and crisp formula for intervention. There is a danger of Presidential piecemeal decision-making and mission creep. Peter Rodman, Richard Haass, and others will debate this issue.

Now, we have a new factor: TV. It has been said that CNN got us into the Somalia conflict, and then, with the bloody pictures of our troops, CNN got us out again. This issue will be taken up by *Time* magazine’s Michael Duffy.

We are faced with an enormous task if we are to understand how and when Presidents decide to intervene, and how misinformation and miscalculations can play out. Geographically, the challenges run from Kosovo to East Timor to Colombia. Taken from the point of view of humanitarian missions, what is the logic of not intervening in Rwanda with its genocide or in Sierra Leone where two million people were driven from their homes – three times as many as Kosovo? And what about the next century, when the greatest intervention challenges may involve preempting a rogue nuclear power, or biological or cyber terrorists? While we cannot be as neat as Eisenhower in 1954, surely we can do better than we have in our formulations since the end of the Cold War.

But beyond the criteria for intervention, I ask myself: why are we reacting to crises all around the world, rather than more frequently deterring them and working to create the strategic environment we need to protect our national interests? I believe in part that it is because we have not organized ourselves to meet the new strategic and humanitarian challenges. We have not adapted our military and diplomatic culture to the inversion in the world environment since the end of the Cold War.

**From “Linear” and “Vertical” Defense to Overstretch and Loss of Agility**

During the Cold War, the U.S. pursued a containment strategy – our defense lines were linear. We fought over lines, the 38th parallel in Korea, and we faced off along a line running through the city of Berlin. As we move from horizontal lines to the vertical ones, strategists followed a highly developed theory of escalation and deterrence. There was strategic coherence even though nuclear strategy had changed some of the rules of classical strategy. When I was at NATO in the 1980s, our war exercises adhered to those guidelines. These were the rules of the game. These have mostly vanished.
The net result is that we are losing our agility and our freedom of action, as we become immersed in civil, ethnic, and religious conflicts. These are issues which Ambassadors Streeb and Melady address: other people’s wars, conflicts, religions, and cultures. Both the Carter Center and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in projects on “preventive diplomacy” have even looked at how religion, often the source of conflict, can be used to engage diverse religious leaders in conflict mediation.

Furthermore, as we find ourselves stretched thin in human and financial terms, we are failing to invest fully in our future armed forces. Ken Allard will address this issue. Ken has been involved for several years in the CSIS project on defense investment, and also the military culture study led by Ed Dorn and Howard Graves. Further aggravating today’s overstretch, we for the most part have not been able to produce proportional burden sharing from our allies and international organizations.

At this point, I like to recall the writings of the late Sir Isaiah Berlin when he spoke of two minds: the mind of the hedgehog, which deals with only one big idea, and the mind of the fox that can deal with many competing ideas with great agility and cunning. Our military forces, our military and diplomatic thinking, and our organization of the government have not moved from the appropriate Cold War mind of the hedgehog to the post-Cold War need for the agile mind of the fox.

The Need to Shape the Strategic Environment

Furthermore, we have lost that art that we had in our Cold War strategy – the art of shaping the strategic environment that in turn influences both friends and adversaries. Instead, we are using force belatedly rather than as one tool in our full panoply of power. That panoply includes diplomacy, economic actions, covert operations, the potential use of military force, the mobilization of non-government organizations (including international broadcasting), and a steady stream of people-to-people contact, including people from the business community.

In addition, the battle of ideas is more important than ever. The purpose is to undercut and change the will of would-be aggressors and ethnic cleansers of all types.

As for the military, what if deterrence fails? If it does, we need agile forces acting like a rapier, not a sledgehammer. Despite the very fine document “Joint Vision 2010” which the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced, we have not been able to implement the concepts of that document to give us truly agile military forces.

Our forces must have quick reaction, mobility, and information dominance so that we have more skillful means of upsetting an aggressor’s center of gravity. The Kosovo crisis proved just that, whether dealing with deployments of Apache helicopters or planning for ground action. The early and very public disavowal of the use of ground forces, and the failure to start mobilizing them, whether we used them or not, I believe, destroyed our agility and hindered our deterrence of Milosevic’s attempts at ethnic cleansing.
In contrast, the Gulf War was a masterpiece of strategic thinking and execution. It combined arms, surprise, and maneuver. Early on we rejected the attrition option and in fact doubled our forces to gain greater maneuverability. President Bush discusses the reasons behind this success. In the Serbia/Kosovo crises, what NATO did, however, was to successfully maintain a remarkable unity when for the first time the alliance really went to war. That is reassuring.

**Reorganization of the National Security Apparatus**

Indeed in any analysis of strategy in history, there tend to be two approaches: one is attrition warfare as epitomized by the World War I generals on the Western front and in strategic bombing in World War II, and again in the Vietnam War. The other is one of maneuver and agility that maximizes the human and psychological factors rather than material forces and resources. I find it interesting that the ideas of “just war” and “just means,” which Father Bryan Hehir addresses, are in line with this second school of strategy rather than the earlier materialistic attrition school.

As the “Joint Vision 2010” makes evident, the information revolution certainly offers us the opportunity for a different level of modern power and influence – “information power in being” – provided we organize ourselves accordingly.

Not all investments in our future need to be material. Some should be organizational. I believe that one of the reasons why we are not doing better around the world is that we are not organized to do so, we are not organized to move from the mind of the hedgehog to the mind of the fox. Once a crisis emerges, the National Security Advisor inevitably ends up as chief operating officer without the time to think ahead about contingencies and strategies; the Secretary of State becomes the negotiator and the Congressional testifier and lobbyist; and the Secretary of Defense is charged with the use of force but does not have a mandate to exercise our nation’s full panoply of power.

History provides an instructive example. Even in the days of the need for the mind of the hedgehog, when General of the Army Eisenhower became President, he organized his security apparatus in a very simple fashion. He had one assistant in charge of operations and execution and another who looked ahead at strategy and contingencies. I think this approach from a great strategist really paid off. Later, with the Kennedy Administration and in all Administrations thereafter, the two functions were combined. One might argue that during the Johnson period, as our commitment built up piecemeal in Vietnam, it would have been far better to have had a strategist who could step back, engage in long-range thinking, and challenge the day-to-day assumptions and strategies.

In any event, we must move in our strategic thinking and implementation from the linear to the highly contingent, but so far we have done so only with the mind of the hedgehog. Now, more than ever, we need the mind of the fox, the mind of the long-range strategic thinker dealing with contingencies.

I know of no Secretary of State who is going to like this suggestion and a would-be National Security advisor might not either. But I think it is important for a President to rethink the structure in the White House because the present structure is not keeping us ahead of the game.
A Strategic Counselor to the President could have a second line to all intelligence sources. Such a Counselor could also work with the Treasury Secretary so that he can think longer range in terms of the best use of resources. The objective would be for the Counselor to be on top of contingencies and not allow the President to be caught off guard. Under this proposal, the current President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board could be transformed into a broader National Security Advisory Board so that a few seasoned practitioners of great standing could serve part-time and help the Counselor look ahead. This proposal has evolved through discussions to recommend that the Vice President chair the President’s Strategic Board, with a Deputy who would spend a large part of their time on Capitol Hill fostering relations with Congressional leaders.

Finally, as we talk about maximizing Presidential power and strategic influence in the world, and the need for a more agile strategic force, we should not forget the need for unity of effort – first and foremost, between the President and the Congress. Again, the Counselor should spend considerable time with Congress. Shirley Anne Warshaw and I will talk more on Sunday about Executive-Legislative interactions.

The second need for effective agile power is with allies and coalition partners, and with international organizations. We won the Cold War because of the unity of NATO. Unity of purpose creates power. Robert Hunter, who was NATO ambassador during its greatest transition, will talk about this requirement with an alliance where we increasingly bear the major burden, and he can also address relations with the UN.
GRAVES: We are going to examine the further complexities of criteria for intervention. What policy decisions lead to the reactive use of force, rather than a proactive strategy of power and influence to shape events in certain Administrations? And what criteria have led to the decision to intervene under different leaders?

Three Intervention Time Periods

Let me frame our discussion by broadly dividing the post-World War II environment into three different periods: (1) the Cold War era of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy; (2) the years immediately before and after the fall of the Soviet Union – the years of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and the first years of the Clinton Administration; and (3) the more recent conflicts in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, and now East Timor. They bring into focus the difficult questions that surface when national interests may be interpreted to include situations that involve ethnic conflict, humanitarian concerns, and/or civil war within a sovereign nation.

The classical philosophers have framed the criteria for intervention in terms of the “just war” and the “unjust war,” and it is appropriate that our first speaker this afternoon is Father J. Bryan Hehir, Dean of Harvard’s Divinity School. Dean Hehir has served at the U.S. Catholic Conference as the first director of the Office of International Affairs and as Secretary of the Department of Social Development and World Peace. Father Hehir has also taken a leadership role with American Catholic bishops on public policy issues. We have asked him to speak this afternoon on the “Politics and Ethics of Intervention.”

A Distinction between War and Military Intervention

HEHIR: I want to make two analytical distinctions. The first one is to distinguish between war, on the one hand, and military intervention, on the other.

Descriptively, they look alike. You use military force; life is taken. You have to think about the relationship of politics and strategy in both. However, I want to argue that, analytically, in talking about intervention, it is best to start by distinguishing between war and military intervention.
One way to distinguish between them is to say that war enforces the UN charter. What intervention does, in the minds of many, is contravene the UN charter. You enforce the UN Charter *a la* the war *vis-à-vis* Iraq. That is to say a sovereign state violates the territory of another sovereign state, and the international community must respond. It is the classic sort of legal model.

What I mean by military intervention is to use military force within another state because of what is going on inside that state – not because the state has aggressed against another state. And that kind of use of military force, at least in the minds of many, is questionable in terms of the UN charter.

Under war, I would classify World War II, Korea, the Gulf War. Under military intervention, I would talk about Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Rwanda. Morally, I want to argue that it should be harder to justify military intervention than it should be to justify war.

**Two Kinds of Interventions**

A second distinction I would like to make is between what I call “great power intervention” and “humanitarian intervention.” I think the non-intervention norm in international law was drawn up primarily to prevent great power intervention, to prevent the kind of intervention that occurred in the balance-of-power era of world politics and, to some degree, to prevent the kind of intervention that occurred during the Cold War.

The kinds of interventions facing us in the 1990s and beyond are not great power interventions. They are driven by different reasons, and have a different meaning. They also have a different moral content to them.

**The Non-intervention Rule and the Tradition of Non-intervention**

First of all, the “non-intervention rule” – whereby states should not intervene militarily inside the sovereign territory of other states – has, in fact, a complicated moral history or a complicated normative history. The word normative usually covers both moral and legal dimensions. The moral dimension of the non-intervention norm was dominant from the 4th century through the 16th. It, in fact, was driven by a “just war” framework, and it produces an interventionist ethic.

It is symbolized by the voice of a 5th century bishop, Saint Ambrose. Saint Ambrose of Milan once said: “He who knows that evil is being done and does nothing about it is equally guilty with the evil-doer.” That moral principle is a rule for universal intervention. I always thought Saint Ambrose was a wonderful saint. I would never want him to be secretary of state. It is at least a clear moral rule: It emphasizes a duty to intervene driven by charity.

The legal tradition of non-intervention arises in the 16th century and continues on to the middle of the 20th century. It is the rule that says that you should not intervene, that military intervention violates international law. In normative history, you get a moral norm that argues for intervention, and a legal norm that argues against it.
The legal norm is what is sometimes called the Westphalian Order, and it includes three things: the sovereign state as the unit of international politics; the norm of non-intervention as the rule governing interstate behavior; and the radical separation of religion and politics.

**Post Cold War Challenges to Non-intervention**

Part of the significance and complexity of the 1990s is that all three elements of the Westphalian Order are under pressure today and are, to some degree, eroded without being eliminated. The effect of the Westphalian Order is what you might call the *status quo ante* on non-intervention. The status quo before 1990 was that there was no political or legal basis for military intervention inside the boundaries of a sovereign state except for the case of genocide.

The events of the 1990s include what I would call a shift of the political-strategic center of gravity. That is to say we have moved from the Cold War cases of classical, bipolar superpower confrontation to an absorption in what might be called the “margins of world politics.” The idea that Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are at the heart of U.S. foreign policy would have surprised most of our immediate predecessors in the field. So you move to the margin of world politics and focus on it.

The effect of moving to these issues has raised serious challenges to the non-intervention norm. The adequacy of the norm today is questioned politically, legally, and morally. And so the question becomes: Should the norm of non-intervention hold?

**Three Purposes of Non-intervention**

Before we throw it away, we ought to know its multidimensional purposes. The non-intervention norm since the 16th century has fulfilled three purposes. First, preservation of order: it seeks to reduce interstate conflict. Second, preservation of the right of self-determination: it seeks to support self-determination by preventing outside interference in the self-determining struggles of a society. And third, it is an anti-imperialist norm: it seeks to protect the small from the great.

The issues of the 1990s – from Haiti, through Bosnia on up through Kosovo – are different questions, humanitarian interventions, not great power interventions. They are driven by the human cost of what one sees happening inside states. One sees what I would call “genocide-plus” – genocide *plus* other atrocious activities that fall short of genocide. Therefore the question becomes: Should you override non-intervention in the face of genocide-plus?

**A Constructive Case for Changing the Norm of Non-intervention**

There ought to be incremental change in the norm, which would have substantial consequences. Essentially, I would take the "just war" model of thinking about the use of force, which is usually about force between states, and transpose it to think about intervention. The “just war” model functions in steps. There is a presumption against the use of force, and then there are a series of exceptions where the presumption is overridden and force is permitted.
We need to ask three questions to determine whether we have a valid exception against the presumption: (1) Why can force be used, for what purpose? (2) When can it be used, under what conditions? and (3) How should force be used, in what way?

First question, where do you locate the presumption? Do you want a presumption against intervention? Or a presumption like Saint Ambrose in favor of intervention? I would argue the wisdom of Westphalia is you should maintain the presumption against intervention.

With regard to the second question, I would expand the causes that override the presumption beyond genocide to other possibilities that would justify military intervention inside the boundaries of a sovereign state – ethnic cleansing being a classic example. But there are others, and I would not expand the causes infinitely. What I will call “ordinary human rights violations” should not justify the use of military force against states, only “extraordinary human rights violations” that reach a certain level.

In the case of the third question, if you expand the cause for intervention, I would limit the authority of who can intervene. I would argue for the need for multilateral authorization in some form to justify military intervention.

And finally, there would need to be a tough test on the means used. Now the means question is very complicated, it is a story in itself.

The ethic of war says the only legitimate use of force is a limited use of force. Is a commitment to the limited use of force, therefore, always a commitment to incrementalism in the use of force? Do the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines fit nicely into “just war”? They seem to argue for massive use of force, and the question about what limits on force would be used have to be raised in light of them.

Two Dimensions to the Intervention Debate

There are two dimensions to the “politics of intervention” debate. One is the question of the American intervention in foreign affairs – what should justify American action – and the second is the question of international institutional alliances. In my view, the basis now exists for overriding the non-intervention rule in a variety of cases, but still a limited group of cases. But the political-strategic consensus does not exist to take much advantage of this new flexibility. Nor has an effective strategy been developed at either the state or international level to guarantee that intervention would be undertaken with both political wisdom and moral rectitude.

A Distinction between National and Vital Interests

I would like to distinguish between national interests and vital interests. I want to argue that vital interests are those interests that directly threaten the well-being of the U.S. or any country. Vital interests are the sort of classical things that one designs military strategy to meet, they are the guide to the use of force.

I want to raise the question whether national interests are not wider than vital interests? If you raise that question, then the space between national interests and vital interests means that you
acknowledge that there are more to national interests than purely material interests. They are part and parcel of the national interests, a conception of values that are as essential to our life as a country and as a state as the material interests we defend under vital interests.

Should we act beyond our vital interests? Should we act beyond our vital interests in the name of national interests? Is it conceivable, indeed necessary, to have action including military action be driven by values that are something beyond the case where we are immediately threatened?

The argument that force should be used only to protect vital interests in a narrow sense might be called a case that arises out of the classical “realist” tradition. The realist tradition says that interventions ought to be rare, interest-driven, and always successful.

**Defining the Scope of the U.S. Role: Two Approaches**

That raises the question of defining the U.S. role. The function of a great power is to help keep the system stable. That is to say a great power expends its energies at well-chosen moments in order to maintain stability in the system. But what a great power does not do is waste its power on minor issues.

Those who make a realist case against an interventionary foreign policy in the sense of humanitarian intervention are what I would call the case of the three Ks: Kennan, Krauthammer, and Kissinger.

I would propose other considerations based, in the first instance, on the shape of the international system in which we live. For whatever reason, it produces conflicts of a violent, virulent sort within state boundaries. Is this a causal result of the end of the Cold War? I cannot be convinced that all this is produced by the end of the Cold War. Whatever the cause, there is a process of fragmentation in states that do not interest us, as a great power, vitally around the world.

Over against the argument that that is a sufficient rationale for the definition of national interests, I again would want to distinguish vital interests. I think that is a sufficient rationale for vital interests. I do not think it is a sufficient rationale for American national interests. Over against that, I would say – and vis-à-vis Charles Krauthammer and others – that today there are norms and expectations which exist in the world partly driven by choices that have been made by the United States and other states over the last 50 years, which go beyond the expectations of 19th century great power politics. We can defy those expectations, and we can ignore them. But they exist. They take the form not only of hopes, but of developed norms.

**A Key Domino: Domestic Support**

Between that definition of a U.S. role and the ability to translate it into strategy stands the crucial domestic domino. Even if you think it is right to have a national interest broader than our vital interests and to have, therefore, a policy that is willing to undertake ethically and politically certain chosen interventions beyond our vital interests, unless you have domestic support, you cannot sustain this, and therefore, that support is crucial. It is, as it was once called, the key domino.
There is, finally, the international side of the debate, for this debate is not purely an American debate. And the international side of the debate must go beyond where [UN Secretary General Kofi] Annan went in his address to the Security Council. In fact, there are three key actors in thinking about this international system, which today is capable of producing genocide-plus.

**Three Key International Actors**

The three agents are: states, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations. There is, in fact, a vital, significant need for a policy framework that could integrate the activity of states, which still are the key actors, the role of international institutions, which can become better actors than they are, and the newly found role of non-governmental actors. It is possible to think out the potential for each of these and to coordinate them, but we do not have a policy discussion that is broad enough to capture that.

The objectives of this kind of three-dimensional strategy should be, first, modest. We should be able to establish, I think, an international 911, something that does not undertake immediately nation-building, democracy, and realization of all human rights, but simply stops the murder.

Secondly, beyond 911, there is the possibility of better-coordinated humanitarian relief, and then, beyond humanitarian relief, there is the stretch to the development of a secure civil society. This is a long stretch, admittedly. But at least it is a conceptual framework that tries to get beyond where we are.

The world has changed, not only empirically, but normatively, producing new expectations. However, the change is not total. There are still great power interests and great power politics. It is just that that does not constitute the entire picture of the world, nor, I think, should it constitute our entire definition of national interests. And I think it is possible to shape a strategy and a conceptual framework that at least builds a minimal support system to see that genocide-plus is not simply taken for granted in the world we live in.

**GRAVES:** Thank you Father Hehir. Our next speaker is Dr. Richard Haass, director of foreign policy studies at The Brookings Institution. Richard was special assistant to the President and a member of the national security staff under President Bush. He was awarded the Presidential Citizen's Medal in 1991 for his contributions to the development and articulation of U.S. policy after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Most of you may well know him best for his appearances on the “Today Show,” and NBC since he is a consultant to that network.

The question we would like to ask you is how were interventionist criteria developed by various Administrations and then do some evaluation of that, if you would, please.

**HAASS:** There are two tendencies about Presidential criteria for intervention.
First Presidential Intervention Tendency: Restrictive

The first tendency, which Bryan Hehir called realist, I would call a restrictive or reluctant approach to the use of military force, whether for war or interventions. And this school or tendency has several tenets or guidelines that I would suggest:

First is that you only intervene with military force when vital interests are at stake.

Second, you only intervene when you have extremely high expectations that you will enjoy Congressional and public support.

Third, you only intervene with military force when you believe you have a large amount of international support, preferably formal international support.

Fourth, and one that actually comes directly out of church teachings, that you only intervene militarily as a last resort, only after you have explored or even tried all other available tools and options and that military intervention is the last one you come to.

Fifth, that you are confident of success, and that you understand that military intervention is a serious thing. Indeed, it is one of the most serious things that Presidents are asked to contemplate, and one should only do it if one believes that it will lead to a successful outcome.

And lastly, this is in some ways a more recent understanding, that one only intervenes if one is confident one can keep the human costs low on our side, or, to use the awful jargon of Washington, that “force protection” can be assured to a large extent.

Who Would Fit within This Tendency?

I would go back to Eisenhower, and what is most interesting about Eisenhower is where we did not intervene. One begins with Vietnam in the early 1950s, when the French ran into their nightmare and Dien Bien Phu. And there was tremendous domestic pressure on Eisenhower to get involved, and what he clearly did was parry that opposition by talking about the requirement for formal Congressional and allied support. It was his way of successfully resisting it. Because he knew that you were not going to get Congress and the allies to sign on the dotted line to get involved to help the French or anyone else.

Interestingly, his successor came out quite similarly. I would call Kennedy another member of the restrictive intervention school. And what is interesting about it is, in part, because Kennedy, like all candidates, criticized the incumbent, the predecessor, but then in office actually was not fundamentally different. He was very cautious in Vietnam.

And even more interesting is what he did or rather did not do in Cuba. And during the missile crisis, despite at times counsels to the contrary, counsels that argued for various uses of military force, Kennedy ended up being extremely careful in what he asked the U.S. military to do.

More recently on the cautious side, I find two Presidents I would put there.
President Bush on Bosnia was someone who was a reluctant intervenor, and in fact did not intervene. He was very uncomfortable for various reasons. But essentially he was very uneasy about a situation where he did not see vital national interests necessarily at stake, was not sure about how we could use military force in a successful mode, was very concerned about the costs that would ultimately be borne, and was not confident about political support at home or abroad. So ultimately, the Bush Administration avoided intervention in Bosnia.

The Clinton Administration did the same in Rwanda. The Clinton Administration was essentially spooked, lost its nerve in the aftermath of Somalia, when eighteen deaths led it to pulling the plug on American intervention there. And despite opportunities to intervene in Rwanda, the Administration did not intervene for the most part in East Timor as well.

Second Presidential Intervention Tendency: Activist

The opposite tendency is more activist and is more open to the idea of using military force. Clearly, Johnson in Vietnam stands out. He believed that vital interests were at stake, was very worried about the loss in prestige to the United States if we did not succeed in Vietnam, and designed an extremely large intervention in which heavy costs were borne.

Ronald Reagan in Lebanon. There are actually two interventions by the United States in Lebanon in the early 1980s. The first one was to help the PLO get out and ultimately to Tunisia. That was fairly straightforward. But then, there were the slaughters in the Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila. And in the outcry that followed, the Administration reinserted U.S. forces without any clear mission and, ultimately, they effectively became protagonists in a civil war and, tragically, several hundred died.

Ironically, it was this experience that led to the articulation, first by Secretary Weinberger and subsequently by Colin Powell, who was a military assistant to Secretary Weinberger, of the modern-day version of the restrictive approach to intervention. It was the somewhat expansive experience there that led to a very restrictive reaction, particularly on the part of Weinberger, who essentially articulated what I described here as the restrictive approach.

Also, a more activist tendency is really the entire class of the 1990s humanitarian interventions, largely carried out by the Clinton Administration, one exception probably being the Bush Administration’s intervention in Somalia. But this has essentially been the hallmark of the Clinton Administration. Another example is probably the Bush Administration in Kuwait, which was also a very active use of military force when some people thought it was premature or unnecessary.

All I would say is that these two tendencies continue to exist or co-exist at times. My own hunch is that any President is going to have to take criteria from each. There is not going to be one approach that will always be right. Indeed, if one had one or the other and always applied it, he or she would get into big trouble – either by underusing or overusing the military instrument.
Useful Criteria Derived from Presidential Experience with the Use of Military Force

It helps to think about military force as one of the tools in the policy-maker's kit bag. And then we have to make both a relative and an absolute judgment about the use of a tool. As an absolute judgment, we have to ask ourselves beforehand the likely outcome of using force. Is it likely to get us more than it costs us, to put it bluntly? Are the expected benefits likely to be greater than the expected costs? And then relative: How does it compare to the likely consequences of other policy tools? The other policy tools could be diplomacy. They could be sanctions. They could be economic incentives. They could be doing nothing. They could be mediation, arbitration etc.

All I am suggesting is that military force has to make sense on its own terms, and it has to make sense compared to the alternatives.

Secondly – and it is really a corollary to this – we cannot separate the decision to use force from the question of how we use it. Often the question of whether to intervene turns very much on the question of how we intervene. How we design the intervention can make a given intervention either desirable or undesirable, either the best option or the worst option.

Therefore the question of intervention cannot simply be looked at in the abstract. It has to be answered very much in the detail of specific plans or forms of interventions, almost with a small "i."

Colin Powell tended to get very nervous when people wanted to use military force for political purposes, to signal or to influence behavior, to coerce, to compel — to use military force not to destroy or defeat, but to influence. However, when you do that, you are ceding the initiative to the other side. Only the other side can decide when it is prepared to say “uncle.” If it is not prepared to say “uncle,” then you are either forced to accept failure, or forced to escalate. And he was worried about either of those consequences, so he was extremely uncomfortable with embarking on any military endeavor where we did not control the situation.

I agree with Bryan Hehir, it is wrong to set up criteria that we only intervene where vital interests are at stake. It's too narrow. There has to be a humanitarian component. People will ultimately not be satisfied by balance of power alone.

Three Additional Criteria for Humanitarian Interventions

First, one has to have some confidence it is going to work. Second, with humanitarian interventions, I think it is important to have others involved, not so much for international legitimacy, though I think some degree of multilateralism is desirable, but for burden-sharing. And third, I think with humanitarian interventions, one should think modestly. By modestly, I mean to design the implementation of the intervention in a way that does not do more than you have to do to keep people alive. Let me give you three examples.

In Somalia, the Bush Administration was justified for going in to feed people, while the Clinton Administration was not justified in allowing the mission to broaden into a form of nation-
building, when essentially they decided to take on Mr. Aidid and become protagonists in a civil war. That was a step that I think was not required and should not have been taken.

Or now in both Bosnia and Kosovo, I get extremely uneasy when I hear people talk about recreating integrated multiethnic societies. Yes, that would be desirable. But the idea that we should use military force and risk lives for such a chancy outcome seems to me absurd. One has other foreign policy tools to do that. One has decades to do that. But right now, one of the things military force is good at is keeping people apart and keeping them from killing each other.

So we may not think of separation as the highest form of social order, but it is a price that I think is justified, and it sure beats people getting killed and getting ethnically cleansed. It may not reverse situations that were unfortunate or immoral, but it does buy time for situations to evolve and for other policy instruments – economic, diplomatic, and what-have-you – to work.

One of the criteria that I would disagree with is the idea of giving Congress and the American public a veto. Presidents have to go out and regularly build political capital for what they do. When it is not there, you can still intervene. It is just that the risks go up.

It is useful to have international support. It eases the burden and can help manage the domestic political debates. It can reduce the friction that the intervention might cause. It gives greater legitimacy. One can get international support from regional organizations, and that is one of the under-explored areas. One can build coalitions of the able and willing. One can use alliances like we did in Kosovo. International support is useful, but one should not equate it with UN Security Council approval.

Some people apply the “last-resort” criteria to intervention. This is understandable, but it is almost always wrong. Almost in every situation I can think of we pay an enormous price for delay, and we pay a price in two ways.

One is that people on the ground tend to lose their homes or their lives or both. Delay is expensive, whether it is the people of Kuwait in a classic war, or the people in Bosnia, Kosovo. Delay is not like wine. Time does not improve things. People pay dearly.

Another is that with the passage of time, often the moment to use military force before the other side has prepared itself passes. Saddam Hussein had more than six months to dig in, and we were lucky that the Iraqis turned out to be so incompetent. We should not assume that all the time. Delay means that you forfeit opportunities to act, not simply before things happen that are bad on the ground to innocent people, but before the opposing military has time to build up and dig in. So it potentially raises the cost to your own side.

Rather than thinking of military force as a last resort to be used only after you have checked every other box, I would argue it should be a tool that is considered on the same terms every step of the way from the onset of a crisis. So if on day one of a crisis, military force is the best tool, when you look at it in the absolute and relative, then it should be used. It should not have to wait until you have tried diplomacy, tried sanctions and everything else. Because by that point, tremendous costs will have been paid.
I am not saying you necessarily use it on day one, just that the President should be willing to look at it in an intellectually honest way with equal amounts of rigor that one would hold up to any other instrument. I do not think we must have a guarantee of success before we use military force. On the other hand, it is very hard to justify it if you do not think you are going to succeed.

**A Few Points about Criteria**

We have to resist the notion of defining success “down” so we are guaranteed it. If you remember several years ago, there was the debate about defining deviancy down where we made ourselves comfortable with levels of social disorder that we should not have. Well, I would say the same thing about military force – that we should not define success down.

So, when one thinks about a reasonable chance of success, success should also be defined in a reasonable fashion. But simply to describe any punitive operation as successful, be it what we did in Afghanistan last summer when we attacked a terrorist camp, or an alleged pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, is too Lewis Carroll for me. These are not successes, other than ordnance was launched and landed. But did they successfully deal with the problem at hand? Obviously not.

Force protection – the idea of keeping costs down – can be a consideration, but it cannot be the only consideration. Another one is about exit dates – a good point to turn to towards the end. The idea that interventions should have endings before they can have beginnings seems to me wrong. We have been in Korea for a long time. That is a successful intervention. We have been in Bosnia for several years. And after several failed and flawed attempts to cite exit dates, we are basically there in an open-ended way. And I think the Clinton Administration learned its lesson with Kosovo: It never set an exit date.

The American people will support an intervention so long as the costs do not get out ahead of the benefits and the interests at hand. So if we can design low-cost interventions – and in many cases we can if we do not get too ambitious in what we try to do – then I think the American people are prepared to support open-ended interventions. So we should not get too hung up on the idea of exits being a criterion, which I probably should have added at the beginning has become one of the restrictive school's approaches.

**Support for Self-Determination Is Not Grounds for Intervention**

We should be very careful about allowing support for self-determination to become a grounds for intervening. Most of the cases for self-determination today would cause more problems than they would solve – either the entities would not be viable, or they would trigger massive civil wars, or they would trigger massive regional wars.

You know you are in trouble when you look to the Middle East for positive guidance. But in this case, let me look to the Middle East for positive guidance in the Camp David Accords. Under the Camp David Accords, the Palestinian people are not given a right to self-determination. Rather, they are given the right to participate in the determination of their own future. And that seems to me about correct. If they simply had a right of self-determination and took it unilaterally, imagine how the Israelis or others would respond. Imagine if the Kurds simply exercised a right of self-determination, or Taiwan. One could go around the world, but in almost every single case if a
claim or a desire for sovereignty—a desire for statehood—were exercised unilaterally, it would be a prescription for regional warfare. So the United States, diplomatically as well as militarily, ought to be extremely wary of allowing that to be a criterion for intervention.

We have to be wary of overusing the military when other tools look like they may do the job. And I think that some of the recent examples I would cite here are Haiti, Kosovo, and Lebanon. In all these cases, I am prepared to argue that, had our diplomacy been done differently, there would not have been a need for intervention.

[New York Times columnist] Bill Safire once criticized me for writing a speech for President Bush, which he described as "the it depends doctrine." But I do think you end up with an "it depends" doctrine. What you need to do as a policy-maker or as a concerned citizen is simply look at interventions, and ask a lot of tough, consistent questions. Ask them every time. The questions may be the same, but the answers will have to be different.

GRAVES: Thank you, Dr. Haass. Are there questions?

QUESTION: Father Hehir, could you expand a bit more in depth on the difference between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” human rights violations?

HEHIR: I used this distinction because once I say you should expand the causes that override the non-intervention principle, the consensus cause that has overridden the non-intervention principle is genocide. That is sort of ensconced.

Then the question becomes: If you want to override that, how far do you want to go? So, what I do is to try and work out a grid that starts with genocide and moves over to what I call “ordinary” human rights violations. It is a perverse term. But what does it mean? It means a regime that imprisons its opponents, closes down the legislative body, closes down the press, closes down the political parties in the union.

Do you think we should use military force when faced with that kind of regime? If we did it would have meant, for example, that we would have used military intervention against virtually every state in Latin America between 1973 and 1980. That seems to me to be disproportionate and out of line.

What fits then? You have a lot of tools in the kit, and what I would call an activist human rights policy, short of military intervention, allows you to do a number of things.

But what do you do between genocide and those kinds of human rights violations? I think ethnic cleansing is a term of art, if you will, from the 1990s. There were debates about whether you call it genocide. But we know enough about ethnic cleansing, and I think it qualifies as an overriding reason for military intervention. Move beyond ethnic cleansing and start thinking about other justifications for military intervention. Military intervention to deal with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Well, that one gives me extraordinary pause. What kind of threshold do you want to use? That a state is threatening to build weapons of mass destruction? That it has built them but not deployed them? That it has not deployed them but has a historical track record that makes you nervous?
Obviously, there are states in the world that have nuclear weapons that we are fairly closely allied with, and we are not about to invade them. And so, therefore, the question becomes: Does that classify? And I just walked my way through these various cases.

**QUESTION:** My question involves the War Powers Resolution. You talked about exit strategy and restrictive policy. What type of effects, positive or negative, do you view that particular piece of legislation as having in light of the fact that, after sixty days, the President either has to get out or seek an extra thirty-day extension?

**HAASS:** The cost of that specific provision that you cite is the reason that the War Powers Resolution has never been triggered. Not one President has even conducted an intervention under the War Powers Resolution so as not to be in a situation where Congressional inaction would necessarily bring an intervention to an end.

Administrations will report to Congress about an intervention pursuant to reporting clauses in the War Powers Resolution, but not one President, Democrat or Republican, in the quarter-century now since the War Powers Resolution became law, has ever activated or triggered the core clauses of the resolution, which would put a clock on any intervention. I think it is a bizarre piece of legislation. Again, I hate the idea that inaction changes policy. So I think the legislation is fundamentally flawed.

People on one side of the political spectrum dislike it because it is seen as empowering the President in ways the Constitution never intended, and you have another bunch of people – the majority really – who are against the resolution because it is seen as restraining the President if Congress does not act in ways the Constitution never intended. So you have this alliance that thinks it is a deeply flawed piece of legislation.

If it remains on the books, it will be nothing more than a reporting requirement. And it will probably remain there because it might be more trouble than it is worth to repeal it. But in terms of actually having an impact on American foreign policy – no.

**Exit Date and Exit Strategies**

I do think it is important to distinguish between exit dates and exit strategies. There are two problems with exit dates. One is that they may encourage the other side to lay low and pop up the day after you leave. The other is: What do you do if things are not fixed by that date? You have invested all this. So imagine, after the first year in Bosnia – we said we were going to leave after a year – and we went: “Oh, my God, if we leave, everything we have done up to now, this peace we have brought, the investment we made will be undone in an hour, that the allies will not stay without us. It will be a mess.”

**HEHIR:** So then the question becomes what do you do if murderous things are going on and it does not count in big power politics?

One strategy is you quarantine it. But I think that is very inadequate.
Then the question becomes: Who takes responsibility and for what purpose? Once you have stopped the murder, there are a lot of problems that are left over. The question is whether the intervening force is then automatically responsible for all those problems or not. And I would like to see a debate about taking responsibility and starting to determine functional specificity matched to a diversity of actors. There are lots of situations where the U.S. will be the only force that can muster the kind of power to intervene and will be expected to act. But in many of the world’s flashpoints, America ought to stay out or get in and out quickly.

HAASS: I think we are seeing some progress in this in both East Timor and Kosovo, which is that you are beginning to see a slightly greater tendency towards regionalization. The bulk of the East Timor intervention is Australian. The bulk of the Kosovo intervention now – not during the combat phase – is European. Over time, it is regional states that have the greatest stake in dealing with these situations. They are the ones who pay the price for refugee flows. They are the ones who often have commonalities in languages. They have trade at stake. They have the biggest interests.

One of the things we want to think about again – the UN I do not think can be the answer – is a much greater emphasis on building up regional capacities to deal with a lot of these situations, so not so much an international 911, but one possibility, a local or regional 911 might be a useful long-term proposition.

The military tool is very good for stopping war, but that is when you then have to turn to other tools, whether they are economic, political, social, as well as simply the passage of time for some healing, rather than necessarily using your military tool.

So I think the goal is multilateralism, as broad as you can get it and in whatever form it avails itself. But again, you are more likely to be effective if what you try to do deals with the immediate crisis. When I taught at the Kennedy School, we used to talk about the difference between problems and conditions. One of the purposes of the intervention ought to be to deal with the immediate problem without necessarily doing away with the basic condition, which might be hatred and mistrust. That is too much to ask. And I think that is the way you have to approach most of these things.

GRAVES: A lot of what we see in the discussions between the military advisors and the policy makers is the struggle to try to define the military mission and the measures of success. And frequently it is seen as a pursuit of an oversimplified analysis. But it really is what we are all struggling with: How are you modest and define success based on what the military mission really is – what the military can accomplish – rather than give it a mission that we hope we will be able to fulfill?

QUESTION: How can the "it depends" doctrine serve not only as a reactionary doctrine, but as a deterrence?

HAASS: You have to look at the situation, for example, in December 1996, when you had China undertaking increasingly aggressive and provocative missile tests clearly meant to intimidate Taiwan. The U.S. judged that its vital interests were at stake and it could do some good by dispatching a second carrier to the region. It was a deterrent-type effort in a very classic gunboat
diplomacy mode in order to signal to China: “Do not go too far here. We have important interests at stake and commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.”

**An Argument in Favor of Alliances**

We have situations where we do not think “it depends”; we call them alliances. And in situations like the 38th parallel in Korea and in Europe during the Cold War and elsewhere, we have “it does not depend” foreign policy, and it is a commitment. But, increasingly in the post Cold-War world, less and less of the world fits into the “it does not depend” situation. You have more and more countries that are not pure foes – Russia, China. They are competitors in some situations. In other situations, we are working alongside Russia. So it gets harder to define relationships with formal treaty commitments in a way that people know exactly what it is we are prepared to do in every conceivable situation.

Korea, again, for the most part, is one of these situations because, in some ways, it is a residual problem of the Cold War. It is a fact of life that in the post-Cold War world it is going to be hard to determine in advance exactly what it is we are or are not prepared to do. So it is very hard to give what you might call “strategic deterrence” in that sense.

On the other hand, if you agree with me that force need not be used only as a last resort, then I do think we can avail ourselves as situations unfold of options of tactical deterrence and use of force. Similarly, they can be availed in a humanitarian situation, at the first sign a situation is unraveling, rather than waiting for a genocide to happen.

One idea would be to say: “Look, we can see a genocide is brewing here.” And the next idea would be a preventive deployment; you have tactical options if you want to undertake them. So I do not think you give up the idea of deterrence. It is not necessarily just being reactive to situations, but one can still get out in front of them if one chooses.

**HEHIR:** In the Cold War logic of things – meaning both the intense global political struggle and the threat of nuclear weapons and escalation – there were clearly situations which were not simply the choice between right and wrong, but a kind of irreconcilable clash where you cannot satisfy all rights.

Increasing Complexity of Interventions: The Cases of Hungary versus Tibet

The standard case was Hungary in 1956. There was no question of what was happening in Hungary: people were simply being massacred. If you said to me at that time there should be counter-intervention in Hungary, I would say on moral grounds there should not be counter-intervention because that meant virtually certain risk of escalation to nuclear war. So there is a good example of what I mean by “clashes of rights.”

At the same time, with the collapse of the Cold War you have fewer and fewer cases where you have the kind of Hungary clarity in which you can walk away and say it is tragic, but not necessarily morally evil to walk away. You have fewer of those cases and more cases where there is no major threat of risk of escalation, no major threat of producing interstate conflict by trying to deal with intrastate conflict. Therefore, we have a wide range of these problems.
Are there still some of the old kinds? How about self-determination for Tibet? A powerful argument could be made on all kinds of grounds. But if somebody was proposing to me they were going to do something about it with military force tomorrow, I would say: “No, wrong idea, it’s a disproportionate fit there.” So it is not necessarily that one walks away with a good conscience.

There are other times when one walks away with a sense of tragedy. This is a little different than moral evil because the clash of right on right produces an unsatisfactory situation. I think we are going to find it harder and harder to walk away and say nothing could be done.
The members of Congress want to be the nation’s policy leaders with regard to military activity. Consequently, Congress has tried to curb the President’s ability as Commander-in-Chief with war powers. One of the interesting points that rarely comes up in the discussion on interventions is that the President has complete power to move troops. If the President decides to send troops to Kosovo, he sends troops to Kosovo; if he decides to send troops to Iraq, he sends troops to Iraq. That is his role as Commander-in-Chief.

Now let me turn to that role and the broader concept it plays in interventions. Congress has become increasingly aggressive in challenging the use of military force around the world in intervention activities. The question arises: Has the President increased the use of military force around the world, or has Congress simply become more aggressive in challenging that use because of a greater mistrust between the two branches of government, particularly since Watergate? I think that Watergate changed the way Congress and the President deal with one another, and the institutional relationship perhaps has been changed forever.

What has happened over recent years such that Congress regularly accuses the President of violating both statutory and Constitutional responsibilities with regard to the use of military force? The answer to this question is part of a larger battle over which branch serves as the nation’s political and policy leader. Every time the President uses his Commander-in-Chief role to commit American troops to action around the globe, it is an exercise in Presidential leadership and in Presidential authority. Presidents have used this power over 140 times throughout the course of U.S. history. The nation looks solely to the President to protect its citizens and to protect its interests around the world.

As the U.S. has moved from an era of Congressional government which dominated the 18th, 19th, and the early part of the 20th century to an era of Presidential government in the post-FDR years, Congress has sought to reclaim its dominance in national leadership. The current era of Presidential government in which the President serves not only as the nation’s head of state, but also as the nation’s policy leader has deepened the gulf between the Executive and Legislative branches. Congress has sought to dampen Presidential leadership through a series of legislative actions primarily as a result of the Watergate scandal. They include: the War Powers Resolution of 1973, The Budget and Empowerment Control Act of 1974, and the Ethics and Government Act of 1978. All of these laws represent Congressional attempts to place limits on Presidential power.

The most relevant of these legislative acts to our discussion on intervention is the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in which Congress sought to constrain the President from committing troops to “hostile situations” without consulting with Congress. The War Powers Resolution, passed by Congress over President Nixon’s veto, remains in effect today. This law requires consultation with Congress on all deployments of troops in hostile situations, and limits the timeframe in which Presidents can deploy troops.
The issue whether Congress can in anyway constrain Presidential use of force has not been brought before the Supreme Court for resolution. Although during the Persian Gulf War a small group of Democratic House members argued that President Bush had failed to follow the mandates of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the Supreme Court sidestepped the challenge on the grounds that it was a non-judicial issue. The Court said that the issue was political because it was brought by a small group of Democratic House members against a Republican President.

In 1995, the War Powers Resolution was again debated in Congress. Republican members were seeking to bring America’s involvement in the multilateral military action in Bosnia under the constraints of the Resolution. Congress debated the issue, but with no result.

Presidents who view the War Powers Resolution as an unconstitutional infringement on their Commander-in-Chief role have regularly ignored it. In 1975 for example – which was the first time this Resolution was tested in an international military conflict – President Ford simply ignored the law. When a U.S. merchant marine ship was captured in international waters by the Cambodian Navy in 1975, President Ford initiated a secret rescue mission by the Marines. He never consulted with Congress, never talked to anybody, he simply moved forward to rescue the Americans, who by that time had been taken off their ship and moved to a little island. President Ford feared that if they were taken off the island and moved into Cambodia, nobody would ever see them again. He said: “When a crisis breaks out, it is impossible to draw Congress in the decision-making process.” He added that the War Powers Resolution “was a serious intrusion on the responsibilities of the President as Commander-in-Chief — the person who formulates and who ought to execute foreign policy.”

Indeed, throughout the last twenty years, Presidents have continued to ignore the War Powers Resolution in exercising their role as Commander-in-Chief. When Presidents are determined to act, to intervene, to send troops, they do so without consulting Congress. When President Reagan sent fighter planes over Libya in retribution for terrorist activity against our soldiers in Europe, the mission was handled with great secrecy and without consultation with Congress. When President Bush sent half a million soldiers to free Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion, the mission was handled by the President: He talked to Members of Congress, sought their guidance, but he did not consult them as to the appropriateness of the action. The talks with Congress were to build public support, not to seek their approval. Never confuse Presidents talking to Congress in an effort to build public support with seeking guidance, consulting with them as a constitutional matter.

Politics will always be part of this process, but the larger issue is that of institutional, not political rivalry. As we move into the 21st century with America committed to furthering democracy around the globe, protecting our global economic interests, and ensuring that ethnic and human rights are safeguarded, the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief continually will be tested by Congress. But there is no possibility that the President will empower members of Congress to be co-decision-makers when matters of military force are at issue. Presidents will continue to act on the advice of their own national security teams to protect and defend the national interest as they constitutionally are required to do. So while these institutional battles will continue, there is no question that the President will always win the war of words with Congress.
In reality, the only true weapon that Congress has is the power of the purse to cut off funds for military actions that are prolonged. This would open Congress, however, to massive public retaliation. Presidents with skilled press teams have been very adept at convincing the American public of the importance of their military actions. Congress has not had the type of press operation the President has to move public opinion to its side.

Who wins the battle over the commitment of troops? Unquestionably, always the President, regardless of whether we have a unified or a divided government. If the President commits to intervention activity, there is precious little that Congress can do. Neither the Constitution nor public opinion will support the institutional battles in which Congress seeks to engage and gain control over military commitments.
“DEFINING THE MISSION AND ACHIEVING IT: 
ENDS VERSUS MEANS?”

PETER RODMAN

GRAVES: The first panel this morning is with Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center. Peter served as the Director of the Department of State Policy Planning Staff from 1984 to 1986. He then served as a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Reagan from 1986 to 1987, and as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and NSC Counselor to Presidents Reagan and Bush from 1987 to late 1990.

RODMAN: Let me start with Somalia just to introduce the subject. Somalia is a good model of what to do wrong. The Bush Administration at the end of 1992 sent about 30,000 American troops with a narrowly defined mission to protect humanitarian relief efforts. About six months later by May 1993 when the Clinton Administration had taken over, the number of American troops was reduced to about 4,000. But in the meantime the mission had expanded to something very grand, institution-building, nation-building. We became much more actively involved in trying to refashion the politics of Somalia. But the mismatch between the ends and the means was a fiasco waiting to happen, and so it happened. It all boils down to a question of means and ends, and that is the theme I want to emphasize today.

The Question of Means

There was an important debate between George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger in the Reagan Administration about the use of force. Lebanon triggered it, and I will say a word about Lebanon in a minute. It was this debate that led Secretary Weinberger in 1984 to give a famous speech enunciating his principal criteria for the use of force: that we should use overwhelming power, there should be public support, and Congressional support, and clear objectives. Some of the criteria resemble what Dave Abshire said about President Eisenhower.

The fact is, there is room for limited uses of force. But in the wake of the Vietnam experience, the burden of proof I think is on anyone who would propose some limited use of force, someone who is proposing the use of force without some decisive element to it.

One always needs to calculate the risk carefully and proceed with one’s eyes open; there has to be some match between the ends and the means. In fact, during the Reagan Administration, something both Secretary Shultz and Weinberger approved was the re-flagging of tankers going to Kuwait. During the Iran-Iraq war, we provided convoy protection to oil tankers going to and from Kuwait. This was very risky because of the possibility of Iranian attack, but it had a strategic purpose. It was the right thing to do, and it was successful. So there is scope for limited uses of force. But again, you must have your eyes open about the risk.

As we saw in Somalia, peacekeeping sometimes is a form of war. For us it may be a limited, obscure, minor intervention; for the people on the ground, often it is total war, and we have to again keep our eyes open, and the ends and means have to be matched.
I would like to say something about the Lebanon debacle in the early 1980s. It was really a function of a bureaucratic stalemate in Washington, and there is a lesson from that experience. George Shultz wanted us to be in Lebanon to intervene in a more decisive fashion. There was a civil war going on, and Syrian-backed forces were trying to topple the Lebanese government. And Secretary Shultz thought that we had a geopolitical stake in it. Secretary Weinberger thought it a mistake, that we should not be there, our Marines were in a very vulnerable deployment. The President just tried to split the difference between these two positions. And that is a mistake: You cannot split the difference.

President Reagan should have decided on one position or the other: either you get out, or you stay in in some decisive way. And by splitting the difference we got the worst of all worlds. We were engaged, our prestige was committed, but we were not able to do anything decisive. And that too was a fiasco waiting to happen.

But I have to say Democratic Presidents have had their own kinds of mistakes. I venture to say that Democratic Presidents are uncomfortable with the use of force – morally uncomfortable – and therefore they try to use force proportionally or surgically, and I think this gets us into trouble. It comes from an understandable discomfort with the use of force, which has an obvious moral basis. It is also bolstered by some fashionable academic theories going back 30 years. The Johnson gradualism in Vietnam was supported by some sophisticated theories from bargaining theory writings on limited war, some mistaken lessons drawn from the Cuban missile crisis, theories about the calibrated use of force, about gradual escalation, about graduated pressures, a search for uses of force. All these notions have been discredited since Vietnam, and they should be.

In 1966 after about a year and a half of the American bombing of North Vietnam, Phan Van Dong, the North Vietnamese Premier, gave an interview to Harrison Salisbury, and Phan Van Dong said: “Look, the bombing was very tough for us at first, but we adjusted to it. We can last 10 years, 20 years. We can outlast you.” And of course he was right. That kind of calibration, that kind of precision does not exist in the reality of warfare.

The Question of Ends

The sustainability of the use of force depends on the American people’s perception that an important national interest is involved. I think the Clinton Administration, particularly when it came into office, was tempted by the idea that strategic interests taint the use of force. That our power should be used only for humanitarian purposes, in the context of the international community, that after the Cold War was over this really would be the main function of our military – to join with the international community in peacekeeping and humanitarian uses of force.

But it turns out that humanitarianism of this kind has very thin public support in this country. It seems too often like a mandate for indiscriminate global interventionism, and it does not resonate with the American public. After the fiasco in Somalia, you may remember that the Republican “Contract with America” in 1994 had a provision that said no U.S. forces should ever again serve under UN command. Now, rightly or wrongly, that tells you something about the public reaction to that notion.
In Haiti in 1995, the Administration made sure there was no vote in Congress – no vote of approval or disapproval – because the Administration knew that they would not get support in Congress for the Haiti intervention. They had a UN resolution, but there was no Congressional resolution.

In Kosovo in 1999, the President conducted an air strategy that did not risk one casualty. That is a glaring admission of how thin he saw American public support to be for what he had undertaken.

Right after Kosovo, the White House was kind of crowing about a Clinton doctrine, we would go anywhere, help anybody that was in trouble. Then along came East Timor, and the Administration was forced to distance itself from the East Timor intervention. Again, rightly or wrongly, the Administration had a very acute sense of the lack of public support for this notion.

I remember [ABC’s] Sam Donaldson in both the Bosnia crisis and the Kosovo crisis constantly asking, “Where is our national interest in this?” And I take Sam as a kind of *vox populi*. Now, it is often said that Americans have a strong Wilsonian streak in their foreign policy, and that is certainly true, but it is clearly wrong to exaggerate this and see the American people as willing to engage in a sort of unlimited humanitarianism.

This is not isolationism at all. The Gulf War showed that the American people step up to their responsibility when they are persuaded by their leaders that something important is at stake. The American people are not isolationists, but they are also not interested in global crusades, and I am afraid they are not interested in foreign policy as a form of social work. It is reasonable of the American people to ask that their leaders should be able to tell them the difference between what is important and what is not. And that for a President is maybe the most important part of defining a mission and achieving it.
“CLASSIFICATION OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS”

From: America’s National Interests (The Commission on America’s National Interests, Fall 2000)

VITAL INTERESTS

Vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans’ survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.

Vital U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad.
2. Ensure U.S. allies’ survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive.
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders.
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment).
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.

Instrumentally, these vital interests will be enhanced and protected by promoting singular U.S. leadership, military and intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and even-handedness in dealing with other states), and strengthening critical international institutions — particularly the U.S. alliance system around the world.

EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INTERESTS

Extremely important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Extremely important U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere.
2. Prevent the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems.
3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes peacefully.
4. Prevent the emergence of [hegemons] in important regions, especially the Persian Gulf.
5. Promote the well-being of U.S. allies and friends, and protect them from external aggression.
6. Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere.
7. Prevent, manage, and if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographical regions.
8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems.
10. Suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking.
11. Prevent genocide.

IMPORTANT INTERESTS

Important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Important U.S. national interests are to:

1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries.
2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization.
3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions.
4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations.
5. Reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations.
6. Prevent the nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad.
7. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors.
8. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations.
9. Promote international environmental policies consistent with long-term ecological requirements.

Instrumentally, the important U.S. national interests are to maintain a strong U.S. and other regional and functional cooperative mechanisms.

LESS IMPORTANT OR SECONDARY INTERESTS

Less important or secondary national interests are not unimportant. They are important and desirable conditions, but ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Less important or secondary U.S. national interests include:
1. Balancing bilateral trade deficits.
2. Enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake.
3. Preserving the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states everywhere.
4. Enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.
“INTERVENTION DOCTRINES OF VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS”

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Considering possible military intervention to assist the French in Southeast Asia, President Eisenhower laid out the following criteria to guide decision-making (the criteria were not met, and the United States did not intervene):

• Support from allies, the Congress, and the American public is necessary.
• Indigenous support is necessary.
• Intervention must be part of a larger U.S. strategy.
• There must be confidence that the United States can act with agility, achieve military success, and exit accordingly.

The Weinberger Doctrine

The failure of the United States to achieve U.S. objectives in Vietnam led to analysis about why the failure occurred and speculation about the circumstances under which the United States could successfully employ military force in the future. In 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed the following criteria to guide decisions on military intervention:

• A vital national interest must be at stake.
• Sufficient resources must be committed to win.
• Objectives must be clearly defined and realistic; the relationship between objectives and forces must be continually reassessed.
• Support from the Congress and the American public is necessary.
• The use of force should be a last resort following the exhaustion of all other options.

The Powell Doctrine

It is believed that General Colin Powell had a hand in helping draft the Weinberger criteria. During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell presented a military leader’s perspective on the appropriate circumstances for the use of force:

• The political objective must be important, clearly defined and understood.
• Military force should be the last resort, and employed only after all other non-violent policy options have failed.
• Military force must be able to achieve the objective and at a reasonable cost.
• The consequences of the use of force must be analyzed.
• Force should be overwhelming when it is employed.

The Bush Doctrine

In a 1993 speech at the U.S. Military Academy, President George Bush elaborated on his beliefs on the use of force. Arguing that “to adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives and would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions,” the President described four principles that should guide decisions on the use of force:
• The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital.
• Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, when and where force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.
• A desire for international support is not a prerequisite for acting, although acting in concert with allies and friends is preferred.
• It is essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is completed.

The Lake Doctrine

In 1996, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake outlined “seven circumstances” which taken in some combination, or even alone, may call for the use of force:
• To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its allies.
• To counter aggression.
• To defend key economic interests.
• To preserve, promote, and defend democracy.
• To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking.
• To maintain U.S. reliability.
• For humanitarian purposes, to combat famines, or to respond to natural disasters and gross abuses of human rights.

A Classification of Current Security Threats

**A-list**: “...threats to U.S. survival of the kind and scale that the Soviet Union presented during the Cold War.”

**B-list**: “...imminent threats to U.S. interests, but not to the survival or way of life of Americans.”

**C-list**: “...Kosovos, Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and Haitis that compose [a list] of important contingencies that directly affect U.S. security, but do not directly threaten U.S. interests.

Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry
*Preventive Defense* (Brookings Institution Press, 1999)
“DEFINING THE U.S. ROLE INTERNATIONALLY”

THOMAS PICKERING

PICKERING: I want to emphasize the importance of our own very unique role in this world, and today, the American vision is sweeping the globe as newly free people consolidate democratic, market-oriented societies.

The Importance of Bi-Partisanship in Defining the U.S. Role

The end of the Cold War marked the end of one broad, consensual understanding of the U.S. role. The last ten years have marked an exponential growth in real U.S. interests overseas. These two factors – exponential growth and U.S. interests, and the search for new philosophical underpinnings for U.S. international action – do put forward the question: “What is the U.S. role today?”

The answer must be: bi-partisan. We cannot serve our country well if two rival views develop with proponents viewing the overriding goal as a zero-sum game, or worse, a device solely for undercutting each other. Americans will and should disagree on particular actions. That is a great strength. However, we need to forge a bi-partisan consensus for American leadership and a bi-partisan answer that puts America first.

That answer must come from politics, but not from politics alone. It will also come from business and from our citizens’ expressed concerns. It must include advancing U.S. trade and investment, must reflect the concerns of the American people – from their economic well-being and their concern over terrorism, to the globalization of compassion in a world instantly connected by CNN and the Internet. As our population becomes increasingly diverse, our citizens also expect government to pay attention to the events in their countries of origin.

Isolationism – A Grave Threat to U.S. Security and Prosperity

We must begin with the presumption that the United States has a very important international role to play. Rather than seeing opportunities in a changing world, too many Americans prefer to stay out of that changing world. Isolationism can be cloaked in any number of appealing slogans, but it remains one of the most significant threats to U.S. security and prosperity. There are myriad reasons for the rise of isolationism. Change is both hard on the human psyche and a challenge to well-loved cultural traditions. But it is ironic that today, when we are triumphant politically and economically, we need to inspire courage among serious segments of our society to urge them not to convert advance into retreat. To walk away from the world is to walk away from both our future and our heritage.

America’s Involvement Abroad Does Not Equal Military Intervention

Too many Americans postulate an erroneous equation, that American involvement in the world equals military engagement. In the post-Cold War era, engagement to them is murky, dangerous, and costly. But to equate the U.S. role in the world solely to military intervention is
grossly inadequate and harmful to the American people; it also exacerbates the fears that feed isolationism and the acrimony that works against developing a bi-partisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy for the coming century.

I now want to consider more broadly the effects of the Cold War’s closure and globalization on some of the actions that we have taken over the last 10 years.

Factors Contributing to Intervention Do Not Guarantee Unity of Action or Accord

A year after the fall of the Berlin Wall in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Deciding to build and then building the Desert Storm coalition was a monumental task, even though in retrospect this is often painted as something near effortless. Several factors helped make the coalition possible. First, Saddam’s attack on Kuwait was a clear violation of international law, and posed a threat to Saudi Arabia and to the region. Moreover, Saddam had picked on a small, peaceful state with no history of aggression. That is the kind of brutal attack that the international community could not ignore. Politically, the region and its strategic position meant that much of the world would be directly affected by any conflict there – by attempts to change borders with force. Economically, the world’s dependence on oil from the region was hugely and directly important.

But these three factors – oil, war in a strategically important region, and aggression – only guaranteed international intervention. They did not guarantee unity of action, and easily could have been the ingredients of a discord leading to wider conflict. Some countries might have seen their interest in siding with Iraq, staying neutral, or cutting a deal. Those tendencies were present throughout the crisis. In addition, there were other challenges: to build a coalition that included Arab states still technically at war with Israel; to protect Israel, keeping it from responding militarily to Iraqi Scud missile attacks, which would have torn apart the coalition; to help manage Israeli-Palestinian issues in unexpected [adverse] events; to end Palestinian terrorist activities; to not undermine the coalition with the Arab states; and to work with the Soviet Union, even as it struggled simultaneously to come to terms with German unification and with the impending break-up of its own Union.

U.S. Leadership Is Key to World Stability

What then was the decisive factor in building the coalition that turned back Saddam? The key to Desert Storm thus was leadership. President Bush masterfully guided the country, building consensus within the U. S. and the international community. Secretary Baker and the rest of the Cabinet responded expertly, ensuring the success of the mission. Without President Bush’s persuasiveness, clear strategic view, and determination, the coalition very likely would not have come together.

A Unified U.N. (Security Council) Is Very Much in the U.S. Interest

The U.S. kept the UN Security Council united in some twelve resolutions from August to December 1990. The Council continued to be ignored by Iraq, which made the rallying of that body easier. It began to look and act more like a coordinating body. The importance of the issue and world attention meant that the Council and its members had suddenly become important and
stood for something. Previously, it had been a sleepy body, riveted with Cold War inertia and divisions. A unified Council was very much in the interest of the U.S. It could pass mandatory sanction resolutions, and it could authorize the use of force. Moreover, resolutions were passed with very large majorities. Even Cuba, then on the Council, ended up supporting nearly half of the resolutions on Iraq.

The most difficult resolution was authorizing the use of force by the Council. The rallying work of President Bush and Secretary Baker was essential. States do not instruct lightly their ambassadors to authorize the use of force. The Council met at the ministerial level and later, in its proceedings, with heads of state present. In the heady days following victory, much of the world was optimistic that this war marked the beginning of greater international cooperation. Although we were not aware of it at the time, the events that followed denoted a kind of second creation, what many had hoped would be a new world order marked by responsible international leadership and cooperation, and a re-invigorated UN.

The Debate between a Gulf War-Type Engagement versus ‘Humanitarian Interventions’

But the horrible and tragic killing of our Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War, and that follows us even today. When is it appropriate to use military force, and can you justify using our military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake, or are willing to only as long as the costs remain very low? Somalia, as well as the concurrent mayhem in Bosnia and genocidal slaughter in Rwanda, drove home the reality that the Gulf experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic line-up was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple and easy to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community’s role in internal strife.

In the case of Kosovo, the Security Council was not able to agree on the use of force, even though it had set the groundwork for international action, and later approved peacekeeping. From the Kosovo experience emerged several lessons and a number of new questions. Once again the central role of the Presidency was underscored as President Clinton built support for Kosovo in the U.S. and abroad.

Political management of the alliance in the UN before, during, and in the period following the use of force is imperative. Military intervention needs to be followed up with an intensive effort to consolidate gains and work out political solutions and actions required to achieve the overall goals of freedom and security. For effective war, fighting needs to be followed by effective war termination and peace consolidation. Bringing Russia along required a huge diplomatic effort, but in the end kept the UN and the allies together, and the Russians on our side of the solution.

Kosovo also set off a new debate around the questions of the Security Council’s role and the responsibility of the international community in the face of humanitarian crises. While the Council’s support for the use of force is always desirable, some now have come to view it as necessary. There is, however, a growing body of world opinion to use military intervention as necessary to address horrific pogroms and ethnic cleansing through a collective framework such as NATO.
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described this ongoing debate over humanitarian intervention: “To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask in the context of Rwanda, if in those dark days and hours heading up to the genocide, the coalition of states had been prepared to act in the defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside as the horror unfolded?”

Are Humanitarian Interventions Undermining the Post-World War II Security Mechanisms?

To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era, when states and groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms of international law, one might ask if there is a danger that such interventions undermine the imperfect yet resilient security system created after the Second World War. The Secretary General’s questions summarized the state of this important debate in the aftermath of Kosovo. On this particular issue, the U.S. remains committed to two vital criteria that go back to the beginnings of our own Republic. Force must be a last resort, and the United States will only use force when it believes its interests are at stake. In those rare cases when we do need to act militarily, working with allies and friends is the most effective and least costly strategy.

Importance of Encouraging Regional Leadership

Turning for a moment now to East Timor, we see yet another example of how the international community can work. In that case, the Council rallied to the cause. Consensus was possible in part because Indonesia’s consent was achieved, both for the deployment of the force, and earlier for the UN to hold a consultation in which the East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for their independence. We also see regional countries leading the effort, with the U.S. in a supporting role. Australia, as you know, is leading the multinational force engaged in restoring order in Timor, while Thailand is serving as a deputy. Other Asian countries will take part in the upcoming peacekeeping operation. This regional leadership sets an example for the future.

American Public Opinion and Humanitarian Intervention

The first point is to underscore the question of national interest. Our historic faith in the judgment of the American people is well placed. Clearly our national interests were at stake in the Gulf War to a far greater degree than in Somalia. We can safely assume that when the national stake is both unequivocal and high, we will have an easier time building the domestic consensus for whatever actions are necessary.

Equally evident is that humanitarian concerns matter to the American people, as the information revolution increasingly attunes them to tragedies overseas. Having foreign policy play out in your living room every night has its own impact, as we have found since Vietnam. Public distress in the face of Somalia’s agony led to an international response that saved a million people from famine. Americans want their government to help people who are suffering. However, humanitarian concerns tend not to be sufficient in themselves to guarantee consensus for military engagement. There is a growth in our range of interests, some hard and existential and preeminent, some softer, less exigent, but still widely supported.
Recognizing Vital Interests Is Key to Successful Interventions

During the Cold and the Gulf Wars, both the American people and Congress were prepared to take on higher risks and to pay the price to defend the U.S. from these threats. The nature of the challenges and our success in meeting them helped keep the public focused on foreign affairs. But let us not forget that even then it took tremendous leadership to get the U.S. involved and through it successfully. The Senate passed the resolution authorizing the use of force in the Gulf by a mere three votes. The corollary is problematic. As we adjust to the expansion of national interests in the globalized world, the instant recognition factor may be absent, even when vital interests are at stake. This condition puts a premium on political leadership.

A second factor critical to international cooperation is the perceived national interests of other countries. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, hope got the best of reality. We hoped countries would see events, interests, and their roles in the world in compatible and even in cooperative terms, and they do not always do that. This leaves us in a new world in which nations pursue their own interests in an ever-changing kaleidoscope of means and partners.
The U.S. record of acting militarily in coalitions has a long history; and it recalls an anecdote, as related by former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman William Crowe, who hosted a delegation of visiting Soviet officers, led by Marshal Akromeyev, near the end of the Cold War. The blunt, bluff Admiral Crowe posed a question to Akromeyev: “Marshal,” he asked, “why was it that you never attacked Western Europe during the Cold War? Was it our conventional forces? The bomb?” “No,” the Marshal replied, “it was because we knew that if we attacked one nation, we would have to take on sixteen.”

During the past decade, the U.S. went through a major debate about whether it was better to act militarily abroad on our own or with others – that is, with coalitions. The debate was reduced to two competing slogans: “unilateralism” versus “multilateralism.” In fact, in practice that debate was resolved: under the circumstances that the U.S. faced in the 1990s, the American people clearly preferred that military action take place with others and, in most cases, the more other countries the better. In Somalia, where the U.S. at times acted alone – even though under UN auspices – the price in human life was judged to be excessive, especially in relation to the U.S. interests involved. Indeed, for later operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo, it became essential for the U.S. to conduct its military actions within a broader coalition of states, in these cases the NATO alliance. Even in military action against Iraq in Desert Storm – in response to Iraq’s clear-cut case of aggression against a critical asset – President Bush thought it necessary to put together a coalition of over 30 nations; and in Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, the use of airpower to constrain Saddam’s forces during the past decade, the U.S. has sought partners, although at times only the United Kingdom has agreed to join active combat operations.

In all these cases, the impetus for seeking coalitions was less military than it was political. And that factor has also conditioned those occasions in recent U.S. history when Presidents have chosen to act without coalitions. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Grenada, and Panama spring to mind. In each of these cases, the U.S. did not need the military assistance from other countries, but also it did not want the political constraints that a coalition could impose. Indeed, at the time of the Grenada intervention, the U.S. went so far as to invite the local British representative to be a “guest” on a U.S. Navy vessel for the duration of operations. The Queen, we are told, was not amused.

But the arguments for a President’s pursuing a coalition tend to prevail in most circumstances. The most important arguments are:

- To show the American people that we are not alone; that our “case” for acting has broad support, especially from countries with which we are formally allied or that share our values. It also helps with burden-sharing: others, especially those whose interests may be more engaged than ours, can be shown to be pulling their weight.

- To affect the outcome of battle, to win. At times that can be a military factor — if, for example, our forces need access to bases or some particular kind of equipment. Even in the Persian Gulf War, we needed access to wooden minesweepers and tank transporters, neither of which were in the U.S. inventory in sufficient quantities. Furthermore, the
U.S. and its partners in the Gulf drew upon the extensive capabilities of the NATO alliance, even though it was not formally engaged. At the same time during that war, “winning” was not just a military issue; it was also political. The U.S. had to demonstrate to local Arab and other states, and to the Islamic public worldwide, that this intervention was not what Saddam Hussein said it was: an imperial venture against an Islamic nation. Thus in the coalition that President Bush put together, he wisely included four Islamic states, to give the lie to Saddam’s propaganda.

- To gain broad legitimacy for what we seek to do, particularly in circumstances in which this is not self-evident. This applied in Korea, and more so in Vietnam, though, in the latter case, without success. This search for a broader political framework to underpin our military actions also applied in Somalia, the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

- To preserve a “coalition” for its own sake. Thus neither Bosnia nor Kosovo were of much strategic significance on their own — risks of escalation to a broader European war were minimal. But the reputation of NATO as well as the European Union was very much at stake, in order to preserve moral and political support for its broader, more important roles in building security across the Continent for the 21st century.

In any form of U.S. military action, the role of the President and of Presidential leadership is crucial. This requirement for leadership also applies to the creation and sustenance of coalitions, recognizing that pursuing that course can also mean accepting limitations imposed by allies: a trade-off, but one that is often worth making, in order to gain the political benefits of a coalition.

As we have seen in recent years, Presidential leadership both at home and abroad is required to fulfill several purposes to help bring about coalitions for military action:

- Clarify the purposes of the military action, within a framework that all can embrace politically.
- Show that the President has exhausted diplomacy and other non-military means, prior to employing military force.
- Demonstrate that the action is legitimate (in some cases, that it has the blessing of the UN Security Council).
- Create a joint strategy that has a chance of success.
- Provide mechanisms for deciding upon goals and means, and then for carrying through joint resolve.
- Convince Americans that they, too, must be willing to share in the risk with others.
- Gain support from coalition partners and the American people to persevere in the pursuit of the agreed-upon goals and missions.

All of these purposes of Presidential leadership, in one form or another, can be found in the three major U.S. coalition military ventures of the 1990s: the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While it is premature to predict that the factors discussed here will necessarily still apply in the current decade – in the absence of a major threat to U.S. interests – they provide a reasonable starting point and a set of salutary lessons for the next President in making decisions about the use of force, building support among allies, and gaining the support of the American people.
They can also be useful in trying to answer another elusive question that is so often posed but so rarely answered: whether an Administration can adopt guidelines about where it will and will not intervene militarily. In practice, such guidelines tend to be adopted after the fact: a short-term “learning the lessons of the last war.” But the factors discussed here can give a President some rules of thumb for making those crucial decisions, which almost always evolve on an ad hoc basis, especially when he judges that acting with others is in the U.S. interest.
Everyone has heard about how President Bush marshaled the allies of 31 nations in the Gulf War. But it is often misunderstood or not known what he did to make public opinion come his way. Because in 1990, he led a public that was not only uninterested, but often unwilling to go to war — and you remember what his numbers looked like at the end of it.

On the first day of the invasion, the President said, “We are not contemplating intervention. This is not about intervention.” Within a few months, he sent half a million people to intervene. But on that first day he said that [our business there] “was not about intervention,” and that was no accident. By then, he had already begun to think about intervention. Two days later, he already had called the Emir of Kuwait and told him, “I will give you your country back.” President Bush had already met with General Powell and others, and certainly discussed sending 250,000 troops just for the defensive stage of the operation. In fact, he informed us later he had already decided to clear Kuwait of the Iraqis. But at that point, the President had not yet signaled his hand to the American public because he knew if he came out on day one and said, “I am taking Kuwait back and I am taking half a million people with me,” his popularity numbers would probably have dropped through the floor. Instead, he played a much smarter, careful, cautious game with the public, just as he did with the allies in a different kind of way as he slowly, quietly brought the country to the idea of undertaking the largest military operation since Vietnam.

This, as you know, took months. And if you go back and look at the polls in those days, you will see that the country was initially no better than split on the idea of doing anything about Kuwait. People in President Bush’s Cabinet also were trying to get their arms around the idea of perhaps doing absolutely nothing at all. I think it was Nick Brady who said, “I think we can live with this. This is not that big a deal.” But it was George Bush who asked the question over and over in those first meetings: “What if we do nothing?”

One of the things that Bush realized, but never talked about then, was what he later described as the need for “the public to come to understand what our interests were there.” He would, in many of his discussions inside his Cabinet, liken Saddam Hussein to Hitler. Not everyone was for that idea, but Bush felt, and I think in retrospect he was right, he had to make the American public understand that Saddam was not just a thug; this was someone who was dangerous in a wholly different way. The American public also understood after the last 25 years that when half the world’s oil is tied up in one person’s hand, national interests are pretty easy to divine.

Having said that, it does not mean that the public moved quickly to the idea of supporting this intervention. It was a few months before Bush announced Desert Shield, the defense stage of the operation, at a press conference, but Bush did not answer the question about how many troops would be going in. His Chief of Staff was left to handle the spin on that, and John Sununu for the next three weeks said 50,000 troops. In the next few weeks 250,000 troops were on their way. The public was slowly being told what the numbers were. Because they would tell us the number of
troops by separate units, we had to sit down every night and add up the numbers. Most of the good news organizations had people at the Pope Air Force Base counting planes, because there was no way to get a number out of the Pentagon or the National Security Council. Also, the Saudis did not want to talk about it either; the idea of having “infidels” on holy ground was not really a great idea for them, at least initially.

Bush did two other things that were pretty brilliant, although at the time they looked the exact opposite. He kept saying, “I want an Arab solution.” That was his way of saying let us keep the attention focused on the Arabs, because the Arabs want to do this in-house even though they are fully incapable of doing it. It made the Americans think this may be a regional problem that can be solved. Bush boldly invited Tariq Aziz to come to Washington for talks. In fact, it turned out to be a lucky thing for Bush: Tariq Aziz refused to come because they could not agree on a date. The effort at home, particularly in Congress, gave the impression to many members of Congress that Bush was trying to do everything possible to avoid war.

What did not work overseas, however, turned out to be very helpful here at home. It is often a case in coalition politics: what works to build your support at home makes the allies nervous, and what drives the allies makes the coalition look very bad at home. Even during his vacation, Bush was signaling to the public, “Look, this is serious, but it is not that serious.” I think you all remember the famous “speed boat” incident in which Bush was criticized in August of 1990 for going out on his speedboat. The signal he sent was, “Look, this is not that serious a crisis. I want people to prudently recreate this summer.” Over and over, he was telling the American public that while he had in fact decided to commit more American troops than any time since Vietnam, this was not that big a deal. The public came right along. But let us remember, the Congressional vote in January 1991, which was four months into this build-up, was still very close. This was not any Democratic-controlled Senate, it was 51-48 for the action; it was a little broader in the House where more Democrats and Republicans joined Bush’s effort.

In sum, the build-up over six months was a brilliant piece of public relations with a lot of Presidential intervention in this process. The unilateral action by the President had some of the same hallmarks of his diplomatic brilliance. But it was a wholly separate, wholly different campaign that was just as successful, and I think you will remember where that turned after the war.

I now want to talk about President’s Clinton management of public opinion on Kosovo, a place where the American interests were not so clear. Bear in mind that, unlike President Bush, President Clinton did not have that kind of experience with the military. He had, however, used air power twice in Iraq. You remember he attacked Baghdad earlier in retaliation for the assassination attempt on George Bush. But he had been doing constant air operations in Iraq, which continue today, referred to by journalists as “Groundhog Day” because they keep going on and nothing very much happens.

Of course Clinton had engaged in the air campaign over Bosnia, so he was more comfortable with air operations alone. In fact, he felt that he had had some success in bringing Slobodan Milosevic to terms in Bosnia by the use of air power. He thought he could do it here again, but he clearly and early on ruled out (in a way Bush never did) the idea of using ground
troops. He left only the tiniest door open in his public statements, and no one took those very seriously.

You remember that when Clinton announced the air campaign against Kosovo, sixty percent of the American public approved of air strikes as long as they were in the context of a NATO coalition. I thought it was a surprising number. At no point during the entire ten-week campaign did the majority of Americans ever favor use of ground forces. In fact, they opposed it even for peacekeeping. It is one thing to be opposed to troops when you are doing peace-making; but up until the time when the troops went in, they really were opposed even to peacekeeping. Clinton rarely talked about anything other than peacekeeping. He never began to make the case for troops going in to make the peace. He did not really talk about troops at all during the air war, so his attitude about intervention beyond using air force never changed.

The low point in the Kosovo crisis came when the Chinese Embassy was struck. High-tech weapons are a double-edged sword: if enough videos appear on American television showing that we can launch a missile from College Station and put it through a window of a building in Houston, and when that does not happen, the public asks what’s going on, what kind of outfit do we have here? For we have gotten used to a very high level of expectations about military operations, which, when you couple that with a large group of Americans who have never been in the military, may lead to a quicker disappointment in events than we are used to.

The House, because of public opinion, opposed the Kosovo mission. But what happened in the Senate was just amazing. I believe it was Senator John McCain, who used rather general language introducing support of all means necessary to accomplish the goals of the air campaign. Although it became clear that McCain’s rather general resolution was not going to pass, the Democrats tabled it rather than watch something go down in defeat which could be misread by the troops, the allies, and the enemies.

This is very different from what happened to George Bush. Again, for all kinds of reasons: President Clinton had been impeached a few months before; the interests in Kosovo were far less clear; the goals were much more limited; and perhaps the public’s trust in the Commander-in-Chief was less. And when the end came, Clinton’s stock did climb back up again but the public never really gave him the credit for what was almost a singular vision here. He alone, even among some of his advisors, said, “We have to do this.” Alone is perhaps too much of a reach, but the point is they were not gathering around saying we are with you. And so I am amazed how little benefit he has received — given what happened to George Bush after the Gulf War.

There are three lessons here. First, in all interventions that I have covered since the 1983 invasion of Grenada, there is what I call an “instant blessing of the public.” No matter what you do, where you go, how many people you send there, and how good you are in expressing your aims, goals, means and ends, the public will give you the benefit of the doubt at the start. And it is partly because of the way we feel about our troops, and partly because of the way we feel about our Commander-in-Chief. It is something we just do; it may be in our wiring.

This blessing however, comes with a wrinkle – the second lesson. Even if the American public will generally support an action by the President, they can do it even if they have in their head serious doubts about the mission: where we are going, how we are going to get out of this,
whether we want to be in business with this or that ally, the potential for casualties. You do not have to poll very far and deep for the public to come up with worries in a minute. But the American people have delegated foreign policy, particularly now, to the President. (They may have personal experience with education policy and tax policy, but they have very little personal experience with foreign policy, and so they entrust this to the Commander-in-Chief to do the right thing.) They absolutely do not trust anyone in Congress to do this — 435 visions is never as good as one. Americans understand this fundamental point clearly.

This leads to my third lesson, which is that a week or two after the intervention, you can count on somebody in Congress of the opposite party picking up on peoples’ worries and running with them. However, despite the fact that this gives a lot of people things to talk about, it does not generally dim the public’s overall support for the mission unless the mission begins to go south. This happened to Clinton when he started hitting the wrong targets in Kosovo.

In short, Presidents have enormous media clout, and can broaden that beachhead of public support. Indeed, it says something about the strength of our system and the faith of our public in the power of the Presidency, that we can have the first impeachment of a President in 130 years, and three months after that event that same President can lead a successful air war.
Influences on Presidential Decision-Making

The subject of this Conference is the most serious problem that lands on the President’s desk: the decision-making that leads a President to commit somebody else’s son, somebody else’s daughter into combat, into harm’s way.

I was richly blessed by the dedication of a superb team to whom I could delegate and happily give credit when we got things right. Such inner fortifications saw me through four years of tumultuous change in our world and our country. The changes were great, too, as freedom at last prevailed in the Cold War and a new and more hopeful era dawned.

President Truman managed to confront a number of defining challenges during his seven years in the Oval Office, from the tough decision to use the atomic bomb – one that I fully support to this day – to launching the Berlin airlift to overcome the Soviet blockade and intervening on the Korean peninsula to push back the invading forces from the North. The example Truman set for Presidential leadership and decision-making in the modern post-war era had a profound impact on me, as did the examples set by other Presidents before and since.

For my part as Commander-in-Chief, I sent our armed forces into a hostile environment on three occasions, and it was never an easy decision to make, nor should it have been. I felt fully responsible, personally responsible, for the well-being of every person involved in each of the operations we undertook. It was a burden that weighed on me heavily throughout the decision-making process.

Presidential Concerns and National Security Considerations: The Intervention in Panama

When you take the extraordinary step of intervening abroad, I do not think you can do it if you do not feel viscerally that you are doing the right thing. As President, my first and foremost concern was preserving and strengthening our national security. And more often than not, our vital national interest should be the main determinant of whether we use force.

One such vital national security interest is the protection of American life. When the U.S. went into Grenada, almost sixteen years ago to the day, October 25, 1983, those medical students were at risk, and I think the danger to them is what drove President Reagan to use force. Much maligned in the press, Grenada was not much of a military challenge. But we prepared for the worst, won an easy victory over a foe that, at best, was disorganized and ineffective, and in the end, American lives were saved.

That up-close hands-on experience leading to the deployment of U.S. force made an impression on me when I became President. For example, in Panama – the first decision that I faced involving American intervention – I decided to move in only after an American serviceman
had been shot and killed in cold blood. I do not care what you think about the war, I can never forgive that. I remember knowing as a scared little eighteen-year-old that the American military, the Navy was going to do everything they could to save my life. These things mattered and helped me make decisions when I became President.

After another U.S. serviceman and his wife were detained and then brutalized by Noriega’s Panama Defense Forces (PDF), that made a real lasting impression and impact on me. After Noriega pushed aside the democratically elected leaders and this thug took over the government of Panama, we watched on television the brutal beatings by the PDF thugs. I told Guillermo (Billy) Ford, who is now Panama’s Ambassador to the U.S., “Billy, I am so pleased you are here in the U.S., but you will never know the impact that that brutal beating you took had on the American people.”

To provide some perspective, during Reagan’s Presidency, George Shultz and President Reagan were desperate to see Noriega out of the picture, as they should have been. They wanted him to leave Panama peacefully. They tried, we tried, to find asylum for him in Spain and elsewhere. I will never forget the meeting in the lovely Yellow Room, that gold room upstairs in the White House residence, in May of 1988. This was the only time I differed in front of others with President Reagan. If I had a difference, I owed him my judgment, but I also owed him not going public with the difference. That is my view of the Vice-Presidency. But this time I told him, seconded by my close friend, Jim Baker, that it would be very bad to make a deal with Noriega, letting him get asylum and escape punishment for his drug activities. I thought that would have a profoundly negative effect on this so-called war against drugs, and because I had been head of the CIA many years before, and because Noriega had an intelligence relationship with us back then, many people had already begun sniping at me for having anything to do with Noriega. First, I thought it was just plain wrong to grant him immunity, and secondly I knew that if we did, I would be accused of making a deal with Noriega.

Intervention was clearly in our vital national interest, not just for the reasons cited above, but because of the effect non-action would have had on our standing in Latin America. I knew full well that given our history of military intervention in this hemisphere, we would not get any overt support. In all likelihood, an intervention would be vigorously criticized, especially by our friend and neighbor, Mexico, given its history with us in that department. It was here that I would make a pitch for personal diplomacy. I believed that because I had been personally involved with some of the leaders in South America, the criticism would be less virulent than if I had had no personal knowledge, had not taken their pulse and they mine.

The military problem we faced was a difficult one. An important factor in the decision-making process, in keeping with Colin Powell’s belief, was that if we used force, we would put together a war plan incorporating a lot of American assets, engaging some of them in very risky night action. The bottom line is the operation worked well because we conducted a lot of personal diplomacy in Latin America, unrelated to Panama, and the reaction south of the border was not nearly as vitriolic as I had expected.

Noriega himself did prove difficult to capture. General Mark Cisneros, who was our number two man, hired two general officers in Panama to help capture Noriega. Noriega sat there in his living room taking pot-shots [at a cardboard Bush target], and he looked like he was a pretty
good shot or else he was up close because my head was full of bullet holes, but it kind of made this personal for us. He finally did walk into the Vatican Embassy and eventually surrendered, and it was a very lucky day for the United States that he did that.

The Decision to Intervene against Iraq

The next major decision I faced came a year later, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait and begun pillaging the country and murdering its people. More than the Panamanian crisis, the Iraqi invasion was a clear case where our vital national interests were at stake. It was more than simply the danger of Saddam Hussein putting a hammerlock on the world’s oil supply. I am absolutely convinced that if he was not checked, that he would have digested Kuwait, and then moved against Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Gorbachev called me, right after the air war started. “George, you must stop the bombing,” and he spoke through an interpreter, “I know that Saddam Hussein will leave if you stop this bombing.” In the back of my mind was the stopping of the bombing in Vietnam, made on the basis of the same argument but to no avail. Indeed, it gave our enemies a chance to strengthen their positions. What I said to him was: “No, we are not going to stop the bombing, but I will tell you what we do not do, we do not shoot fleeing soldiers, we do not kill people that have their hands in the air as they are walking away, so just ask them to put down their weapons, they know how they got in there, and they can go out.”

I told him also that I have intelligence that shows the Iraqis will be leaving Kuwait City, but they are going south toward Saudi Arabia. So it was more than the danger of locking up the world’s oil supply. Oil was a factor, as was the de-stabilization of the entire Gulf Region, as was the threat that would exist for the free countries if this man had become kind of a Nasser-like hero through the entire Middle East. It would have been disastrous for the entire world community, not just the U.S.

But more fundamental to me in the decision-making process was the fact that the sovereignty of this member state of the United Nations, albeit a small state, had been totally violated. I wrote to my five kids on New Year’s Eve, and let me just read a couple paragraphs:

“I have thought long and hard about what might have to be done; as I write this, there is still some hope that Iraq’s dictator will pull out of Kuwait. I vary on this, sometimes I think he might, and at other times I think he is simply too unrealistic, too ignorant to what he might face. I have the peace of mind that comes from knowing that we have tried hard for peace. We have gone to the UN. We have formed an historic coalition. There have been diplomatic initiatives from country after country. And so here we are, a scant 16 days from a very important date, the date set by the UN, for his total compliance with all UN resolutions, including to get out of Kuwait totally. And when the question is asked, ‘How many lives are you willing to sacrifice,’ the answer is ‘none, none at all.’ We have waited to give sanctions a chance. We have moved a tremendous force so as to reduce the risk to every American solider, if force has to be used, but the question of loss of life still lingers and plagues the heart. How many lives would have been saved if appeasement had given way to force earlier on in the late 30s or the early 40s? How many Jews might have been spared the gas chambers? How many Polish patriots might be alive today? I look at today’s crisis as good versus evil. Yes, it is that clear.”
I sent that letter off to the kids because I am sure that their friends and others they met had been debating whether sanctions would work and whether we had to use force. The presiding bishop of my church was protesting in front of the White House. Ed Browning, a man of peace with whom I differed on all of this, had his sign out. He put his sign down and came in. He is a lovely, peaceful man, and he said: “You are wrong. The use of force is immoral,” and we had a little discussion about the “just war”. I said: “Ed, have you read this report of the brutality of the 13 and 14 Kuwaiti girls that were raped and brutalized, their lives ruined forever, given that culture? Have you read about the incubator where the little preemies are taken out of the incubator and are sent off to Baghdad? Please tell me then, sir, if the use of force is immoral.”

He wrote me back and said: “I wept when I read it, but I still must counsel you that the use of force is immoral.” I did not agree with my bishop. It made it more difficult to put our forces into battle, but I felt that our vital interests were so clearly at stake, and the lives of American hostages being held in Baghdad were of such paramount importance, that we had [to] go to the UN and we formed this coalition, and in those circumstances, I felt that we had to use force. I do not believe Saddam Hussein thought we were going to use the force. He listened to the debates. He quoted back to me the names of Senators who did not want to use force, he quoted back the demonstrations in our country. Also, I honestly believe that he felt, given the undistinguished results of the Vietnam War, that he was going to win. I believe he meant it and felt it when he said “we are going to win the mother of all battles.” He mistook vigorous debate in a free country, free press, for lack of support. He saw this huge build-up, and he felt it would not be used.

I have a clear conscience because I felt we did give peace a chance, we did try to let sanctions work, and we did use the UN in a way that was historic since it was founded in 1948. Because we had Russia and China, they were not automatically going to veto these resolutions calling for withdrawal, calling for the restoration of peace, calling for the restoration of Kuwait’s assets. Desert Shield and Desert Storm had the firm imprimatur of international law because of these UN resolutions, and that is a comforting thing for a President. If you do not have a declaration of war, which is probably the most comforting as Roosevelt had when the country entered War World II, you need some approval. You know what you can do, you move the force without it, but you need some approval of the Congress and, in this instance, we drew on the resolutions from the UN to get the Congress to give the President whatever means necessary – that meant the use of force – to end the aggression. The Iraqi invasion and the war that followed was a clear situation, certainly during my Administration, where force was justified.

**The Decision to Intervene in Somalia**

The last was the U.S. intervention in Somalia. This had less to do with vital national security interests, but it used the military in a different way, a way that is understandably being debated today. Having watched those starving kids, the struggling in Mogadishu, a seven-year-old kid weighing fifteen pounds dragging his pathetic little sister, a four-year-old, in the quest of a little pitiful cup of rice. We called Powell, and I said: “Please come over to the White House, I cannot watch this any more. We have to do something.” And Powell said “What do you want to do?” I said: “I want to get CARE in and open the supply lines so we can end this starvation. The American people cannot stand seeing this little seven-year-old kid,” and he said, “Okay, twenty-eight thousand, thirty-thousand troops and you got it.” So we went. The press beat our Marines
ashore in anticipation of a huge conflict and firefight, [but found a] peaceful environment because the warlords had run away and we ended the starvation.

Our mission was different, and it is one that the President has to be very wary of, because of the precedent. We cannot be the world’s policeman, and we cannot put force in place every time a President or Congress sees a terrible tragedy of genocide or starvation, or whatever it might be. This use of force in Somalia was the exception. It proved the rule that force should be used when our vital national interests are at stake. And, to be clear, I put saving Americans in the vital category, but not a humanitarian gesture. Maybe it is kind of illogical, but that’s at least the way I interpret these things. There are many places where national disasters strike and tribal warfare comes out, and they all want help and all need help, but we cannot always use force.

In closing, it remains my belief that the United States is the only country that has the logistics, the might, and the muscle to support massive movements of armed forces. We have the most sophisticated equipment, the best-trained and most dedicated all-volunteer force in the world. The Commander-in-Chief must use force sparingly, but not be afraid to deploy our forces when those vital interests are at stake. As one of our great soldiers and statesmen in history, General Eisenhower, said: “Americans, indeed all free men: Remember that in the final choice, a soldier’s pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner’s chains.” When it comes to deploying troops into harm’s way, and when it comes to U.S. military intervention abroad, we must be guided by our fundamental values. I hope you never take for granted the freedoms with which we are blessed.
“INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION COSTS LESS, YIELDS MORE”

ROBERT OAKLEY

A number of government and non-government experts have examined the kinds of interests that justify military intervention. They have also looked at the kinds of interventions undertaken and their objectives, which can range from protecting vital security interests to humanitarian ones, such as preventing or ending internal conflicts. Less well covered is the debate over whether and which C-list or B-list countries in crisis situations might warrant military intervention, whether military deterrence can be an effective alternative to intervention, and whether the threat or application of economic sanctions can be an effective deterrent. Not dealt with at all, except for advocacy of NGO activities, has been the very important issue of earlier, longer-term civilian intervention — the so-called pre-crisis assistance. The latter applies to efforts to avoid a violent conflict where the application of external military force becomes unavoidable if one wishes to end the crisis.

The Question of Prevention: Do C-list or B-list Crises Justify U.S. Intervention?

Let us treat briefly the problem of whether C-list or B-list crisis intervention is justifiable in terms of U.S. interests. Such crises can involve actual or potential ethnic cleansing or “genocide plus,” often with disintegration of national institutions and threats to regional stability. This was the case in Somalia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. These situations have generated military intervention by the U.S. and others on moral or humanitarian grounds.

Similar events can also threaten important U.S. economic interests and regional political-economic stability (for example, oil and gas production in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Colombia). Furthermore, largely unchecked narcotics production and trafficking (Colombia, Pakistan/Afghanistan) and sanctuaries for regional and international organized crime and terrorism (Albania/Kosovo, Pakistan/Afghanistan, etc.) have a direct, negative effect on U.S. security. These countries can also increase the risk that weapons of mass destruction will fall into the hands of radical, non-state actors, such as the Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan.

When more than one of these problems occurs in the same country, the threats to U.S. interests are much more acute. In all of these cases – as was true of Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s – there is a real danger that powerful, internal disruptive forces could involve neighboring countries and thus jeopardize a region that is much more important to the U.S. than a single country. Examples include West Africa with such oil-rich countries as Gabon, Congo, Angola, and Nigeria; ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, which play an important financial-economic role in Asia and which can impact the global economy; such economically and politically important Andean countries as Colombia; the countries of Central Asia; India; and Pakistan/Afghanistan.

The growing economic and financial importance of globalization can raise the economic stakes of serious internal unrest or localized cross-border conflict in certain C-list or B-list countries or regions to something approaching that of the Persian Gulf, where for decades the U.S. has seen military intervention as clearly justified without a direct threat to its national security.
This is not to say that such C-list and B-list situations would, or should, automatically justify some degree of U.S. military intervention — bilateral, multilateral, or with the UN. However, the U.S. should be prepared to make ad hoc decisions to intervene in similar situations. No matter what “doctrine” may be adopted to avoid intervention, there have been and will be exceptions — and not only because of humanitarian reasons or CNN and the media factor.

For example, the Haiti intervention may have appeared to be caused by human rights and democracy issues, but it was as much an issue of stopping large numbers of refugees coming to Florida in an election year. Similarly, the intervention in Panama was not primarily because of human rights and democracy issues. In too many instances over the past decade, country-specific and regional problems have been allowed to fester, become more virulent, and ultimately explode into a crisis which has required military intervention by the U.S., UN, or a multinational force. Too often military force is used because potentially explosive problems were not addressed early on in an effective manner using essentially civilian means.

**Deterrence by Threats**

In some cases, deterrence by threats rather than military action has been attempted, but without success. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait is a prime example, and to this day Iraq continues to produce weapons of mass destruction. Serbia’s actions in Bosnia and Kosovo are similar examples. In many cases, the opposing governments, or factions in the event of a shattered state, do not believe that the U.S. would in fact have the will to take effective military action, such as launching a main ground attack rather than engaging in limited bombing. Aggressors increasingly feel that they or their country have little to lose from U.S. military action, and perhaps stand to gain internal and possibly even regional political support as “victims,” or are so strongly committed to their cause so as to not be deterred by threats. Post-Kuwait Saddam Hussein certainly illustrates this problem, and so did Aidid in Somalia. Deterrence thus should not be seen as an effective means to end A-list or B-list crises.

**Economic Embargoes – Not an Alternative to Military Force**

Some people believe that threatened or actual economic embargoes can be combined with military force, or the threat to use force, to change a country’s leadership. Such was the case with the Cedras military junta and Haiti prior to September 1998, with Saddam Hussein and Iraq prior to and after Desert Storm, Castro and Cuba, Gaddafi and Libya, Iran, the Taliban and Afghanistan, Angola and UNITA, Sierra Leone and RUF, etc. However, in none of the major cases involving economic sanctions has the U.S. achieved its objectives. Rather, the greatest hardships have fallen upon the civilian population. Indeed, the authoritarian leaderships have been undeterred, not seriously weakened, and have not changed policy. Over time, there has been strong international as well as indigenous criticism of continuing sanctions, exacerbated by the defection of a number of states whose participation was vital to the sanctions’ effectiveness. Thus, sanctions should not be seen as an alternative to military intervention, no matter how virtuous they may make us feel.
Far-sighted Preventive Diplomacy Can Be Successful Despite Difficulties, Its Absence Costly

Absent the Cold War and long-term, global competition with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, there has been a trend over the past decade for the U.S. to become reactive rather than proactive in policies and programs for many countries and regions. U.S. leaders respond to crises when they occur, rather than promote stability well before so that the crisis never arrives.

There are, of course, major exceptions: the pursuit of the Middle East Peace Process, and stability of friendly states providing free access to the Persian Gulf; the stability and pro-Western orientation of East Central Europe; special attention to China and Russia; and global emphasis upon promoting democracy, protection of human rights, and private-sector economics. However, this situation has left many countries and regions off the radar screen when it comes to long-term programs for stabilization, development, and crisis avoidance. Special envoys, Presidential speeches, and jawboning once the crisis erupts cannot replace systematic, intelligent, long-term attention and material assistance.

More broadly, there has been a major reduction in the resources available for, and the importance attached to, civilian foreign affairs agencies of the U.S. Government, even if an Administration were ready to employ them effectively. Yet, funding for humanitarian assistance has gone up, rather than down, in response to the growing number of crises just as U.S. and international military intervention have been used more frequently than before in response to various crises.

However, effective crisis prevention by essentially civilian means in many countries and regions has been badly neglected, despite the clear evidence that it is much less expensive than intervention in terms of strain upon and cost of military resources. Interventions can also incur huge human costs – death and human suffering, mass movement of refugees and internally displaced persons. And the burden of longer-term economic and political rehabilitation can have quite a cumulative drag on the global economy and thus, indirectly, on the U.S.

With certain exceptions, as noted above, the Administration and Congress have shifted largely to a crisis-response mode. And on most occasions when the pending or actual crisis has attracted enough top-level public and political attention, and at least a modicum of willingness to commit extra resources, the situation is no longer susceptible to non-military means. Frantic bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, special envoys, top-level telephone calls cannot head off or stop violent upheaval.

What has worked during the Cold War period – ASEAN, Taiwan, South Korea, Central America, among other successes – has been long-term programs comprising the coordinated use of diplomacy, security assistance (military and police), public and private economic assistance, and investment by the U.S. and others. Military efforts have often included a degree of deterrence against reasonably rational states such as the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and even Cuba. Here the U.S. has also engaged in such activities as training, providing equipment, and establishing U.S. presence, rather than the use of U.S. forces in combat situations.
During the Cold War, the overall approach to individual countries or regions with individual programs was more carefully attuned to indigenous cultures, aimed at giving priority to political stability and better economic prospects while encouraging a gradual evolution toward democracy. In the post-Cold War the U.S. has pushed for much more rapid movement on human rights and democracy. In several instances, this push has encountered powerful, indigenous resistance like in Somalia and Kosovo, or an indigenous inability to sustain externally “assisted” reforms once U.S. and international military presence and civilian assistance have been reduced, as can be seen in Haiti.

Looking globally into the future, we are likely to see trends toward increased instability, internal tensions, and serious violence, as well as institutional erosion or collapse. This is due in part to predictable effects of globalization upon poorer countries and poorer populations within countries, which simultaneously experience high population growth and more rapid increases in income gaps. Fragility of quasi-democratic institutions and corruption, religious, ethnic, and tribal differences, as well as political ambition by competing leaders are additional aggravating factors. Thus, the future promises more of the same problems that we face today, including threats to important U.S. values and interests and increasingly difficult choices regarding U.S. military intervention in C-list or B-list crises.

A Posture of Long-Term Prevention Is Urgently Needed

This situation argues strongly for a shift in U.S. policy to long-term prevention, at least for selected countries. Prevention by means of U.S. and international assistance must address critical socio-economic problems, including population planning, education and public health; improving pay, training, and equipment for the public order, judiciary, and military sectors; providing short-term humanitarian assistance; and fostering longer-term economic development. The latter is particularly important and should focus on enhancing foreign and indigenous private-sector activity, debt relief, and improved commercial opportunities for indigenous products.

This approach may mean reduced emphasis on the rapid pace of human rights and democratic reform. Sometimes pressing for an immediate establishment of a multi-party political system can exacerbate existing internal differences. A preventive posture will certainly require us to employ cohesive, experienced, skilled, and culturally aware country teams and strong ambassadorial leadership in our embassies in the states selected for attention. In addition, it will require experienced, cohesive, coordinated planning, and management by civilian and military agencies in Washington to be able early on to identify potential problem countries for priority attention. The best case scenario would include better Congressional comprehension, coordination, and support, both internally and with the Executive branch, and effective coordination of U.S. efforts with other influential governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private businesses. Such enhanced comprehension should provide for adequate U.S. funding for bilateral and multilateral preventive activities.

Fortunately, funding of such an effort would be small compared to potential expenditures for humanitarian and military intervention — much less than intervention plus reconstruction. The allocation of an additional $2-3 billion per year for civilian foreign affairs activities around the world would probably be sufficient. Currently, we spend several times that amount for each major intervention, as well as the longer-term costs for U.S. military capabilities. Unfortunately, a
revolution in perceptions of funding priorities will be required by the Executive branch and Congress to obtain this relatively modest amount. Further restructuring in the organization and orientation of civilian foreign affairs agencies also will be required, as well as restructuring the mechanisms for their coordination with the military in order to build an effective means of civilian prevention with only a modicum of military non-combat support. Despite these challenges, the next Administration should invest in long-term civilian crises prevention, as well as military readiness and intervention.
“THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONFLICT PREVENTION”

SIDNEY WEINTRAUB

Countries that have had the greatest success in achieving stability and significant economic growth during the past several decades are those that have opened their markets to imported goods and services and to foreign investment. By lowering import barriers, the burden on their own exports has also been reduced. By lowering import barriers, countries position themselves to take advantage of the growing globalization that is a hallmark of our times.

However, when countries open their markets to imports and foreign investment, governments must step in to:

- Set the policy framework for the creation of wealth by the private sector.
- Provide those critical social services beyond the capacity of the private sector, such as the provision of education and health care.

In addition, the development process works most satisfactorily when civil society – encompassing a free press, independent labor unions, and a diverse array of NGOs – are consulted during the policymaking process. NGOs are necessary to petition governments to take or not take actions, to speak out against injustices, to monitor the activities of private entrepreneurs – for example, not to despoil the environment – and to permit citizens to take actions for themselves that neither governments nor private companies can do as well, such as the formation of cooperatives and credit unions.

The foregoing model simplifies reality by not taking into account the fairness of tax systems, the adequacy of budgets to provide public education, the nature of the justice system, or the effectiveness of safety nets to deal with economic hardships or poverty. However, the model does highlight the importance of the private sector. We have learned that comprehensive government planning, such as that which existed in the Soviet Union, cannot sustain economic or job growth as effectively as competitive open markets.

One additional and significant virtue of a competitive market economy is that democracy can flourish only in societies where this paradigm exists. All democracies have market structures, even if all countries with market structures are not democracies. However, many countries which started out with authoritarian political systems gradually evolved into democracies because their private sector economies were allowed to function. This was the case in South Korea and Taiwan. Many in Congress who voted to grant China permanent normal trading relations believe that doing so will encourage the development of a more complete market economy in that country and, in turn, gradually move China toward some degree of democracy.

Open markets can also salvage faltering democracies. For example, Mexico began to open its markets more fully to imports and private foreign investment after its economic collapse in 1982. This step led to another — opening the political system to comparable competition. The outcome, in the Presidential election of July 2, 2000, was the first change in political power in Mexico in seventy years.
Two assumptions that underlie the foregoing discussion should be made explicit. The first is that conflict is better prevented in countries achieving meaningful economic growth than in those that are retrogressing. While economic growth is not a sure-fire strategy to reduce internal conflict, the maintenance of internal order has a higher probability in most of East Asia where there has been economic growth, than in Africa where there has not. Likewise, modern Chile is less likely to erupt in internal violence than is Haiti, in part because Chile is moving more quickly toward a market-based economy.

The second, and equally important, assumption is that democracies are less apt to settle internal disputes violently than are countries with authoritarian regimes. Indonesia had far more internal conflict after the 1997-98 economic crisis in East Asia than did South Korea. And, partly as a consequence of this, South Korea came out of its crisis more rapidly than did Indonesia, which has not yet fully recovered. Conflicts between democracies are less likely than those involving authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

In short, the private sector and government can work together to help prevent conflict in modern societies. The government sets the political-economic-social framework. Civil society — groups other than government and private business — imposes checks on governmental and private power, and also stimulates actions it sees as desirable to improve the workings of the society. The private business sector provides the engine of economic and job growth.

In all the situations discussed, the analysis deals with probabilities, not certainties. Market economies are more likely to have higher economic growth than totalitarian states. Competitive market economies are more likely to be democracies than are countries in which the government plans, manages, and operates directly in the economy. Democracies are more likely to pay attention to social needs and the administration of justice than are authoritarian states. Internal conflict is less likely when democracy prevails than when it is suppressed. State conflicts are less likely between democracies than when authoritarian states are involved.

The key aspect from which this analysis starts is that a thriving private sector, while not sufficient unto itself, is the necessary condition for reducing the probability of conflict.
GRAVES: As we look at the post-Cold War world, military intervention may or may not be the proper response. And if it is the proper response, the goal may well be to stabilize the situation so that non-military groups can rebuild a society.

We want to examine the role of non-military players in executing, if you will, military strategy or the use of military forces in non-combat roles in pursuit of our overall national political strategy.

In this examination, we will want to ask such questions as: Is our Clinton Doctrine of humanitarian intervention a departure from military strategy? And as we hinted at in the first session, if invoked, what does this doctrine mean for exit strategies?

Our first speaker in this second panel is Gordon Streeb. A former ambassador to Zambia, Gordon is Associate Executive Director for Prevention and Resolution at the Carter Center. As such, he oversees projects to promote democracy, human rights, economic development and conflict resolution. Dr. Streeb came to the Center in 1994 as the diplomat-in-residence near the end of a 30-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service.

Gordon will talk about the role of non-governmental institutions (NGOs) in conflict resolution. I hope that, in doing so, he will examine this concept from two perspectives: Should a nation intervene for non-military reasons at all? And what role might NGOs, such as the Carter Center or the German Lutheran Church, have in resolving conflicts?

STREEB: My talk deals with how Presidents can use other organizations to reduce the need for military intervention. And in this case, I am talking about NGOs. And I would like to go through some settings of different conflict-type situations and, from each of those, derive some sort of criteria or reasons why NGOs might be more effective or could be used in these situations.

Let me just say a few words about some of the NGOs, not just the Carter Center. For example, San Tegidio at the Vatican provided not only the setting, but some of the expertise that helped resolve the Mozambique conflict. The Applied Social Sciences Institute in Norway was very instrumental, quietly, behind the scenes, in bringing about the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli peace plan. The Lutheran World Federation was instrumental in bringing about the peace in Guatemala, and then the Carter Center, most notably got the talks between the U.S. and North Korea started again.

Three Types of Conflicts

Let me talk about three different types of conflict situations vis-à-vis the United States in particular.
One is the U.S. versus another country. And here I am thinking mostly of situations like North Korea and Iraq. The second one is between foreign countries, let us say India-Pakistan. And the third are those which are internal to countries, such as Angola, Somalia, Sri Lanka. Each of these has a slightly different context for interventions.

**The ‘U.S. versus Another Country’ Category**

The first example, U.S. versus another country, clearly is most complex. And the President's inclination is obviously going to be to believe that only the U.S. government itself can intervene. He will believe that his staff is the only one which really truly understands U.S. national interests. His professionals are better equipped to negotiate. They know the minimum and maximum negotiating room they have. The public, and very importantly Congress, expect the President to be in charge. The bureaucracy itself will be arguing internally why it must be a “take control situation,” and that it has a great distrust for outsiders.

Well, why then would the President consider turning to a NGO rather than entrust such situations to his own internal staff or, as is becoming increasingly the case, special envoys?

The virtues of the NGO are the flip side of the U.S. national interest. The objective of diplomats and the envoys must be to defend U.S. national interests, not necessarily to find grounds for compromise.

Negotiations very often involve the development of personal relationships. Out of these personal relationships, you engender trust. Administrations have very limited lives: they have very immediate short-term objectives most of the time, rather than more long-term ones. NGOs can remain more focused time-wise, and they do not get caught up in the complex mix of factors weighing on governments: the politics, the public relations, other relationships, and so forth.

Therefore, an NGO is more in a position to make tactical moves without having to explain these to various constituencies.

One of the cardinal rules of intervention, we have heard, is an exit strategy. Using an NGO allows governments to then have sort of the perfect exit strategy. If the intervention happens to succeed, then the President takes credit and says: “We did a very good job here and we have resolved this conflict.” If the intervention goes off-track, perhaps does not quite serve U.S national interests, then the President says: “Well, they took a shot, it was a good try, we will have to try something else; clearly, these issues were intractable.”

Furthermore, the President's prestige is not necessarily at stake. Now, I know there are arguments that, if the President does turn to an NGO, he has by then already diminished his prestige. But at least in the active part of the negotiation, the President's prestige is not on the line. And on top of that, in the final analysis, stronger options – military or other – are still not foreclosed.

Within this category of the U.S. versus another country, there is a very special category, and that is what I would call the “rogue state” that nobody wants to deal with: [the states led by]
Saddam Hussein, Kim Il-Sung, since deceased, Fidel Castro, Muammar Gaddafi, Abdallah al-Turabi in Sudan, Raoul Cedras, and so forth. These are the kinds of situations where NGOs have, perhaps, a far better opportunity because they are able to go in and deal with such characters, whereas the U.S., for various reasons, is prohibited from doing so, or the President, for public relations reasons, may not want to.

‘Hostilities between Other States’ Category

The second category is hostilities between other states, fortunately, a category which is diminishing: Israel-Palestine, Pakistan-India, Peru-Ecuador, Argentina-the U.K., China-Taiwan. Perhaps I should be referring to entities rather than states, but nevertheless, they are these kinds of bilateral conflicts. It is a little bit easier for the President to look to NGOs to deal with such situations, rather than intervene directly with diplomatic efforts.

If anything, in recent years the President has turned more and more to special envoys for such situations, so now we have a special envoy for Cyprus, for Sudan, for Liberia, Jesse Jackson in Africa, and so forth. And the UN is emulating this to some extent. Every crisis now also has a special envoy from the UN.

But there are a few more points I could make regarding NGOs in even these settings.

First, there is no link to another agenda. No matter what the countries are that are involved, the U.S. will always have some bilateral issue that is of importance to them and may even have a tilt in that. I suppose the most glaring example would have to be Israel and Palestine, but I think, even in other situations, the U.S. would be seen as leaning towards one party or the other no matter how neutral it tried to be. Second, I come back, again, to the issue of staying power, because in these cases, the solutions are even less obvious, and you need to stick with these for a long time. The NGOs do not need to get worried about getting embroiled in the domestic politics of these countries. They can sort of stand aloof.

The ‘Internal Conflict’ Category

The third category is that of an internal conflict. Here I would argue that governments are even less well equipped to mediate such conflicts, especially to the extent that these are ethnic, religious, or economic as compared to just sheer power struggles within these countries.

NGOs are more grass-roots focused. They are more capable of getting people within the country involved in trying to seek a solution to their own problems. They are trusted as caring more about the people rather than the geopolitical strategic outcomes. And they are far more flexible in dealing with other levels or types of conflict — for example, in the case of the Carter Center, those that come up around elections.

The Role of Conflict Prevention, Multilateral and Regional Bodies

Talking about this last category compels me to then mention the issue of conflict prevention. Certainly prevention is now coming more and more to the fore as almost equal to, if not more important than, intervention.
Part of this is because of the visual legacies of Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the UN, in a recent speech elaborated on this and said the UN must put much more focus on the issue of prevention. Also, in a recent strategic planning meeting, CARE decided that it needed to move away from a sort of strictly assistance mode into one of advocacy, that humanitarian action after a crisis is not an intervention policy. And on top of that, it is usually the NGOs who find themselves most exposed if the intervention prevention does not work. They are on the ground. For example, with the crisis in East Timor, we had three of our people at gunpoint leave East Timor.

And in fact, it is the failure of governments to make decisions in these emerging crises that result in the NGOs taking the greatest risks.

On top of that, NGOs bring a lot more analytical tools. They have spent a lot more time with the people and are working with NGOs within these countries. In the prevention area, I believe that NGOs are far better equipped to deal with the dynamics within these countries. They obviously cannot do this on their own without support from governments.

No matter how much I might have extolled the virtues and comparative advantage of NGOs, one thing is almost always certain: NGOs have little capacity to implement. They have to fall back to governments to provide the means to do that. And in the more sensitive bilateral cases, whatever is worked out has to be in line with government interests, or the agreements themselves will go nowhere. And even where the lead is entrusted to NGOs, governments still have to help provide an enabling environment and, in the toughest cases, be prepared to provide these stronger interventions even up to the point, as I said earlier, of armed intervention.

I have not said very much about multilateral or regional bodies. Clearly, they are emerging as of greater importance as well. If we look at the examples in West Africa of the West African forces, the so-called ECOMOG military forces in both Liberia and Sierra Leone relied upon these interventions rather than individual governments.

**NGOs Are Increasingly Important, But Are Not a Panacea**

So let me summarize what I think are some of the reasons a President might want to turn to NGOs.

An NGO can do things the government may not. If the intervention succeeds, the President takes credit, and if the outcome does not satisfy U.S. national interests, the President walks away from it. He does not stake his prestige. Other military options, and so forth, are not foreclosed. And NGOs can deal with pariahs. They can remain focused over a longer time. They can bring into play other elements of the society. And they do not have other agendas, and thereby they can engender greater trust.

The lessons learned from this is that, when serious differences threaten a conflict, it is prudent – in fact, essential – that there be somebody who can talk directly to the decision-maker on the other side, and that often NGOs can open channels of communication that governments cannot in order to resolve or ameliorate such differences.
While I can talk about some of the advantages of NGOs, I am not naïve enough to believe that they are a panacea. Certainly, in the most critical kinds of situations – all out attacks, such as Iraq against Kuwait – or in very chaotic situations, such as in Kosovo, I do not think at that point NGOs are going to be able to provide an awful lot of consolation, and that they can walk into a situation just like that and try to resolve the conflict.

But to the extent that we are trying to improve the capacity to intervene, I think we should be thinking about roles that an NGO might play. Particularly as we move more into the area of conflict-prevention, then at least in this area NGOs are perhaps better equipped than anyone else.

I do not have any illusions that it is going to be sustainable once President Carter fades from the scene to get the Carter Center as involved as it was in the two outstanding cases of North Korea and Haiti for the very special circumstances there. Even if we have eminent persons working at the Center in his place, it is not quite the same thing.

Where the NGOs will need to be called up is in the prevention stages and in the lower-key situations. For example, right now the Center is involved with Uganda and the Sudan. We also are involved quietly, behind the scenes, working with the three parties in Congo-Brazzaville. We get a lot of requests to get involved right now in Sri Lanka, in Angola.

These are the kinds of situations where, despite the fact that there are special envoys named for them, there are not a lot of U.S. national, particularly strategic, interests. There is an interest in the humanitarian side of resolving these conflicts, and their spillover potential and so forth. But they are somewhat lower key.
“RECONCILIATION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF”
THOMAS PATRICK MELADY

GRAVES: Our next speaker is Thomas Melady. Dr. Melady has held four diplomatic posts, including U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, Senior Advisor to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, and the U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican.

He also served as President of Sacred Heart University from 1976 to 1986, and is now President Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of political science. Ambassador Melady will address the issues of reconciliation, peacekeeping, peace-making, and humanitarian relief.

Prevention and Humanitarian and “Modified” Interventions: The Cases of Kosovo and East Timor

MELADY: Thank you for inviting me here. I have looked at some of the low-key interventions, sometimes personified by a rough-and-ready ambassador putting diplomatic pressure on the smaller states. Prevention seems to follow applying an American model in post-intervention trauma. New eras bring new opportunities. They also bring different responsibilities.

We have an opportunity to continue policies that serve U.S. interests and meet our strategic goals, to modify those that have not done this, and to initiate new policies and practices that are appropriate for the U.S. in the new century. Great geographic distances have disappeared. Instant communications to all parts of the world are available to many of us. We are all practically next-door neighbors. Peacekeeping, peace-making, and humanitarian relief are part of the contemporary scene. Regarding these, I want to comment, first of all, on our experience in Kosovo.

The year 1999 will be regarded by history as that year when the members of the world’s greatest regional security organization, NATO, inspired and led mainly by the United States, took decisive military action to stop an ongoing genocide — one of the worst massive violations of human rights since World War II. Numerous attempts before the military action to correct these significant violations of human rights were unsuccessful. This was a responsible action because it was preceded by numerous negotiations to resolve the problem without violence.

The intervention by NATO established that an ongoing genocide would not be allowed, at least in the heart of Europe. And that is something for us to examine. It remains for the U.S., NATO, and other responsible states to determine the criteria for further such interventions. Will they be limited to Europe, or to other areas as well where there are significant U.S. interests and cultural ties?

Other “modified” interventions can take place. One recently did in East Timor where our role was far more restricted, while the U.S. played no significant role in ending the Rwanda tragedy of 1994. All of this poses the question: Is the U.S. in the process of becoming the world’s policeman? When should our country so act? And when it does act, with what other responsible authorities should it seek a de facto alliance before proceeding with military intervention as we did in the recent case of Kosovo?
Two Models of Reconciliation

In addition, another critical aspect of U.S. policy that should be examined is our post-war policy in Kosovo. The determination to impose the U.S. model of reconciliation in Kosovo, in my opinion, is ill-advised.

Following almost a year of pre-war and war of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by the Belgrade government, it is not reasonable to expect immediate reconciliation between the Albanian and Serb peoples in Kosovo. External forces cannot impose ethnic reconciliation. It can only come from the people themselves. Certainly, the ultimate goal must be reconciliation, but we cannot impose it.

Now, we have seen tragedies – and I lived through one – where this model of ethnic reconciliation was imposed. A disastrous coup d’état followed by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, in which about 110,000 Tutsis and 150,000 Hutus were killed.

I recommended a plan for reconciliation to the State Department that involved a separation between Hutus and Tutsies. I read from history the deep alienation between the two communities going back to the times the country was a German colony, followed by the Belgian mandate. Outside police forces – the Germans or the Belgians – prevented severe ethnic conflict. But when that outside police force left, the ethnic conflict began right in the first year of independence.

My plan was rejected, as well as the model of reconciliation – that they must learn how to live together. I think the rejection of my plan was partially responsible for the continuing Central African turmoil, and also in neighboring Rwanda which has had two genocides since then.

We did not do that in the case of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish communities are separated there. Not a perfect model, but one that has not resulted in people killing each other, and certainly one day soon there can be sufficient reconciliation where the two communities can live together. That is another model. But in sum, we will have to learn to recognize models that may not fit our historical experience.

The Question of Independence

In my opinion, a long-term strategy is needed in Kosovo. Reconciliation cannot be imposed unless we keep a military presence. Now, if we are going to keep a military presence there for a generation, we can probably prevent a major ethnic conflict from occurring again. When the new President takes office, he will have to confront a new challenge here. And that is the people in Kosovo will be seeking independence, but that right we should not give to them.

Non-interference in Internal Affairs and Selective Outrage

Let me address Somalia briefly. In the early months of the Clinton Administration, the humanitarian focus was augmented, and it included democracy training and other activities, which clearly involved the U.S. in the political affairs of Somalia. Once involved in these internal affairs, there was confrontation and U.S. soldiers were killed. This situation had not been planned. Would it have been better if we had stuck to the original humanitarian mission – opened the roads, gotten
the food and medical supplies in and helped the people – rather than changed it to what could be considered intervention in the internal affairs of that country? The President-Elect of 2000 will want to look into this issue as well.

I would like to point out to the future President some of the challenges in these countries.

We are now committed to the core principles of democratic government – civil society and human rights. But as Americans, we have to look at a new practice started at the time of President Carter, and that is our annual evaluation of the human rights situation in the world. I am in favor of continuing this annual evaluation, but perhaps we need to look at our own backyard and make sure we do not appear arrogant and as if we are judging the actions of others.

In some states in East and Central Europe and other parts of the world that I have witnessed very recently, U.S. representatives publicly criticize their host governments. This could be construed as a form of intervention in local policies on human rights, civil society, and domestic procedures.

We are the “significant power” and should avoid giving the appearance of becoming involved in internal affairs unless there is, as recently in Yugoslavia, a severe, ongoing violation of human rights. In the more moderate internal cases, where a human rights situation does not meet our expectations, we should engage in dialogue or persuasion. Some classify that as old-fashioned, traditional diplomacy. But our ambassadors must avoid giving any appearance of being the heavy-handed big brother.

Again, I will say I believe the traditional channels of quiet diplomacy allow us to transmit our opinions where there are situations that do not measure up to our expectations.

Therefore, the President-Elect should examine the allegation that we may be engaged in selective outrage. We get involved in some cases and not in others. In our dealings with other nations, we have to make sure that we are being even-handed. We must recognize that if we are going to speak out about a violation in one country and not in another, we will be open to the charge of practicing selective outrage.

We must be sensitive to various nations’ desires to retain their culture. Just because we give a country technical assistance and aid, that does not mean that we can intervene or interfere in their institutions. And in the case of humanitarian relief, I am a great believer in looking at the ability of some of private organizations doing this. We have great opportunities looking forward.
“PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE ROLE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS”

JOHN BOLTON

“Preventive diplomacy” rapidly became a contemporary buzz phrase for several obvious reasons. It is virtually impossible to argue with the abstract proposition that preventing conflicts is superior to resolving them after they have erupted into military violence. The costs in human life, property, and lost political and economic opportunities will almost certainly be higher once conflict breaks out, both for the parties directly involved and for interested outsiders. Successful preventive efforts, moreover, may lessen the inclination to resort to force in the future by building trust and confidence, and by actually helping to solve underlying disagreements.

If preventive diplomacy is so attractive, why is it so infrequently successful? More specifically, why has the UN not achieved a better record at prevention? First, hard as it is for many people to believe, war is often an entirely rational calculation, and preventive diplomacy can no more stop it than it can reverse the power of gravity. Second, the UN is, and is likely to remain, only a collection of governments, the sum of whose efforts will not be greater than their individual exertions and may well be less. Third, governments should understand that the UN Secretariat, especially the Secretary General, does not operate on a higher plane than mere mortal national officials, and that the Secretariat’s contribution is more likely to be at the molecular rather than the molar level. Let us consider each point in turn.

First, Clausewitz correctly noted that war is a combination of “hate and enmity,” “the play of probabilities and chance,” and “the province of pure intelligence.” Advocates of UN preventive diplomacy typically assume that only “hate and enmity” are at work, and, therefore, that “good offices,” mediation, arbitration, and conventional diplomacy will frequently be successful in preventing the resort to force. Unfortunately, this is both naïve and often dangerous. The respective trips to Baghdad of Secretaries General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1990 and Kofi Annan in 1998 did not in either case preclude the U.S. and its allies from subsequently using military force against Iraq when it suited their purposes to do so. While the trips took place under vastly different circumstances, and with at least the acquiescence, for lack of any better characterization, of the U.S. in both cases, they nonetheless prove the limits of UN diplomacy in the face of major-power calculations.

Where UN efforts have played a role in avoiding conflict, such as the preventive efforts of former Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah in Burundi in 1993-95, it often has had more to do with the abilities and personality of the individual involved, and the particular circumstances they face, than it has with the UN as an institution. During the time Ould-Abdallah pursued his mission in Burundi, the country remained relatively at peace, as Ould-Abdallah strove to keep the conflicts between ethnic Hutus and Tutsis political rather than military. In neighboring Rwanda, by contrast, which had the “benefit” of a UN peacekeeping force on the ground rather than simply a diplomatic representative, the same ethnic groups, with essentially the same historical circumstances, fell into genocide.
While the UN’s role in either situation is far from providing the entire answer, this contrast shows that differences in UN capabilities and resources are not dispositive either. This is because the UN’s size, personnel, internal communications, administration, or finances, although often cited as inadequate, are rarely the real issue; the real issue is the balance of calculations between the potentially warring sides, which may be susceptible to political resolution or may not be. In the latter case, a political settlement may or may not be facilitated by an outsider’s involvement. Accordingly, there is little ground for true optimism to be found in the preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping reforms endorsed in September 2000, by the UN’s Millennium Summit in New York. Indeed, placing too much emphasis on such relatively simple institutional changes leads inexorably to the risk of underestimating the complex of factors underlying most difficult international and intra-state conflicts.

Second, UN member states do not put aside their national interests when they enter the General Assembly or the Security Council chambers. Indeed, obtaining two-year, non-permanent seats on the Council is often a national policy objective precisely so that the new Council member can take care of national business during a particularly critical or sensitive time. Sudan’s current quest for a seat on the Security Council, or Cuba’s tenure in 1990-91, are excellent examples of this phenomenon in practice. Even where direct national interests are not at stake, broader political alignments and the potential precedent-establishing importance of Council decisions, among other factors, will play an important role in decision-making.

In short, the Council is not composed of Platonic guardians, but states pursuing interests, often seemingly far removed from the subject under debate. Thus, Ecuador abstained on Resolution 687, the post-Persian Gulf War cease-fire text, because it contained provision for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwaiti border, which might turn out later to have an impact on the long-standing Ecuadorian-Peruvian border dispute. To be sure, such behavior may say more about human nature than the UN institutionally, but it is unmistakably pervasive. For that very reason, moreover, the oft-mentioned alternative to the UN – reliance on regional security organizations – is also not really likely to provide measurably different results.

Perhaps the more important misperception, though, is not about the conduct of small- or medium-power states when they serve on the Council, but the deep-seated misconception about how the Five Permanent Members will – or ought – to behave. Not surprisingly, this fallacy is inherent in the very concept of Permanent Membership, which was in large measure an effort to keep alive the cooperation (real and imagined) among the leading anti-Axis powers of World War II, known collectively until VE and VJ days in 1945 as “the United Nations.” That predecessor “United Nations” had essentially common and unquestioned goals (the defeat of Germany and Japan), and at least some of the drafters of the UN Charter hoped to keep such unity of purpose alive in the new world organization, thus avoiding the inadequacies that had doomed the League of Nations.

The drafters’ more cynical colleagues might have said that the wartime “United Nations” was never so cohesive as they imagined. In any event, whatever illusions any of them had were stripped away when the Soviet Union and its allies launched the Cold War, and actually contributed to the military defeat of one of the original Perm Five, the Republic of China, which was isolated on the island of Taiwan. Thereafter, for nearly forty years, the Security Council was gridlocked by the Cold War, and great power conflict made the Council a nearly impossible place to transact
business, let alone to authorize much in the way of preventive initiatives by the Secretariat. Indeed, an intense part of U.S. multilateral diplomacy during that period was keeping critically important matters out of the Council’s purview.

Surprisingly, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union after it lost the Cold War convinced some observers that the halcyon days of 1945 had returned, and that the Perm Five could begin to function once again as a cohesive “global directorate.” This has manifestly not been the case. Perm Five politics within the Security Council, as during the Cold War, have continued to reflect the larger strategic objectives of each of the Five, as played out in the UN arena. China has relentlessly pursued its own interests and separate path, although only rarely standing directly in the way of the other four. NATO’s air war over Yugoslavia may or may not have convinced China to assume a more aggressively oppositionist policy in the future, in effect following the course Russia had already started to pursue in the mid- and late 1990s. Both are likely to see suggestions for “preventive diplomacy” through prisms like Tibet and Chechnya, and to be skeptical except where their respective national interests are highly attenuated. Britain and France, by contrast, are both intensely interested in proving their continued bona fides as global great powers (as well as, somewhat contradictorily, advancing the evolving agenda of the European Union), and hence are determined to bolster the role and importance of the Security Council in world affairs. Even today, affairs in their former colonies evoke responses not found in the other Perm Five, as, for example, in Sierra Leone or Cambodia.

The U.S., by even further contrast, and notwithstanding the favorable climate of the Clinton Administration, remains riven by internal debate over the Council’s proper role, and thus distant and unhappy with, and at times unsupportive of, many diplomatic and operational aspects of UN activity. None of this will change dramatically in the near future for any of the Perm Five. As a consequence, unless the Secretary General is able to squeeze out a dramatically more autonomous role for himself, the Council’s internal divisions among the Five are likely to inhibit UN preventive diplomacy, except in the most marginal cases, for quite some time to come. Although the recent “experts’ report” by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, endorsed both by the Council and the Millennium Summit, as noted above, supports such a larger role for the Secretary General, the actual operational impact of the report remains to be seen.

Third, the foregoing assessment leads immediately to an important corollary: While the “Dag Hammarskjold myth” has unusual persistence in UN circles, it is nonetheless still just a myth. It rests on the abstraction that a fearless, dynamic, independent Secretary General can right the world of its wrongs by the moral force of his personality, free from the petty national interests of the UN’s member governments. This myth fails on two grounds. First, there is no such person, and even Hammarskjold, the poetry-writing idealist, failed more often than he succeeded. Moreover, the Soviet Union would surely have vetoed Hammarskjold for a third term as Secretary General had he not died during a 1961 mission to the Congo. In precisely the same vein, the Clinton Administration savaged Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he became inconvenient to its objectives in the 1990s. Any Secretary General who ignores this reality will suffer the same fate. Second, the Secretary General is only the UN’s “chief administrative officer” (under Article 97 of the Charter) and has neither the political legitimacy nor the authority to exceed the wishes of member governments. That reality is also not going to change.
On the other hand, when a Secretary General is serving the interests of a Security Council majority, or even just one powerful member, by playing an important “out front” role, he can typically expect ample support as a useful surrogate. These occasions, however, should not be mistaken for real independence or autonomy. Ironically, where the Secretariat can be most effective – on the ground in specific crisis and pre-crisis situations – it is often most cautious and bureaucratic. Thus, where a Special Representative acts decisively and even boldly (as did UN Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari of Finland during the 1989 Namibian elections, or as Ould-Abdallah did in Burundi), the UN’s chances of success are higher, but these cases are unfortunately rare. We are, after all considering an international bureaucracy operating in situations that are, by their very definition, not yet of crisis dimension, so we should not be surprised that risk-taking is rare.

While conflict prevention by the UN is attractive in the abstract, preventive diplomacy’s desirability should not obscure either international political reality or the UN’s institutional inadequacies. In all likelihood, therefore, the UN will continue to play only a highly limited, if occasionally useful, role well into the foreseeable future. Some may find this outcome undesirable, but ignoring the UN’s actual capacity would only be a prescription for greater tragedy. This has happened too often already, and recent headlines from the field in locations as diverse as Sierra Leone and Kosovo only prove the point.
PREVENTION
Three recent reports make recommendations for major reform of the United Nations in order to improve its capabilities for conflict prevention and intervention:

- One by U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, which focuses primarily upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN Secretariat;
- One by the Secretary General which focuses upon the state of the world, and includes UN reform; and
- One by a panel of prominent international figures with long experience in various aspects of international tension and upheaval and efforts to ameliorate them, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, which focuses on the UN Secretariat (not only DPKO), the entire UN system, and UN member states.

The recommendations of the first report are generally covered by the Brahimi report, undoubtedly the most insightful, comprehensive, and hard-hitting examination of UN capabilities and weaknesses. It contains the most far-reaching recommendations for reform of the UN system. The Secretary General’s own report is broader, but consistent with that of the Brahimi panel. None of them calls for any expansion in the authority of the UN or its powers, although that of the Secretary General argues for the right of intervention in internal crises. The emphasis is on better performance by the UN system, combined with closer cooperation and stronger support from member states.

Would these reforms improve significantly the capability of the UN, working with member states, to prevent the sort of primarily internal conflict which has taken center stage on the world scene over the past decade? The answer is clearly, yes. However, the difficulties in obtaining such far-reaching reform are immense. Depending upon the determination of the Secretary General and heads of other UN agencies, and the willingness of key member states – especially the Permanent Members of the Security Council plus Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa – to support him and carry out the recommendations for action by themselves, one can foresee a significant improvement in both conflict prevention and UN intervention.

The Brahimi report lays bare the immediate causes of weakness in UN conflict prevention and intervention, and goes further to address the underlying reasons. Inter alia, the report notes that the UN Secretariat has only 32 military officers to plan, recruit, and equip the deployment and support of some 28,000 military forces under UN command in 14 countries. In addition, it has nine police officers to do the same for 9,000 UN police in the field; and an overall headquarters (DPKO) to field budget ratio of 1:50. However, Brahimi goes much deeper in examining quality, attitudes, and procedures of UN personnel and organizations, not merely general statistics.

His report calls for the different fiefdoms within the UN Secretariat and other relevant parts of the UN system to overcome fifty years of closed, defensive, stove-pipe behavior by opening up
to full cooperation with one another. He also calls for introducing clarity and rigor in place of both unconscious (attitudinal) and deliberate fuzziness.

This would require the UN Security Council to decide upon clear mandates rather than the usual vague ones – susceptible of multiple interpretations by different member states or UN officials – and, therefore, would have to be much more binding on all concerned. It would also require the DPKO to confront the Security Council members with: actual requirements needed to carry out the mission, rather than the vagueness many of them prefer; the members to approve the resources needed when they approve the resolution containing the mandate; and the Security Council to refuse to initiate the operation unless adequate resources were available for timely deployment.

Such restructuring would go a long way toward removing the all-too-familiar “game” of Security Council members blaming the UN for failure in undermanned, underfunded operations which they support only rhetorically. The report would also oblige states whose personnel are volunteers for peace operations to see that they are properly equipped, trained, and arrive on time for the mission — or not send them at all. This would remove another all-too-familiar problem of incapable forces that are present more for the prestige and money they bring home than to carry out an operation. Finally, the report calls for UN personnel to be experienced, capable, and accountable — a far cry from the present situation where many positions are filled with individuals who are favorites of member states or senior UN personnel, with little or no regard for capability and none for accountability. Such requirements, however, are sure to encounter opposition by a number of UN member states which profit from the status quo.

With respect to peacekeeping, the report observes that “there are many tasks which the UN should not be asked to undertake…but when the UN does send its forces, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them.” It condemns the prevalent view that UN forces should always be neutral and avoid taking a stand for or against parties even if that is clearly needed to carry out the mandate. Such a reversal of the ingrained UN ethos of “neutrality” at any cost will be hard to put in practice, but would make an immense difference. Moreover, the report acknowledges that there will be situations potentially too dangerous to be undertaken by a UN force even with reforms in place. In such cases, it supports the deployment of a more powerful, cohesive Multi-National Force approved by the Security Council but not under UN command. The UNITAF force in Somalia, for example, and the MNF in Haiti were commanded by U.S. troops; KFOR in Kosovo is under NATO command; and MNF in East Timor is commanded by the Australian military. This is an important provision for intervention.

The three reports point out that the UN is not an independent body. Not only does it need approval plus material and financial support from member states to be effective, but it usually must have active, ongoing parallel political support of influential member states to achieve its missions successfully. The UN is not intended to be a substitute or a subcontractor to relieve member states of their own responsibilities, but a partner in a broader effort which includes actions undertaken by the UN system (fact-finding missions, special envoys, sanctions, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities) in conjunction with bilateral and multilateral actions undertaken by interested member states (persuasion, pressure, inducements) and with other organizations (UNDP, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, regional organizations and banks, etc.).
The Brahmi report goes beyond peacekeeping as a means of conflict prevention or conflict management. It calls for greater and earlier use by the Secretary General of his authority to deploy fact-finding missions to potential trouble spots well before the situation reaches the crisis stage. In his related Millennium Report, the Secretary General similarly stresses the need for earlier attention to such problems as ethnic or religious tension, serious human rights violations or repression, refugees or internally displaced, etc. When brewing trouble is identified, a combined effort of diplomacy and assistance should be mobilized by the UN and interested member states to attack the causes rather than wait passively for the crisis stage when some form of military intervention will probably be needed. The UNDP has taken the lead within the UN system in trying to change the mind-set and operational capabilities from reaction to prevention — a long, difficult test. Should the mind-set begin to evolve, however, there will be a need for increased resources.

Experience within the U.S. Government over many years has shown just how difficult it is to identify potential crises at a very early stage, and how much more difficult it is to generate the political will and the material resources needed to redress the situation prior to the crisis. Obviously, this is still more difficult for an international organization which must persuade its members of the correctness of its early warning, and then convince them to provide the requisite resources to address the problem. However, if progress can be made, it should mean fewer situations requiring interaction.

For the U.S., this new approach to UN preventive diplomacy will require a major change: first, in providing strong political support for enactment of the reforms; second, in paying its past dues and making future payments promptly — both to set an example as well as to help the UN regain its strength; third, in working closely and forging compromises with other Security Council members in order to adopt and support clear mandates and adequate resources; fourth, using its influence and political support as well as providing material support to other UN agencies in identifying potential conflict-countries early on.

In doing so, the additional financial cost to the U.S. for averting crisis would be relatively small. However, the political-diplomatic, humanitarian, and possibly military gains from avoiding crises would be substantial. Inter alia, in some cases more effective UN intervention could replace U.S. participation in MNFs at less than half the cost to the U.S.

Strong U.S. leadership, in deed as well as in word, would be necessary to carry out the above changes. If provided, there is a reasonable chance of serious commitment by the UN leadership and other governments to the sort of reforms indicated, making progress achievable in prevention as well as UN intervention. The U.S. would, of course, retain its veto power in the Security Council as well as its powerful political influence which would only increase once arrears are paid, and should be prepared to use them to block action if a particular situation takes a wrong turn.
ABSHIRE: I first became interested in strategic reorganization of the national security process in a book I published during the advent of the Bush Administration, at a time when the Cold War was winding down. Eisenhower was my guide: He organized the National Security Council with an Operations Coordinating Board and a Planning Board. This Board was not drawn into the crises of the moment, and could plan ahead. I offered the idea, as we moved into the post-Cold War era, of creating a **Strategic Counselor to the President** and of changing the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) into a broader **Strategic Board**. I also thought that this Strategic Counselor should spend perhaps a third to one-half of his time on Capitol Hill. Today, I think we should consider making the Strategic Counselor a Chairman of the Strategic Board. (In further discussions on this concept, the recommendation has been made that the Vice President of the United States should serve in this capacity.) Whenever our two branches of government are seriously divided on national security or foreign policy, serious disasters can occur. Our strength in the Cold War (except in Vietnam) was generally a strategic consensus, both Executive and Legislative, and with the public. Such strength cannot be regained unless the White House is dedicated to pursue this objective.

One may argue that the proposal to form a Strategic Board to the President offers layering, but in fact it will transform the PFIAB which has existed since President Eisenhower founded it in the 1950s. Thus, there is no new layering. The Strategic Board will have no operational authority, even though it is somewhat reminiscent of President Eisenhower’s Planning Board separate from his Operations Coordinating Board. The proposed Strategic Board will deal with quality of anticipatory intelligence, trends in the financial and technological world that may impact our security, and with potential geo-political and geo-economic contingencies using the war colleges’ gaming capabilities. Its basic function is to look over the strategic horizon and provide a greater peripheral vision in order to develop a long-term strategy and integrate the elements of national power.

In many ways, the national security structure in Washington is broke. People in high-positions in this Administration have said that there is no real capability to look ahead, anticipate, and shape. It is not the fault of the people in power; it has to do with the system.

Let us size up the problem. A devastating mismatch exists between strategy and resources. The latest nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office report states dramatically that to sustain the U.S. forward presence abroad at current spending, our forces must be reduced by 25 percent, or else Congress and the President must appropriate an additional $50 billion a year to fill the gap. Even more troubling than the dollar levels is the imbalance between spending on defense and on diplomacy. In 1948, the ratio of defense to diplomacy was 2:1; since 1990 it has shifted to 16:1. This ratio reflects the deeper truth that we are applying neither the strategy nor the resources to prevent conflict in the new century. The result is that we will be asked increasingly to act as the fire brigade.
In addition, there is an organizational mismatch: the Cold War structures, which we still have today, have outlived the Cold War. Ironically, our planning and investments go largely into how we might fight the last two wars simultaneously, Korea and the Gulf. What we need is to build the deterrence and hardheaded diplomacy required to prevent such wars and thus to reduce the interventions that have increased four-fold since the end of the Cold War. From Korea to Kosovo, our wars have been rife with pre-conflict miscalculations. Sharper public and diplomatic definition of our interests and better anticipation and warning could have shaped the strategic environment and avoided putting our troops in harm’s way.

The next President will inherit compartmentalized Executive and Legislative branches that are not organized to think strategically about the world’s preponderant power in the 21st century. Indeed, of all of the potential threats, our biggest enemy by far is how our national security system is misorganized and compartmentalized. Unless the new President wants to confront crisis upon crisis, he must conduct a strategic reformation during his first months in office.

If one looks at early months of the most successful Presidents, the tendency is to put national security and foreign policy on the back burner in order to turn up the flame in one or two big domestic issues (such as education and social security in the present campaign). The exceptions were Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.

For the United States, Cold War strategy between two superpowers demanded, to borrow from Sir Isaiah Berlin, the “mind of the hedgehog.” It was a linear strategy, with fixed lines and spheres of influence, driven by singleness of purpose, predictability, determination, and with stamina. Today’s strategic landscape presents blurred lines, frayed borders, shifting alliances. This generates unconventional, complex, multilayered, and rapidly mutating threats to U.S. security as we are witnessing in the Middle East. These factors are amplified by the competitive culture of high-tech globalization and the cyber world of business and government. Such a strategic environment demands the attributes of the multifaceted agile “mind of the fox”: rapid-reaction to fluid events coupled with the ability to anticipate unseen dangers, shape events, capture new technologies, and adapt in the face of changing circumstances. The move from one to the other is a cultural inversion. It is not surprising that our system has not adopted it.

Given these changes in the strategic environment, we would like to see the President-Elect say: “I am getting my house in order, am thinking anew, and I invite Congress to meet me on those terms.” And so, we would like to build up a little caucus of apostles in Congress that will help sell this concept to others, because the basis of effective strategy is anticipation and integration. These are the two things that are lacking today, and the compartmentalization in Congress destroys the structure of entire strategic integration.

Eisenhower felt his forward planning had to be separated from his operations, that while these two had to work together, they had to be separated. We are going beyond that, because while the word “planning” was used back then, we are talking about contingency planning. Today, we cannot have the straight-line plans that we had in the Cold War.

Most national security advisors are on board with us on this issue. One of them wanted to make the Counselor a subgroup of the National Security Advisor, and we worried that it would be
drowned out and swallowed up just like policy planning today in the State Department is swallowed up by the latest crisis or the latest speech. What some of us envision for this Counselor is access to intelligence with its forward planning, to the Joint Chiefs, to Treasury, DIA, and so forth, and to the war gaming available at the war colleges so that he can take a good look at contingencies. He would have no jurisdiction, but would be ahead of the game, both conceptually and by looking at crises. But again, it is fundamental that the Strategic Counselor spend a third to one-half of his or her time on Capitol Hill, fostering relations with Congress.

The role of the Strategic Counselor could also be strengthened by changing the President’s PFIAB. When he took office, Eisenhower named seven people to the PFIAB. Some people were put there for political reasons, but most were strong, insightful individuals. The PFIAB is valuable; it is one group that reports directly to the President.

One option is to change the PFIAB into a National Security Board or better yet a Strategic Board with some full-time government members and some part-time private sector members. However, we need to reach beyond traditional military circles and also overhaul our science and technology to the President. We want to build a structure equal to the National Security Council, the National Economic Council – in other words, a National Technology Council – because, in both the security and economic direction, the information revolution is driving events and the policy process. And the Counselor will be able to overarch into these groups. For these reasons, you have to have the person with the right personality in this job. It has to be a process-driven person, not an ego-driven person.

Granted, this idea will be difficult to implement, but defense consensus can begin in a very practical way by conducting a dynamic Net Assessment. This Assessment must address new vulnerabilities — homeland defense, new challenges in the technological revolution, and new realities such as the demographic and aging problems among allies as well as at home. The current Net Assessment has been improved, but it is driven by the budget cycle and has the self-interest of the Services, not the realities of the 21st century.

There is a historical precedent for what we propose, and also some differences. In 1947, 1953, we did not have the deep politicization, the leaks, the investigative reporting where contingencies talked about were blown out of proportion. Eisenhower had his “Solarium Exercise.” We want to do something much broader.

When I got to NATO in 1983, eleven threat assessment committees existed. But no Net assessment committee existed. NATO leaders did not want a Net Assessment. If there had been a Net Assessment, it would have shown that the maldeployment of troops in the North Army Group Area could have made it possible for the enemy to break through and get to the Channel in ten days, just as Hitler did on May 10, 1940. It will take money and political will to correct the current situation, and the Pentagon is not anxious to do a rational Net Assessment. But the challenges that we face in the next century call for this broader measure.

Our Report to the President-Elect 2000 does not propose to complete such an assessment. But we do want to vigorously advance the notion so that Andy Marshall and others, and particularly the members of Congress see how to deal with this issue. We have written the outline to a Strategic Assessment thus far and have provided a conceptual framework.
This step is important from the strategic point of view, but is also important for political reasons. It integrates a strategic apparatus that is compartmentalized and broken. As we see it, the President needs a Strategic Counselor for several reasons: to look ahead and work with agency heads and Congress; to work with the military and the scientific and business field; and to work with Capitol Hill on the forming of a National Security Committee, as the Murphy Commission report had recommended. This committee will be like the Joint Economic Committee that has no appropriating or authorizing authority, but as has happened with some of the better chairs of the Joint Economic Committee would have an impact and be a counterpart to what the President is doing.

If this organizational approach is unproductive, the President can simply meet regularly with key people on an informal basis. But my key point is that the President must pursue this domestic initiative during his first hundred days. This is the only period when he will be able to build the momentum to reorganize the national security advisory structure while also building Congressional muscle to handle the difficult choices ahead. The Net Assessment will identify our security problems and vulnerabilities, and build the momentum needed for a new investment strategy.

The State Department, which is broken today, would be a primary beneficiary of this initiative. Congressional relations would also improve, and we would get a much-needed upgrade in enhancing our capabilities and minimizing vulnerabilities created by advances in technology.

NYE: That the system is broken is probably pretty well shared. I especially like the emphasis on the Strategic Council spending time on Capitol Hill.

CARTER: I will put a proposition on the table which may get us off to a start: We are not that bad at policy conception and at looking ahead. But our deficiency is in execution, in the ability to organize around, put resources in, and competently carry out policies once they are conceived. That is a big proposition, but if I go down the list in the national security area, one deficiency would be the gap between using the military to establish peace and order somewhere and reconstructing civil society.

There is a missing instrument to achieve such a goal. It is an arguable point whether it ought to be one of our missions or not. But observing behavior over the last decade it seems to be an aspiration this country has. We failed again and again, most recently in the Balkans, to have the capability to do that. So we have missing capabilities.

Another proposition is the consequent management associated with catastrophic terrorism. And there the problem is the marshaling existing resources behind the mission, which requires a lot of cooperation among stovepipes.

Those are just two examples, and I will close with one more thought: the NSC works pretty well, and I do not think that you can begin with the premise that the NSC is broken and get any traction. Presidents do not seem to believe that. National security advisors that I have talked to about it do not seem to believe it. And it is not, in fact, broken for what it does, which is policy
coordination. What the NSC does is get people together around a piece of paper, which says this is what our policy is and this is what we would like to do.

What the NSC has no competence and clout to do is program coordination. That is, marshalling Cabinet department resources in some concerted way, not just the views of the leaders of those departments. As soon as anybody at the White House in general, but at the NSC in particular, begins to say “DOD should do this, the FBI should do that,” and so forth, all the agencies then say: “I have a cabinet secretary who has his or her prerogatives, and I have a committee that provides me money. And if my committee learns that the money they are giving me is actually being used to cross-subsidize another agency, then there is a problem.”

I give you an example that is most vivid in my mind: the Nunn-Lugar program. Nunn-Lugar was originally intended to be bankrolled out of the Pentagon, which we were perfectly happy to do. But pieces of it were best executed elsewhere in the government.

OAKLEY: I do not think that at the present the National Security System is doing a very good job of policy. Not only is it weak in terms of making program decisions – because you have to have a consensus which allows anybody who holds out long enough to block the situation and get their way – but it makes policy decisions dependent upon who has the best pitch, domestic political pitch or play on your conscience pitch.

I find it very worrisome to make policy decisions today. For example, in Kosovo our original policy was to stop the ethnic cleansing. We had to get the Serb army out and get the refugees back. And then all of a sudden, our policy mutated into building multi-ethnic democracy in Kosovo.

I do not think that is a very good example of clear policy thinking, much less implementation. And I think we have seen too much of that.

HUNTINGTON: I was struck, as maybe you were, at Ashton Carter’s argument for program coordination. I think this could well involve the need to appropriate several hundred million dollars a year for the NSC.

I have also been struck by what seems to me to be the incongruity between the emerging missions in the national security field and our organization. On the one hand, we have the kind of traditional military concerns such as fighting regional wars, possibly in various places simultaneously. On the other hand, there is the humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping range of functions. And then the third role is what some people have called “societal security,” or homeland defense. These are three rather different functions. At least the second two do not seem to be terribly well reflected in the national security organization, and you ought to know who is responsible for these. I hear again and again from military officers about how conflicted they are in terms of having to go out and do peacekeeping when they have been trained to do war fighting. There are different functions here which require different types of training and different types of culture. It is a problem, at least, to sort these out in some way and probably, I would think, eventually come up with different organizations to perform these.
BACEVICH: You could make an argument that we are at least on the front edge of a significant military institutional crisis. Ours is an all-volunteer force. We think that conscription is simply beyond the pale. The point is that it has become very, very difficult today to define what it means to be a military professional in an era of almost continuous operations, but very infrequent war.

NYE: The question is what is the nature of the threats or the problems we face, and then what are the instruments. We can make the case that we should not have been involved in Kosovo. But if we are going to be involved in Kosovo, Timor, Haiti, or Somalia, and if these places represent just the nature of the world today, then the question of whether we have the right instrument for such operations is a very serious one. Kosovo, as you know, essentially entails a policing job, but we are using our military for that policing job, and are actually restoring or creating civil authority where none exists. Then we say, we will have the UN hire police to do that job, while the UN does not have the resources to do it, and there is nobody else doing it.

So it is not just the problem of what do we tell the military, what do we tell the soldier or an officer about what their job is. We can pour much money into things we used to know how to protect against like tanks coming across the North German plain, and training people to be warriors in that context. But when it comes to pouring money in Timor or Kosovo, we are totally inept at dealing with them. One can make the argument that we are trying to use the wrong instruments, but it touches the Hill; the Hill will not put the money up for the job. And it touches the military, because the question remains what is the mission? Certainly the State Department does not have any capacity. So if we are going to be stuck in such places, whether we have the right set of instruments I think is very important. You are right to focus on the military. But it is a broader question than just the military.

EDWARDS: I want to go back to a very good point Ash Carter made. I was not in the Executive Branch, so I do not know about the NSC’s ability in terms of policy coordination. But in terms of program coordination, a lot of the problems with the Hill come from the fact that we cannot get any kinds of definitive answers from the Executive Branch. If you had the Treasury Department and the State Department with two different ideas about where the appropriations ought to go and what the priorities ought to be, it was a waste of time to go either to the Chief of Staff or the NSC and try to get a decision. You have all the policy coordination, but it just falls apart on the programmatic side.

NYE: I would support Ashton Carter’s proposition. It struck me that there is even a more fundamental proposition related to your question of whether the system is broken: that the system right now systematically focuses on the less important issues rather than on the “A list,” which are the things that the strategist regards as the most important. Your ideas about rethinking the organization of the NSC and the national security apparatus is to look for some sort of an institutional structure that helps us to stay on the A-list. So when I hear “Strategic Counselor” I think of someone who is going to be spending their time primarily on things that we would regard as more important than the Bosnias and the Haitis, or the airlift in the Congo.

This then gets us to the question of why are we on the C-list all of the time? Because the institutional structure is not robust enough? The question really is what is the source of our distraction onto less important issues. And if the answer is institutions, it may be very helpful.
The conventional wisdom on this is that it is the “CNN effect.” We can do A-, B-, and C-list operations, but we cannot keep getting stuck on C simply because the media keeps pushing our nose in it. But there is an interesting wrinkle on that: When there is a public outrage, it affects the Hill, which then affects the President, and so forth. It is the anticipation of the public, and it works directly on the decision-maker.

OAKLEY: So in the anticipation of what is the worst case, you draw back. The same thing is true of whether or not you are willing to take a few risks, and therefore, take a few casualties. Public opinion polls show that with the right kind of leadership and explanation, the public, and presumably Congress, will accept a few casualties. But we have gotten ourselves into an internal conflict of a political nature, so we do not dare take any risks.

HEHIR: Over the span of the last 30 years, there exists a precipitous decline in the character of Congressional debate on foreign policy. There were people who used to be the foreign policy people, and they were always ready for a debate. I have a hard time identifying those people today. It appears to me that the Kennedy School has taken a lot of the Congressional people who used to lead the debate on the Hill.

How we debate interventions threatens institutions. When you ask about the A-,B-, or C-list operations, you are confronted in the first instance with a fundamental question: shall we act or not? And this is an area that is not governed by necessity in the classical sense of necessity. It is an area of choice. It does seem to me that when you ask that question seriously, there are both empirical and normative reasons why you could make a case that you ought to pay attention to the C-list and you ought to be involved in it. But “shall we act” is a very fundamental question for a country like ours to ask today on both normative and empirical grounds.

If we should act, what are then our objectives? Here I just see one tension between conception and implementation. If we think we should act in an interventionary way, what is the object of the intervention? Are we going in to stop the killing, period, 911? Are we going in to stop the killing and build a constitutional system, or are we going in and also going to deal with economic justice?

The tension I see is if you go to the Hill and say we are going to do all three, you will never get the vote. So that there is a tension between conceptual clarity and an overall view that says go in to stop the killing. There is also an inherent tension between trying to make good policy on this and trying to sell it.

NYE: The question is, having at least alerted ourselves to this problem, whether David Abshire’s innovations will prevent us from ever getting onto the C-list. I do not think the Strategic Board will advise against it. But we are going to be on the C-list whether you like it or not.

CARTER: To make the Counselor part of the action, we ought to resolve this debate over deciding what the policy is, or how good we are at implementing it. I would say that if we had a competent instrument for dealing with the Bosnias of the world, it would not occupy as much of our leadership’s time. These two things are related.
Before Goldwater-Nickles, a President carrying out military operations such as the one in Vietnam spent enormous time brokering, in essence, several different wars conducted by several different military services. We now have regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) who are in charge of regional wars, and there is one point of contact — them. They do the planning and the coordination and marshal the capability. And for a President, if his instruments are well suited to the kinds of things he is trying to do, then his workload is less. We maybe trying to do something that the system cannot do, even though we are involved in such work day-by-day. That is why every day, e.g., the principals would sit there the whole afternoon discussing Bosnia, because there was nobody else to make decisions, there was no guide. One could say that they were in charge of the whole operation. Or one could say that they were in charge of the military side, while somebody else was in charge on the diplomatic side, and someone else on the economic side. So there is a relationship between having competent instruments and the extent to which some things become a distraction to them. I would not be as excited if the C-list were taking up a C amount of time. But the C-list is taking up an A amount of time because we do not have a mechanism for dealing with it. So there is a relationship between policy and execution. Any President can spend all of his time getting sucked in the holes because there is nobody else to work them.

ABSHIRE: But whether it is the A-, B-, or the C-list, the strategic game remains prevention, deterrence, and shaping.

Let us even take the C-list, just as well as the A-list. The tragedy with most of our wars is that they could have been prevented. My war, Korea, could have been prevented. And although President Bush brilliantly fought the Gulf War, we can do a scenario of how effective communication could have prevented it. We can take the Kosovo situation, at least some people would think that if there had been more communication and warning and other measures Milosevic could have been deterred. The strategic challenge is prevention, whether we face the A-, B-, and C-list.

FALKENRATH: Ashton Carter is right about the inadequacy of the instruments that many of you see with the C-list missions that we talked about. The heart of the problem is the fact that the costs and risks involved in any of these interventions are not commensurate with our interests.

NYE: That is a good point, because if I look at the idea of the Strategic Counselor, the last thing you want to do is to get him involved in operations, or he loses his ability to step back and think. But it is an interesting puzzle. If you think of a Strategic Counselor being put in the system as it is now, just imagine if Albright and Cohen and Berger had slightly different views last February about what you should do with Kosovo.

Assume this Strategic Counselor was out on his own, forming an alliance with one or the other. If he went to the President alone, this would greatly irritate the other two, and they would try to keep information from him and get him out. The Counselor has no operational capability. How is he going to get into the action? And once he gets down to the point where you are talking about getting close to operations, the Strategic Counselor does not have any levers. If he is a very close friend of the President, he may have some influence by whispering in the President’s ear. But if he is not, then it is not clear that he will not be isolated as an alien body. And so the question is how does he get this leverage?
The best answer to that question is your point about having a person who would work the Hill. A lot of the problems we have really are the result of increased partisanship, the divergence between the Congress and the Presidency. If you have a Strategic Counselor who is trusted on the Hill, is known to people on the Hill, has the President’s ear, and is not tied down with day-to-day operational responsibilities, then this person might actually have clout.

But if he is just another bureaucratic actor, it would be pretty easy to isolate him and make him irrelevant. On the other hand, if he was the sort of person who can say to the President, “I can be your interlocutor on the Hill in a way that two or three hours of testimony in front of a committee can never do because I am over there working with the right people all the time,” then he will have an enormous source of power. So the thing that sold me on the Strategic Counselor idea was the link to the Hill.

This however, does not solve Ashton Carter’s problem. His is a different problem, which is how do you set up something that can manage the minor details that the principals’ committee used to spend all of its time on, and get the Counselor out of its warpath and have somebody else working that, not the Strategic Counselor. He is called a Counselor so that he may be doing something else they need besides handling the problem that Ashton identified.

OAKLEY: Hopefully, the Counselor would help not only Congress, but the Administration as well as to address issues before they break and before Cohen, Berger, and Albright have to make decisions about when are we going to have to bomb. So the Counselor would not have to be so much operation-engaged. Because when an issue becomes public on the Hill, it is almost too late to deal with it in a non-partisan way.

NYE: The thing that would make the Counselor efficient on the Hill is not being just a good communicator, but also having his eyes and ears open — knowing where the key members of Congress will draw the line, what they will go with and what they will not. Because it would be very easy for his job to develop into one where he becomes the principal spokesperson for the decisions already made in the White House, and then that would, I think, backfire.

During the Cold War we faced a new situation and created new instruments: the Marshall Plan, the Board of International Broadcasting, Agency for International Development (AID). When we talk about the need for a Strategic Counselor, it seems that we have lost the art of creating new structures that were entirely out of the box when they got started.

John Deutch talked to me about his idea that we really need another Executive Department. We have already abolished AID. The argument is that in addition to the Departments of Defense and State, we need something that handles things that cross the civilian and the quasi-military, and that can give aid to develop a local police force, or can create a local election system so we can run elections abroad and have local mayors hired, and so forth. But effectively getting rid of AID — it was not a great organization, but at least it was operationally capable of doing something. Now there is nothing. AID’s budget was starved, and AID reports through the State Department, and there is an [institutional] incapacity. Deutch’s idea of establishing another agency is actually not bad, we may call it a preventive defense agency.
INK: Joe Nye raises an important issue about the consequences of having buried a declining AID in the State Department and its effects on our classification of threats. Even before this unfortunate action, it was difficult for our national security machinery to factor in the strategic value of non-military foreign assistance except when large cash payments (ESF) were used. Yet, when used intelligently, assistance has contributed a great deal to our strategic interests in developing countries. These countries, we need to remind ourselves, represent the major potential for future growth in U.S. trade, and some are seedbeds for terrorists and sources of illegal drugs entering the U.S. Yet this key instrument in helping these countries correct the underlying causes of such problems, AID, is fading into the background.

It was the credibility earned by AID in its work with the Indian population that dominates Western Guatemala that enabled Guatemala to hold its first free elections in the 1980s. Similarly, the credibility gained by AID through several low-cost projects in Chile made possible the “yes-no” vote that paved the way for Pinochet’s downfall. It is highly unlikely that AID as a part of the State Department could now develop the level of trust with middle and low income people that made these vital democratic initiatives succeed.

This weakening is illustrated by the shift of assistance coordination for nations emerging from communism from AID to State. This led to a drastic change in how AID handled assistance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet countries with unfortunate consequences. In Poland and Russia, for example, the well-intentioned, but poorly designed, move toward privatization has made our assistance unnecessarily vulnerable to waste and corruption, tarnishing the image of democratic reforms.

In sum, we have not been good at factoring into our strategic planning the contributions of most foreign assistance. This weakness is now more glaring with the decline of AID. As Dr. Abshire suggests, we need a national security structure with a broader vision that can factor in a wider range of instruments available to us for true strategic planning to be able to fully take into account the A-, B- and C-lists concurrently.

HEHIR: It does seem that the only coherent way to get on the C-list is that it has to be designated into the military force structure. We have to have part of the force structure designated for that task, because that is part of what pushes this issue up, to have it debated whether we should act militarily or not.

NYE: But in the post-Cold War world, we have the pressing question of the C-list issues, and how we cope with those and also how do we get more attention back to the A-list. There is a third list besides the A- and the C-list, and that is an “A-plus list,” homeland defense – which crosses the old boundaries. Is there a recommendation how you handle the A-plus list?

FALKENRATH: We need to focus on vulnerabilities in this period when we are so powerful in most conventional measures, and figure out sensibly how to reduce our vulnerabilities, whether they are cyber threats or catastrophic terrorism threats. One way of thinking about handling external national security problems is for the President and the people he appoints to have authority to do what they need to do in cooperation with Congress.
When we look inward and start worrying about the internal threats to security, cyber and catastrophic terrorism, most importantly, we need an entirely different frame of mind. We no longer have hierarchical systems to work with. We have a completely non-hierarchical system with separate institutions, not only sharing powers, but duplicating powers. On the governmental side, there are federal actors, state actors, local actors, all of whom have overlapping jurisdictions with no clear de-conflicting mechanisms.

Also, the private sector is involved in an enormous way, especially in the cyber area but also in the domestic with regard to terrorism. And what happens often is that people who are accustomed to thinking about national security problems come in and look for a tidy hierarchical fix. They ask: who is in charge, who reports to whom? And in fact, that method, at best, only works at that part of the federal government that responds, and it does not work for federal interaction with state and local agencies. The latter are essential because they provide a great deal of the capability needed for an effective response. So it is a problem that requires a much greater commitment to lucid, informal coordination than do foreign policy and national security problems by themselves.

CARTER: But regarding your larger point of homeland defense, of which cyber terrorism is a part, I think that is another candidate. This is where we are actually more focused in attempting to create a new department. It is the interior ministry which should cover homeland security, but only if the other institution we are talking about creating recognizes that the boundary between peace and war is not so sharp in the new world, that the boundary between foreign and domestic threats is not so clear as it used to be.

ABSHIRE: I had mentioned that the State Department, our principal instrument of prevention, is starved financially, that it that cannot get the necessary resources. And one of the things that we have thought about is the weak configuration with Congress. We will need to resell the concept of what national security is with an agile, optimally utilized State Department in the national security complex.

CARTER: Strobe Talbott recently said that the State Department is denuded of operational activity and has become a policy formulation and policy coordination organization, and that all of the capability and all the money resides in other departments in the U.S. government or in private companies. Perhaps that explains why the Secretary of State is not given the respect it should have.

OAKLEY: In addition, our embassies overseas do not have very many economic officers or political officers aboard, and they are the ones who bring you not so much policy formulation, but an understanding of what our policies might be and how our policies can be matched to the realities of the country in question and our capabilities of pulling together the Department of Commerce, the Special Trade Representative, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, and all the others, and make some sense out of all the different stovepipes and all these different organizations.

ABSHIRE: Are there any questions?
QUESTION: At one time there was talk about changing the Atlantic Command (ACOM) to homeland defense. It obviously did not go in that direction, and it is now the Joint Forces Command. Should there be a homeland defense function inside the Defense Department?

CARTER: I believe so. I believe the Joint Forces Command [under the CINCs], for the time being, is that command. But the Joint Forces Command has another mission – a much more important mission – which is to be the leading edge of the next wave of Goldwater-Nickles. The last wave of Goldwater-Nickles said we should fight jointly, but they did not say we must buy jointly. Again it is a pick-up game, because we may think that [regional] CINCs are great, and they are, but CINCs are also a pick-up game. They take what is provided by the services and put together a unified plan, but they have not yet put together a unified plan for what the services ought to buy. And moving that kind of thinking forward is something that I think most people in the defense community want to see happen, and the existing constellation of CINCs are too busy with current operations, and should not be distracted by involvement in the acquisitions system. By the way, the services are a great institution, but we needed some flavor of CINC thinking, of joint command thinking in the acquisition system. And that is what the Joint Forces Command is going to do.

ABSHIRE: This reform process at the Pentagon and the relations between the Executive and Legislative branches is what the Center for the Study of the Presidency is looking at, whether it is the base-closing commission getting started up again under a new Administration or other reform activities. We are looking closely at commissions that have worked and have not worked. The Rumsfeld Commission worked, and we are looking at these reform devices because we must develop a better defense investment strategy given the new and more complex environment that we face.

QUESTION: What is the new role of NATO in connection with the potential changes in our defense structures?

HUNTER: The “New” NATO is an example of how to do things right, in terms of building – in this case, rebuilding – an institution for the future, in part to reduce the chances that something will go wrong and that military intervention will become necessary. What has been done at NATO also means that, if intervention is required, there is a greater chance of success.

Most commentary in recent years has focused on NATO enlargement – the taking in of new members and keeping the “door open” for others. But what NATO has done has actually been a package, attempting to provide a sense of added security for all European countries that are prepared to take part. Thus NATO created its Partnership for Peace, which now includes all the countries that emerged from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. All get to take part in key NATO activities and, if diligent, to experience transformation of their militaries to a democratic model that, among other things, can help reduce sources of conflict. NATO has also reached out to Russia – including the Founding Act and getting Russian troops involved in the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping operations on the same footing as NATO countries.

At the same time NATO has created better instruments for intervention if intervention becomes necessary, that can also have a deterrent effect. The new Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters, which can be used either by NATO or by the new European Security and
Defense Identity, borrows concepts developed and tested by the U.S. military. The CJTF headquarters will make NATO more efficient and effective, and by involving a wide range of allies, also help both to build coalition support and contribute to burden sharing within NATO. Meanwhile, the alliance has embarked on a new Defense Capabilities Initiative. This is designed to help European allies make the changes to their militaries that are necessary to keep pace, at least to a degree, with the radical transformation of U.S. military forces, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. The term of art within NATO is preserving “interoperability.” Politically, the success of Director of Central Intelligence can also send the right message to Congress that the Europeans can and will work together with the Americans, militarily, if and when the alliance has to use force. Most important, both in Bosnia, with the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and in Kosovo, with the International Peace Implementation Force (KFOR), NATO is gaining invaluable experience in the techniques, the politics, and the culture of peacekeeping, which can have a critical impact elsewhere.

Of course, none of these developments enabled NATO to avoid the conflict in Kosovo, although they helped to produce success, both in the use of force and in keeping the allies together. All recognized that NATO has critical importance for the future of European security and that pulling together over Bosnia and Kosovo was a major test. What led to Kosovo was not NATO’s failure but inadequate diplomacy. Add to this that one of the key challenges for NATO in the future is to relate its intervention role to broader diplomacy, in which, as a political-military coalition, it has no direct part.
SCHLESINGER: Our discussion today is about national security policy. National security policy antedates or should antedate questions about what weapons systems or force structure there should be. So the first thing we do as good analysts is to make an assessment of the situation. And the assessment is that, here in the post-Cold War world, the United States remains a colossus that bestrides the world. We pride ourselves on being the sole remaining superpower. The Secretary of State has said the United States is the indispensable nation. Indeed, we are the economic center, as well as the most powerful military nation. And this has led to something that we call hubris. A problem for the United States foreign policy is summarized by Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

Devising U.S. Foreign Policy as a Function of U.S. Grand Strategy

At the moment, because of our dominant position in the world, we tend to prescribe actions for other nations. And because they remain silent, we take that for agreement. Our foreign policy today, regrettably, is largely determined by domestic politics and by television. That is a formula for not formulating goals of foreign policy and developing strategies to achieve those goals. It is a formula for reacting to external events. Indeed, it is almost definitional that we react to external events if we depend on CNN to tell us what our policies should be.

The purposes of our foreign policy should be foreign policy, not domestic politics, and to achieve goals in the national interest. So for the next President of the United States, we would advise him to start with formulating a conception of the United States’ role in the world. At the moment, the United States tends willy-nilly to react to external and internal stimuli. With respect to the armed forces, at the same time that we are expanding our commitments, we have been shrinking our forces. Given the actions of the military establishment, those forces tend to be overstretched.

There is a great deal of talk these days about devising a national strategy. Devising a national strategy was easy in the Cold War. Whatever the Soviet Union was doing, we had to watch carefully and, for the most part, to oppose what it was doing. It was a very simple thing to devise that strategy. Some presume that it would be easy to devise a national strategy today. It is not easy. The world has become much more complicated. It is not the simplified lines of power and lines of conflict of the Cold War days. And even more difficult, each day, the foreign policy scene tends to change.

This country, the United States, was ideal for dealing with the Cold War threat. The public could focus on what was apparently a permanent military threat to the United States and to the free world. By contrast, today, you have a changing — a kaleidoscopic change in the external
environment. You no longer have clear-cut good guys and bad guys. They change their hats. Some days, they wear black hats; some days, they wear white hats. If you look at Yassir Arafat, for example, he has gone through three or four different phases, just in the last few years. So it becomes more difficult for us to formulate a strategy.

During the early parts of the Clinton Administration, there were calls on the Department of State to form an overarching strategy for the United States. Warren Christopher, then Secretary of State and a good lawyer, said we are not going to have an overarching strategy. We are going to deal with things on a case-by-case basis, a good lawyerly remark, for which he was much derided. But a grand strategy a la the Cold War is just not available to the United States and will not be available to the next President. We are forced, in part, to react to external events. Those reactions should be based not upon television, television pictures, or domestic politics. They should be based upon the national interest.

**Not Grand Designs But Coherent Policies**

Even though we must react, however, we need to have a conceptual framework for what we are doing. It is possible, even though we cannot formulate a grand strategy, to have a less incoherent set of policies than we have at the present time. We can stop giving unsolicited advice to all other nations. Our view at the present time is that they should be grateful to us for pointing out their defects, or at least the defects as we see them. For some reason or other, they are not generally grateful to us for those observations. Indeed, we have a checklist and we kind of go down whether or not this country is performing correctly on democracy, human rights, and so forth, and we chide them for their failures. Over time, that will reduce the influence of the United States.

The first thing for the President-Elect is to have a sense of proportion about the limitations that being a nation of only three or four percent of the world’s population imposes upon us. We need less high-faluting pronouncements and a greater tendency to protect U.S. interests in the short and in the long run. That is a task enough. We do not need to be the international sheriff or an international 911. If we are prepared to be that, we need to have a larger military establishment than at the present time, which brings me to the armed forces.

Armed forces are derivative from a nation’s foreign policy. They should be shaped by our objectives. As I mentioned earlier, in the last decade, we have been increasing our commitments at the same time we have been shrinking our forces. Sooner or later that constitutes a problem. At the moment, we have so many commitments that our armed forces are overstressed, and that is causing problems for recruitment and retention.

**Our Military Forces Need Greater Funding**

At the moment, because of our various commitments, we tend to finance everything else at the expense of what we call modernization, which simply means the recapitalization of our armed forces. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) points out that each year the equipment of the armed forces depreciates on a straight-line basis by over $100 billion a year. This year, we are finally getting up to around $50 billion in expenditures. At a recent hearing by the National Security Committee, there was debate over that issue. Some said that the CSIS study was exaggerated, that it was only $50 billion rather than the $100 billion
specified by CSIS. I point out that there is agreement that we are not modernizing the force, that we are not recapitalizing the force, that the force is shrinking at the same time that our commitments are expanding.

Congress tends to go along with the choices of the President. However, the President’s choices with regard to foreign policy are not necessarily followed by the Congress. They may overrule him, as was the case with Jimmy Carter who desired to remove our ground forces from Korea. When he made that announcement, immediately moves started on the Hill that required him to retain our forces in Korea. And when he normalized relations with China, we got the Taiwan Relations Act, which partially overruled what he had decided.

Congress continues to dispose of the President’s wishes, and over the course of the last decades, there has been an increasing restlessness on the part of the Congress and a lesser willingness to follow the lead of the President. I think that is partly the climate of the times. It is partly the personalities involved.

HAMRE: It was very easy to understand our foreign policy and our security policy during the Cold War. It was keeping a place in the world that would be free. I never personally thought I would live long enough to see that period end. I am so thankful that we have. And we are now ten years into a transition to a new era. We do not know really what that new era is going to look like, but it will not have the clarity of the Cold War.

The powerful clarity of the Cold War motivated the American public to understand very clearly what security policy was all about. And today, it is a very different problem. It is no longer, as Jim Woolsey said in testimony about five years ago, it is no longer the bear in the woods. It is now the snakes and the alligators in the swamps that we are having to worry about. And it is a much harder problem. Now, what does this mean for the Department of Defense?

**A Need for a National Debate on Security and Foreign Policies**

First, I think, unfortunately, we have not had, at least in ten years, a national debate on security policy nor perhaps on foreign policy. We will now be going into the third Presidential election without really having a debate on security policy. What is our national interest? What should we be doing? How should we focus our forces and to what end? And are we properly structured to do it?

In the absence of that sort of a debate, a debate we desperately need, the Defense Department has had to find its own path for restructuring itself in the post-Cold War period. And it has been dominated by two things. It has been dominated by a gradual erosion of the resources available to the Department. Modest changes. Each year, the Congress will add a billion here or a billion there. But in general terms, there has been a significant reduction in the resources available to the department. And the Department’s response has been to adopt an inherently conservative approach. And by this I do not mean conservative in its popular sense of conservative-liberal. But I mean trying to conserve the things we know are valuable and we may, indeed, need, if we have to go to war again.
That has opened us up to criticism, that we have not recognized the end of the Cold War and that we have tended to hold on to the things that we built during the Cold War. This is true because we have not had a clear idea about what we cannot do in the future or what we will not have to do in the future. Do we know right now we will never fight on the Korean Peninsula? No. Do we know for sure we will never go to combat again in the Persian Gulf? No. Do we know for sure that we will never have to prepare for and deter nuclear war? No. So we have adopted an inherently conservative approach, conserving as much as possible of what we have built up that we knew was valuable.

Now, I would argue that has not kept us from trying to adopt things that we know we are going to need for this new order that is still emerging. And there are several dominant features to that.

**Steps Taken to Meet New Challenges**

First, I think the department has made a significant change in the way it has chosen in peacetime to reach out with an engagement strategy for its forces to the militaries of other countries. We are very actively involved with the forces around the world, with some controversy, I might add. We were heavily criticized for being involved with the Indonesian military, and yet, at the time when the civil war was erupting, we were then asked, please, cannot you get over and stop the shooting. It seems to me that if we want to have the opportunities to influence events at the time there are crises, there has to be an ongoing mode of engagement in peace time. And we have tried very hard during the last ten years to do that.

Second, I think that we have tried in significant ways to address what we perceive to be some of the significant threats that are emerging in this new era: cyber terrorism and cyber threats. We have been doing a great deal to organize the department, first to protect ourselves, and then to try to share the technology of protection with the rest of American society because it's a significant problem and much more complicated than the traditional military threats we face.

We have been working very hard on the issue of bio or chemical terrorism in the United States and how to respond to that and have been resourcing it at about a billion dollars a year, the preparation for homeland defense. And in a more traditional sense, the Department has made great strides in what we call network warfare where we are integrating the firepower of disparate units and able to bring them to bear in a concentrated and focused way. We are already the best military in the world, and we will be dramatically better over the next five to eight years. Nonetheless, we do face some significant impediments.

**Issues Yet to Be Addressed**

I think the first impediment that we face is a public perception, held too much, I fear, by our politicians, and I do not mean that negatively, that the American public does not care about defense issues, and so they do not talk about them. As I said, we have not had a debate in this country in at least ten years on defense policy.

I think a second problem is, in the absence of that clear and compelling image of the threat that we had during the Cold War, what little debate we have had has tended to be consumed by
intense parochialism, saving a base in this state or saving a weapons system manufactured in that factory. But it has not been focused on the larger intents and purposes that should motivate the structure of the defense establishment and its policies.

Third, I think we have faced an impediment that is internal to the department, which is the impediment from having won the Cold War. It is very hard for an organization that found itself to be so successful to now think that it has to change. And it is been very hard for the organization to think that it needs to change in an environment where it clearly felt it won and it can keep doing the same thing all over.

And finally, I think the most significant impediment is we are still in this transition period. It is still not clear what the next epoch of American security policy will be like. And therefore, we are hoping to hold on to many different features of today until the new era does emerge.

I believe it is absolutely crucial that there be some form of national debate on security policy, and the only time we really will get it is when we get a new President, regardless of which party it is. It is the one time when the one individual in the country that can speak to the public in a compelling way has to speak in a compelling way. And as I said, we have now gone for three elections without having that been the case. We cannot really afford to have it happen this time around.

So it is my plea through this organization that you be effective with the two candidates as they now refine and focus their thinking, that they make it an imperative in those first hundred days for the next Presidency to have the national debate on national defense that we must have.

**QUESTION:** The nature of conflict has fundamentally changed in the post-Cold War era to become largely internal and ethnic. What are the most effective strategies for dealing with the new threats to international security?

**HAMRE:** One of the real problems that we face in this new security epoch is that there are so many different rivalries and tensions and conflicts that seem to be emerging, many of them along ethnic or cultural lines. And the very hard thing is that they are not amenable to the form of deterrence that worked to constrain violence during the Cold War. The traditional modes of statecraft that may have worked to contain a Kosovo in the mid-1970s and 1980s did not work in the 1990s.

So the dilemma that is presented to America in larger international sense of its security responsibilities is how do we create effective modes to deter unacceptable international behavior in a period when people are not deterred by the traditional structures of state power? That is very difficult. It clearly was unevenly applied in the Balkans this last time. We found no effective way to deal with it in Chechnya, partly because we could not find countries within 300 miles that would take 800 airplanes and base them. It was not possible.

But you would find this almost all over. And one of the real dilemmas, I think, is to find ways, again, to bring effective mediation that is backed up by deterrent force. And part of the problem we have is that the international structures right now are remarkably weak. The UN was
badly damaged by the events in Somalia in the mid-1990s and really has not recovered very effectively. And so, it is not just a resentment of the United States, but the very nature of the UN where you still have veto rights of the Security Council members, that impedes real effective operation in many ways for these sorts of activities. But even then, I am not sure that the UN is going to be more effective than a coalition of willing states in deterring unacceptable behavior in the international order.

**Policy Consistency Must Be Maintained**

**SCHLESINGER:** It is no accident, as they used to say in Moscow, that when representatives of beleaguered communities in various states speak, they speak in English because that is the way to communicate with the American public, the American Congress, and thus, presumably, to affect our foreign policies. But if the United States is going to intervene seriously on behalf of ethnic minorities, first of all, it has to make that policy clear, and not changeable, which it has failed to do up to this point. And it needs to have a much larger ready military force to respond to all of these emergencies. There will be many of them.

But our policies have not been entirely consistent. In the case of Nigeria, when the Ibos set up Iboland back in the 1960s during the Kennedy Administration, we said we cannot allow countries to break up, and, therefore, we joined with the British in suppressing the Ibos, who were, incidentally, supported by the French. That, by the way, is a permanent part of American foreign policy: opposing the French, and only in response to their policies.

In the case of Turkey, a NATO ally, we have supported the Turkish government in effectively suppressing the Kurds.

In the case of the invasion of Azerbaijan by Armenia, reflecting domestic pressures, even though there are a million Azeri refugees that have been driven from their homes by the Armenians, we prohibit all assistance to Azerbaijan other than humanitarian assistance, and we give the Armenians the highest per capita economic assistance that we give to anybody in the world. Not exactly a consistent policy. It is part of this reason that we need to establish a framework, a conceptual framework, for American foreign policy.

We must bear in mind this fact that minorities are just that — minorities. And if we get into conflict with the Russians because of their treatment of the Chechens, or if we get into conflict with the Chinese because of their treatment of the Tibetans, there are 160 million Russians, and a handful, relatively speaking, of Chechens. But there are 1.4 billion Chinese and 3-4 million Tibetans. If we side with every minority group, we are going to be building up the majorities to further resent the United States.

So it is very hard for us, at the same time to protect our long-run position and go off as a kind of international Don Quixote to solve the problems that have been ongoing for decades, if not centuries.

**QUESTION:** How instrumental is NATO or the UN for the U.S. to mobilize troops or military force without the appearance of acting in self-interest only?
HAMRE: Let us use Kosovo as an example to talk about it because it is a very complicated question, and it needs to get grounded in some real events to focus the answer.

Europe and NATO were confronted by a very awkward situation with Kosovo. We felt we needed to do something, and especially our allies were deeply troubled by not being able to go to the UN to seek a legitimizing mandate for the use of force in Kosovo. In one sense, it represents an incredible triumph by the UN as an international institution that the world’s democracies seem compelled to seek a legitimizing mandate for the use of force.

NATO felt awkward doing this on its own because the alliance has historically been oriented toward protecting attacks from the outside against its member states. When the strategic concept was approved at the 50th anniversary – and it had been about 18 months working up to it – there had been a fair amount of debate about the ability to go outside of the NATO confines for an operation so long as it met the primary test of the alliance, which is it had to be unanimous and there had to be a consensus to do it. And ultimately, the allies felt that was the appropriate legitimizing action to take to justify going into a conflict. But they felt quite ill at ease about it.

The dilemma, of course, is that getting a mandate from the UN was subject to the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council. And if the structure of the Security Council would impede, providing such a mandate, NATO had to find another course. And it is going to be like that for some time, I feel. It will be part of the inherent dilemma. The way we have worked around it is to come up with rather general blanket-authorizing resolutions and then to seek a coalition of the willing to enforce it through the use of force. That has been primarily the pattern of the last ten years. That was not the pattern for Kosovo. And it is an awkward thing that the alliance has to go through or that some countries have to go through.

SCHLESINGER: Your question wound up with the phrase “without the appearance of acting in self-interest.” Nations act in their national interest, which some would believe is self-interest. We are interested in our long-term national interests, and it is essential for us to perform in that way. The problem we have at the moment is that other nations, while they expect us to act in our national interest, are not expecting us to erratically change our minds every few days about what the national interest may be.

Building a New Consensus with Congress

QUESTION: Mr. Schlesinger, you have spoken of a need for conceptual framework. This could be developed in a way to bring a consensus, an executive-legislative consensus along with it. How would it be possible for the President-elect, if he is smart and wise, to get a structure that would draw some of the good members of Congress on the Intelligence and the Armed Services Committees into something above the Pentagon level – the national security level – so that this debate is constructed in a rational way and we are able to develop a new consensus?

SCHLESINGER: We have a difficulty in establishing a consensus because there is not that permanent enemy out there. So we will have to accept the fact that we are not going to have the same kind of national consensus that we had during the Cold War.
The way a President achieves this outcome is to establish credibility by successful performance. Only in that way does he bring the Congress along ultimately. One can put out tentative ideas with regard to how we should conduct ourselves over time. There will always be members of Congress, some elements of the population, that will object. If you have an enormous success, as President Reagan had in Grenada, you will find that the criticism dries up. If you do not have an enormous success, as President Reagan incidentally did not in Lebanon, you will discover that you will either have to withdraw precipitously or there will be great criticism.

So establishing a consensus means that we will have to deal with what is an increasingly fragmented society, and that makes it immensely hard. I see no easy solution.

HAMRE: Let us go back and recall what happened in the 1992 election. President Bush was being criticized for being a foreign policy President, spending all his time traveling outside of the United States and not tending to the economy. And so at the time that the Berlin Wall came down and the world was opening up, for political reasons they felt impeded from carrying on a debate about a national security strategy. Candidate Clinton was seized by that famous slogan, “It is the economy, stupid!” And so both political parties decided in the 1992 election that it was fruitless and counterproductive to try to have a debate on foreign policy and security policy.

In the context and in the frustration of that, several members of Congress – Sam Nunn, John Warner – started a process whereby we produce a national security strategy every year. And we have done that every year for about the last six or seven years. It is an effort to do exactly what you’re describing, and virtually nobody pays any attention to it.

I am not sure that creating yet a new process would be as important as it would be to get a pledge from both Presidential candidates that they will personally give a speech to the nation about the national security strategy that they intend to develop sometime in the first three months of their Presidency. I think something like that is more likely to grow on top of an existing structure that is already in process.
Neither the Cold War nor the Gulf War provides us with the cookie-cutter way of pursuing American interests. While our strategic objectives remain constant, the tactics of our diplomacy must be different in different situations. This is one of the least understood post-Cold War truths, particularly among those inclined to call our foreign policy incoherent or inconsistent. The aftermath of the Gulf War corresponded with a parallel hope that democracy and free markets would spring up easily all around the world. Part of that hope has proven true, even miraculously so when one considers Central and Eastern Europe, South Korea, Taiwan, and most of South America. In Africa alone, the number of democracies has grown exponentially in most recent years, with Nigeria the most recent addition. This is good news even if reform has not proven easy, quick, or permanent in other areas.

Another hope was that the UN would be more effective. International organizations can only be effective when the member states agree with each other and want the organization to function. When Russia and China disagree with us, the UN is stuck. Russia has seen some traditional interests, such as Serbia, loom large on the domestic scene and become the cause for decisions against moving in the Security Council, especially without Serbian acquiescence. China has a doctrinal view against UN intervention no matter how serious the need, unless there is whole state approval in advance.

Three Factors for U.S. Security: Strength, Preparedness, and Alliances

A review of recent history reveals lessons that are profound, and that get to the heart of how the U.S. can best pursue its interests in the world. Strength plus preparedness plus friendship equals American prosperity and security. None of these is created in a second, and each requires the disciplined work of soldiers, diplomats, and statesmen supported by a bi-partisan American consensus, and adequate resources.

The strength of the U.S. is a composite of economic, political, and military force. These are the three forces with which we defended our interests and influenced world events. They were essential in the Gulf and in Kosovo. We have built our strength over decades. It is a legacy each generation of American pioneers, entrepreneurs, and statesmen passed to the next. But the national strength is only useful if we are prepared. U.S. force cannot be pulled from thin air. You cannot snap your fingers and pull together an international coalition any more than you can wage war without years of training.

But perhaps most difficult is the diplomatic job of heading off the conflicts that could become worse if not carefully dealt with beforehand. In the Gulf, Kosovo, and East Timor, we were effective because we drew on the experience of long years of diplomacy. Preparedness, both diplomatic and military, comes from years of engagement and from adequate resources.
The Critical Importance of the U.S. Not Squandering Its Preventive Diplomacy Capability

Today, the U.S. risks squandering its predominant position in the world and the incumbent ability to shape events, markets, and politics because it is not adequately funding its diplomacy and the defense necessary to back it up and ensure its success. This is a national shame, and a victory of shortsighted isolationism. We won in the Gulf and in Kosovo because we were prepared. We must prepare ourselves for the challenges of the next century, which will clearly be even more international than these hundred past years have been.

Reducing our spending on foreign policy needs by 40 percent since 1985 is not the answer, neither are 15 to 20 percent cuts in the same area in our current budget. If we do not restore our diplomatic strength, we will gut our capacity to make the world conducive to business and safe for Americans. We will strangle our ability to shape events to the point where we may not be able to build the next Gulf coalition through diplomacy when our country needs it the most. We will squander the heritage that so many of our parents fought and died for in two world wars, and we will put more young American soldiers at risk because we failed to pay for the ounce of prevention. The next President deserves to have in hand a vibrant diplomacy fighting for the American people.

The Critical Importance of Alliances to U.S. Security and Prosperity

Finally, let us consider alliances, cooperation, and friendship. By this I mean the importance of developing excellent relations with other countries, both to advance our interests day-to-day, and to form a base on which we can rely in crisis situations. In my opinion, alliances are a critical determinant of our future.

From the Gulf War to Kosovo, the value of NATO became extraordinarily clear. We trained together and planned together. Nowhere else in the world have 60,000 troops been brought together for as important a task as was the case in Kosovo, ready to work, operate, and fight as one force. No single country outside of our own can manage that feat, and it can be done better and at less cost to all of us through NATO.

But the international coalition against Iraq and in East Timor was composed of more than the NATO allies. In the Gulf War the alliance included countries from every continent. International cooperation galvanizes support for our positions and means we can carry our objectives more successfully and at significantly less cost to us in blood and treasure.

Strength and preparedness in international cooperation are lessons from the Gulf and Kosovo that we must carry forward as we face new challenges and opportunities. These are traditional lessons and not particularly mind-bending, except when you consider how easily and how often they tend to get forgotten. The conflicts in the Gulf, Kosovo, and East Timor are not the sum total of our foreign policy. International engagement does not always equal military intervention. The U.S. is engaged around the world for the very simple reason that our political, economic, and security interests span the whole globe. The real debate, therefore, should not be over military intervention alone, but how the U.S. can advance its interests around the world.

Today’s leaders must choose whether to lead or whether to pretend that the U.S.’s prosperity does not depend increasingly on international engagement. This means pretending that
30 percent of America’s jobs are not dependent on foreign investment and trade; pretending that the safety of our citizens is not at risk from terrorism and pariah states seeking weapons of mass destruction; and pretending that we can find refuge here at home and that the rest of the globe does not count nor have any effect in the United States. We can lead or be led by others. America clearly must lead, we ought to lead, we are here to lead. We have the capability, the resources, and the national interests at stake to demand that we do so. Let us all join together and forge a bi-partisan consensus for American leadership.
FUTURE THREATS

Policy Recommendations Compiled From *Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them*

Anthony Lake

*In his landmark book Six Nightmares, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake examines six major threats to America’s security that could arise from global terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other serious risks, as well as how the U.S. government is prepared to face these risks and the alarming ways in which it is not. What follows is a summary of select policy recommendations that Mr. Lake offered for confronting the six nightmares.*

**Selected Policy Recommendations Regarding Future Threats**

1. **Pursue deterrence as a valuable and selectively effective tool in preventing terrorism.** e.g., Clinton strike on Iraq in Spring 1993 after a plot to assassinate/harm Americans was uncovered, and in which preemptive strikes are not ruled out. Do not allow ourselves to be terrified by terrorism.

2. **"Loose Geeks" (weapons scientists/specialists) and "Loose Spooks" (spies) need further support for a “proliferation alternative” in the post-Cold War era:** Investment such as the Congressionally mandated Nunn-Lugar program, combined with private sector infusion, would redirect this otherwise dangerous set of skills from emigrating and perhaps (likely) ending up under the hire of hostile powers.

3. **We need to emphasize critical infrastructure support/security measures as evinced by our poor performance with “Eligible Receiver.”** Much of our government's computer systems can be violated with minimal defense and capability for locating/apprehending perpetrators. The private sector is at equal if not further risk of attack. Cyber crime is already a large and growing problem.

Counter-terrorism preparation must occur on three levels: government, society, international.

4. **Establish a National Director for Combating Proliferation and broaden the position to make him/her Assistant to the President (“in the White House”).** The National Director is responsible for coordinating the command structure of agency involvement to fight against international crime, terrorism and WMD, by coordinating policy and budget decisions, resolving operational disputes among agencies, and supervising activities on the ground in case of terrorist incidents.

5. **Need to provide greater funding to law enforcement for cyber- and other terrorism, while enhancing the coordination between the federal government and the private sector and between our and other governments.**
New Military Must Exploit RMA

6. RMA must and will make integration of forces commonplace.

7. Battlefield Command must adapt to technological change. New challenges to nature of military command are implicit.
   a. Top to bottom: with advanced and expanded information, hierarchical discipline must be preserved, e.g., command structures are at risk of failing if new technology allows Pentagon and even White House policy-makers/advisors to look over the shoulders of battlefield commanders in real time. Combined with new technological potential for instant Congressional review of battlefield decisions, this could lead to dangerous risk aversion.
   b. Bottom to top: soldiers more aware of risk due to more detailed intelligence about environment, may question orders before acting.

8. Must couple RMA development with traditional warfighting hardware/technique.

9. Must address question of whether/how to share RMA technologies with Allies, others.

10. Capabilities to conduct "ambiguous warfare" must be honed with:
    a. more Delta Force deployments.
    b. the development of advanced weaponry (missiles/bombs) that leave no trace.
    c. greater focus of the national debate on development and management/control of information warfare/operations as a possible alternative to military response in cases of asymmetrical/ambiguous attacks on U.S.
    d. options for effective "warning shots" that could be managed by the Assistant to the President cited above, with proper Presidential and Congressional controls.

Peacekeeping Missions

11. Peacekeeping needs clearly defined political objectives within reach, not necessarily an expiration date. "The proper ‘exit strategy’ is one that is based on a definition of ‘success’.”

12. As a last alternative, we should consider a policy of creating a “peaceful separation” if a calming "breathing space" does not lend to a healing process in fractured states.

13. To relieve our troops of a policing burden, an on-call UN constabulary should be formed to undertake initial police functions and local police training.
STRATEGIC PAPERS
Miscalculation: “To calculate, compute, or reckon wrongly.” (Oxford English Dictionary)

Every President and every Presidential Administration in the last five decades has made miscalculations that have caused international crises, contributed to their aggravation, and, to be fair, in rare instances probably helped to resolve them. In some instances their miscalculations have led to still larger miscalculations by other governments, thus exacerbating the crises.

Among the types of miscalculations are the following:

1. Strategic: misreading of the international context; failures to anticipate some major structural change in the international environment.
2. Political: failure to calculate the international, the domestic, the bureaucratic, the organizational situations correctly, or even the rivalries among one’s senior aides.
3. Operational: failures to assess the details of implementation or to correct flaws when they emerge.
4. Ideological: failures in which preconceptions of reality lead to terror.
5. Transitional: failures that come when a new government finds itself trapped by the plans or actions of its predecessor, or when the new bureaucracy and its leaders exploit the ignorance of a new Administration for their own ends.

Such miscalculations stem from many factors. Among them are the following:

1. The sheer hubris of the President and/or his senior advisors.
2. A failure to remember that national security policy entails dealing with foreign governments whose interests may radically differ from ours; foreign leaders may speak English, but their agenda may not coincide with America’s.
3. The intractability of the U.S. or the foreign government’s national security bureaucracy.
4. The limits and restricted options imposed by alliance arrangements.
5. The tendency for a government to adopt an option for a current crisis that was considered for the last crisis in the belief that the current and former crises are similar.
6. Failure to see an issue from the perspective of the other government or other governments.
7. A lack of historical knowledge about a region, a country, or leadership of other governments.
8. Conversely, an abundance of knowledge about a region that may lead the policymaker to become a self-described expert in a particular crisis.
9. Failure to remember that Clausewitz’s dictum about friction in war holds true for almost any given effort to implement a complicated foreign policy or national security decision.
10. A failure to ask the policy advisors: what if it does not work? what are the details of
implementation?
11. A miscalculation of how American public opinion will react to a chosen policy option, expressed through the media or by Congress as a barometer of public opinion.
12. A closely related miscalculation: a sheer misreading of American domestic politics and what the political advantages or disadvantages are for any given option.

Examples of Miscalculation with Brief Analyses:

**Korea (1950)**

The late June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops caught American policymakers completely by surprise. President Truman and, more particularly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson significantly miscalculated how the North Koreans, the Russians, and the Chinese would assess a February speech by Acheson. In that speech the Secretary had signaled that the United States did not consider Korea within its essential sphere of interest. The statement reflected the intense budget pressures by the Administration and Congress about new military expenditures, especially given the newly signed NATO treaty. At this point no one wanted a surge in military spending, and there was *de facto* increasingly implicit reliance on nuclear weapons. Even the vaunted study NSC-68, which called for a massive increase in funding, did not necessarily mean there would be huge amounts of new money. Acheson’s statement, following the Chinese Communist victory in late 1949, appeared to the Sino-Soviet group as a clear signal that they could move. They did so, with nearly complete success. Only the heroic actions of American troops in the Pusan perimeter saved the situation. Later the Inchon invasion landings would restore the military balance and allow UN forces to surge north of the 38th parallel to commit still more miscalculations, this time by General Douglas MacArthur.

What led to these miscalculations by Truman and Acheson?

1. Their intense preoccupation with focusing American energies on the newly created NATO alliance.
2. Their alarm that the Soviet Union now had a nuclear capability.
3. Their preoccupation with the decision on whether or not to proceed with the hydrogen bomb.
4. The continuing impact of the very conservative fiscal policies of Truman, which meant a very small military and an increasing reliance upon nuclear weapons as a way to offset the smaller standing forces of all services.
5. Their failure to await the then in-progress assessment of American security policy that led eventually to NSC-68 before Acheson made his speech.
6. Their preoccupation with the first of the most serious attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy on the State Department.
7. Their belief that the Koreans and the Chinese were not entirely ready to do more than consolidate their recent gains and thus would not precipitate any military move.
The Suez Canal (1956)

In 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser, head of the Egyptian government, seized control of the Suez Canal following the decision by London and Washington to refuse to fund the construction of a high dam at Aswan on the Nile. This decision, coupled with an earlier move by the Soviet Union to sell weapons to Egypt through Czechoslovakia, sharply escalated the Cold War. The miscalculations were of a double nature. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles misread the serious intentions of the British and the French to reassert their imperial position in the Middle East. The British and the French equally misread the degree to which the American President did not agree with their intentions, at least not during the course of his campaign for re-election.

The results of these miscalculations sorely tested Anglo-American relations. In the early fall, and on the eve of the American elections, the British, French, and Israelis, under a light deceptive cover, launched an attack to seize the Canal. The UN, with the US providing leadership, moved to undo this imperial move. And from Moscow the Russians, though in the midst of the Hungarian crisis, threatened Europe with a nuclear missile attack. The close American allies were forced to withdraw; the canal remained under Egyptian control. Prime Minister Anthony Eden fell from power within months. Anglo-American relations were at a post-1945 nadir.

What were the miscalculations of Eisenhower and Dulles?

1. That their friendship with Eden, forged during the Second World War, would ensure that Eden would do nothing to harm the President’s re-election efforts.
2. Their collective failure to realize that imperial control as symbolized by the Suez Canal remained an important factor in Anglo-French politics.
3. Their failure to establish close working relations with the Israeli government, which in turn allowed Tel Aviv to flirt with the British and French.
4. Their failure to anticipate that Moscow would begin to intervene actively in the Middle East and that this would force the U.S. to side with the UN and the Egyptians as a part of the larger Cold War strategy.
5. Their failure to address systematically the intelligence reports which indicated the likelihood of an Anglo-French move.

The Bay of Pigs (1961)

The collapse of the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs represents a classic set of transition miscalculations. Having campaigned against the Republicans on the Cuba issue, Kennedy found himself confronted with an invasion plan developed by the CIA under his predecessors. Failure to proceed would lead to political attacks by those who knew of the plan. And with the Administration still early in its tenure, there was a reluctance to second-guess the plans begun by a famous general/President (Eisenhower); this lack of experience and self-confidence was not repeated later in the Cuban missile crisis. Thus, in the spring of 1961, despite qualms about the plan, Kennedy agreed to move ahead with it. But then there were problems of planning, press leaks from the Cuban community, and new misgivings about the feasibility of the plan. Still the plan went ahead, Kennedy cancelled American air support, and the invasion was a fiasco. The after-action report by General Maxwell Taylor analyzed the miscalculations in detail.
They included the following:

1. Failure to force the CIA and the Pentagon to review jointly the projected invasion plans for their feasibility.
2. Failure to assess the probable Cuban reaction to an invasion; there was too much dependence on Cuban exile illusions and not enough realism.
3. A clear under-estimation of the military capability of the Cuban government.
4. A forgetfulness about the difficulties of mounting a seaborne attack on hostile shores.
5. Failure to recognize that bureaucratic interests within the CIA wanted to proceed for their own internal reasons.
6. Political miscalculations about the competence of the senior CIA officials and of Kennedy’s own staff, and whether or not some senior CIA officials were more loyal to the Agency than to the new Administration.

The Iranian Crisis (1978-1979)

For much of the last two centuries Iran (previously Persia) has been a focal point for international rivalries: first the British and the Russians over the approaches to India, later the British and the Soviets over the same issue, and then, during the Cold War, the West versus the Soviet Union. Major crises in 1946 and again in 1952 reflected the degree to which the United States was willing to protect its interests in Iran. In the decades after 1952 the U.S.-Iranian relationship deepened, with the Shah (a close ally) and his intelligence/police forces an integral part of the Cold War apparatus for both countries.

The nature of this relationship led to complacency and a willingness by the US to avert its gaze from the seamier side of the Iranian political situation: the corruption among the elite, the harshness of the internal regime, a widening gap between the public and the ruling elite, a military leadership with little independence, and a growing Muslim fundamentalism that seemed quaintly irrelevant. In all of this, American contacts with opposition groups were limited and reports about unrest largely discounted. The climax came quickly in 1979 with the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the subsequent departure of the Shah into exile, and the capture of the American Embassy by Iranian students. The resulting debacle undid the Carter Administration and appeared to confirm the continuing weakness of the post-Vietnam American government.

What were the miscalculations?

1. An underestimation of the power of religion to shape a popular reaction.
2. A failure to understand that modernization often creates dispossessed groups who do not benefit from it; they become the easy recruits for those opposed to modernization.
3. A failure to gauge the true measure of Iranian nationalism.
4. A failure to have sufficient contacts among opposition groups, whatever the preferences of the Shah’s regime.
5. A failure to press the intelligence establishment to have a broader, more comprehensive approach to non-democratic regimes.
6. An over-confidence in the ability of the Shah’s military leadership to remain loyal to him; their desertion ended his chances of retaining power.
8. The intrusion of personal preferences and their effect on an assessment of the situation: the Shah was known to have become the “comfortable leader,” and it apparently was very hard for him to think of anything (or anyone) else but the comforts he enjoyed.

**Iraq (1981 and 1990)**

The decisions to back Saddam Hussein throughout the decade of the 1980s represented a collective set of miscalculations that have not yet been resolved. In considering Iraq, the observer must remember that the context surrounding Iraq’s position in American foreign policy shifted constantly. Anger at the Iranians over the embassy seizure became a litmus test for American policy toward any regime that might help the U.S. avenge its honor. In addition, the U.S. always had to consider that the Soviet Union, already linked to Iraq, might use it as a base to expand its Middle East influence. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Washington could fear that Iran might seek to seize still more power. The nearest regime at hand was that of Saddam Hussein, who was, for his own reasons, prepared to strike at Iran to prevent growth in its military power and to curb the spread of Shiite religious fundamentalism into Iraq. Thus, supporting Baghdad appeared a prudent part of an American containment policy, and the U.S. backed Iraq in its bloody war with the Iran, even if it did not like Hussein’s domestic repression. Whether support for Baghdad against Iran was a wise course of action depends on what would have happened if Iraq had won the war. With success Hussein would have controlled more of the world’s oil and the Straits of Hormuz; a victorious Hussein also would have been in a position to threaten Saudi Arabia and other Anglo-American friends, such as Kuwait. As it happened, Iran proved more than a match for Iraq, and the war cost Saddam Hussein prestige and fiscal resources, while adding more instability to the region.

In this context came the Iran-Contra negotiations, as Washington sought to use alleged anti-Khomeini groups to release hostages even if it meant selling arms to Iran. This proved a huge miscalculation, but is not a part of this essay. It just suggests the confusion of the issue.

Meanwhile, the U.S. did not alter its course of support for the regime in Baghdad. No reasonable alternative for checking Iran, even if there were signs of mellowing through the Iran-Contra tangle, appeared to exist. Efforts to extend trade credits continued, as did American trade missions under senior Congressional leadership. The U.S. continued to let the anti-Iran feeling dominate its policy options toward Iraq.

As the tensions grew in the summer of 1990 between Kuwait and Iraq, Washington took few firm measures. And in steps that seem reminiscent of Acheson on South Korea in 1950, the American ambassador on July 25, 1990, said that border disputes were not of intrinsic interest to the U.S. And still more importantly, President Bush sent a letter to Hussein that did not draw any firm “line in the sand” on the Kuwait issue. In that sense, the President’s failure to make his policy clear weakened the position of the ambassador.

Finally, the tensions between Iraq and Kuwait in the summer of 1990 saw wishful thinking lead to an initial disregard of intelligence reports suggesting that Hussein meant to take some military action against Kuwait. Even until the last minute, these warnings were not given the priority they deserved. Personal relationships and assurances from Egyptian President Mubarak were given far too much emphasis, an emphasis strengthened by the caution of other Arab leaders.
in the region. There was thus a “surprise” attack that should not have been a surprise. Whether more aggressive diplomacy would have averted the crisis is not clear, but it would have found the U.S. in a more positive military posture.

In conclusion, it should also be remembered that it took the U.S. another six months to prepare the coalition for warfare, that President Bush did not have overwhelming Congressional support for ground action, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to have reservations about ground operations.

What were the miscalculations?

1. Trusting too much in the assurances of a close Arab friend and the other Arab leaders who were themselves misled.
2. Failure to send clear, unambiguous instructions to the ambassador and a failure to give Presidential direction in a dangerous situation.
3. An unwillingness to address the true nature of the Hussein regime after 1988, when it became clear that Iran was no longer a major threat to the region’s stability.
4. A consistent over-evaluation of the military capability of Iraq, which might have led to more caution at each stage of the crisis than was necessary.
5. The Soviet Union’s helpful role in the UN resolutions reflected the heyday of Soviet-American relations; there were few miscalculations here. But there is the recurrent suggestion that the Soviets had virtually gotten Hussein to agree to withdraw in early 1991, only to have Washington determined to push ahead with a war rather than have a negotiated settlement.
6. Then the greatest of the miscalculations, as seen by some: the failure to continue the war until Hussein was forced from power. While there were urgent arguments for not becoming involved in the domestic Iraqi situation, the decision not to oust Saddam and to rely instead upon sanctions and diplomatic pressure to contain him in the future was a major miscalculation. It should be remembered that no international coalition has ever held together for more than a few years, whether it fought against Napoleon or Kaiser Wilhelm II or Hitler. There is no reason to think that the situation with respect to Hussein is or was any different.

**Somalia (1992–1993)**

The ill-fated American intervention in Somalia ranks high as an example of miscalculation and of transition mistakes by both the outgoing and the incoming Presidential Administration. When assessing these events, the observer must remember the nuances that distinguish the Bush period – when only U.S. forces were dispatched – and the Clinton period, when UN forces with U.S. support were sent to Somalia.

The late 1992 American efforts to restore some semblance of political stability while providing humanitarian assistance to a country that had not been high on the American agenda struck many observers as quixotic. The American ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, was among this group, and his cables about the risks of intervention would later receive wide circulation. Why the sudden urge to intervene? Some assert it came from a desire to do good and look good; others felt that the U.S. wanted to show that it would help Muslim and African nations.
In retrospect, it looks like the Bush Administration had become overly sensitive to then Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s charge that Washington failed to pay attention to Africa. The Somalia intervention. It may also owe something to Pentagon assurances that an American force, in the wake of the success of the Gulf War, could easily restore order. Finally, some critics have suggested that the decision may simply have been an ill-conceived action by an Administration focused on its election defeat.

For its part, the Clinton Administration played badly the poor set of cards it inherited. The new Administration should have abandoned the operation. But to do so would have undermined the Clinton Administration’s public commitments to the UN, exposed Clinton to attacks from ethnic minority members of Congress, and suggested a lack of confidence in American military forces. So-called “mission creep” thus came about easily, almost imperceptibly until the chaos and deaths and public humiliation of the American troops on the ground made the evening news. Once the tragedy in Somalia was exposed, the Administration sought to limit the damage.

What were the miscalculations?

1. A failure by President Bush to define any real American security interest in the intervention, though he talked often of the humanitarian dimension of the mission and of its limited mission.
2. A failure by the Clinton Administration to realize that the UN could bring little to the table operationally, even if the U.S. provided back-up military forces.
3. An early confusion in the Clinton Administration about the military risks of a more forceful intervention in the civil strife, the so-called “mission creep” and a failure to consider the Bush-Powell plans for a withdrawal in early 1993; here is possibly another of the miscalculations made by an incoming Administration in a sense trapped or captured by the actions of its predecessor, like the Bay of Pigs in 1961.
4. A belief that the American public would actually support such an enduring operation, even if couched in humanitarian terms; this appeal worked initially for Bush but Clinton’s failure to explain the expanded mission later left him vulnerable to all kinds of Congressional and media criticism.
5. A misunderstanding of the culture, tribal aspects, and inherent instability in this area of the world, a point that Hempstone made in his cable in November 1992 and that remained relevant but was ignored by the Clinton Administration.
6. A failure to understand the depths of Republican Congressional hostility to any military action supervised by Clinton. Congressional hostility came to include the UN and now threatens to extend to the case of U.S.S. Cole and Yemen, even though it ignores the military leadership’s errors that contributed to each tragedy.

A Balkan Medley: 1914 and the 1990s

High on the agenda of the next Administration of whatever party will be the interconnected Kosovo, Bosnian, and Serbian problems. The nearly intractable issues have bedeviled European and international politics for nearly two centuries, and there is no indication that the capacity of decision-makers to miscalculate in the Balkans will go away. Miscalculations by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in July 1914 toward Serbia led to the First World War. Miscalculations by Joseph Stalin about Yugoslavia in 1948 led to the first cracks in the Soviet system. Miscalculations
by the Bush Administration in 1990-92 led directly to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the bloodletting in Bosnia. Miscalculations by the Clinton Administration then allowed the Kosovo crisis to escalate to actual aerial warfare. Each of these episodes needs some comment because of their internal logic and linkages.

**July 1914:** A Habsburg government, alarmed by the growth of Serbia after two Balkan wars, aware of the support by Belgrade for internal dissension within the Habsburg realm, and frustrated by the continual failure of Serbian authorities to honor their commitments: all of these issues shaped Vienna’s response to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Convinced, correctly, that the Serbian government had had knowledge of the plot, Vienna – with the support of Germany – planned to deliver an ultimatum to Belgrade that could not be accepted. That would be the basis for a quick military move against Serbia and an end to the Serbian-inspired attacks on the monarchy. To Vienna’s surprise, the Russians did not this time back away from the challenge and instead offered full support to Serbia; the resulting crisis led to Russia’s general mobilization and a European war. When it was over, the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties, as well of that of Germany, had vanished.

What were the miscalculations?

1. That Russia would allow Serbia to be humiliated or destroyed.
2. That Europe would understand that an old empire could not tolerate the assassination of the heir-apparent to the throne by an upstart Balkan kingdom.
3. That the earlier Habsburg military plans for action against Serbia were still valid, including their assumption that Russia would stand aside.
4. That Vienna could execute its military plans effectively and swiftly, a position almost no one really believed but which formed the basis of the military planning in Vienna.

**Yugoslavia (1990-1995):** A number of observers in 1990 believed that Yugoslavia would fall apart and that Serbia would assert its traditional aim to become the *de facto* strong regime in the area. In particular they believed that Serbia would seek to gain, as it had since 1900, direct access through Bosnia to the Adriatic. Many also believed that the excesses of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, would play havoc with a region quite close to the heart of Europe.

But, as Ambassador Warren Zimmerman later noted, the Bush Administration – with calculation – decided that Yugoslavia’s importance, and thus the Balkans, occupied second place to their diplomacy with Russia and that anyway this was Europe’s problem. From those decisions, and a clear set of signals that Washington would do nothing during an election year, the disintegration of Yugoslavia began at once. And almost immediately there were excuses for the inaction: the area was always a troubled one; the U.S. should not be involved in tribal conflicts; and there were no strategic stakes involved, despite the proximity to NATO members Greece and Turkey. Even the horrific reports of atrocities of Bosnian Serbs sponsored by Yugoslavia failed to stir the Bush and then Clinton Administrations to much more than talk. The spiral would continue until the bombing of the Sarajevo square and the deaths of three senior American officials. This led to a brief bombing campaign, an assertive Croatian offensive, and efforts to arrange a détente with the Dayton Accords in 1995.
What were the miscalculations to this point?

1. That the Balkans were strategically unimportant, a statement that in retrospect seems silly and certainly ahistorical.
2. That the European powers could forge an effective response at the same time the Germans were seeking to integrate East Germany into a new Germany.
3. That the UN would play any truly significant role, except as figleaf for American/European involvement.
4. That the Serbian leadership would honor any commitment made by them.
5. That air power might coerce the Serbian leadership and their various associated Bosnian Serb henchmen to negotiate.
6. A failure to go to the American public and talk about the importance of stability in the Balkans for overall regional stability in Europe.

Kosovo (1998-99): Once again, many of the same arguments for inaction emerged as the Kosovo crisis developed. In this instance the overwhelming population differential between Albanians and Serbs, the willingness of the Montenegrin President to play an independent role, and the increasing violence of the Serbian regime conferred at least a margin of public support in this country for action. Also, new UN leadership showed a greater willingness to provide some measure of assistance. But the resulting air campaign was strictly limited, as NATO for the first time in its history conducted a campaign. Riven by internal alliance restraints and by an American Administration unwilling to countenance the use of ground troops, General Wesley Clark depended on air power to coerce Belgrade — with only limited success. Indeed, it can be argued that the Belgrade regime did not consider negotiations seriously until there was louder and more insistent talk of ground action. And in all of this, the Russians played a completely unhelpful role, using their ability to delay the negotiations in the name of European harmony, and thus allow Belgrade maximum flexibility. The net results: open-ended occupation of Kosovo by foreign troops, a weak UN effort to construct a multi-ethnic society and government in a hostile pro-Albanian environment, rampant organized crime and ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population, and continual doubts among the powers about the wisdom of their involvement in Kosovo. In short, the ingredients for a further set of tensions, even military action, are present in Kosovo and will continue to be so.

What were the miscalculations?

1. The failure to see that Russia would use its Slavic brotherhood/motherhood mantle as a reason not to intervene.
2. That Serbia would relent in the face of air attacks and withdraw from its alleged historical and spiritual homeland.
3. That air power alone would convince Belgrade to yield.
4. That NATO would see all of its partners supportive of the action, when in fact the Greek and French governments actively worked to curtail its efforts.
5. That military operations can have collateral damage that complicates the situation, as in the bombing of the Chinese mission.
6. That the decision to exclude the possibility of ground troops effectively allowed Belgrade to manipulate and delay for as long as possible the situation in Kosovo.
Final Observations

Are there maxims that will prevent miscalculations? What guidelines might a new organizational structure for national security policy adopt that could reduce the incidence of miscalculations? There are no easy rules, nor can there be. Individuals daily make miscalculations about issues, and individuals when in positions of governmental leadership will also make miscalculations. Office does not confer infallibility. Nor can it be forgotten that some very effective leaders, for example Winston Churchill, make many miscalculations and yet contribute to the common good in the final analysis. Still, six ideas may have merit in making miscalculation less likely:

1. A systemic policy review by any incoming Administration of all of the major policy issues confronting it and especially any operational plans developed by the prior Administration but not yet acted upon.
2. The institutionalization of some individual or group that seeks to critique major policy decisions from the perspective of the governments against or toward whom the decisions are being directed.
3. An early and thorough Presidential knowledge of the operating procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and how decisions are made by the JCS, with the possibility of minority opinions being forwarded to the President directly.
4. A studied examination of the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief; there needs to be a return to the idea that the President is the Commander and that he has the right to intrude into military decisions when they are of major strategic dimensions. The Huntington position of the President leaving all of the military decisions to the military does not accord with American history (for example, Lincoln and FDR) nor with the Constitution.
5. The possible utilization of some non-governmental experts on certain issues to force a different set of views on the issues; security restrictions are a problem but not insurmountable. For example, any serious study of the formation of policy toward a post-Castro Cuba will need the input of scholars; this will not be an easy issue, since the usual interest groups have their own agenda.
6. Finally, the President needs to spend time on national security issues. The long-term American position in the world is a strategic issue that only a President can address. Hours devoted to this are far more important than many photo-ops. The American future deserves the full attention of the President, pleas of his domestic staff notwithstanding.
Introduction

In the spring of 2001, if past history is any guide, advisors to the newly elected President will begin meeting to formulate the broad outlines of American national strategy: a more-or-less coherent statement of long-term U.S. objectives and of the internal (tax, research, trade) and external (military, diplomatic, intelligence) policies necessary to attain them. High-level deliberations will probably continue through the summer and will most likely result in a formal, classified Presidential decision document whose essence will then be revealed through briefings and press leaks.

What (if anything) can be expected from such an attempt at coordinated strategic planning? How have such efforts been conducted in the past, and what have they accomplished?

It should be noted at the outset that national strategic planning is especially difficult in liberal, democratic political systems where the power of the state is limited and the process of government is open to a wide range of influences. Indeed it may be that, as Samuel Huntington has argued, in a country like the United States "a national strategy is impossible because the interests, issues, institutions, and purposes involved are simply too diverse and complex to be brought together and integrated into any sort of coherent pattern."

There is certainly a strong case to be made for this claim. It is nevertheless true that successive Administrations have tried, with varying degrees of energy and success, to define something resembling a national strategy for the United States. The importance of these efforts and the significance of the documents they produced can be exaggerated, but -- as will be illustrated -- they have nevertheless had an impact on the development of America’s foreign and defense policies, and, in many cases, on the nation’s domestic social and economic policies as well.

Attempts at comprehensive planning are probably doomed to fall short. In the American system the final product of bureaucratic and domestic political struggles over strategy is likely to be a diminished or distorted version of some more coherent ideal. But if that conception is absent at the top, it is extremely unlikely that the other layers of the system can provide it. Even if people at the pinnacle of the Executive branch try to formulate a national strategy, fragmentation may still be the result. Where they fail to do so, it will be inevitable.

Over the last half century there have been no fewer than fifteen separate attempts at broad, national (as compared to agency-specific or narrowly problem-specific) strategic planning. These are listed in chronological order.
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<thead>
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<td><strong>Past National Strategic Planning Efforts</strong></td>
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**Truman**  
November 1948  NSC 20/4 “U.S. Objectives w/ Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security”  
April 1950  NSC 68 “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”  
January 1953  NSC 141 “Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security”

**Eisenhower**  
October 1953  NSC 162/2 “Basic National Security Policy”  
February 1955 “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack” ("Killian Report")  
November 1957 “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age" ("Gaither Committee Report")

**Kennedy/Johnson**  

**Nixon-Ford**  
September 1969  NSSM 3 “Military Policy”  
January 1977  NSDM 348

**Carter**  
January 1981  PD-62, 63

**Reagan**  
May 1982  NSDD 32 “U.S. National Security Strategy”  
December 1987  Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (CILTS)

**Bush**  
[June 1990 “Base Force”]  

**Clinton**  
[September 1993 “Bottom Up Review”]  
[May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review”]  
March 2001  United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (Final report)

These studies can be further divided, roughly, into efforts that take place at the beginning, middle, and end of an Administration.
Table II

Planning Efforts by Type

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<td>NSC 68</td>
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<td>Kennedy BNSP</td>
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<td>NSSM 3</td>
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<td>NSDD 32</td>
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<td>[Base Force]</td>
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<td>[Bottom Up Review]</td>
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Type I: “New Looks”

Planning efforts undertaken at the beginning of a new Administration are typically large-scale interagency exercises in which representatives of the various bureaucracies participate along with newly appointed high-level officials and, occasionally, outside consultants. Labor is divided among a number of working groups formed soon after an election. These groups are generally given from six to eight months to complete their tasks. In most cases the entire enterprise is coordinated by the National Security Council staff, and the final result is a NSC document signed by the President or his national security advisor.

One fairly typical example illustrates the pattern: at his first NSC meeting in January 1977, President Jimmy Carter ordered a wide-ranging review of national security policy. This study, designated Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, had two parts. The first was a “comprehensive net assessment” of the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was intended to outline not only the relative military strength of the superpowers, but the “relative performance – military, political, economic, and ideological – of the two competing systems.” According to its director, the net assessment was undertaken by twelve separate task forces, “five dealing with particular geographical areas, five with political, intelligence, economic, and technological issues, and two with exclusively military questions.”

The second (and by all accounts less successful) component of the overall PRM 10 effort was a more narrowly focused evaluation of “the capabilities of the current U.S. defense posture under various assumptions.” This so-called military posture review sought to construct a range of alternative “defense postures for the United States, along with rough estimates of their costs and what they could accomplish.” Several of the more radical possibilities were leaked to the press (including one which seemed to require conceding most of Germany in the event of a Soviet invasion), with predictably unsettling political results. Nevertheless, by the end of the summer both halves of PRM 10 were essentially complete, and, in August 1977, their results were incorporated into a Presidential Directive (PD 18).

There have been variations in this general pattern; the Reagan Administration, for example, did not initiate a review of strategy until after it had been in office for just over a year. In March
1989 George Bush followed the usual practice of ordering a major strategic review (NSR 12), but this effort was overtaken by the fast-moving events in Eastern Europe, and it lacked the active participation of the new Administration’s distracted top-ranking officials. According to Colin Powell, NSR 12 was drafted “by career bureaucrats and few Administration appointees. The study team [lacked] practical political guidance from the President and his NSC team.” As a result, “NSR 12 came up short, a bland work, full of generalities and truisms, doomed to the dustbin.”

Clearly not all initial planning efforts are equal in quality or in their impact on policy. With the apparent exceptions of Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton, however, every newly elected President in the post-war period has felt the need for some substantial and sustained attempt at comprehensive national strategic planning. Cumbersome as these efforts may sometimes be, they have nevertheless served a number of important purposes.

The first and most obvious is to formulate and codify a new Administration's preferred approach to national strategy. This may amount to little more than rendering a new President's campaign rhetoric into bureaucratic prose, but an early review can also provide the opportunity for more thoughtful analysis. PRM 10 concluded rather generally that U.S.-Soviet relations would “continue to be marked by both competition and cooperation,” and it asserted that “in many of the non-military aspects of the competition, the United States has enormous advantages over the Soviet Union.” Somewhat more specifically, PD 18 directed that defense spending be increased by three percent a year in order to maintain strategic “equivalence,” strengthen preparations for “forward defense” in Europe, and prepare a force of “light” divisions for possible deployment to the Persian Gulf and South Korea.

Other Administrations have made similar, broad initial choices which have then influenced the subsequent evolution of policy. In order to prepare for strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets, the Nixon Administration decided to forego a substantial buildup in ballistic missiles aimed at preserving an American advantage in first-strike capabilities while simultaneously deploying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The nuclear portion of the two part-NSSM 3 review, completed in May 1969, also raised questions about the desirability of a strategy of “assured destruction” and suggested the need for greater control and flexibility in targeting nuclear forces. These suggestions, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, did not bring results for another five years. Meanwhile, the conventional half of the NSSM 3 study reportedly recommended scaling down the assumptions on which planning for general purpose forces had previously been based. Instead of preparing for “2 1/2 wars” (one major conflict in both Europe and Asia plus a lesser “brushfire” war) the military services were directed to plan for only “1 ½” simultaneous engagements.

While they never succeeded in preparing a final document that satisfied all the bureaucratic participants, President Kennedy's advisors did draft a number of statements of “Basic National Security Policy” (BNSP) that crystallized the essence of the new Administration’s strategic approach. A “short version” of the BNSP circulated in August 1962 that laid the groundwork for the subsequent adoption of a strategy of “flexible response” by emphasizing the need to build up conventional forces so that they would be able to “frustrate, without using nuclear weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces against areas where vital U.S. interests are involved.” Nuclear forces were to be made less vulnerable to surprise attack and more susceptible at all times to tight central control and discriminating use. The BNSP also urged that the United States
“vigorously use the array of instruments available” to it to help “the less developed countries maintain their independence in the face of subversion and indirect aggression.” In addition to presenting the rationale for “flexible response,” “counterinsurgency,” and “nation-building,” Kennedy’s advisors also offered an initial justification for the policy that would eventually become known as *detente*. Instead of avoiding negotiations, they urged that the United States should promote “the habit of meaningful U.S.-Soviet communications” and “to the extent consistent with our national interests grant to the USSR the position that its status as a great power warrants.”¹xiv

To take another, earlier example: In the spring of 1953, President Eisenhower initiated the “Solarium” study to review an array of possible alternative U.S. strategies for dealing with the Soviet Union and its communist bloc allies, including “rollback” and several variations on the theme of containment. The Solarium study was a classic Type I planning effort: it brought together top experts from throughout the government for serious, sustained, secret discussion and debate, and it actively engaged the interest and attention of the President himself. The results of the Solarium process were eventually incorporated into NSC 162/2. This document, promulgated in October 1953, indicated the new Eisenhower Administration’s dual commitments to containing Soviet expansion without doing grievous harm to the American economy. To achieve these ends it recommended a greater emphasis on alliances and on the deterrent utility of strategic and tactical nuclear (as compared to conventional) forces.¹v These choices cleared the way for the subsequent “pactomania” of the Eisenhower period and for the adoption of the strategy of “massive retaliation.”

In addition to their intellectual function, early efforts to formulate strategy may also serve the political purpose of differentiating a new government from its predecessor. Thus NSC 162/2 was in part a direct response to the approach to national strategy embodied in the Truman Administration's NSC 68. Instead of urging a rapid buildup of military strength aimed at achieving maximum capability in a predicted year of “peak danger,” as NSC 68 had done three years earlier, the new document stressed sustainable strength for what Eisenhower had referred to during his Presidential campaign as “the long pull.” The argument put forward in NSC 162/2 was both a working through of that theme and a rationale for the leaner defense budgets which the new Administration was about to put before Congress and the public.

Whether by design or otherwise, initial strategy studies also fulfill a number of bureaucratic functions. In the process of formulating a statement, the members of a new government are forced to educate themselves, to get to know their opposite numbers, and to learn one another's views. This can promote cohesion (provided the differences in outlook revealed are not too large), but it can also produce lasting scars and animosities. In any case, documents completed and promulgated in the first year or so after an election inevitably become the “sacred texts” from which all future internal debates over policy must proceed. They can thus help to set guidelines and to instruct the bureaucracy about the goals and policies on which a new Administration has decided.
Type II: “Mid-Course Corrections”

Efforts undertaken during the middle of an Administration usually result from a sense of anxiety within (and sometimes outside) the government and from an emerging perception that existing policies are inadequate to deal with the dangers facing the country. Because they begin, at least implicitly, with a criticism of what is already being done, such efforts are often conducted outside the usual channels and rely heavily on the work of private, non-governmental experts. On completion, their analysis and recommendations are presented to the President, who may then act on them or not as he sees fit.

The best known of these outside efforts had their origins in the first intense decade of the Cold War. In March of 1954, several months after the successful testing of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower asked that a special group be formed to explore possible new technical and scientific solutions to the growing problem of surprise attack. The Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee which resulted from this request was headed by James Killian, Jr., President of MIT. It included representatives from the three military services and the CIA, faculty members from major universities, and experts from industry, the various national laboratories, and assorted think tanks. Two years later a similar panel (the so-called Gaither Committee) was created to review a range of proposed nationwide programs to protect the civilian population from thermonuclear bombardment. The Gaither Committee quickly widened its focus to include not only shelters but the full spectrum of strategic issues.

While it differed from earlier Type II efforts in its timing and in the relative lack of urgency surrounding its deliberations, the 1987 Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy was similar in its composition and in the scope of its charter. The Commission was made up of a mix of government officials and outside experts; indeed its two co-chairmen were a high-ranking Defense Department official (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle) and a senior civilian defense analyst (Albert Wohlstetter). Commission members were given the task of setting “guidelines for defense technology and strategy for the next twenty years” and, in their final report, they issued recommendations for (among other things) more accurate and effective conventional weapons, more survivable or replaceable space capabilities, “versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on overseas bases,” and an increasing emphasis in arms control talks on conventional force reductions.

Like those undertaken at the beginning of an Administration, efforts at planning in mid-stream can also fulfill both political and strategic functions. By offering visible evidence of high-level concern over existing policies, they can help deflect external pressures for sudden and dramatic change. If completed in advance of some major public crisis, they can also provide the government with a ready plan for strategic changes that might otherwise have been impossible. Thus in 1950, responding to a series of setbacks that included the Soviets’ early detonation of an atomic bomb and the victory of communist forces on the Chinese mainland, President Truman ordered a review of national policy by an ad hoc committee of State and Defense Department officials. First circulated in April 1950, NSC 68 warned that, if existing spending and procurement policies were continued, the United States would decline sharply in power relative to the Soviet Union. It argued that only a major effort to mobilize the potential resources of the free world (and, in particular, an increase in U. S. defense expenditures of large but unspecified
proportions) would be sufficient to avert catastrophe. Reluctant to boost peacetime spending, President Truman put NSC 68 on the shelf until the outbreak of the Korean War. With the war underway and earlier constraints removed, that document provided a justification for higher overall outlays on defense and for a more vigorous and wide-ranging variant of the original policy of containment. xviii

The impact of a mid-term effort depends ultimately on the inclinations of the Administration that commissions it. The Gaither Committee Report, which focused in large part on the imminent emergence of a Soviet ICBM threat, was completed within weeks of the Sputnik launch in October 1957. If the Eisenhower Administration had wanted to, it could have used the Committee's findings as a powerful argument for substantial increases in strategic offensive and defensive programs. xix Instead, bureaucratic inertia, Presidential skepticism, and concern over costs combined to smother the report and reduce its impact. Nevertheless, the Gaither Committee's conclusions tended over time to find their way into Congress and the press, and, through these mechanisms, the report may have had some impact on the 1960 election and on the policies of the Kennedy Administration. xx

Mid-term efforts which highlight emerging issues or lead to specific, programmatic recommendations can also exert a more direct, although still delayed, influence on policy. The Killian Report suggested a wide range of increased government research and development programs on everything from high-energy jet fuels to airborne nuclear propulsion systems to the use of satellites in intelligence gathering and communications. Although not all of its proposals yielded results, in a number of cases the Killian panel succeeded in planting seeds that bore fruit only in the late 1950s or early 1960s. xxi The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy began to look past the preoccupations of the Cold War and drew attention to a number of issues (including the rise of Chinese power and the growing potential of conventional precision strike weapons) that would achieve greater prominence in the 1990s.

Type III: “Swan Songs”

Least widely known are the strategic planning exercises initiated towards the end of a Presidential term. Generally, these have been relatively small-scale, in-house efforts undertaken with varying degrees of seriousness depending on the domestic political situation. When an Administration has some hope of succeeding itself, the product of an end-of-term review of national strategy can serve as the basis for policy for another four years. In the summer of 1948, for example, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, under the direction of George Kennan, prepared two papers outlining “U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia” (NSC 20/1) and “Factors Affecting the Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies” (NSC 20/2). The conclusions of these documents were then incorporated in a third which was formally adopted as national policy a few weeks after President Truman's re-election. Entitled “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security” (NSC 20/4), the paper called for containing communist expansion and weakening Russia's grip in Eastern Europe through economic aid, political propaganda, and a moderate level of peacetime military preparedness. This relatively modest formula governed policy for two years before being superseded by NSC 68.
According to participants, both the Ford and Carter Administrations made an attempt at planning during their waning days, but these efforts seem to have been rather forlorn. William Hyland reports that towards the end of 1976 the NSC staff "drafted a long national security directive on defense policy; it was quite an eloquent document that Ford signed shortly before Carter’s inauguration. It was immediately cancelled by Brzezinski, who was puzzled by its very existence."xxiii Four years later the outgoing National Security Advisor would do exactly the same thing to his successor. Having reviewed overall U.S. military strategy and, in particular, policy for the Persian Gulf, the Carter Administration issued two last Presidential Directives meant, as Brzezinski reports, "to provide our successors with a useful point of reference, even though they would obviously not be binding on them."xxiii

While it did not initiate an end-of-term national strategy review comparable in scope to its initial, ill-fated NSR 12, in early 1992 the Bush Administration’s Defense Department did prepare a study that aimed to address the highest level military planning issues. Had President Bush been reelected, this Defense Planning Guidance document might have provided the basis for national security policy during his second term.xxiv

Over the course of the last 50 years there have periodically been situations in which a sitting President either could not or did not wish to continue in office but still had some hope of being followed by another representative of his own political party. Such an intra-party transfer of power has happened only once in the post-war period, in 1988, but it was possible in 1952, 1960, and 1968, and it is conceivable again in the year 2000. In the autumn of 1952, President Truman’s advisors prepared a detailed and careful reappraisal of existing national security programs (NSC 141). This review called for increases in spending on continental air defense, a vigorous civil defense program, and larger allocations of economic and military assistance to key non-European countries like Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan, Indochina, Formosa, Japan, and Korea.xxv With the election of a Republican, any additions to existing programs became extremely unlikely, and NSC 141 was essentially ignored. No comparable, detailed efforts to guide the hand of a new President were made by the outgoing Eisenhower, Johnson or Reagan Administrations.

Although it has not controlled the process by which it was produced, the Clinton Administration will bequeath to its successor the results of the work of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. The Commission is unusual in its origins (a 1998 Congressional mandate rather than an Executive branch initiative), its carefully balanced bipartisan membership (most notably its chairmen, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman), and the broad scope of its charter.xxvi These characteristics create the possibility of objectivity and originality, but they also carry with them the danger of blandness and political irrelevance. Whether the next Administration will embrace or ignore the Commission’s findings remains, at this writing, to be seen.

**Conclusions**

The most important measure of any attempt at national strategic planning must ultimately be its impact on policy. By this standard, the effectiveness of the various kinds of planning efforts tends to decline across the lifespan of an Administration. This is not surprising. Initial planning efforts come when a President’s power is likely to be at its peak, both inside the bureaucracy and in the country as a whole. Thus, early decisions about national strategy are those most likely to have a strong and lasting impact on subsequent developments. By contrast, mid-term efforts run
the risk of being ignored, either because their authors lack influence within the government or because the crisis that provoked them subsides before a consensus can be built up around their recommendations. Finally, unless a President succeeds himself or is followed by a like-minded leader, end-of-term efforts will usually find their way quickly onto the garbage heap of history. The experience of the last 50 years suggests that serious strategic planning must be attempted in the first six to twelve months of a newly elected Administration’s life. Subsequent opportunities for deliberate thought and coordinated action will be few and fleeting. Here, as in so much else, the first chance may be the best chance to get things done, even if it is not necessarily the last one.

NOTES


3 If four recent Defense Department-orchestrated, military-focused studies (displayed in brackets in Tables I and II) were included the total might rise as high as 19. Although I will mention these in passing, their scope, purpose, and bureaucratic origins are narrower than the studies that are the primary focus of this report. Because they are essentially exercises in public rhetoric rather than genuine strategic planning, I also will not discuss the annual “National Security Strategy” statements that Congress has required from the White House since 1987.


5 Huntington, p. 28.


7 Brzezinski, p. 177.


In 1993 President Clinton’s first national security advisor, Anthony Lake, promulgated the doctrine of enlargement that would inform much of the Administration’s subsequent action, but this does not appear to have been the product of a large-scale, interagency review of the sort that produced PRM 10. See Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993. As during the Bush Administration, the Clinton Defense Department also initiated its own review of national military policy and posture, the so-called “Bottom Up Review,” carried out over the spring and summer of 1993. The Defense Department is now required by law to conduct a so-called Quadrennial Defense Review and to report its findings to Congress and the public. The first QDR report was issued in May 1997, shortly after President Clinton’s re-election. The second will take place following the 2000 election. The timing of the QDR makes it, in effect, a Congressionally mandated Type I planning effort, albeit one focused on exclusively military issues and carried out within the Department of Defense, rather than at the inter-agency level. (Congress has also required that a group of outside experts, the National Defense Panel, be appointed to review and comment on the QDR.)

Brown, p. 3.


“Basic National Security Policy: Short Version,” Draft, August 2, 1962. Quotes from pp. 13, 27, 62 and 64. This document was a condensation of an earlier study prepared by Walt Rostow while he was chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. Another version was drafted by the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs in March 1963. None was officially adopted, in part because of disagreements over portions dealing with tactical nuclear weapons but also because President Kennedy preferred in the end not to endorse any formal statement of national strategy. On this episode see Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972), pp. 174-176.


The report called, among other things, for dispersing, hardening, and defending SAC's long-range bomber force, accelerating and enlarging existing IRBM, SLBM, and ICBM programs, and beginning work on a nation-wide fallout shelter program. See "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age," November 7, 1957, pp. 6-11.

Halperin, p. 383.

According to one analysis of the Killian Report, “its overall impact was enormous. It helped accelerate the ICBM and IRBM programs, it sparked Presidential endorsement of the Navy’s Polaris submarine program, it led to the development of the U-2 spy plane and it spurred Eisenhower to establish his own office of the special assistant for science and technology.” Kaplan, p. 131. Most of the report has now been declassified. See “Meeting the Threat of
In its initial form, the 1992 DPG contained a clear and broad, but ultimately highly controversial, formulation of American national strategic objectives for the post-Cold War. According to published accounts, the DPG stated that the primary goal of American policy must be “to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. [The United States must] endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.” See “Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’” The New York Times (March 8, 1992), p. 1.

The Commission’s charter calls for it to “analyze the emerging international security environment . . . develop a U.S. national security strategy appropriate to that environment . . . [and] to assess the various security institutions for their current relevance to the effective and efficient implementation of that strategy, and to recommend adjustments as necessary.” As of the summer of 2000 the Commission had completed the first two of its tasks and issued two reports. The third and final report, on organizational issues, will be published after the election, in March 2001. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Supporting Research and Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1999), p. vi.
The new Administration will have to decide how and to what ends the U.S. Government should organize its handling of these increasingly important global organizations.

Most recently, there has been considerable disposition of functions related to these institutions within the U.S. Government. Issues affecting the World Bank and the IMF are handled by the U.S. Treasury; and matters involving the WTO are handled by the Special Trade Representative. In normal times this dispersion would make sense. But the times that the next Administration will confront in international economic policy are not “normal.” This is evident if you look at changing domestic attitudes.

For example, a majority of a public committee recently appointed by Congress has recommended drastic changes in the World Bank, and to a lesser extent, in the IMF that would greatly reduce the scale, scope, and usefulness of these organizations, which have contributed totally to post-World War II progress by acting as lenders of last resort. Another example is that of U.S. trade policy, which is facing great uncertainty; powerful U.S. special interest groups insist that the U.S. take greater account of their views on labor standards and on the environment in fixing that policy. These changes in attitudes only thinly disguise the fact that major U.S. groups want less free trade and less World Bank/IMF activity. They object to “globalism” in these and many other respects.

They do not want international trends and organizations that they cannot control making decisions that will affect the U.S., as has been the case since World War II.

These new attitudes result not only from growing economic parochialism; they also reflect real emerging problems, such as the growing importance of private capital movements compared to World Bank and IMF loans, and a growing divergence between the perceived interests of developed and developing countries’ views in regard to whether and how such issues as child labor and global overheating should be dealt with in fixing trade policy.

To meet this situation, the next Administration will have to consider not only substantive changes in foreign economic policy, but also new methods of organizing the handling of that policy. The next Administration will thus want to review some methods that have been tried in the past to involve domestic interests without crippling foreign economic policy. These fall under three categories:

1. **Alternative No. 1**: There were attempts to organize powerful U.S. inter-governmental committees with staffs and subcommittees, including people from the “domestic” side of the White House, to play a large role in deciding foreign economic policy. This method did not achieve large successes. It produced a lot of manpower, but it did not produce clear-cut decisions or original initiatives, nor did it bring the best minds in
government to bear on the need to dispatch urgent foreign economic problems swiftly. Trying to run anything – especially something as complicated as foreign policy – by committees just does not work.

2. Alternative No. 2: In some Administrations, a different type of high-level intergovernmental committee dealing with both foreign and domestic economic policy has been tried. One such committee in the Carter Administration met weekly and was chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and was attended by the Vice President and relevant cabinet and top sub-Cabinet officials (including some from the domestic side). It did not generate a lot of paper work or take too much of the time of its participants, so it did no harm. Its advantages were that it kept high-level people informed, and that it provided an opportunity for free-ranging discussion among these people. But it did not produce clear-cut decisions, for committees rarely do.

There was, in the Clinton Administration, a somewhat different White House committee that had responsibility for tackling disagreements between the main parties involved. It was chaired by Robert Rubin and later by Gene Sperling. It seems to have been useful in dealing with foreign and domestic economic problems.

3. Alternative No.3: To appoint one person answering directly to the President to coordinate foreign economic policy, taking due account of both foreign and domestic factors. At one point, this job was done by John Leddy. He did not answer to the President but to Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Doug Dillon. Practically Leddy’s entire time was devoted to this task, and it seemed to work well. In this job, for example, Leddy helped to produce the World Bank’s IOA. In the Nixon Administration, Peter Flanigan tried to perform a similar task in the White House solely with one assistant, Phil Trezise. Peter was careful, however, not to trespass on the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury. In the Carter Administration, I coordinated some aspects of foreign economic policy as a member of the NSC staff. I had a staff of three to four people and worked very closely with the relevant Under Secretaries of Treasury and State, Tony Salomon and Dick Cooper, as well as with Bob Strauss, the Special Trade Representative, who answered directly to the President and who spent much time with relevant domestic groups and achieved much success. I devoted a lot of my efforts to the annual G-7 Economic Summit. The following Administration remanded all matters relating to G-7 Economic Summits to the State Department, which did not work too well.

The choice among these different methods, or a combination of them, will be made by the President in light of his disposition and experience. I offer three important milestones:

1. Stay away from policymaking by committee, i.e., Alternative No. 1. Committees rarely achieve anything and waste the valuable time of many people.

2. It may be of greater use to allow committees to exchange views and seek agreement between contending parties rather than to make decisions.
3. Even more useful may be to establish a procedure that involves the President more directly in these matters, because they increasingly involve questions of great domestic political importance and sensitivity. If the President is not directly and continually involved, hard and durable decisions will not be made. This means making sure someone in the White House devotes his or her full time to help make sure that the President is involved in issues of foreign economic policy. If such an assistant makes recommendations to the President and has his full confidence, his influence will be considerable, and he should be able to work out many decisions with the Secretary of the Treasury, even in the President’s absence.

A system that takes into account the above three points will only work, however, if the Treasury Secretary is a person of great ability and is at the center of all these matters, and if the Special Trade Representative is a person of great political experience and is respected by Congress and the AFL-CIO. The reason that after World War II we did not enter another Great Depression but had prosperity instead is partly because the heads of the U.S., Europe, and Japan made economic policy their top priority. How the next President organizes his Administration to handle this vital issue will help ensure future prosperity and correct such deficiencies by former Administrations.
INTERVENTION CASE STUDY BRIEFS

KOREA (1950-1953)
The Korean War

- At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel by agreement among the U.S., Britain, and the USSR. The Soviet Union supported North Korea, while the U.S. supported South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK).
- U.S. troops withdrew from the Republic of Korea shortly thereafter in the “bring the boys home” policy.
- The Soviet Union and China rapidly built up the North Korean army.
- January 14, 1950: Secretary Dean Acheson’s speech at the National Press Club omitted the ROK from the perimeter vital to the defense of U.S. interests in Asia.
- June 25, 1950: North Korea attacked South; the U.S. was surprised and unprepared.
- President Truman and his advisors were convinced that the Soviet Union incited North Korea’s attack as part of worldwide offensive moving from subversion to armed aggression.
- Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur on June 26 to employ U.S. air and naval forces.
- Truman prevailed quickly on UN Security Council to authorize military aid to South Korea on June 27. The UN Security Council named MacArthur Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command. The Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council and therefore could not veto the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” which authorized UN action.
- MacArthur decided to do Inchon landing and made rapid progress until China began to infiltrate troops south in October-November. On December 30, MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Chinese could drive UN forces out of Korea. No warning was provided by CIA nor other intelligence given.
- January 1, 1951: 500,000 Chinese and North Korean troops attacked South.
- MacArthur led a counter-attack, but clashed with President Truman over continuing the attack north to the Yalu River.
- Truman, fearing a world war potentially involving nuclear weapons, relieved MacArthur of his command on April 11, 1951, and replaced him with General Ridgeway.
- June 23, 1951: Soviet delegate to the UN proposed cease-fire discussions. Armistice was achieved at the 38th parallel.
- UN forces ceased offensive operations on November 12, 1951. Protracted armistice negotiations and intermittent fighting ensued.
- The first major test of Communist military aggression was exposed and defeated.
- This was the first war in which the U.S. deliberately chose to accept less than absolute victory. The conflict ended in a pre-war status quo.
- The elected government of South Korea was declared protected from being overthrown.
- The first major test of the UN to protect against armed aggression was a success. North Korean and Chinese forces were repelled from South Korea.
- The conflict inaugurated an era of deep American diplomatic and military entanglement in Asia.
- There U.S. suffered over 54,000 battle and battle-related deaths, with more than two million North and South Koreans dead, wounded, or missing.
The conflict set a precedent for containment of communism, and became a prelude to the war in Vietnam.

CUBA (April 1961)
Operation JMARC (“Bay of Pigs”)

- 1959: Rebel forces under Fidel Castro completed the overthrow of Cuban dictator Fulgencia Batista. U.S.-Cuba relations became strained as Castro’s policies threatened American business interests and holdings in Cuba.
- March 1960: President Eisenhower authorized a CIA plan to “bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. [but] in such a manner as to avoid the appearance of U.S. intervention.”
- Building on the model of the successful covert operation against Guatemala’s President Arbenz in 1954, the CIA quickly developed a plan of armed intervention, sabotage, and psychological warfare. The CIA established anti-Castro radio broadcasting, and began training a force of 1,500 Cuban exiles in Guatemala. The scope of the operation grew from an initial plan to infiltrate a few dozen commandos to a full-scale invasion.
- January 1961: President Kennedy assumed office and continued the intervention planning process. Training by the CIA-led “Cuban brigade” was completed.
- March-April 1961: President Kennedy became concerned that U.S. involvement could not be concealed. However, he remained determined that the operation succeed and authorized its execution on April 16.
- Because Kennedy considered the Executive bureaucracy cumbersome, he gave the CIA control over the operation, mostly concentrated in the hands of a single man, Richard Bissell. Many senior Administration officials were not informed about the operation. When CIA airstrikes began prior to the landing of the Cuban forces, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, was not told of the deception. Consequently, he repeated a CIA cover story to the international community.
- The Castro forces, however, had anticipated the landing. The landing site, a supposedly deserted beach, was lit with floodlights. Castro’s regular army units, including armored units and militia, were present in force.
- Two supply ships were quickly sunk by the Cuban air force, cutting off the invasion force from ammunition and supplies.
- U.S. air support was largely called off at the last minute to avoid the appearance of direct U.S. involvement.
- Without support from the indigenous Cuban population, and cut off from supplies, within a few days 114 members of the Cuban brigade were killed and 1,189 captured.
- President Kennedy issued a statement acknowledging U.S. support for the invaders, adding that U.S. efforts had been restrained and that future U.S. action against the Cuban government might be more severe.
- The covert operation was deemed a foreign policy disaster and is termed “the perfect failure” by prominent historians.
- Castro was provided with a major issue around which to rally his supporters in Cuba. Thirty-nine years after the failed invasion, the Bay of Pigs continues to define present-day U.S.-Cuban relations.
Recently released CIA after-action analysis of the invasion characterized its failure to be the result of ignorance, incompetence, and arrogance.

CUBA (October 16-18, 1962)
Cuban Missile Crisis

- May 1962: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba to counter the U.S. lead in strategic missiles and to deter a U.S. invasion of Cuba.
- October 16, 1962: President Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photos of the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.
- October 22, 1962: Kennedy announced on television that nuclear attack against the U.S. emanating from Cuba will be responded to as if it were an attack from the Soviet Union.
- The U.S. initiated a naval blockade of Cuba, prompting a possible pre-intervention crisis.
- President Kennedy formed a special team of national security advisors — the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. The Committee negotiated both publicly and also through back channels with Khrushchev, making decisions outside public scrutiny.
- The Committee placed emphasis on avoiding a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or Cuba. However, Kennedy and his advisors adopted a strategy of avoiding concessions.
- The President extended deterrence to critical U.S. allies. Regarding Europe, the President deemed an attack against Europe as equivalent to direct attack against the U.S.
- The U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba.
- The Soviets agreed to remove missiles from Cuba in return for the U.S. removing its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
- The Soviets also agreed to remove strategic light bombers from Cuba.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis served as the origins for a period of détente, the Test Ban Treaty, and strategic force limitation initiatives.

IRAN (April 25, 1980)
Operation Eagle Claw

- November 1979: During the Iranian Islamic revolution, radical Iranian students controlled by Ayatollah Khomeini seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in contravention of international law and accepted diplomatic norms. Fifty-two American hostages were taken.
- December 1979: President Carter ordered planning for a possible military rescue mission.
- Training exercises were conducted through March 1980. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved mission readiness on April 16. Forces deployed to Southwest Asia on April 19-23, 1979, in anticipation of Presidential order to execute the rescue mission.
- April 24, 1980: After six months of failed negotiations, the National Command Authorities ordered execution of Operation Eagle Claw.
- Mechanical failures, poor weather conditions, and accidental aircraft collisions at the Desert One site resulted in cancellation of the mission with a U.S. loss of eight killed, five wounded, and one helicopter and one refueling aircraft destroyed. The dead soldiers and five intact helicopters were left behind during evacuation.
President Carter’s popularity declined dramatically.
The American hostages were released after President-elect Ronald Reagan assumed office.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (April 28, 1965 – September 27, 1966)
Operation Powerpack

May 1961: The influential Dominican political leader Rafael L. Trujillo was assassinated.
January 1962: President Joaquin Balaguer resigned. A Council of State, including moderate opposition elements, with legislative and executive powers over the Dominican Government was formed under the leadership of President Rafael E. Bonnelly.
1963: Juan Bosch was inaugurated as new President.
September 1963: Bosch was overthrown in a military coup.
April 24, 1965: Another coup led to violence between military elements favoring the return to government by Bosch (so-called Constitutionalists) and those who proposed a military junta committed to early general elections (Loyalists).
The U.S. leadership was imbued with perception of low Soviet stakes in the Dominican Republic.
American leaders were caught by surprise at the sudden and violent nature of the ensuing fight for power.
President Johnson was determined to end the fighting quickly, and to leave no doubt about American intentions for return to stability.
Johnson subordinated military concerns to political and diplomatic considerations in the U.S. involvement, despite the constraints this might have imposed on the military operation.
Johnson also chose to seek retroactive approval from the Organization of American States (OAS) because he did not believe that prior approval would be forthcoming.
In late April 1965, a six-vessel U.S. Navy task force was deployed to conduct evacuations of U.S. citizens.
Elements of the 82nd Airborne entered the capital Santo Domingo, and established a “line of communication” separating Loyalist and Constitutionalist forces.
Diplomatic initiatives secured ex post facto approval of the intervention by the OAS and the deployment of an OAS-led inter-regional peacekeeping force.
May 3, 1965: The Dominican combatants were totally isolated by U.S. forces manning a “line of communication” across the capital.
May 6, 1965: After vehement objections, the OAS eventually backed the intervention and formation of an Inter-American Peace Force to keep the peace. Relations between Washington and South American countries remained strained over the reintroduction of intervention allegedly in violation of the OAS charter.
Mid-June, 1965: A major offensive by the Loyalist forces to breach the line of communication failed, compelling them to the negotiating table. The U.S. mission evolved to include nation building.
August 31, 1965: Both parties signed an OAS-brokered peace agreement that installed an interim government under Hector Garcia-Godoy.
June 1966: Political moderate Joaquin Balaguer, whose security was provided by the U.S. Marines, defeated Juan Bosch in free and fair elections monitored by the UN.
September 27, 1966: Withdrawal of final American soldier and deactivation of OAS peace force.


The Vietnam War

- 1954: French forces are defeated by the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. A French request for U.S. military assistance was refused for fear of protracted U.S. involvement.
- Late 1950s: South Vietnam faced a communist insurgency led by the Viet Cong within its borders, as well as a powerful North Vietnam supported by China and the Soviet Union.
- 1960: President Eisenhower sent a small contingent of U.S. military advisors to the South.
- 1962: President Kennedy increased the number of U.S. advisors to 13,000.
- 1964: Congress adopted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which supported “all necessary measures” to repel armed attacks against U.S. forces and prevent further communist aggression.
- The U.S. leaders were constrained in their efforts by a perception of high Soviet and Chinese stakes in Vietnam.
- The U.S. military and political intervention increased incrementally under President Johnson, who was committed to prevent the “domino theory” of communist aggression in South Asia from materializing.
- The President, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense in Washington exercised tight operational control over the war. The President and his advisors made all major strategic decisions, here including target lists.
- Theater commanders were given lists of acceptable target types including not only North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, but also North Vietnamese transportation infrastructure and oil storage facilities.
- U.S. field commanders were given ambiguous goals and were told to improvise.
- May 1965: U.S. airstrikes halted for six days to give negotiations a chance; North Vietnam, however, refused to negotiate.
- July 1965: 125,000 Americans were involved in the fighting in Vietnam.
- Initially, most Americans supported Washington’s Vietnam policy. As military victory appeared more elusive, public opinion became more critical and resulted in the creation of an anti-war movement and protests.
- January 31, 1968: The Tet Offensive was launched by Viet Cong; 36 out of 44 South Vietnamese provincial capitals were attacked; the U.S. Embassy was also attacked in this offensive. The offensive was crushed within a week, and the Viet Cong suffered 50,000 casualties.
- The American public was shocked by the ability of Viet Cong to launch a major offensive. Military victory for the U.S. and the South was overshadowed by increased public skepticism of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. President Johnson lost credibility and support in both public and official circles, and announced on March 31, 1968, his decision not to run for re-election.
- 1969: President Nixon is elected. American policy shifted toward disengagement through policy of “Vietnamization” to creating strong, self-reliant South Vietnamese military forces.
1973: An armistice was signed by all major parties (the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong) ending U.S. involvement.

April 29, 1975: Saigon fell to communist forces.

LEBANON (August 25, 1982 – February 26, 1984)

U.S. Multi-National Force (USMNF)

- July 24, 1981: U.S. Presidential envoy Philip Habib announced a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The cease-fire held for 10 months, but was followed by a series of incidents including PLO rocket attacks on northern Israel.
- June 6, 1982: Israel launched a ground attack into Lebanon to neutralize PLO forces and their Syrian supporters. By mid-June, Israeli forces had surrounded Beirut and laid siege to the city.
- August 1982: Habib succeeded in brokering an arrangement to evacuate PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for a three-nation peacekeeping force.
- August 24, 1982: 800 U.S. Marines together with French and Italian units entered Beirut to assist in the evacuation of PLO fighters. The Marines departed on September 10, 1982, upon completing their mission.
- IDF stopped its attack on Beirut. Israel and Lebanon promised to protect the remaining Palestinians once the PLO withdrew.
- August 25-28, 1982: PLO was evacuated.
- September 1, 1982: President Reagan announced his Middle East Peace Plan, but omitted Syria from the plan.
- September 14, 1982: Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated.
- September 15, 1982: Israeli troops entered West Beirut.
- September 16-19, 1982: Lebanese militiamen massacred Palestinians in refugee camps. Amine Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon.
- September 22, 1982: A peacekeeping force was ordered back to Lebanon.
- April 18, 1983: The U.S. Embassy in West Beirut was bombed, causing 63 casualties.
- April 23, 1983: Secretary Shultz went to the Middle East to push for the implementation of the Israel-Lebanon peace agreement and omits visiting Syria.
- May 17, 1983: An agreement is signed by Lebanon, Israel, and the U.S. for Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria refused to be a party to the agreement, and progress was stalemated.
- Opposition to negotiations and U.S. support for Gemayel escalated tensions.
- September 4-7, 1983: IDF withdrawal from Shouf (overlooking Beirut); U.S. bombed Shouf.
- October 23, 1983: The U.S. and French headquarters were bombed by a lone terrorist, resulting in nearly three hundred deaths. The American public and Congress were shocked by the unexpected and huge U.S. losses, exerting pressure against continued U.S. presence in Lebanon.
- December 3, 1983: U.S. aircraft flying over Lebanon were fired upon by Syrian anti-aircraft artillery, engaging U.S troops with force for the first time.
- December 4, 1983: U.S. aircraft from two carriers launched against Syrian targets. Two U.S. planes are shot down; a U.S. pilot was taken prisoner by Syrian troops.
- February 1984: Lebanese government forces experienced major defections and the government was about to collapse.
February 26, 1984: U.S. Marines withdrew from Lebanon. Syria exerts pressure on Gemayel to abandon the May 17 Accords.

March 5, 1984: Gemayel declared May 17 Accords dead.

**GRENADA (October 23 – November 21, 1983)
Operation Urgent Fury**

- March 13, 1979: Grenada’s first elected Prime Minister, Sir Eric Gairy, was ousted in a nearly bloodless coup by the New Jewel forces of Maurice Bishop.
- Bishop declared himself Prime Minister, established a Marxist-Leninist government, and forged close ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries.
- October 1983: Power struggles within the Bishop government resulted in the arrest and subsequent murder of Bishop and several cabinet members by rebellious elements of the New Jewel forces, better known as the People’s Revolutionary Army.
- Following a breakdown in civil order, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States appealed to the U.S. for military assistance.
- President Reagan ordered the Pentagon to provide options for a military operation to be mounted within days.
- The White House dominated the decision-making process. Consultations were conducted with the UN and with regional allies. A political determination was made for the operation to involve a coalition.
- Congressional leaders were briefed about planning, but were not asked for approval.
- Planning was turned over to the Pentagon, which developed a campaign plan and issued an order to execute within days.
- All three major military objectives were accomplished within three days: to defeat the New Jewel forces, rescue all U.S. citizens, and establish a secure environment.
- 599 Americans and 80 foreign nationals were safely evacuated.
- Nineteen U.S. military personnel were killed in action; over a hundred were wounded.
- Free and fair elections were held in December 1984, and a democratic and constitutional government restored in Grenada.
- The operation marked the first successful use of U.S. military force following the loss of the Vietnam War.

**LIBYA (April 12-17, 1986)
Operation El Dorado Canyon**

- March 1986: Aircraft from the U.S. Sixth Fleet conducting maneuvers in international waters off the Libyan coast were attacked by Libyan surface-to-air missiles. In response, U.S. attack aircraft destroyed Libyan missile radars and launch sites.
- Simultaneously, U.S. forces destroyed a Libyan missile attack vessel when it approached U.S. ships guarding American aircraft carriers.
- April 5, 1986: A bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by American service personnel, injuring 63 Americans and killing an American soldier.
The Reagan Administration cited “irrefutable proof” that Libya was responsible for the attack, and had conclusive intelligence of 12 such planned attacks (but not precise targets). Libyan terrorists sent to Turkey and France seized while attempting attacks on U.S. embassies.

Economic sanctions were tightened against the Gaddafi regime. However, the President and his top national security advisors agreed that only military action could compel Gaddafi to alter his behavior from hostile actions including terrorism.

President Reagan decided an immediate response to the discotheque bombing was required.

Reagan ordered the Pentagon to formulate plans for a military response.

The Pentagon plans were presented to the National Security Council for review.

The NSC recommended airstrikes be launched against Libyan ground targets directly connected to Libya’s ability to conduct terrorism.

The NSC selected the final list of targets including the Aziviyah military barracks, the facilities near Tripoli airport, Cide Bilal military base, Benina air field, and the Jamahiriyah barracks.

President Reagan ordered the execution of airstrikes.

April 15, 1986: A U.S. attack was launched at night against all five major Libyan targets.

Targets were struck simultaneously, in spite of the fact that some strike aircraft were forced to fly from the U.K., having been denied flight over France by the French government. The actual attack lasted 12 minutes, and 60 tons of munitions were dropped on Libya.

The attack came as a surprise to the Libyans. Only one U.S. plane was lost in the attack. No Libyan aircraft was launched to counter U.S. air forces, while anti-aircraft fire was light and usually commenced in response to targets being struck.

While the attack was underway, President Reagan explained the operation to the American people on television.

Terrorism emanating from Libya declined immediately following the bombing, but the trend did not last long.

December 21, 1988: Pan American flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing over 250 passengers and 11 people on the ground. Evidence points to two Libyan terrorists with likely ties to Gaddafi.

PANAMA (December 17, 1989 – January 31, 1990)

Operation Just Cause

1970s: Panamanian officer Manuel Noriega was recruited by the CIA and DEA. The Carter Administration blocked indictments against Noriega for drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

Early 1980s: Noriega supported U.S. operations against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.

May 1984: Manuel Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) manipulated Presidential election results to ensure that Noriega’s hand-picked candidate, Nicholas Barletta, became President.

June 1987: Noriega extended for five years his role as PDF commander. The U.S. called upon him to step down. Pro-Noriega demonstrators attacked the U.S. Embassy, causing property damage.

The U.S. engaged in covert and overt operations to remove Noriega from power, including support for opposition in 1989 elections, support for coup attempts, and a combination of sanctions, negotiations, and military threats.

February 4, 1988: Noriega was indicted by Federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, on twelve counts of racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering.
December 22, 1988: Reagan declared the “Noriega must go” policy.
May 11, 1989: Bush Administration formulated seven-point plan to remove Noriega from power based on applying sanctions to Panama, supporting the political opposition to the Noriega regime, and stating military threats.
Summer 1989: Noriega voided the Presidential election and ordered his Dignity Battalions (DIGBATs) to attack opposition members.
October 1989: An unsuccessful PDF coup attempt was undertaken against Noriega.
Noriega’s grip on power continued to erode. Distrustful of the PDF, Noriega began to rely increasingly on irregular paramilitary units for his hold on power.
Noriega’s ordered the DIGBAT to harass U.S. military personnel and civilians in Panama.
December 15, 1989: Panama’s National Assembly declared a state of war with the U.S., and adopted measures to confront foreign aggression.
U.S. service members and dependents were increasingly harassed, and a Marine lieutenant was killed by PDF members.
December 17, 1989: Bush asked principal national security advisors whether Noriega could be captured in a limited operation. General Colin Powell argued for large-scale intervention to destroy the PDF, ensure the capture of Noriega, and establish conditions to permit a democratic government. Bush approved Powell’s plan.
U.S. troops seized all D-Day objectives in Panama within 24 hours of launching the operation including major airfields and strategic intersections throughout Panama City.
Noriega surrendered to U.S. troops after several days of fighting.
Noriega was sent to U.S. and sentenced to 40 years in prison.
A new government was sworn into office the night of the intervention.

Operation Desert Storm

August 2, 1990: Iraqi army invaded Kuwait.
President Bush ordered the immediate deployment of U.S. troops and materiel to defend Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi invasion.
President Bush began immediately to build a worldwide coalition to condemn the Iraqi invasion and isolate Iraq economically and diplomatically.
Preserving stability in the Middle East by supporting friends and allies in the region (Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others) were primary goals.
Of a more strategic nature, other goals were to prevent regional political and military hegemony by Iraq; ensure a free flow of fossil fuels and other energy resources at reasonable prices; demonstrate support for the principles of the UN Charter and the peaceful settlement of disputes (as well as support for international rule of law, including respect for sovereignty and preservation of recognized borders); and maintain freedom of navigation and rights to flight over the Persian Gulf.
President Bush relied heavily on his advisors for counsel, and the Executive branch dominated the decision-making process. The President clearly defined the political objectives, but otherwise relied on the military to develop contingency plans and execute the military campaign.
The President and his advisors worked tirelessly to achieve international consensus through the UN, and to build an international political and military coalition to confront Saddam Hussein.
The President sought Congressional approval on January 8, 1991, six months after initial troop deployments, by which date 500,000 U.S. troops were deployed in the region. Diplomatic efforts lasted six months, and were accompanied by a continuous build-up of coalition forces, equipment, and supplies in Saudi Arabia and other neighboring states. President Bush warned Saddam Hussein of final deadline for peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Coalition air campaign was launched during the early hours of January 17, 1991. After 38 days of airstrikes, coalition ground assault was launched on February 24. Iraqi army was crushed in a hundred hours. Iraq accepted coalition cease-fire conditions, including the establishment of a UN commission to oversee the destruction of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons program, Iraq’s missile program, and the demarcation of a “no-fly” zone for Iraqi aircraft.

SOMALIA (December 9, 1992 – May 4, 1994)

Operation Restore Hope

January 1991: Somali strongman Siad Barre was ousted from power by a coalition of Somalian clan leaders. Fighting among potential successors escalated, and government authority completely collapsed. The Horn of Africa was in its second-year of catastrophic drought. The subsequent civil war coupled with the drought produced a famine of biblical proportions. June 1992: The death rate reached 3,000 people a day. Nearly 300,000 people had died of famine, and nearly two million more were at risk of starvation. UN efforts to distribute food were met with armed opposition and the theft of relief supplies by the armed forces of the local and regional war lords. July 1992: The UN Security Council approved an airlift of food as well as a protective UN force to assist the distribution. August 1992: The airlift known as Provide Relief began, but had very limited impact. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) ran the airlift out of Kenya. September 1992: 500 Pakistani peacekeepers were airlifted into Mogadishu to help protect food shipments. Although 28,000 tons of food had been sent to the country over six months, significant food deliveries to the interior were impossible because of the intense fighting. November 1992: The security situation continued to worsen, preventing the distribution of relief aid. A ship laden with supplies was fired upon in Mogadishu harbor and forced to turn back without dispensing relief supplies. The Joint Chiefs informed the President that incremental force increases would fail to protect relief convoys. The JCS proposed the military force package that would eventually carry out Operation Restore Hope. December 9, 1992: U.S. forces began arriving in Somalia to lead a powerful multinational force of 30,000 troops built around a core of two U.S. divisions. Its mandate was limited strictly to protecting humanitarian activities and restoring stability with an expected duration of the operation of up to four months. February 4, 1993: UNITAF completed its mission ahead of schedule. The mission appeared a success: starvation had disappeared, aid agencies began replacing food programs with health care efforts, and daily death rates in cities like Bardera and Baidoa dropped from hundreds a day to less than a dozen in each.
Operation Continue Hope (May 4, 1993 to March 25, 1994)

- May 4, 1993: Operation Restore Hope became Operation Continue Hope as the U.S. transferred control to the UN.
- This UN mission was much broader, intrusive, and open-ended: to disarm warlords and rebuild the Somali political system by force if necessary. The implicit U.S. objective was to rebuild the country into a democracy; the result was a political confrontation which led to military confrontation.
- June-July 1993: Chaos suddenly returned when 23 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed fighting with forces of local warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The UN forces attacked strongholds in retaliation, and began a massive manhunt for Aidid in which 50 Somalis were killed. Riots erupted and resulted in the death of four foreign journalists.
- As fighting continued during the summer, the U.S. forces under separate U.S. (not UN) command assumed primary combat role from UN forces.
- October 3-4, 1993: 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and another 90 wounded as U.S. Rangers attempted to seize Aidid. Media coverage of bodies of U.S. soldiers dragged through streets shocked the American public and Congress; they were not told by the Clinton Administration of the shift from a humanitarian, low-risk mission to a political, high-risk mission. Both were highly critical of the outcome because the U.S. was humiliated by its losses and inability to confront the local warlord Aidid.
- October 7, 1993: Congressional anger was unanimous; members demanded withdrawal of U.S. forces. President Clinton called off the hunt for Aidid, and pledged to withdraw U.S. forces before April 1994.

HAITI (September 19, 1994 – October 15, 1994)

Operation Restore Democracy

- December 1990: Jean-Bertrand Aristide won 67 percent of the popular vote in a Presidential election that international observers deemed free and fair. Aristide assumed office in February 1991.
- September 1991: Aristide was overthrown in a military coup and forced into exile by the Haitian military.
- June 1993: UN imposed an oil and arms embargo against Haiti’s military junta.
- July 3, 1993: President Aristide and General Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, signed a UN-brokered agreement on Governor’s Island, establishing a 10-step process for the restoration of constitutional government and for President Aristide assuming power by October 30, 1993.
- UN re-imposed economic sanctions to punish the military junta for non-compliance with Governor’s Island Agreement, as well as continued violations of political and human rights.
- October 1993: The USS Harlen County carrying U.S. and Canadian troops in accordance with UN resolutions turned back rather than confront an angry but unarmed pro-Cedras mob on the docks of Port-au-Prince. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. military began contingency planning for military action.
- May 1994: The Haitian military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional President. The UN passed Resolution 917, further tightening economic sanctions.
July 1994: The UN adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to restore constitutional rule.

The collapse of the Governor’s Island Agreement and the subsequent failure of tightened sanctions led the UN to authorize use of force in July 1993.

President Clinton, facing generalized public concern over an unfolding humanitarian tragedy and waves of refugees, as well as political pressure in an election year from an umbrella of organizations led by Randall Robinson to “do something,” decided to extend a final diplomatic offer backed by the use of military force authorized by the UN Security Council.

Final diplomatic effort by Former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. Simultaneously with diplomatic mission, airborne forces dispatched from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were en route during negotiations to pressure military junta.

Last attempts at diplomatic solution, backed by military forces en route to Haiti, elicited concessions from the Haitian military junta.

U.S. troops entered Haiti without having to resort to force.

October 15, 1994: Aristide returned to Haiti.

March 31, 1995: The U.S. transferred peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN.

The refugee flow slowed, but still remains a problem given Haiti’s egregious human rights violations, while Haiti has become a transshipment point of choice for drug cartels in the ensuing chaos.

TAIWAN STRAIT (July 21, 1995 – March 23, 1996)
Taiwan Strait Crises

October 1994: A nuclear attack submarine from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) shadowed a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea, raising tensions between the U.S. and PRC.

June 9-10, 1995: Taiwanese President Lee visited the U.S.

July 21-26, 1995: PRC conducted tests of nuclear-capable missiles 60 kilometers north of Taiwan in conjunction with move of bombers to within 250 kilometers of Taiwan. PRC simultaneously denounced Lee’s visit to the U.S. Taiwan’s stock market and currency devalued.

U.S. 7th Fleet deployed carrier battle group to region.

January-March 1996: PRC re-deployed military forces from other parts of the country to coastal areas facing Taiwan.

March 5, 1996: PRC announced plans to conduct week-long missile tests beginning on March 8, 23 miles off Taiwan’s coast. Shipping and air traffic disrupted for duration of missile firings.

President Clinton and Defense Secretary Cohen were directly involved in recommendations for diplomatic interactions and the deployment of naval forces.

Although Congress did not formally take action, its members who were strong advocates of Taiwanese independence were very vocal with the White House and the Defense Department regarding the PRC’s aggressive behavior.

Two carrier battle groups were sent into the region to monitor the PRC missile tests.

PRC promptly ended the missile tests.

The U.S. secretly increased military assistance to Taiwan.

Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC deteriorated, but subsequently improved.

The U.S. and PRC signed a formal agreement to minimize incidents at sea.
IRAQ (December 16-19, 1998)
Operation Desert Fox

- Iraq continued and intensified non-compliance and interference with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) overseeing the dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and production capability.
- Iraq also continued with production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Iraq expelled UNSCOM; maintaining the credibility of the UN in such circumstances became a priority for the U.S.
- Iraq has resisted all subsequent efforts to resume inspections. President Clinton’s national security team agreed that the U.S. is empowered under existing UN resolutions to use military force against Iraq.
- President Clinton’s advisors recommended limited airstrikes, fearing that a sustained air campaign would result in the demise of the UN weapons inspections regime in Iraq.
- Four-day airstrike campaign, the Desert Fox, began December 16, 1998.
- “Substantial damage” was inflicted on: Iraqi air defense systems; command and control facilities; missile production capability; the systems which could be used for chemical and biological warfare; and the Republican Guard organization which, being Iraq’s elite military forces, were heavily involved in the weapons of mass destruction programs.
- Iraq fully rejected UNSCOM inspections and the UN-imposed no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.
- Iraqi challenges to the U.S., its allies, and the UN continued and intensified.
- Since Desert Fox, the U.S. has conducted over 120 airstrikes against Iraqi targets in response to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones.
- Iraq has continued to resist inspections including a very new scheme proposed in September 2000 and despite a loosening of the embargo, which allows Iraq to sell all the oil it produces.
- No military actions are being taken against Iraq in retaliation for its refusal to allow inspection or against facilities believed to be producing weapons of mass destruction. The only military action has been in response to Iraqi attacks of U.S. patrols.

YUGOSLAVIA/KOSOVO (March 24, 1999 – June 10, 1999)
Operation Allied Force

- Mid-1990s: Kosovo’s autonomy as a Serbian province within the Yugoslav federation of six republics was suspended by Slobodan Milosevic, the new chief of the Serbian Communist Party. New Serbian laws superseded the old which provided for Albanian institutions. In 1997, the newly formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) pushed a violent offensive for Kosovo’s independence and killed over 50 Serb policemen, as well as civilians loyal to the Yugoslav regime.
- In 1992, President George Bush warned Milosevic that the U.S. would use force if the Serbs attacked Kosovo. The U.S. goal was to avert another Bosnia and regional destabilization.
- February 1998: Milosevic sent troops in areas controlled by the KLA, destroying property and killing 80 KLA fighters in the rebel stronghold of Drenica. The killing provoked Albanian riots and violence throughout Kosovo, resembling similar (prior) violent unrest in the early 1980s.
- July and August 1998: KLA expanded its violent offensive and seized control of 40 percent of Kosovo before being defeated in another Serb offensive.
September 1998: Twenty-two Albanians were killed by Serb police in clashes in KLA strongholds. UN Security Council called for immediate cease-fire and political dialogue.

October 1998: NATO authorized airstrikes against Serb military targets. Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops, permit the return of refugees, and accept 2,000 unarmed international monitors.

October-December 1998: Fragile truce continued with periodic incidents of violence on both sides.

December 1998- January 1999: Violence escalated prompting the NATO allies to demand that warring sides attend the peace conference in Rambouillet, France.

February 6-March 18, 1999: Two rounds of talks were held between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Rambouillet. Despite its initial refusal, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed an accord calling for interim autonomy secured by 28,000 NATO troops. The Serbs refused to accept the agreement’s demands that NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo have freedom of movement throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia, and rejected the accord.

March 22-23, 1999: Special envoy Richard Holbrooke arrived in Belgrade in a last attempt to convince Milosevic to accept the accord. The Yugoslav parliament rejected the NATO demands.

NATO remained the prime institutional decision-maker, with a requirement of consensus among 19 members on all major decisions. Ground intervention was taken off the table publicly, but no planning was done until late in the second month of bombing.


The original objective of the bombing, included in the UN Security Council resolution, was Serb troop withdrawal from Kosovo and return of Albanian refugees.

June 3, 1999: The Serbian parliament approved the G-8’s peace plan.

June 10, 1999: Yugoslavia began to withdraw its military forces from Kosovo, NATO suspended the bombing campaign, and the UN Security Council formally ratified the negotiated peace proposal. NATO peacekeeping force began deployment to Kosovo.

The U.S., followed by others in NATO, set new objective for building a multiethnic, multiparty democracy for Kosovo — a big jump in feasibility and potential danger.

June 1999: Attacks against Serbs and other non-Albanians and against property – mostly including Christian churches but also other places of worship – with an Albanian intent at reverse-ethnic cleansing produced another mass exodus of refugees. Albanian organized crime, closely tied with the KLA and their activities, overwhelmed UN peacekeepers.

September 1999: The first UN peacekeeper was killed by a KLA splinter group in Kosovo for speaking Serbian in public.
ADDONIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE DIALOGUES ON INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION:


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