Center for the Study of the Presidency

An Initiative: Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications



An Initiative:
Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications

Phyllis d'Hoop
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Center for the Study of the Presidency
Washington, D.C.
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About the Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Center for the Study of the Presidency, founded in 1965, is a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to serving as a central resource addressing issues affecting the modern Presidency. As the foremost organization in the United States dedicated to this effort, the Center endeavors to examine all aspects of the American Presidency, to strengthen the Executive-Legislative Branch relationship, and to encourage public service, especially among young Americans.

Other CSP publications include:

Presidential Studies Quarterly (ISSN 0360-4918)

Lessons for the 21st Century: Vulnerability and Surprise, December 7, 1941 and September 11, 2001 (Washington, D.C., March, 2002)

Marshalling Science, Bridging the Gap: How to Win the War Against Terrorism and Build a Better Peace (Washington, D.C., June, 2002)

Panel Report to the President and Congress on Comprehensive Strategic Reform (Washington, D.C., September, 2001)

Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut (January 2001)

F*orward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies* (Washington, D.C., 2001).

A Call for Transformational Leadership: U.S. and Japan (Tokyo, 2001).

Advancing Innovation: Improving the S&T Advisory Structure and Policy Process (Washington, D.C., 2001).

In Harm's Way: Intervention and Prevention (Washington, D.C., 2000).

Dialogues on Presidential Leadership: The President, Congress, and the Media (Washington, D.C., 2000)

Papers of the 2002-2003 Center Fellows (Washington, D.C., 2003)

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FOREWORD

Why This Initiative?
Why CSP?

DURING THE 2000 ELECTION YEAR, the revitalized Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP) undertook new efforts to look at Presidential leadership and how to improve those organizations that support it.

After relocating from New York to Washington, D.C., the Center initiated several studies related to the Presidency. One, entitled *Comprehensive Strategic Reform*, was a bi-partisan call, by twenty-three practitioners and scholars, for a sweeping move away from the rigid governmental institutions which originally were created to win the bi-polar Cold War. The panel called for a new national security approach that placed a premium on anticipation, agility, and communications in this uncertain world.

This report, written in 1999-2000, spotlighted new structures and strategies needed to go beyond traditional State Department public diplomacy. The report warned that anti-Americanism was on the rise around the globe, precisely at a time when our communications capabilities had been left considerably weakened by the dismemberment of the United States Information Agency and significant cuts in funding. It also called for a new communications strategy that would overarch relevant departments and agencies, as well as engage private sector talent and technologies. In addition, the report suggested that a new public corporation might be required to tap into the information and entertainment expertise of the private sector.

This strategic reform report was discussed in outline form with the new Administration and Congressional leaders during 2000 and 2001.

Then came the earth shaking attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.

CSP responded to the tragedies of 9/11 by focusing on communications with Muslim communities worldwide. Initial funding came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Dr. Scholl Foundation in support of a range of meetings engaging scholars and practitioners with expertise on Muslim communities, American culture, and communications and information technology. In June, the Center hosted a large plenary meeting on the challenges of strengthening U.S. Muslim Communications, which was made possible by a grant from the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation. A valuable report by the Council on Foreign Relations on public diplomacy, energetically led by Chairman Pete Peterson, also assisted our efforts; and several of our scholars were involved in the Council's efforts.

At stake is our national security. The current gulf between the public diplomacy challenge we face and the inadequate financial and organizational capabilities we have is frightening and poses a direct and present danger to America.

Although budget deficits are increasing and new appropriations must be fully justified, this huge gap in what clearly is a part of our national security must be put in

precisely the same context as funding for our Armed Forces or the reconstruction of Iraq. A major increase in Congressional appropriations to public diplomacy is critical. Toward this end, we encourage Congressional spokespersons for this cause to help organize informal caucuses so that a wider range of members of Congress will understand the importance of the challenge we face.

If anyone believes that the issue of anti-Americanism stemming from our ineffective public diplomacy is not a critical national security deficiency, they should look again at the collapsing Twin Towers and the burning Pentagon. As was said in the concluding panel of our June plenary meeting, the time for talk is over, and the time for action is now.

Given the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, there is a new battle of ideas added to what has confronted us with al Qaeda, radical Wahabbism, and Baathism. It is a battle for hearts and minds of Muslim communities, not only in Iraq but also throughout the world. Will America be labeled an invader and occupier as well as a new target for converging terrorists? Or instead, will America be called a liberator and become the bridge to a world of democratic ideas, governance with checks and balances, empowerment of all genders and ethnic groups, job enhancement, and civility with religious tolerance as a way of enhancing deeper spiritually?

Currently, we are crippled in our organizational structures, with insufficient marshalling of our brainpower, and with inadequate resources to face this challenge, both in Iraq and around the globe. The perceptions and credibility of U.S. leadership rests largely on our ability to meet this challenge. As this report amply indicates, Executive Branch officials are doing innovative work, but they lack the increased investment and effective organization needed to meet this new challenge.

The timing of this CSP effort on U.S.-Muslim communications was fortuitous indeed. During the summer of 2003, Congress established an Advisory Group within the State Department to identify ways to improve U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds. It will report to the Executive and Legislative Branches this October. CSP's work has been shared with members of this advisory body. The able Chair is Ambassador Ed Djerejian. I am a member of this group and had the experience, in 1974, of serving as the first chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting.

We hope that this CSP initiative, which involves a range of scholars on the Muslim world as well as high-level public policy practitioners both in and out of government, will help generate the resources and organization that world peace and American security demand.

David M. Abshire
President
Center for the Study of the Presidency

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Our work has been greatly enhanced by Jeffrey Thomas's substantive contribution. Not only did he offer valuable inputs throughout the whole of the initiative, but, in addition, he has played a central role in the creation of this report.

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Phyllis d'Hoop
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ADDRESSING THE COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGE

DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

By Jeffrey Thomas

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Following the end of the Cold War, some degree of skepticism about—and even resentment of—America as the dominant world power was inevitable. During the 1990s, misgivings and ambivalent attitudes about the United States in many countries no doubt reflected this tendency. But today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the rise in anti-Americanism among Muslims in much of the world is extraordinary, in both its scope and intensity. Surprisingly, opinion polls show that **this increase in Muslim resentment of the United States has occurred at a time when Muslims across the world are open to values and ideals that America has propagated for decades, such as democratic governance, free market economics, and the expansion of international trade and investment**. This paradox is present in many non-Muslim countries, but the level of anti-Americanism in predominantly Muslim regions is unmatched elsewhere, even though Muslims generally accept many core American principles as universal.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, people and governments around the world expressed sympathy for the United States and unity with the American people. Nevertheless, within two years, this widespread empathy has largely evaporated as America's popular image has deteriorated in much of the world. The decline in support for the United States is starkly evident in predominantly Muslim countries, where—despite wide diversity in culture, language, and historical experience—a common and deep antipathy for America has developed. From Muslim populations in northern and western Africa to Indonesia, animosity for the United States and America's international objectives have become endemic.

Both the depth of anti-American sentiment and its expansion among Muslims are apparent in areas of strategic importance to the United States. In Jordan and the Palestinian territories, a region critical to the success of the U.S.-led Israeli-Palestinian peace process, opposition to the United States is essentially unanimous (ninety-nine percent in Jordan and ninety-eight percent among Palestinians). **Perhaps even more alarming, in Turkey, a key NATO ally, and Indonesia, the most populous predominantly Muslim country in the world, support for the United States has declined from majorities in 2000 to just fifteen percent in the spring of 2003**. Parallel to this precipitous decline in support from a key ally and a strategically important country, opposition to America among many Muslims has become manifest in sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and home to approximately 65 million Muslims, only thirty-eight percent of Muslims hold favorable attitudes toward the United States, in contrast to an approval rating of eighty-five percent by Nigeria's non-Muslim population.[1]

The decline in America's image worldwide reached a low point in the days leading up to the Iraq war in the spring of 2003, but recovered somewhat in most countries following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Most Muslim populations, however, have

remained impervious to this modest post-war recovery in attitudes toward the United States. **In fact, intense dislike of America has spread beyond the Middle East and Pakistan, where it had been concentrated in recent years, to Muslims elsewhere in Africa and Asia**. In the weeks prior to the Iraq war, disapproval of the United States rose substantially in the Middle East, reaching as high as ninety-five percent in Saudi Arabia and ninety-one percent in Morocco.[2] Opinion surveys conducted after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein reveal that anti-American sentiment, while remaining strong in Arab states, has expanded to other Muslim populations, even at it has begun to recede in much of the rest of the world. [3] Consequently, although the rise in anti-American sentiment is not exclusively a Muslim phenomenon, the breadth and intensity of Muslim aversion to the United States indicates that, if unchecked, it could become a defining characteristic in U.S.-Muslim relations.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Anti-Americanism and presumed anti-Western sentiment among Muslims has been the subject of commentary and analysis since the terrorist attacks in September 2001. However, as alluded to above, negative Muslim attitudes toward the United States are not based on a general dislike of all things American or on a broader anti-Western outlook; nor are they derived from a clash of values brought about by globalization and modernization. Rather, as with anti-American sentiment among many non-Muslims, the principal source is aversion to U.S. policies.

The Fallacy of a Values Divide

Extensive opinion surveys by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press and the American-based polling firm Zogby International have found that, despite low opinions of the United States, Muslim views of Americans are mixed. In both surveys, more people expressed favorable views rather than unfavorable views of Americans in about half of the Muslim countries polled.[4] Although these results suggest room for improvement, they do not support the assertion that Muslims are generally disdainful of all things associated with America.

In addition to contrasting Muslim attitudes toward the United States and the American people, **opinion surveys since September 2001 reveal that Muslims from diverse regions of the world generally like many aspects of American culture**. Polling by the Pew Research Center and Zogby International demonstrate that, from West Africa to East Asia, **Muslims broadly approve of American science and technology, American-made products, American education, and American entertainment**.[5] Additionally, contrary to the frequently expressed view that young Muslims are particularly prone to anti-Americanism, favorable attitudes toward American culture are strongest among Muslims between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine.[6]

This acceptance of highly visible aspects of American culture is accompanied by strong approval among Muslims around the world for democracy and the civil liberties embraced by the West. According to a Pew Research Center survey of Muslims in seventeen different countries (including six countries in which Muslims are not a majority of the population), with one exception—Indonesia—more people accept the idea that democracy can work in their countries than believe that democracy is just a Western phenomenon. Additionally, survey data reveal that most

Muslims desire to live in countries that regularly hold honest multiparty elections, ensure the separation of religion and the state, and guarantee freedom of expression.[7]

Perhaps most surprising, Muslims generally have positive attitudes about key features of globalization. Opinion surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in ten Muslim countries reveal that majorities in all ten nations polled support the expansion of international trade and business ties, faster international communications, greater international travel, and the increased availability of products from different parts of the world. Similarly, in most of the Muslim nations surveyed, majorities or pluralities believe that large multinational companies and the key international institutions supporting economic integration—the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization—have a positive influence on their countries.[8] **These results belie the contention that economic integration, modernization, or the intrusion of Western culture into Muslim societies is sparking a clash of values between Islam and the West**.

The Role of U.S. Policies

In contrast to Muslim attitudes about Americans and American culture, Muslims around the world have strongly negative views regarding U.S. actions abroad. **Opinion surveys since September 2001 reveal that large majorities in Muslim countries believe the United States acts unilaterally without regard to the interests of others and is ruthless, aggressive, and easily provoked**.[9] This aversion to the U.S. approach to world affairs, which generally is as strong among young Muslims as it is among older generations, more closely parallels anti-American sentiments among Muslims abroad.[10] Along with non-Muslims around the world, Muslims cite this aversion to U.S. policies as the principle reason for differences with the United States. According to the Pew Research Center's 2002 global survey, majorities in thirty-eight of forty-three countries—Muslim and non-Muslim—blame differences between their countries and the United States on policy disputes, rather than a clash of values. **In every Muslim country in which majorities expressed negative attitudes toward the United States, the principal reason cited was U.S. policies**.[11]

This disapproval of U.S. actions abroad is reflected most acutely in widespread Muslim opposition to U.S. policies toward Muslim countries. **A Gallup Organization poll conducted shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan found that large majorities in eight Muslims countries believed U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to be morally unjustified**.[12] Moreover, opinion polls conducted in the spring of 2002 indicate overwhelming Muslim opposition—even in the non-Arab countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia—to U.S. policies toward the Arab states. America's approach toward the Israeli-Palestine conflict attracts even greater Muslim condemnation, with large majorities—ranging from seventy-eight to ninety-six percent—in eight Muslim countries opposing U.S. policies.[13]

Muslim opposition to U.S. policies toward Palestine is exacerbated by the elevated standing the Palestinian cause has assumed among Arabs and, increasingly, Muslims in other parts of the world. Significant Arab and Muslim support for such extremist anti-Israel groups as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades suggests a reservoir of hostility concerning this issue. At the same time, the Israeli-Palestine conflict for many Muslims has taken on a significance usually reserved for personal quality of life matters. Opinion survey results reveal that Arabs rank the impor-

tance of the Palestinian issue as highly as they rank the importance of their personal economic circumstances and far higher than they rank the importance of the general Arab situation or their countries' relations with non-Arab states. **Thus, among a large number of Muslims, the Palestinian cause has assumed an importance beyond that of other regional or foreign policy issues and is now equated with issues of personal welfare.[14] Along with U.S. policies toward the region, it has become a prism through which Arabs and, increasingly, Muslims in other regions view the United States**.[15]

In addition to U.S. policies toward the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S approach toward Iraq has emerged as a new focus of Muslim resentment. As demonstrated by the intensity and reach of anti-American sentiment among Muslims in the weeks before the Iraq war and by continued Muslim antipathy for the United States in the months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, **developments in Iraq have become a key factor in how many Muslims judge the United States. Moreover, Muslims are largely dismissive of American plans to establish a stable democratic regime in Iraq and to promote democracy elsewhere in region**. According to post-war polling results, majorities in most countries around the world believe that the Iraqi people will be better off with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In contrast, this contention is widely rejected by Muslims, who generally believe that Iraqis will suffer more after Saddam Hussein's overthrow than they did under his rule. Additionally, although much of the world expresses guarded optimism that the Middle East will become more democratic with the downfall of Saddam Hussein, this idea is largely rejected in predominantly Muslim countries.[16] **An opinion survey conducted in six Arab countries in the weeks before the war found that only five percent of respondents believed that a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq would bring more democracy to the region**.[17]

"The poisonous image of The United States that is deliberately propagated around the world is more than a mere irritation. It has a direct and negative impact on American interests, not only by undermining our foreign policy goals, but also by endangering the safety of Americans here at home and abroad."

Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL)
Chairman,
House International
Relations Committee

This skepticism about the U.S. role in promoting democracy in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East is accompanied by a widespread belief that, while the United States voices support for democratization abroad, it supports autocratic regimes and helps ensure that democracy is denied to many Arabs and Muslims. Despite the broad support for democracy and civil rights in most Muslim countries, large numbers of Muslims believe they lack such basic liberties as fair elections, impartial judicial systems, freedom of the media from government censorship, and freedom to criticize their governments.[18] **The perception that America supports many authoritarian governments and, at least indirectly, assists them in the suppression of these rights, especially in the Middle East, fuels anger at the United States and its policies**.

Muslim resentment of perceived American hypocrisy on the issue of democracy and human rights is exacerbated by perceptions that, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the U.S. government discriminates against Muslims in America—foreign visitors and American citizens alike—and denies them basic rights afforded others. At a time of almost instant international communications, perceived incidents of abuse by U.S. authorities—even if they are not the norm—can do enormous harm to America's image abroad, especially if news of their

occurrence is circulated via the Internet or reported by satellite television stations such as Al Jazeera. Moreover, **Muslims in America—especially visiting students and recent immigrants who still have close ties with their (or their parents') countries of origin—constitute some of the most important informal ambassadors of the United States. What they report to families, friends, and classmates in foreign countries can have a substantial impact on the views adopted by Muslims abroad**.

CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

Popular Muslim resentment of America and its polices has strong negative consequences for the U.S. government and the American people. **In addition to encouraging anti-American violence, hostility toward U.S. policies has a corrosive impact on America's interactions abroad—in formal government-to-government relations and in the private interactions of individual Americans—and undermines the prospects for cooperation in the long term**. Moreover, although acts of violence are the most extreme and dangerous manifestations of anti-American sentiment, other detrimental effects are more widespread and, as the United States takes on major new commitments in the Middle East, pose a growing danger to American interests.

"In an era when allied cooperation is essential in the war against terrorism, we cannot afford to shrug off negative public opinion overseas as uninformed or irrelevant. The governments of most nations respond to public opinion, whether it is demonstrated in the voting booth or in the streets."

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN)
Chairman,
Senate Foreign
Relations Committee

Support for Extremist Groups

The most alarming consequence of hostility toward the United States is anti-American violence. Only a very small minority of people—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—who profess even profound antipathy for the United States actively engage in terrorism or other forms of political violence. However, hatred of America, along with other socio-political factors that induce people to engage in extremist activities, does impel some to accept violence against civilians as a legitimate political instrument and to join radical groups with anti-American agendas. Recent terrorist attacks against the United States, from the 1998 bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, demonstrate that even a relatively small group of dedicated individuals can inflict massive damage and loss of life.

More common than active participation in political violence is the encouragement and support—political and financial—that people who harbor anti-American sentiments provide to extremist groups. Popular political support for radical organizations with anti-American agendas can deter foreign governments from fully confronting such groups, even when under intense U.S. and international pressure to do so. At times, some governments actively encourage support for radical causes as a means of channeling popular discontent away from internal political concerns. Authoritarian governments with tenuous popular legitimacy, such as those found in much of the Middle East, are particularly susceptible to the influence of popularly supported extremist groups.

By adopting or emphasizing strong anti-American positions, extremist groups can also gain support from people who harbor hostility toward the

United States, but who care little for the overall political, social, or religious objectives pursued by such groups. A disturbing illustration of this trend emerged from opinion surveys conducted in the two largest Muslim countries, Indonesia and Pakistan. According to polling data, the people of both nations support freedom of religion and generally believe violence against civilians is never or is rarely justified. Yet large numbers of Indonesians (fifty-eight percent) and Pakistanis (forty-five percent) believe Osama bin Laden will do the right thing regarding world affairs.[19] Such an endorsement of a man who was instrumental in erecting an oppressive theocracy in Afghanistan and who coordinated acts of mass murder against American and other civilians is at odds with a belief in religious tolerance and the rejection of violence against non-combatants. However, **Osama bin Laden's anti-American actions and rhetoric are well matched to the large percentage of Indonesians (eighty-three percent) and Pakistanis (eighty-one percent) who hold negative views of the United States**.[20]

Impact on Policy Making in Foreign Governments

Popular anti-American sentiment also exerts strong pressure on foreign governments. Because few governments—even oppressive ones—can ignore popular sentiment indefinitely, public opinion affects the policy-making process to some degree in virtually all countries. Predominantly Muslim countries—whether under democratic or authoritarian rule—are no exception. A prominent example took shape in the weeks before the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. According to polling data, prior to the Iraq war, more people in Turkey believed that the removal of Saddam Hussein would be beneficial for their country than believed it would be bad for Turkey. However, **a majority of Turks also expressed negative attitudes toward the United States and accepted the contention that U.S. plans to use military force in Iraq were part of a larger war against Muslim countries**. Consequently, an overwhelming majority of Turks (eighty-three percent) opposed allowing the United States and its allies to use bases in Turkey to end Saddam Hussein's rule.[21] **Despite a U.S. offer of several billion dollars in economic assistance, the Turkish parliament refused to grant the United States permission to use Turkish bases, thus scuttling U.S. plans to deploy heavy ground forces in northern Iraq**.

Widespread anti-American sentiment among Muslim populations also poses serious risks to U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. Although international support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts has declined since the Iraq war, strong majorities in many countries—ten out of twelve non-Muslim nations according to a post-war opinion survey—still support the United States on this issue. In contrast, **Muslims populations express almost universal opposition to the U.S.-led war on terrorism**. In Pakistan, one of the most important allies in America's ongoing anti-terrorism efforts, opposition to the war on terrorism rose from forty-five percent in the summer of 2002 to seventy-four percent after the Iraq war. **Only in Kuwait does a majority support the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign**. Opposition in seven other predominantly Muslim countries ranges from sixty-seven percent to ninety-seven percent.[22] Sustained opposition of this magnitude to the war on terrorism may undermine the willingness and ability of many governments in Muslim countries to cooperate with the United States on an issue that will remain vital to U.S. security for years to come.

Erosion of Mutual Trust and Cooperation

Muslim animosity for the United States, combined with the potentially corrosive

influence it has on American perceptions of Muslims abroad, also undermines prospects for building and maintaining a basic level of mutual trust and understanding between Americans and Muslim societies. Just as widespread opinion that the United States is dismissive of the interests of Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere promotes anti-American sentiment, **American perceptions that Muslims are generally hostile to the United States and the American people foster the formation of negative attitudes about Muslims and Islam on the part of the American public**. A nationwide poll conducted in the summer of 2003 indicates that this process may already be underway. The survey reveals that a plurality (forty-four percent) of Americans believe that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence, a substantial increase from the twenty-five percent of Americans who held this view just one year previously.[23] **Mutually reinforcing negative perceptions, if unchecked, will severely constrain opportunities to expand constructive relations between individual Americans, American companies, and American civil society and their Muslim counterparts**.

The failure to establish cooperative relations also jeopardizes American interests and commitments in predominantly Muslim regions. Over the long term, military basing rights in the strategically important Persian Gulf, continued close political and military cooperation with Turkey, and anti-terrorist collaboration with Pakistan will be difficult to sustain if hostility toward the United States remains prevalent in these countries. Additionally, in the past two years, the United States has assumed the leadership role in a renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace process and has embarked on critical state-building projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Failure in any of these endeavors could have enormous repercussions for regional stability and could undercut the global campaign against terrorism by providing new catalysts for anti-Americanism. Mistrust of and anger at the United States, which may grow if U.S. efforts do not begin yielding results soon, has already put these initiatives at risk, Furthermore, Muslim hostility toward America endangers public support in the United States for the arduous years-long effort required to secure a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to build stable democratic states in Afghanistan and Iraq.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The United States maintains a sophisticated apparatus of international communications programs designed to help shape foreign public opinion. However, a number of experts question whether the organization, methodology, and funding levels of America's global communications structure are adequate to the task of addressing the broad anti-Americanism prevalent in Muslim countries. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush Administration has played the leading role in overthrowing two of the world's most despotic regimes, both of which were responsible for massive human rights abuses and atrocities against their own Muslim citizens. Additionally, **at enormous political and diplomatic risk, President Bush has publicly embraced the concept of a Palestinian state and has assumed the leadership role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, he receives little credit internationally for the positive aspects of these policies, which are widely denounced or viewed with skepticism by Muslims abroad**.

Track-Two Operations Supported by the U.S. Government

As a fundamental part of its efforts to promote human rights and democracy abroad, the United States supports several independent activities that are shielded from government interference. Among the most important is the State Department's Human Rights Report, mandated by Congress since 1961, which details human rights abuses in countries around the world on an annual basis. The independence of this report partially shields the U.S. government from censure by foreign governments singled out in the report, including governments with which the United States must cooperate to advance such vital interests as combating terrorism and halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Similar independence is a hallmark of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Established by Congress in 1983, the NED provides hundreds of grants each year to support democracy around the world. Although it receives annual Congressional funding, it is a private, non-profit organization that operates independently of the U.S. government. The NED channels funding to four principal non-profit organizations:

The International Republic Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

These two organizations promote democratic ideals and institutions worldwide through technical support and training in the electoral process, the building of independent political parties dedicated to democracy, the development of civil society, and other democracy-building activities.

Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)

Affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Supports the development of private enterprise through training programs, technical assistance, and grants to indigenous organizations in developing countries.

American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS)

Affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
Provides training and information to workers around the world who are trying to build independent trade unions.

Sources: American Center for International Labor Solidarity <www.solidaritycenter.org>; Center for International Private Enterprise <www.cipe.org>; International Republican Institute <www.iri.org>; National Democratic Institute <www.ndi.org>; and National Endowment for Democracy <www. ned.org>; U.S. Department of State <www. State.gov>

Modern Public Diplomacy

During the First World War, Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information to propagate U.S. war aims to foreign audiences. Franklin Roosevelt followed this example in 1942 with the creation of the Voice of America (VOA) to serve as the principal instrument of U.S. communications with foreign publics. During the Cold War, U.S. international communications expanded and grew more sophisticated with the creation of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The Fullbright Act of 1946 and the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 added a new component to U.S. communications by officially incorporating educational and cultural exchanges between Americans and other societies into U.S. foreign policy.[24] Together, these communications operations constituted an increasingly important component of U.S. overseas engagement.

In 1963, President Kennedy inaugurated the modern age of U.S. public diplomacy. At his initiative, the U.S. government's international communications programs, rather than focusing primarily on disseminating information, became more actively engaged in influencing public attitudes abroad. While retaining the task of informing and explaining American ideals and national goals to foreign audiences, U.S. communications operations also assumed the mission of achieving specific foreign policy objectives by helping to mold popular opinions overseas. Additionally, President Kennedy directed USIA to advise him and other U.S. policymakers on the likely impact of U.S. policies, programs, and official statements on foreign public opinions.[25] Thus, public

THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BBG) OVERSEES THE FOLLOWING BROADCAST SERVICES:

Voice of America
Broadcasts around the world in fifty-three languages

Radio Sawa
Broadcasts in Arabic to the Middle East

Radio Farda
Broadcasts in Persian to Iran

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Radio Free Asia
Broadcasts in ten languages to East and Southeast Asia

Radio and TV Marti
Broadcast in Spanish to Cuba

WORLDNET Television
Broadcasts worldwide via satellite

Source: Broadcasting Board of Governors <www.bbg.org>

diplomacy evolved into a complex process—involving international broadcasting, cultural and educational exchange programs, overseas libraries and cultural exhibits, and a corps of policy and opinion analysts—dedicated to three broad tasks:

- influencing the formation of public attitudes abroad about the United States and its policies;
- informing U.S. policymakers about the impact of current and prospective U.S policies on attitudes overseas; and
- facilitating dialogue and mutual understanding between Americans and foreign societies.

In 1973, Congress introduced an innovative approach to U.S. public diplomacy by establishing the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), an independent public body assigned to oversee Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (formerly funded by the CIA). This new board was modeled on the British Broadcasting Corporation to separate it from government influence and to build its reputation for independence and quality journalism. Under the BIB's guidance, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty served as surrogates for a free press in the Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact allies, ensuring the free flow of ideas in communist-dominated societies.[26] This independent broadcasting track of public diplomacy, which played a considerable role in ending the Soviet state and the Cold War, provided a model for independent (track-two), government-funded operations to support democracy, human rights, and free enterprise overseas.[27] (See Box on Track-Two Operations.)

After the Cold War, the framework of U.S. public diplomacy was altered significantly. The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated all non-military U.S. government international broadcasting services under a newly created Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Four years later, the Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998 mandated that the BBG become an independent public organization. As a result, under the BBG's supervision, all seven major U.S. international broadcasting services now operate independently of the U.S. government. (See Box the BBG.)

The 1998 law also consolidated USIA into the State Department. Under this consolidation plan, the State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs assumed primary responsibility for U.S. global communications programs and information services while the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs assumed responsibility for government-sponsored exchange programs.[28] Foreign opinion analysis operations were placed in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In January 2003, President Bush signed an executive order adding a new element to the newly reorganized public diplomacy structure. This directive officially established the White House Office of Global Communications to advise the President on U.S. communications policies and to coordinate international communications on specific issues of strategic importance.[29]

Inadequacy of Current U.S. Public Diplomacy

Despite this network of communications and analytical resources, experts have identified for major weakness in current U.S. public diplomacy efforts. **First, public diplomacy is frequently undervalued as a tool of foreign policy, a problem that has been amply demonstrated in the years since the end of the Cold War. In the past decade, funding for U.S. public diplomacy has fallen by thirty-five to forty**

percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.[30] This decline is particularly evident in activities directed toward Muslim countries. In such key Arab states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, participation in the State Department's educational and cultural exchange programs has fallen by twenty-one percent. In the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan—home to almost half a billion Muslims—participation in such exchanges has declined by one-third.[31]

Second, the (often enormous) impact of U.S. policies easily overwhelms the effects of policy advocacy and other aspects of public diplomacy. The role that U.S. actions abroad, and increasingly at home, play in the formation of public attitudes overseas is far larger than that of U.S. communications with foreign audiences.[32] Public diplomacy has little effect when weighed against American policies that are perceived by foreign audiences to have negative impacts on human rights, the local economy, or domestic politics.

Third, U.S. public diplomacy faces a competitive disadvantage in today's global communications environment. Foreign audiences today receive news, interpretation, and analysis of U.S. policies from a multitude of sources, especially as satellite television, the Internet, and other innovative media have expanded their global reach. In the Middle East, for example, competition for the satellite television market has become intense, with the Qatar-based al Jazeera, Saudi MBC, the Lebanese LBC-al Hayat, Hezbollah's al Manar, and Abu Dhabi Television all competing for Arabic-speaking audiences.[33] Both the effects of U.S. policy on foreign populations and information about these effects from the many available sources frequently drown out policy advocacy and communications from the U.S. government.

Fourth, American communications and interactions with foreign audiences come in a variety of forms and from many different sources. The nature, content, and quality of these interactions are far beyond the reach of coordination and control by the U.S. government (or anybody else). **The influence of Hollywood, the Internet, American business, American civil society, American colleges and universities, and American overseas travelers cannot possibly be shaped from Washington**.[34] Consequently, public diplomacy initiatives constitute a relatively minor segment of the stream of communications reaching foreign audiences from America.

MEETING THE CHALLENGE

Anti-Americanism is not a new occurrence; nor is it exclusively a Muslim phenomenon. However, the dramatic rise in Muslim anti-American sentiment over the past few years presents a new challenge to American national interests. This is especially true as the United States adopts new state-building and peace-brokering commitments in the Middle East and South Asia. Addressing this challenge will require, in addition to wise and informed policies, a new U.S. communications strategy that more accurately presents America's foreign policy objectives, establishes the foundations for constructive U.S.-Muslim interactions, and counters the negative stereotypes Americans and Muslims overseas often have toward one another. The following section of this report outlines some of the recommendations offered by a team of scholars, specialists, and practitioners convened by the Center for the Study of the Presidency to formulate such a strategy.

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4 Pew Research Center, *Views of a Changing World*, pp. T133-T134; and Zogby, *America as Seen through Arab Eyes*, p. 20.

5 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *What the World Thinks in 2002* (Washington, DC, December 2002), pp. T57-T58 <www.people-press.org>; and Zogby, *America as Seen through Arab Eyes*, pp. 12, 24, 28, and 32. Results on Muslim attitudes toward American entertainment are uneven. Zogby found that, of eight Muslim countries surveyed, majorities in all eight like American movies and television. The Pew Research Center found that majorities in five of ten Muslim populations like American music, movies, and television.

6 Zogby, *America as Seen through Arab Eyes*, pp. 13, 17, 25, and 33.

7 Democracy and civil liberties are embraced by most Muslims living in Bangladesh, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Muslims in Indonesia also embrace civil liberties, but are skeptical about the efficacy of democracy in their country. (Pew Research Center, *Views of a Changing World*, pp. 36, T58, T66-T71.)

8 Key aspects of globalization are favored in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. (Pew Research Center, *Views of a Changing World,* pp. T21-T25, T47, T50.)

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33 Marc Lynch, "Taking Arabs Seriously," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003), p. 86.

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RECOMMENDATIONS ON STRENGTHENING U.S.-MUSLIM COMMUNICATIONS

As the United States pursues its new long-term commitments to combat terrorism worldwide and to rebuild the nations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the close link between America's national security and popular perceptions abroad has become unmistakable. Yet the United States has failed to formulate and fund an effective global communications strategy to convincingly communicate U.S. policies, ideals, and national objectives to populations overseas. This failure is increasingly apparent in Muslim regions, where large majorities reject even those U.S. policies designed to advance common interests. **Similarly, the United States has failed to anticipate and adequately take account of public attitudes abroad and to consider how foreign popular opinion contributes to the success or failure of U.S. foreign policies. These shortcomings jeopardize the success of key initiatives that are heavily dependent on the support of foreign populations, such as finding a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.**

The United States has also failed to present an accurate and convincing picture of what America is and how it relates to the rest of the world. At the same time, the United States has failed to promote cross-culture dialogue and to adequately support activities that educate Americans about foreign cultures and languages. These failures are illustrated, in part, by the spread of negative stereotypes abroad about America and the growth of negative stereotypes about other cultures and societies in popular American culture. The false perceptions frequently held by Americans and Muslims toward one another contribute to (and, in turn, are reinforced by) mutual antagonism. A lack of knowledge about the religious and ethnic diversity of America, as well as about the diversity of American politics, distorts the image many Muslims abroad have of the United States. Similarly, a lack of knowledge about Islam and the multitude of Muslim societies lays the foundation for misconceptions and distortions among non-Muslim Americans about the world's diverse Muslim communities.

* * *

The President during his election campaign called for modesty in leadership, as becomes a great power, and in his inaugural address asked for civility in all leadership. Therefore, the United States should avoid styles of leadership that could be interpreted as unipower arrogance and, thus, play into opponents' hands.

FAILURE TO:

Effectively Explain U.S. Policies and Objectives

Adequately Integrate Analysis of Foreign Public Opinion into Policy Formulation

Convincingly Communicate an Accurate Picture of America

Promote Dialogue and Mutual Understanding between Americans and Societies Abroad

Fully Communicate Modesty of Leadership



CONSEQUENCES:

Increased Opposition to U.S. Policies

Miscalculations about Foreign Public Response to U.S. Actions

Spread of Misperceptions about American Principles and Objectives

Growth of Negative Stereotypes Held by Americans about Cultures and Societies Abroad

Widespread Perception that America Is Overly Domineering, Uncaring, and a Threat to Peace

To reverse these inadequacies of U.S. communications abroad, the United States must broaden and revitalize its global communications strategy. Traditionally, the term "public diplomacy" has implied a narrow focus on communications programs that are managed principally by the State Department. Addressing the new global communications challenge requires a broader approach that integrates and coordinates the communications of the Defense Department (with its enormous capabilities and technologies), the intelligence community, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Small Business Administration, and others with valuable experiences that should be communicated abroad. This broader approach also requires new structures to marshal the creativity of the private sector.

Within this broader framework, a revitalized communications strategy requires:

- upgrading the White House architecture for global communications to ensure that policy formulation and policy explanation take into account perceptions abroad,
- incorporating the best elements of the private and non-governmental sectors,
- taking greater advantage of new interactive technologies and methodologies,
- strengthening the coordination, formulation, and communication of key messages, and
- gaining and sustaining Presidential and Congressional support.

This undertaking presents a challenge that will require strong Presidential and Congressional leadership and a recognition that the Congressional authorization and appropriations process for global communications is as much an integral part of U.S. national security policy as is funding for the Defense Department and the reconstruction of Iraq.

Through its plenary, steering committee, and working group meetings, the Center for the Study of the Presidency convened scholars and practitioners to discuss recommendations for revitalizing U.S. global communications. These sessions included specialists on Muslim communities, international communications and information technology, American culture, and U.S. foreign policy. There was no formal process of voting for or against recommendations, but the conclusions of the large majority are presented below. Attribution for those who introduced specific recommendations appears in italicized print within parentheses.

I. THREE OPTIONS FOR UPGRADING THE WHITE HOUSE ARCHITECTURE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. CREATE A CABINET-LEVEL ADVISORY POSITION FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

Before USIA was dismantled, some of the agency's directors were close advisers to the President, often participating in decision making at the NSC level (as exemplified by the close working relationships between Ed Murrow and President Kennedy, Leonard Marks and President Johnson, and Charlie Wick and President Reagan). A new cabinet-level advisory position (such as a Special Counsellor to the President) is needed to ensure similar close interface between the President and his chief global communications adviser. This new adviser would not replace the President's Deputy Assistant for Global Communications, who must concentrate on fast-moving, daily tactical messages.

This new Special Counsellor would:

- Participate in policy formulation in the National Security Council and other decision-making bodies to ensure that policymakers at the highest level are aware of the likely impact of U.S. policies on foreign attitudes.
- Advise the White House on both the message content and method of communicating to foreign audiences.
- Coordinate communications among the many departments and agencies outside of the State Department to ensure clarity and consistency in U.S. messages to overseas audiences. A coordinating structure that includes representatives (at the assistant secretary level) of principal U.S. agencies could facilitate this coordinating function. (*Peterson*)

2. CREATE A GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY BOARD (GCAB)

The White House should form a Global Communications Advisory Board (GCAB) that is modeled after the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which is the only currently existing board that meets directly with the President. The Chairman of PFIAB has always been a well-known individual with prior high-level policy experience. As PFIAB overarches the entire intelligence community in reviewing and critiquing the quality of intelligence, this new board would also overarch all federal agencies involved in global communications. (*Abshire*)

This new board would:

- Provide strategic analysis to the White House, both on broad themes and short-term issues, concerning U.S. communications abroad.
- Be chaired on a part-time basis (like PFIAB) by an individual with high-level experience in the fields of communications and government operations.
- Consist of consultants, rather than term members, so as to provide maximum flexibility in obtaining advice on specific issues, such as communications technology, foreign news media, and the history and culture of Muslim and other regions.
- Periodically prepare appraisals of the U.S. government's global communications efforts, similar to PFIAB's reports on the quality of U.S. intelligence.

3. COMBINE THE PROPOSED POSTS OF SPECIAL COUNSELLOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE GCAB

The President should appoint a Special Counsellor to serve as Chairman of the proposed GCAB. The Special Counsellor would serve as the President's principal adviser on international communications, while also chairing the GCAB on a full-time basis.

II. HARNESS THE RESOURCES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

ESTABLISH A CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Congress should establish an independent Corporation for Public Diplomacy (or a similarly named organization) with the authority and resources to provide grants for private and non-profit activities. (*Ginsberg and Peterson*)

The corporation would:

- Remain autonomous, like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National Endowment for Democracy. Such independence would facilitate objectivity (and therefore credibility with foreign audiences) and cooperation with foreign nationals and others (including Arabs and Muslims) who may be unwilling to associate directly with the U.S. government. (*Peterson and Abshire*)

- Have an organization and structure similar to that of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, with a mix of government, foundation, corporate, and individual contributions for specific programs as well as general support.

- Provide grants for projects that facilitate dialogue and cooperation, such as joint ventures between Americans and Muslim counterparts overseas, rather than focusing exclusively on projects that rely on one-way communications. (*Idriss and Malik*)

- Utilize its grant-making authority to attract creative professionals from the private and non-governmental sectors and to employ the most advanced media and information technology. (*Peterson*) The Corporation's grants could support such creative endeavors as Layalina Productions, an initiative led by Ambassadors Richard Fairbanks and Marc Ginsberg to raise non-government capital for the production of programs for both American and overseas audiences.

III. EXPAND THE USE OF INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODOLOGIES

Establish Dialogue

Dialogue is central to fostering understanding, trust, and a willingness to engage. It also helps Americans and people of other societies learn about one another and helps dispel negative stereotypes on all sides. A willingness to engage in open dialogue and debate also helps counter claims of arrogance and indifference to the interests of others.

The Internet is a revolutionary mode of dialogue and individual communications with wide public ramifications. It is a special attraction for more fortunate youth, who frequently help propagate ideas through Internet-based networks. Thus, a new priority in financial resources and imagination should be devoted to this opportunity to communicate with this segment of the world's youth. (The Center for the Study of the Presidency will initiate a special study of this subject with USC's Annenberg School for Communication.) (*Abshire*)

The United States should:

- Expand the use of interactive media and innovative techniques, such as the Internet and satellite teleconferencing, to promote open dialogue and debate between Americans and Muslims overseas. (*Ross*) The State Department's interactive Web site, www.opendialogue.com, which is cosponsored by the Council of American Muslims for Understanding, is a good first step.
- Take advantage of call-in shows and other interactive programs on satellite television, which has enormous international reach (especially in the Middle East), to engage Muslim audiences abroad. Existing foreign networks and the proposed Middle East Television Network (METN) could serve as vehicles for such interactive exchanges.

Encourage Joint Ventures

Joint broadcasting and educational ventures between American production companies and partners in Muslim countries promote cooperation and long-term trust. Frequently, such ventures are also able to craft messages more credible to Muslim audiences than messages crafted solely by Americans.

The United States should:

- Promote joint ventures through grants and technical support. (*Idriss and Malik*) The proposed Corporation for Public Diplomacy would be instrumental in attracting overseas partners.

Revitalize U.S. Exchanges

Educational, cultural, and professional exchanges in a wide variety of fields—when administered by capable professional organizations—are demonstrably effective in promoting greater understanding and cooperation. (Kawar) According to opinion surveys, people who travel to the United States or are in regular contact with Americans are more inclined to have favorable views of America.[1] Additionally, almost 200 current and former heads of state, and 1500 cabinet-level officials, from foreign countries have participated in U.S. exchange programs.[2]

The United States should:

- Expand its exchange programs and promote the expansion of exchanges managed by responsible, professional organizations in the private and non-profit sectors.
- Ensure that new visa and domestic security requirements do not undermine exchange programs.

IV. CRAFT AND COMMUNICATE KEY MESSAGES

Strengthen the Communication of U.S. Policies and Objectives

The United States must more convincingly communicate its policies and objectives overseas, especially in areas where America and Muslim populations have strong common interests.

The United States must better communicate:

- U.S. commitment to construct stable, independent democratic regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Effectively communicating U.S. objectives within these countries is essential to developing positive perceptions of, and popular support for, American presence. Furthermore, the success or failure of U.S. operations there, especially in Iraq, will inform perceptions of the United States worldwide.
- President Bush's commitment to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (*Telhami*) The President has publicly endorsed the concept of an independent Palestinian state and, at great political risk, has initiated a peace process designed, in part, to realize this goal. The President's commitment to this approach has not been convincingly communicated to Arab and Muslim audiences, who remain hostile to U.S. policies toward the Palestinian issue. (*Abshire*)
- U.S. objectives in the war against terrorism, which is widely condemned by Muslims as an attack on Islam or Muslim societies in general. (*Esposito*)
- The rationale for U.S. oversees military deployments. The presence of U.S. military forces frequently gives rise to negative perceptions about American intentions and resentment of American influence in local affairs. (*Hudson*) The large-scale deployment of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf after the 1991 Gulf War provided one of the rationale's for al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the United States. While exercising caution about any non-essential military deployments, the United States must justify it presence in foreign countries in terms of those countries' national interests. (*Bacevich*)
- U.S. support for democracy and human rights in other Muslim countries. (*Masmoudi*) Enhancing the visibility of the National Endowment for Democracy and the democracy-promoting organizations it funds would be a step forward. (*Abshire*) Another possibility is to support the expansion of the OSCE, and the human rights commitments embraced in the Helsinki Final Act, southward to the Middle East. (*Kampelman*)
- A commitment to protect the civil rights of Muslims and other minorities in the United States, especially in light of perceptions that U.S. domestic security policies discriminate against Muslim residents and visitors. (*Esposito and Said*)

Communicate America's Strengths, Culture, and Diversity

In addition to better articulating U.S. polices and objectives, the United States should emphasize aspects of America that are widely respected in most Muslim societies.

The United States should communicate:

- America's diversity and America's culture of tolerance, with an emphasis on how the interaction of different religious and ethnic traditions have strengthened American society. (*Barone and Needleman*)
- America's culture of civic participation, with an emphasis on how individual citizens influence the political process and on how diverse opinions (such as on the Iraq war) are expressed and debated. (*John Zogby*)
- America's genius in entrepreneurship. With new polling demonstrating worldwide Muslim approval of globalization and modernization, an extraordinary opportunity exists to initiate innovative programs to more effectively communicate American experiences as the most entrepreneurial nation in the world. (*John Zogby and Abshire*)
- America's image as the leader in information technology. America is seen as the center of the information and communications revolution. This is a principal attraction for young people, who are empowered by the new information technology. (*John Zogby*)

V. EXPAND THE USE OF INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVES

Expand Track-Two Communications

Many Muslims believe that U.S. policies contribute to human rights violations and the lack of representative governance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Track-two activities independent of the formal diplomatic track, such the State Department's Congressionally mandated annual human rights reports, promote the credibility of U.S. communications on this issue by "propagating the truth" without interference by the U.S. government. The activities of the independent, government-supported Broadcasting Board of Governors and the National Endowment for Democracy further illustrate the value of such operations.

The United States should:

- Expand the use of independent track-two communications on a broad range of issues, including human rights, democratization, and news reporting.

- Better propagate the State Department's annual human rights report and make it more available to foreign journalists. (*Abshire*)

Support Non-Governmental Activities that Correspond to U.S. Interests

Some of the most innovative and effective means of establishing dialogue and trust between Americans and people in other societies are developed and implemented outside of government. Seeds of Peace and Search for Common Ground are models for these types of endeavor.

The United States should:

- Expand its support of effective non-governmental programs that communicate messages compatible with American interests and ideals. The proposed Corporation for Public Diplomacy would play a key role in this task.

VI. DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Strong Congressional support is needed to formulate and sustain a global communications strategy that is agile and adaptable in an age of rapid and continual change in the technology, techniques, and sources of cross-border communications. Such support will determine if U.S. global communications receive sufficient funding (especially important after more than a decade of neglect) and if important new initiatives (such as the proposed Corporation for Public Diplomacy) receive the Congressional mandates they need to begin operations. (*Helmke and Ross*) To help build and sustain such support, the Bush Administration should cooperate with leaders in Congress to organize a Congressional caucus for public diplomacy. (*Abshire*)

Notes for Recommendations

1. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *What the World Thinks in 2002* (Washington, DC, December 2002) <www.people-press.org>.

2. Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy, *To Prevail* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2002), p. 149.

PLENARY MEETING
U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

PLENARY MEETING AGENDA
U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

This plenary meeting was held in Washington, D.C. on June 12 - 13, 2003. It was designed to bring together individuals with different areas of expertise for a dynamic exchange on how to strengthen U.S. communications with Muslim communities. Following presentations by the chair and lead discussants of each session, participants offered comments and recommendations on the session topic.

AN URGENT CALL FOR REINFORCING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Speaker:

Dr. David M. Abshire is President and CEO of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Vice Chairman of the Board and Co-founder of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and President of the Richard Lounsbery Foundation. Dr. Abshire served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1983 to 1987 and as Special Counsel to the President in 1987. He has also served as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. In 1974, Dr. Abshire was appointed as the first Chairman of the Board of International Broadcasting.

MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Speaker:

Mr. John Zogby is President and CEO of Zogby International, an international opinion survey firm. His clients include MSNBC, Fox News, Gannett News Service, and several other newspapers and television stations across the country. He has conducted opinion surveys in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. His analyses have been published in the *New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer, Newsday*, and the *Boston Globe*. Mr. Zogby is the editor of *Zogby's Real America* and a contributor to *What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns*.

BEST PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS

Chair:

Mr. Geoffrey Cowan is Professor of Journalism and Law and Dean of the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California. Prior to becoming Dean, Mr. Cowan served as Director of Voice of America. He also served as Assistant Director of the United States Information Agency and Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau. He is author of *See No Evil: The Backstage Battle Over Sex and Violence on Television*, and *The People v. Clarence Darrow: The Bribery Trial of America's Greatest Lawyer*.

Lead Discussants:

Mr. Gregory Lagana is Associate Director for Global Communications in the White House Office of Global Communications. Before retiring as a member of the Senior

Foreign Service, Mr. Lagana held several senior positions at the Department of State, including Director of the Office of Press and Public Affairs in Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Deputy Director of the Office of Central American Affairs, and Chief of the Drug Unit and Training Division at the United States Information Agency.

The Honorable Marc Charles Ginsberg is President of Layalina Productions as well as Managing Director and CEO of Northstar Equity Group, a technology venture funding company specializing in e-commerce and software applications. Previously, Ambassador Ginsberg served as the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco; U.S. Coordinator for Mediterranean Trade, Investment, and Security Affairs; Deputy Senior Advisor to President Carter on Middle East Policy; and White House Liaison for the Secretary of State.

Mr. Mouafac Harb is Director of Network News for Radio Sawa. He is also the director of the proposed U.S.-government-funded Middle East Television Network. He joined Radio Sawa before the station's launch and has guided its expansion across the Middle East. Before coming to Radio Sawa, Mr. Harb was the former Washington Bureau Chief of Al-Hayat, the respected Arabic-language daily newspaper. A longtime journalist, he has also worked for ABC News and broadcasting outlets in Lebanon.

Mr. Shamil Idriss is Chief Operating Officer of Search for Common Ground (SFCG). Previously, he served in SFCG's Middle East Project and helped initiate SFCG's Islamic-Western Dialogue and Cooperation Program, an effort designed to build cultural ties between non-Muslim Americans, Europeans, and Muslims from around the world. Mr. Idriss has also coordinated several projects under SFCG's U.S.-Iran initiative, an effort to improve U.S.-Iran cultural relations following the election of Iranian President Mohamed Khatemi.

Mr. Afzaal Malik is Public Affairs Director for the Central Europe, Eurasia and Middle East Group at the Coca-Cola Company. Based in Brussels, he manages the company's relations with regional government officials, trade associations, and non-governmental organizations in forty-eight countries throughout Europe and the Middle East. Before joining Coca-Cola, Mr. Malik worked from 1994 to 1997 as a political consultant with Mars Incorporated and The Kellogg Company. He also served as an advisor on trade policy and investment to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Alsace, France, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises.

OPEN DISCUSSION ON BEST PRACTICES AND
TECHNOLOGIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS

WHAT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT AMERICA

Chair:

Dr. David M. Abshire, President, Center for the Study of the Presidency (See above for personal history)

Lead Discussants:

Dr. Jacob Needleman is Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University and the author of many books, including *Time and the Soul, Money and the Meaning of*

Life, The Heart of Philosophy, and *Lost Christianity*. He also serves as a consultant in the fields of psychology, education, medical ethics, philanthropy, and business, and has been featured on Bill Moyers's PBS series, *A World of Ideas*. His newest book is entitled *The American Soul: Rediscovering the Wisdom of the Founders*.

Mr. Michael Barone is Senior Writer for *U.S. News & World Report*, a regular panelist on the *McLaughlin Group*, and a contributor to the Fox News Channel. Previously, Mr. Barone served as a member of the editorial page staff of the *Washington Post* and Senior Staff Editor at *Reader's Digest*. From 1974 to 1981, he was Vice President of the polling firm Peter D. Hart Research Associates and, from 1969 to 1971, served as Law Clerk at the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Mr. John Zogby, President and CEO, Zogby International (See above for personal history)

OPEN DISCUSSION ON WHAT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT AMERICA

THE GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGIONS

Speaker:

Dr. Peter Berger is Professor of Sociology and Theology at Boston University and Director of the Institute on Religion and World Affairs. Dr. Berger is also Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture. Previously, Dr. Berger taught at the New School for Social Research, Rutgers University, and Boston College. Among his more recent books are *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (ed. with Samuel Huntington, 2002), *Redeeming Laughter*: *The Comic Dimension of Human Experience*, and *Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning*.

UPDATE ON THE CFR REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Speaker:

The Honorable Peter G. Peterson is Chairman of the Board at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman of the Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Chairman and Co-Founder of the Blackstone Group. He has been the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, founding Chairman of the Institute for International Economics, and founding President of the Concord Coalition. Mr. Peterson is also Co-Chair of the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprises. In 1971, President Richard Nixon named Mr. Peterson Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. He also served as Secretary of Commerce, Chairman of President Nixon's National Commission on Productivity, and U.S. Chairman of the U.S.–Soviet Commercial Commission. Mr. Peterson is the author of several books, including *Gray Dawn: How the Coming Age Wave Will Transform America – and the World, Facing Up: How to Rescue the Economy from Crushing Debt and Restore the American Dream*, and *Economic Nationalism and International Interdependence: The Global Costs of National Choices*.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Chair:

Ms. Judith Kipper is Senior Fellow of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Director of the Middle East Forum at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is a consultant on international affairs for ABC News and negotiated interviews for Peter Jennings with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad (1990) and with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow (1991). She participated in the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summits in Casablanca (1994) and in Amman (1995). She is co-editor of *The Middle East in Global Perspective* and editor of *The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations*.

Lead Discussants and Topics:

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Dr. Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he was Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern Studies Program at Cornell University and Visiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Dr. Telhami has written several books on the Middle East and international relations, including *The Stakes: America and the Middle East, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, and International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict* (ed. with Milton Esman, 1995).

U.S. Challenges to National Identity, Sovereignty, and Domestic Policy

Dr. Michael C. Hudson is Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He has held Guggenheim, Ford, and Fulbright fellowships, and is a past president of the Middle East Studies Association. He has lectured in universities and research institutes around the world. He is editor of *Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration* (Columbia University Press, 1999) and *The Palestinians: New Directions* (Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990). His most recent article is "Imperial Headaches: Managing Unruly Regions in an Age of Globalization," *Middle East Policy* IX:4 (December 2002).

War on Terrorism or War on Islam?

Dr. John L. Esposito is University Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Founding Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Dr. Esposito is the author of more than a dozen books on Islam and is the editor-in-chief of the four-volume *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* and the *Oxford History of Islam*. His books, translated into Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Japanese, Chinese, and European languages, include *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, *Islam and Democracy* (with John Voll), *Islam: The Straight Path*, *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?*, and *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam.*

The Need to Encourage Representative Governance in Muslim Countries

Dr. Radwan A. Masmoudi is Founder and President of the Center of the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID). He is also Editor-in-Chief of the Center's quarterly publication, *Muslim Democrat*. He has written and published several papers on the topics of democracy, diversity, human rights, and tolerance in Islam. Dr. Masmoudi was also a Founding Member and President of the Tunisian Scientific Society (TSS). In 1999, he won the prestigious George Olmsted Award for his research on: "Rapid Prediction of Effluent Biological Oxygen Demand for Improved Environmental Control."

OPEN DISCUSSION ON PRINCIPLE SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

Speaker:

His Excellency Karim Kawar is the Ambassador from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1999, Ambassador Kawar was appointed to Jordan's Economic Consultative Council by His Majesty, King Abdullah II. Ambassador Kawar also served as Chairman of the Information Technology Association of Jordan (INTAJ) and led a team of forty information technology professionals to launch an indigenous IT industry in Jordan. He was selected as a Global Leader for Tomorrow by the World Economic Forum and was selected as an Eisenhower Fellow for the year 2000. He is a founding member of the Jordan American Business Association (JABA), the Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA) and the Jordanian Intellectual Property Association (JIPA). He is also a member of the Young Presidents Organization (YPO). Ambassador Kawar also served as Vice Chair of the Jordan River Foundation, an organization chaired by Her Majesty Queen Rania, which empowers women through income-generating projects and business development services for micro-entrepreneurs. Ambassador Kawar also served as the Network Coordinator of the UN ICT Task Force – Arab Regional Network.

U.S. PRESENCE ABROAD: POWER, PRINCIPLE, AND PERCEPTIONS

Chair:

General Edward C. Meyer (U.S. Army-Ret.) is former Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the George C. Marshall Foundation, and former Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on the Balkans 2010. General Meyer graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1951, after which he served as a commander and staff officer in combat and Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He was Army Chief of Staff from 1979 to 1983. Following a 36-year career in the Army, General Meyer served on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative Panel and the Defense Science Board. He is a member of the boards of directors of FMC, ITT, GRC International, the Brown Group, ITT Financial, MITRE, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Scientists' Institute for Public Information. General Meyer is a recipient of honorary doctoral degrees from Boston University, Susquehanna University, and Norwich University.

Lead Discussants:

Ambassador Max Kampelman is Chairman Emeritus, American Academy of Diplomacy at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, he served as Ambassador and head of the U.S. delegations to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from 1980 to 1983 and as Vice Chairman of the United States Institute of Peace from 1992 to 2001. Ambassador Kampelman was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by President Reagan and the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian award in the nation, by President Clinton. Ambassador Kampelman is currently Of Counsel at the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.

Dr. Andrew Bacevich is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Relations at Boston University. He is the author or editor of several books, the most recent being *War Over Kosovo: Strategy and Policy in a Global Age* and *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U. S. Diplomacy*. His articles and reviews have appeared in a variety of journals, including *Foreign Affairs*, *Journal of Military History*, *Diplomatic History*, *The Wilson Quarterly*, *The National Interest*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, and *The Weekly Standard*.

Dr. Abdul Aziz Said is the senior ranking professor at American University and the first occupant of the Mohammed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace. He is Founder of American University's Center for Global Peace and Director of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program in the School of International Service. He has written, co-authored and edited more than fifteen books including *Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice* and *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective* (4th Edition).

OPEN DISCUSSION ON U.S. PRESENCE ABROAD:
POWER, PRINCIPLE, AND PERCEPTIONS

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Speakers:

Dr. David M. Abshire, President, Center for the Study of the Presidency

(See above for personal history)

The Honorable Chris Ross is Special Coordinator for Public Diplomacy at the Department of State. Previously, he served as Ambassador to Syria and Algeria and as the Department of State's Coordinator on Counter-Terrorism. He has also served as Public Affairs Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, as Director of Regional Affairs at the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and as a United States Information Agency officer in Libya, Morocco, and Lebanon. Ambassador Ross has received four Presidential Meritorious Service Awards and the Department of State's Distinguished Service Award.

Ms. Judith Kipper, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS; Director of the Middle East Forum, Council on Foreign Relations (See above for personal history)

Mr. Barry Zorthian is Partner with Alcalde & Fay and former President of the Public Diplomacy Council. He was an executive for twelve years with Time Inc.; first as

President of Time Life Broadcast and Cable and then as Vice President for Government Affairs in Washington. Mr. Zorthian worked with Voice of America for thirteen years, the last five as Program Manager, and served overseas as a Foreign Service Officer in India and Vietnam, where he was director of all media relations and communications programs for four years during the Vietnam War. He was a member of the Board for International Broadcasting for four years by appointment of President Bush. Mr. Zorthian received the U.S. Army Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award for consultation on public relations over a period of twenty-five years.

Mark Helmke is Senior Professional Staff Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He served as Press Secretary for Senator Richard Lugar and as Communications Director for Senator Lugar's 1996 presidential campaign. Mr. Helmke also worked with Senators Lugar and Sam Nunn on the development of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act to help the Russian Federation dispose of Soviet nuclear weapons stockpiles. He also served as an advisor to the government of Ukraine during its 1991 referendum to declare independence from the Soviet Union. Mr. Helmke is a founding executive of the public affairs firm Robinson, Lake, Lerer & Montgomery and a former award-winning investigative and political journalist.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Communications with Muslim Communities Plenary Meeting

Dr. David M. Abshire
President
Center for the Study of the Presidency

Mr. Hady Amr
The Brookings Institute

Dr. Andrew Bacevich
Director
Center for International Relations
Boston University

Mr. Michael Barone
Senior Writer
U.S. News & World Report

Mr. Richard Behrenhausen
President and CEO
McCormick Tribune Foundation

Dr. Peter Berger
Director
Institute for the Study of Economic Culture
Institute on Religion and World Affairs

Dr. Janaki Blum
Director
SARID

Mr. Paul Bosco
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Dr. Zahid H. Bukhari
Director and Principle Co-Investigator
Project Maps
Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding

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Ambassador Max Kampelman
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The White House

Mr. Afzaal Malik
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The Coca-Cola Company

Mr. Leonard Marks
Of Counsel
Cohn and Marks

Dr. Radwan Masmoudi
President
Center for the Study of Islam and
Democracy

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Information Strategy
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General Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army (Ret)
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San Francisco State University

Mr. Peter G. Peterson
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Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. James Pfiffner
Professor
School of Public Policy
George Mason University

Mr. Michael V. Phelan
Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
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Ms. Julia Pitner
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Ambassador Chris Ross
Special Coordinator for Public Policy
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Mr. McKinney Russell
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U.S. COMMUNICATIONS WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES PLENARY MEETING

OPENING REMARKS: AN URGENT CALL FOR REINFORCING U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

June 12, 2003
David M. Abshire

As the World War II war clouds gathered, I grew up reading military history and continued my studies at West Point. In those studies, Napoleon stood out as the greatest military mind, despite his political follies. **Napoleon, who maneuvered his armies so brilliantly, had a maxim that the moral is to the physical as three is to one. This means that, according to this master strategist, the psychological and human forces of perception are three times more important than military force. When applied to U.S. public diplomacy, this statement is a striking indictment of how we conduct ourselves today.**

In the 1970's, I became a true believer in public diplomacy when I became the first Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting. Modeled after the BBC Board of Governors, this Board was created after a bitter fight by some in Congress to disband Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty when CIA funding ended. T**hese saved radio stations were key to eventually winning the battle of perceptions and values behind the Iron Curtain. Eighty percent of the adult population of Poland, for example, listened to our Radio Free Europe**. Every morning the Communist hierarchy had an overnight summary of what RFE was saying about Polish economic trends because they could better trust the accuracy of our economic analysis and forecasting than their own. Truth pierced the Iron Curtain.

I learned that the United States Information Agency (USIA), set up by President Eisenhower, was another instrument of our Cold War success. A five-star general who commanded the largest military force in our history, **Ike understood the three-to-one ratio**. He knew that ultimately the battle of ideas and perception was the key strategic element in winning the Cold War. In the 1970's, the CSIS Stanton-Marks Commission further shaped the Agency that Ike formed by consolidating into it the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the State Department.

One example of awesome success in American public diplomacy came when I was NATO Ambassador in the 1980's. Before I arrived, Ronald Reagan had already delivered his "Westminster Speech," during which he stated, "The ultimate determinant in the struggle that is now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets, but is a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish." **Reagan understood the three-to-one ratio**.

The Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles to sever our deterrence strategy, causing the last missile crisis of the Cold War (the first was Cuba). According to the Washington Treaty, NATO nations must act through consensus, but in this moment of crisis, NATO nations were not unified. Public opinion in three smaller nations was increasingly anti-American, and coalition government factions strongly opposed our counter-deployments.

Through our public communication strategies – USIA assets and VOA broadcasts – we changed those domestic public opinions and the positions of their governments to produce NATO unity on the counter-deployments. As a result, Gorbachev made a U-turn and moved to negotiation, thus ending the last great Soviet attempt to split up the Alliance. We won the victory of perceptions and ideas and contributed to the dismantling of the Berlin wall a few years later.

The supreme irony is that since the Cold War, our military forces have gone through a magnificent transformation. In contrast, our public diplomacy has not been transformed, but has regressed since the end of the Cold War instead. Indeed, the decline of U.S. public diplomacy tracks with the decline in funding after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the dismemberment of USIA by Congress in the late 1990's and the placing of its parts in the State Department. Congressional timing could not have been worse in terms of 9/11 and our increasing loss of global popular support. Furthermore, the dismantling of USIA removed the position of an often-powerful agency head very close to the President, such as had been the case with Ed Murrow and Kennedy, Leonard Marks and Johnson, and Charlie Wick and Reagan. One good development out of this change, however, was placing VOA and other broadcasts, as well as RFE and RL, under a re-formulated broadcasting board.

Today, the United States – the only superpower – is the leader of the communications revolution. Yet one would never know it because we are losing the battle of ideas, values, and perceptions worldwide – especially in the billion-person Muslim communities. This phenomenon aided a man in a cave in Afghanistan to recruit the team that destroyed the Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon. We brilliantly won a war in Iraq, but to many we have become the occupiers instead of the liberators and have been portrayed as having beaten down and humiliated another Muslim nation. The Iraqi War, in my judgment, was misnamed "shock and awe"; it should have been labeled agility and information dominance. **Unlike the military campaign, we have not had information dominance in the aftermath of the war**. Tomorrow afternoon, Professor Abul Aziz Said, who is working closely with U.S. officials in Iraq to help our reconstruction efforts, will discuss the challenges we face in Iraq. Meanwhile, turning worldwide, as Condi Rice herself has noted, many in Europe deem the United States a threat to peace. This is true even in South Korea where my generation fought to maintain freedom.

Which raises a fundamental question: **Why is it that we cannot utilize our information dominance to communicate America more effectively? Why do we not display agility and information skills in our messages?**

As pointed out in the Council on Foreign Relations' report on reforming U.S. public diplomacy, "There is little doubt that stereotypes of the United States as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive, and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue are pervasive and deeply rooted. . . . Among the most startling manifestations of [resentment toward the Unites States] were the expressions of joy from some groups immediately following the terrorist attacks" of September 11.

Something in our strategic priorities and investments is vastly out of kilter with Napoleon's three-to-one ratio. We have done so brilliantly with the "one" but so poorly with the "three."

True, some recent progress is evident. The President has established the Office of Global Communications under Tucker Eskew, who began coordinating inter-

departmental communications soon after 9/11. In addition, Secretary Collin Powell has begun the difficult task of marshalling the State Department's resources to address this problem. Colin Powell is one of the best speakers in America or the world, and he believes that all ambassadors, indeed all foreign service officers – not just public affairs officers – should be communicators. That capacity has been remarkably increased under his leadership. Secretary Powell has also initiated new programs to expand the State Department's communications and outreach and has established an innovative Middle East Partnership Initiative, which supports local efforts to develop civil society in the Middle East. **These programs are a modest, but much needed, beginning toward creating a framework for more effectively engaging the world**. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has also come up with important initiatives. New operations – such as radio SAWA (credit to Norm Pattiz) – are also step forward, and the Voice of America is breaking new ground with its new Middle East television network.

However, the resources we currently make available to accomplish this enormous task are inadequate. Total defense expenditures in 2003 are 380 billion dollars while, as Senator Richard Lugar recently pointed out, outlays for public diplomacy total only about 1.2 billion dollars, less than one percent of that amount. This is smaller than what many American corporations spend on product advertising.

The importance of U.S. public diplomacy toward Muslims abroad is compounded by demographic trends within these communities: half of the one billion Muslims in the world are under twenty. The Arab Human Development Report published last year indicates that the Arab population of the Middle East, which has expressed some of the most intense anti-American sentiments, could swell from its current 280 million to as high as 460 million by the year 2020. **The addition of nearly 200 million more young people to this troubled region in less than twenty years will make winning more hearts and minds in the Middle East all the more important, not just for us, but for your grandchildren and for the grandchildren in the Muslim communities**, too. Karim Kawar, Jordan's Ambassador to the United States, will speak about this issue tomorrow during our luncheon session.

What we need is a fresh look at our communications strategy – at what we communicate, how we communicate, and to which audiences with what characteristics. The Center for the Study of the Presidency, dedicated to strengthening Presidential leadership and organization, as well as Executive-Legislative relations, functions as a catalyst to bring together the best minds in order to address critical problems faced by our national leaders. This plenary meeting, funded by a grant from the McCormick Tribune Foundation, is the culmination of more than six months of meetings funded by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Dr. Scholl Foundation. Over the next two days, we will engage in a dynamic, multi-faceted exchange on how to strengthen U.S. communications with Muslim communities. We will submit our final report to the President.

As for this plenary meeting, the first question is: What are our instruments and methods of communication? This is the work of the session chaired by Dean Geoffry Cowan of the USC Annenberg School for Communication. We will discuss ways to revitalize our nation's public diplomacy and global communications effort. We have an opportunity we didn't have in the Cold War: a much greater opportunity to be interactive as compared to the effort that I oversaw in the 1970's when short-wave and one-way broadcasts were our principal tools.

The exchange programs created by the Fulbright and other such programs were and are interactive and innovative ideas that, like "Seeds of Peace" and "Common Ground," improve interpersonal and intercultural communication. But the new electronic interactivity is mind-boggling and affords new opportunities for religious and cultural dialogue. My grandchildren are into an interactive electronic world. The Annenberg School's Online Journalism and Communication Program, represented here by its director, Josh Fouts, is pioneering with the Internet and the new interactive media. This will be one of the issues discussed in the session on "Best Practices and Technologies in Communications."

We must support governmental efforts by reaching outside of government to mobilize the best of the private sector. The Coca-Cola Company, represented here by Afzaal Malik, knows how to adjust advertising and communications to reach specific audiences, as compared to stereotyped "branding" to one mass audience. Our communications strategy must include paving pathways to education, jobs and skills as an antidote to radicalism.

Pete Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, will discuss the Council's report on reforming public diplomacy at the breakfast session tomorrow morning. He will highlight the importance of establishing a Corporation for Public Diplomacy to enlist the private sector in this endeavor. By leveraging private sector creativity and flexibility, the envisioned organization could take advantage of the fact that the private media often communicate American family values, religious commitments, and the merits of democracy more effectively than do government officials. It is difficult for me to adequately praise this initiative of Pete Peterson and the Council on Foreign Relations. Tom Korologos, a former chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, will work with us in the coming months as we attempt to move this important initiative forward on Capitol Hill.

In addition, Ambassadors Dick Fairbanks and Marc Ginsberg have created a private entrepreneurial effort, Layalina Productions, to match al Jezeera programming. This private television production company, which will develop educational and public affairs programming for distribution in the Middle East, is another example of putting innovative ideas into practice. With new initiatives, we must not fight over re-dividing current funds, but must think boldly about mobilizing public and private funds to enhance and expand our public diplomacy.

Second, what to communicate about America? The United States of America is not monolithic, but a nation of immigrants. It has greater diversity than anywhere else in the world.

America is also a very religious nation; what de Toqueville noted in his book, "Democracy in America" remains true today. But in order to preserve their religions, the founding fathers secured that diversity in the Constitution. What an example this is to the world. America is a nation where an observant Muslim population now numbers more than twice that of Episcopalians, one of the key religions of the Founders. Peter Berger will address the "Globalization of Religion" at our dinner session tonight. As we all know, religious and political moderation comes through interactivity and dialogue, the kind of civility so beautifully mentioned in the President's inaugural.

We must make clear that we recognize that the United States is a nation that has had imperfections – the most notable being the sin of slavery and the treatment of

native Americans. But **America has learned the importance of self-criticism, reform, and renewal**. Democracy in this country has evolved over time, within a framework set by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The Emancipation Proclamation came in 1863. Women did not obtain the right to vote until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.

I think **the authors of the *Federalist Papers* might be appalled with our rather careless use of the word democracy, as those authors sought to balance democracy and liberty in near alarm over a tyranny of the majority**. We have seen this tyranny come true in Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Our lead commentator, Professor Jerry Needleman, has written beautifully on our heritage in his book entitled, *The American Soul*. But have we been able to communicate all of this richness of America and the process by which we became a mature democracy? Of course not. We will discuss these issues during our second session this afternoon.

Third, **we need to reexamine the sources of anti-Americanism**. In this effort, we must move beyond the stereotypes of the Muslim world. There are many Muslim communities worldwide. They are not all the same; there are different strands of the Muslim faith and practice, just as there are in Christianity and Judaism. We need to explore the diversity of the Muslim world. **In his insightful monograph, "Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith," Vartan Gregorian at the Carnegie Corporation of New York emphasizes that "Muslims are as diverse as humanity itself, representing one in five people in the world. . . . Muslims represent the majority population in more than 50 nations, and they also constitute important minorities in many other countries. . . . Religious, cultural and population centers for Muslims, then, are no longer [found only in Asia and the Middle East] — they also include Paris, Berlin, London and now New York, Detroit, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C."**

John Zogby and others will help us understand Muslim views of the United States and the sources of anti-American sentiment in these diverse and multifaceted Muslim communities. He **pointed out last year in his survey "What Arabs Think" that, although Arabs have strong favorable attitudes toward American science and technology, freedom and democracy, and American cultural exports, they have very unfavorable opinions of the United States and U.S. foreign policy**. A recently released Pew Research Center survey found that, following the war in Iraq, this negative view of America has spread to Muslim populations beyond the Middle East. Judith Kipper, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Director of the Middle East Forum at the Council on Foreign Relations, will chair our session on "The Principle Sources of Anti-Americanism" tomorrow morning.

The Council on Foreign Relations report notes that foreign policy and public diplomacy must go hand in hand. Having analyzed these three questions concerning U.S. communications, we need to take our public diplomacy back to its policy base in order to explain our power and principles and to deal with misperceptions. This will be the task of our final session under the leadership of former Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer. Having chaired the CFR task force on the Balkans, where U.S. forces and the United Nations work side by side, he is familiar with the challenges we face in projecting our principles and values as well as our power. Ambassador Max Kampelman will join General Meyer during tomorrow's session. As former Head of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE, a negotiator during the strategic arms reduction talks, and Counselor to the

State Department, as well as Chairman Emeritus of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Ambassador Kampelman will bring a wealth of both scholarship and experience to this discussion.

September 11th was a watershed; it began a process that is redefining America's relations with Muslim societies and our country's role in the world for the future. In the midst of these changes, the President himself remains the chief spokesman for America, and he fulfilled this role in his recent trip to Europe when he reminded us that "we are the nation that liberated continents and concentration camps. We are the nation of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift and the Peace Corps." It is one thing to talk about the past, but he also talked about the future and called for other countries to join us. He talked about our $15 billion AIDS prevention program. Communication cannot be separated from policy. **In changing attitudes in Muslim communities around the world, there is no substitute for the dynamic new initiative the President has undertaken with the "roadmap" and his statement in Aqaba that he was going to make the peace process "a matter of highest priority."**

The Pew survey suggests additional areas where we can seek common ground with Muslim communities abroad. Despite perceptions of widespread international resentment toward globalization, majorities in most of the Muslim countries surveyed have a favorable view of the world's growing inter-connectedness. They support many of the basic elements of globalization, including growing trade and business ties, faster communication and travel, and the growing availability of foreign culture. Economic globalization is particularly popular; majorities in most Muslim countries surveyed believe that growing economic ties are good for their countries and their families. Furthermore, in a stark repudiation of the contention that Muslim societies face insurmountable cultural barriers to the acceptance of democratic values, majorities in many predominantly Muslim nations believe that democracy is not just a Western way of doing things, but can work in their countries as well. They place a high priority on having the freedom to criticize the government and support multi-party electoral systems and judicial systems that treat all citizens equally.

A major challenge for us, as well as a unique opportunity, is to mobilize our communication capabilities to support this trend – through exchange programs and training in entrepreneurship, small business development, and representative governance; through educational programming and development cooperation to support economic reform and the growth of civil society; and through open and frank discussions of how American society developed and the challenges we still face. Toward this end, pioneering institutions outside of government, such as the International Center for Journalists, will play an increasingly important role in helping us raise journalist standards and promote professional, independent media in countries with little tradition of an independent press.

Along with the Executive Branch, Congress must drive this revolution in American public diplomacy. Senators Lugar and Biden and Representatives Hyde and Lantos have already elevated this issue in Congress. **We need to encourage on Capitol Hill the development of a caucus on Public Diplomacy to unite concerned members who want to meet this great challenge and are willing to take action**. Toward that end, we will make our findings available to Ambassador Djerejian,

director of Rice University's Baker Institute, who is preparing a report to the Congress on U.S. public diplomacy toward the Arab and Muslim communities.

In conclusion, we now have the opportunity to move into a truly transformational situation in the Middle East with new foreign policy initiatives. Current policy is getting ahead of communication – even when good communication is an absolutely necessary component of effective policy. If our foreign policy is to be successful in the age of mass media and the Internet, we must revolutionize our public diplomacy, making it an interactive process, clearly demonstrating our values and beliefs, and marshalling the best private and public communications tools to get the job done. During our final dinner session, we will have an open discussion of where we go from here, which will include feedback from representatives of the Executive and Legislative branches.

Of all of our Presidents, Lincoln was, since William Shakespeare, the unmatched communicator, anywhere, anyplace, anytime. Lincoln so modulated policies and prose with deft timing to capture new opportunities and open closed minds. Let me conclude with his line: "The dogma of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew."

This we will seek to do at this symposium, and urge the Executive and Legislative branches to do as well.

MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES: POLLING IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001

Speaker:
Mr. John Zogby, President and CEO, Zogby International
(Abridged version)

Polling since September 2001 reveals that, while Muslims around the world have sharply negative opinions of the United States, they generally like important aspects of American culture and society. This is especially true of young Muslims (ages 18 to 29).

American Freedom and Democracy (Mar-Apr 2002)



American Movies and Television (Mar-Apr 2002)



American Science and Technology (Mar-Apr 2002)



American-Made Products (Mar-Apr 2002)



In contrast to Muslim attitudes toward American culture, overwhelming majorities in most Muslim countries polled oppose U.S. policies toward the Middle East and other Muslim regions.









These data do not support the contention that anti-American sentiment among Muslims is the result of a clash of cultures or values. Rather, negative Muslim attitudes toward the United States are driven by aversion to U.S. policies, especially those that are perceived to have a negative impact on Muslim countries.

BEST PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS

CHAIR:

MR. GEOFFREY COWAN, Dean, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California; Former Assistant Director, USIA; Former Director, International Broadcasting Bureau

LEAD DISCUSSANTS:

MR. GREGORY LAGANA, Associate Director for Global Communications, Office of Global Communications, The White House

THE HONORABLE MARC CHARLES GINSBERG, President, Layalina Productions; CEO and Managing Director, Northstar Equity Group; Former Ambassador to Morocco

MR. MOUAFAC HARB, Director of Network News, Radio Sawa

MR. SHAMIL IDRISS, Chief Operating Officer, Search for Common Ground

MR. AFZAAL MALIK, Public Affairs Director, Central Europe, Eurasia & Middle East Group, the Coca-Cola Company

Chair: Best Practices and Technologies for Communications

MR. COWAN: This is a very interesting panel you've put together. David, your initial remarks were terrific, and Zogby's comments were excellent. I was particularly interested in your three-to-one ratio. We would be rich indeed if international public diplomacy broadly could be funded with that a concept in mind.

This panel is concerned with best practices in technologies for communication, which really consists of two different elements. One is, what's the medium, or what different media do you use, **what technologies? And the second question is, what kinds of messages?** And we all know that the media and the message have to be different for each society. We know that domestically.

David and I were talking about how nice it would be if we could get Karl Rove at a session like this. Anybody who's ever run a political campaign knows that you reach different audiences with different media and different messages. People of a certain age have never heard of AM radio; they're FM users exclusively. There are still a significant number of people, though, who listen to AM radio. That's broken down in part by demographics. There are people who speak Spanish principally and whose main source of information is Spanish language media. There are people who read magazines, people who are influenced by direct mail, people who you reach on the Internet, people who notice buttons or billboards. You reach people with every different kind of communica-

tion strategy you can, and they are influenced by different kinds of messages. Some messages work with some kind of audiences and they highlight some things, and some with others.

And in some ways what's exciting about the prospects for public diplomacy, as we think, for the future is that we really have more tools available to us than ever before; there are more ways of delivering messages than there every have been. **And we would be as foolish as a society, company, or political campaign if we didn't take advantage of all of the tools that we have as a society and if we didn't take advantage of what we were able to know about what kind of messages work most effectively for different audiences, whether by region, culture, language, background, generation, or by gender**.

We also have an ability that we haven't had before to conduct research at levels that are really unprecedented, and so we should be also doing research as we roll this stuff out. **No campaign, no company would just rely on occasional research or begin to operate on the tiny budget that the federal government has for research. And you wouldn't only do it once; you'd be continuously testing your media, the impact of your messages, and what was working with each audience as well as what were people thinking** — not necessarily trying to change your product – although, if you want to think of policy as a product, that's one piece of it — so much thinking about the ways in which that product can be understood in the best possible way by people around the world.

In the adjacent room, they're talking about a huge investment that USAID and others make in improving health around the world through the use of messages, much of them on popular entertainment. They are spending more money in their field and thinking about how to do it than most people are spending – than the United States government is spending on public diplomacy. It just happens that that's the conference that's going on next to ours.

So I was thinking about what were the things that we did while I was at the Voice of America? Each of us sort of goes through our war stories and thinks about it anecdotally. When I came to the VOA, we had a mantra, which was moving from monologue to dialogue. You talked about that a little, David, in your comments. Short-wave radio only made a monologue possible to speak to the world, but technology makes it now possible to engage in a dialogue with the world. And a lot of the technologies have improved since then, but we tried to engage in a dialogue with the world and think about what that could mean. And so, for example, we started call-in radio programs and television programs too, so that people could feel that they were engaging in a dialogue and in fact be engaging in a dialogue with people on the Voice of America. I think they now exist – Alan, you know that at least 23 languages, or maybe more, now have call-in shows.

We began to realize that direct broadcast television made it possible to communicate things. So we started direct broadcast television shows to China, to Iran, to the Middle East, including call-in programs on most of those shows. Of course, much more is possible. The Internet was only coming online when I was at the Voice of America. My years there were 1994 to 1996. The Internet was just starting. I remember being dazzled when Josh Fouts, who's here with me and then was an assistant of mine, we went over to see Larry Irving – many of you know him, at the Commerce Department,

head of NTIA – and he showed – it was the first time I'd ever seen the Worldwide Web. That was 1995. Of course now we all take it for granted.

But the things that are made possible by changing technology are going to continue to grow. The technology is going to keep changing, and we should always be at the forefront. But it happened that we were able, the Voice of America, to go on the Internet very early. RealAudio made us a test-bed. We started immediately going on, in languages as well as text, in most of the language services of the Voice of America, which are heard around the world now, and of course that's been extended too.

At the same time I think you never want to give up on the old technologies. When we went into Afghanistan, apparently 70 or 80 percent of the public was listening to Voice of America broadcasts in Pashto and Dari. They were listening on radio because it was their lifeline. So you don't want to give up on the old technologies, including the human voice, including the person-to-person diplomacy that has been so important for USIA and for the U.S. government in years gone by — that so many in this room have done so much with. So I think we want to think about the whole range of technological delivery services and the whole range of messages.

Exciting things have been going on in international broadcasting recently, and one of the innovations, which we'll talk about shortly, is Radio Sawa. From talking to John Zogby, I know that his polling shows its importance. The role of popular music in reaching young audiences is something of great importance. In addition, the Voice of America is talking about the direct television network, which we'll talk about later. A couple of members of this panel are working on that project. That will be exciting to talk about.

Before we move into the panel, I want to talk about some polling numbers that reinforce what we heard at lunch, maybe extend them in a certain way. For those who were not at lunch, you'll be interested to know them.

I want to read you a couple of paragraphs from it. "The speed of the war in Iraq and the prevailing" – this is the opening paragraph – "belief that the Iraqi people are better off as a result have modestly improved the image of America, but in most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago," — a point we heard about at lunch. "The war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global support for the pillars of the post World War II era, the U.N. and the North Atlantic Alliance."

They go on in this poll to describe a lot of fascinating findings, both from the Middle East and from other largely Muslim nations. They say, for example, "If they didn't hate us before … the bottom has fallen out since then." **Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which have been largely limited to countries of the Middle East, have spread to Muslim populations in Indonesia and Nigeria**. Since last summer, favorable ratings" – I'm just quoting your poll – I'm quoting the Pew poll reinforcing some of your points — "favorable ratings for the U.S. have fallen from 61 percent to 15 percent in Indonesia and from 71 percent to 38 percent among Muslims in Nigeria" — Nigeria is an enormously important area for us to continue to reach.

And by the way, something that was very gratifying, when I with was the Voice of America, **independent polling found that the most respected source of news and information about Nigeria, according to Nigerians, was the Voice of**

America. So it shows you what international broadcasting can accomplish.

Support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has fallen in most Muslim populations. Equally significant, solid majorities in the Palestinian Authority, Indonesia and Jordan, and nearly half of those in Morocco and Pakistan, say they have at least some confidence in bin Laden to do the right thing regarding the world — 71 percent of Palestinians say they have confidence in bin Laden in this regard. There exists more confidence in bin Laden, in much of this part of the world, than in the United States and George Bush. This is a fascinating study in many respects, which I would urge you to read, but which is sometimes based on inaccuracies, I would argue.

One of the things that this poll found was that opinion about the war is strongly related to perceptions of how the U.S. and its allies conducted and managed the war and its aftermath. In countries opposed to the war, there is a widespread belief that the coalition did not try hard enough to avoid civilian casualties. Now, what we know is that in most of the world people were not watching Fox News. **In this country, if you were watching the Iraq war, you were seeing the embedded reporters, you were seeing the American military, but you were not seeing the casualties on the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq. But in fact, in most of the world – and I'm not talking here about Al-Jazeera, I'm talking about if you were watching German television, French television, or if you were watching Japanese television — most of what you were seeing were casualties**.

So the image the world was getting was of an indiscriminate American military effort, which affected their perception. I say this is unfair because I think it's probably true, whether you were for or against this war, the military probably took more efforts in this war than any war ever fought to avoid civilian casualties. However, that was absolutely not the perception that was being given around the world; and it's one of the many reasons why the perception of America has been so dramatically affected.

One thing that's interesting is just to look at Jordan and how American favorability ratings have dropped: favorable view of the United States in Jordan in 2002, according to this study was 25 percent. Today it's at 1 percent in Jordan. The favorable view of Americans in 2002 was 53 percent – Americans as distinct from America; today it's 18 percent. And, support for the U.S. war on terrorism went from 13 percent to 2 percent. But I would say if there is good news it is that what can be that volatile in one direction maybe can be as volatile in the other direction, that there is a lot that can be done in this area, and that hopefully we'll begin to develop the will to do it.

Lead Discussants: Best Practices and Technologies for Communications

MR. LAGANA: Thank you. I think that over a period of time we've seen progressively more engagement by the U.S. government, generally, and particularly by the White House, with foreign media and foreign audiences. With each White House it's gotten incrementally greater. But after September 11th, we saw a big leap in that engagement. There was a conscious effort to reach out more, to speak more, and to speak more directly through foreign media.

Before President Bush went to Latin America, he had a Latin American reporters' roundtable, and he did interviews with Salvadorian Television and Peruvian Television. Contrast that with when President Reagan was going to have a meeting with

the president of Mexico. We did a written interview with Notimex, and I wrote it.

So things have changed quite a bit. We have had scores and scores and scores of international media events and interviews, live interviews on talk shows, with a particular effort in the Arab and Muslim world, with the President, the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Deputies, the Under Secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense. I think this is due to a recognition that, first of all, we can't just leave it to the end of the season; and second of all, we can't just speak and expect that it's going to get picked up — that there is a certain amount to be gained through the gesture of talking to people directly and to listening to them.

We've made a special effort to bring foreign media in the White House for some very practical reasons. But, that's not always easy because the White House press corps is there, and they pay a lot of money to be there. They are cared for constantly and are very jealous of sharing their prerogative. So we have to make special efforts to bring the foreign media in, which we do — and particularly to bring Arab media in where we think it's important. So I think there's a greater awareness now of the need to do that and a greater effort being made.

We've also made an effort in talking to Arab and Muslim media and directly to Arab and Muslim audiences. We do listen, and we do acknowledge differences, which I think is very important. We acknowledge difficulties that exist sometimes in the relationship. Palestine would be one area where we try to do that, but we press on U.S. values and don't pander, which I think has been very important.

With American Muslims, I think what you've seen is an effort at inclusion. **You've seen the President begin to treat American Muslims and American Muslim communities more as part of the mainstream. That has been a very important effort — not to reach out or speak to you because you're a Muslim, but to reach out to you just as we reach out to other American communities — and to welcome you into, and treat you as apart of the American mainstream**. It has been very important for us to project that overseas. When the president speaks at a mosque, hosts a Ramadan event, or speaks to an Iraqi exile community, we are projecting that overseas. It is important, we think, for Muslim communities overseas to understand how American Muslims are welcomed, to understand how they are treated, and to see them as Americans. This is especially important given that we very seldom have a clean environment in which to deliver our message, because of interests that conflict in various ways. The national security measures that were taken after 9/11 seriously affected perceptions of how Muslims were treated in the United States. And so, it is important to project that overseas. It really is. It's part of our message to Muslim communities.

Another message to Muslims overseas is democracy. One of the interesting things noted in the Pew research is that **in spite of the favorable view of the United States being low in Muslim and Arab countries, there is still strong support for democracy and greater freedom, as well as strong indications that they associate democracy and freedom with us. Therefore, it really is important for us to continue to stress those values and continue to reach out and speak to Muslims and Arabs who hold those views**. We're not particularly interested in the groups we can't reach. But there's a large group of people who perhaps can be reached, and we want to speak to them. You'll see that in the messages and the statements that are made about Palestine, we talk about a future for the Palestinian people.

We are really trying to get at this tension between the national liberation impulse, the impulse that says that once the Palestinians are not under Israeli domination they're somehow free, to something that takes freedom beyond that, to adjust society to a better society. In addition, we also want to get at the kind of solidarity impulse that that affects the whole region. So that when one Arab or Muslim country is seen as being at odds with the United States, regardless of how negatively that country is viewed by other Arab or Muslim nations, there is an impulse to close ranks behind it. Iraq is a good example of that.

There is a challenge with new transnational media, and that has been a big change. In the government, we are organized to deal with media, foreign media, either in Washington or on a country-by-country basis. So, our embassy in Cairo has relationships with the Egyptian media, our embassy in Paris has relationships with French media, and so on. And they are dealing with these people every day. We're asking things of them, they're requesting things of us. There is a give and take and a means to hold media accountable for things that we think are unfair.

We saw an explosion of transnational media, and there was no one in the United States that actually owned a relationship with them. That is something we are trying to do now with the State Department. We've set up an office in London to deal primarily with transnational Arab media, the three main newspapers, and particularly the satellite television networks, all of which are headquartered in different places but which have significant presence in London. This is really important because we are not monitoring them and they are very influential. Al-Jazeera in particular because of it's 24-hour news and because it's a bit more daring on many of the issues, but also the other networks.

I think we find – let me get back to television – that TV images are particularly important in the Muslim and Arab world. Radio, of course, is very important. In a lot of less-developed countries, radio is the primary means by which people get information, but television and satellite TV is very important. Even if people don't have it their homes, they can see it in cafes and other places. And these television images are often picked up by local television. So, it is very important for us to be on television; not just on radio but on television as well.

We've tried to inject some coordination and discipline into the message, and I must say we don't try to coordinate it too closely. You know, we have 200 embassies overseas, we have a lot of people — and every environment is different. One of the challenges out there is that there is so much information flying around and so much of it is good information, that you need people to put it in one place and distill the things that people are saying. It's sort of a roll up your sleeves kind of work. But it is necessary, we think, to make sure that we're all speaking the same thing and to know that the many actors that are out there talking for the government know what the president is going to be saying, so that we have a message that's a little bit more disciplined.

We have to respond to rumors. This is really critical. Right now Iraq is just a rumor mill. I think in that part of the world, you have a lot of different players. You have people and organizations which put all conflicts into a religious context. You have a religion that is non-hierarchical, in which different imams issue their theology, and people follow them. So, there are a lot of actors who are out there making charges, making pleas, speaking philosophies. So, rumors, reports and perceptions vary from one place to another. Right now in Iraq, there are rumors that vary from things like the

United States is replacing all the voltage with 110 in order to force Iraqis to buy U.S. appliances and products, to things that are much more serious than that.

So, rumor and disinformation control is a really important thing. Before the conflict, we tried to accomplish this by getting out information about what the Iraqis had done in the previous Gulf War. Now, whether that had an effect or whether people just studied on their own and were very wary of things that the Iraqis might say, either overtly or covertly, I don't know. But, it is certain that most of what came out of Iraq was viewed with some skepticism.

I think we'll have some challenges. One with the media that we're dealing with in that part of the world is accountability. For example, in some parts of the world, after the war in Iraq, we were seeing comments from people saying that they weren't going to believe the images they received anymore. The outcome for many people was unsuspected because the news reports they were getting just didn't seem to bear that out.

We have an intercultural challenge in dealing with television. It will be important to develop accountability, so that we have a relationship with them — sit down and really talk with them — and deal with them like we do with U.S. media. I mean, simple things like — one network had described the Arab reporter who was killed in Baghdad as having been martyred. So then all deaths that occur at the hands of non-Muslims are martyrdom, whereas the people who are found in the graves in Iraq are not called martyrs.

These are long-term things that we're going to have to deal with, but we're really only just beginning to deal with this media, which is growing very powerful.

AMBASSADOR GINSBERG: I want to talk about solutions. After having attended enough conferences, participated in the Council on Foreign Relations Public Diplomacy Task Force, served as much time as I have as an ambassador in the U.S. government, witnessed the disintegration of any coordination within the U.S. government that results in an effective communications offensive during the war on terror, it is clear that the private sector is going to have to step up to the plate to play an effective role.

And, yes, we all understand the cliché that until the Palestinian situation is resolved – I've heard this as you have a thousand times before – we can broadcast radio and television to every country in the region, and it will not change anyone's mind until the pictures of Palestinians being killed at the hands, of what are perceived to be, American weapons are eradicated. We understand that. We understand that this is a long-term challenge.

But since my days as ambassador, **it is clear that we have walked away, by budgetary and by governmental means, from engaging in a comprehensive public/private sector initiative to rebuild our public diplomacy programs in the Middle East**. It is not something that is going to be a panacea. It is not a magic bullet. It is not going to solve the polling problems that Jim and John and others have pointed out. It is not going to solve the Palestinian problem.

All you have to do, as I do, is go on Al-Jazeera once or twice a week to understand the questions that are being asked in a provocative way and just how bad the perception is.

Winning the war on terrorism is going to take far more than public diplomacy. We are engaged – and I want to stress this – in a battle of ideas. Whether we wage this battle of ideas through the U.S. government, through the universities, economic support mechanisms, or through public diplomacy, it is going to have to be waged on a variety of fronts. And the U.S. government is apparently incapable, on its own, of understanding the comprehensiveness and integrated nature of this effort, which is not going to be resolved by public diplomacy alone.

At the same time, however, there are terrific and talented people throughout the Voice of America, the State Department, and the White House, who are doing everything possible to understand how to tackle the problem. But they need the support of what is essentially – I'm not coining this phrase, it was Congressman Hyde who said, for a country that has produced Hollywood and Madison Avenue, the sheer idea that we have been reduced to a point of absolute derision in the Arab world and in the Muslim world at large is unfortunate.

And what can we do? What are the solutions that can be arrived at? I know that we are not here, Geoff, to talk about economic development, about changing the educational system in the Middle East, about helping to finally be more aggressive in solving the Palestinian issue, about helping to develop new civil societies. But when I took Tom Friedman to the Middle East a few years ago at the height of the peace process, I brought him into a group of university students –and I said to him that Yitzhak Rabin is alive, the peace process is alive and well, but when you walk out of here, I guarantee you that you are going to be shocked at what you'll hear and the level of vitriolic attacks on U.S. policies – it has nothing to do with the Palestinians. At the time the Palestinian issue was far on its way, in our perception, to resolution. Tom walked out of that meeting and said to me, "Marc, I feel like I've just been in an Arab League meeting in 1950."

The elites of these countries, the journalistically, self-described elites, the people who have been given newspaper passes, who are not newspaper people but who work, for example, for Palestinian media because they're loyal to Arafat but who are not journalists, those who are in the academic world, they **have insufficient contact with United States assets on the ground. They do not see any image of the United States on television other than reruns of "I Love Lucy" or "Dallas."** Does anyone know around the table what the second-most-high destination for Arabs coming to the United States, besides Disney World, is? It's San Angelo, Texas, ladies and gentlemen, because they want to go see where "South Fork" was. That's where "Dallas," in their mind, has been filmed. That's their perception of American society.

They don't understand how we can reach out to them with technology, with health news. It's almost as if we need a Peace Corps on the air for people to understand that we do care, and we are willing to engage in communication – and to provide a platform for the critics of these regimes. The importance of legitimating our efforts is as important as reaching out to the government — the critics of these regimes, how many of them have come through the United States from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, journalists and others who will not be given the time of day, who are afraid to go on and criticize the bureaucracies of their own countries. And I can list name after name of Egyptians or Moroccans or others who are banished from the airways of their own countries because they're not permitted to critique even the administrative corruption within their own countries.

These are the issues that we're dealing with, to provide an opportunity for dia-

logue and outreach. I remember going a few years ago to Saudi Arabia and engaging in a very intense discussion with young imams who were training to be mullahs, and in a very intense exchange – here I am Jewish, speak enough Arabic to get by at the time — talking about religion and tolerance. When I looked around at their library there was not one book on their shelves that had been translated from English into Arabic. No Mark Twain, no John Grisham, much less anything that resembles de Tocqueville or anything that speaks of religious tolerance.

This is the challenge that we face. One of the things that I'm fortunate to be working on is a new Arab language television production company that was formed by the inspiration of a gentleman by the name, that many of you know, Richard Fairbanks, who is the former head of CSIS and brought in a very distinguished group of individuals together under the leadership of President Bush's father. David Abshire serves on the board, as well as Dick Allen. There are Democrats and Republicans. I can go through the list, but it's a very distinguished group of individuals who have decided that what we need to do here is to reach out and to engage and to open up these lines of communication.

Layalina Productions is currently engaged in an effort to raise sufficient capital from the private sector – it's a not-for-profit, which is why it's been extremely difficult to get the financing in here because we are not taking U.S. government financing. But through the efforts of people sitting around this table, including Julia Pitner, who is the vice president, and others, we are in the process of developing debate programs, drama programs, and educational entertainment programs.

I went up to Hollywood, and we hired about 30 producers, directors and writers. I sat down with them, along with Dick Fairbanks, who regrets that he couldn't be here, and we listed on a wall the 30 or some-odd reasons why we're hated in the Arab world. And we said to these young gifted writers and producers, many of whom have won Academy Awards and Emmys, try to develop programs that deal with these issues, that don't simply talk about the United States but deal with the problems that we face, deal with them as an entertainment matter, in dramas, shows that will be in Arabic with Arab actors, producers and writers.

We've signed on the former foreign minister of Jordan to be the head of our advisory group. The effort is to license these programs to existing private satellite stations in the Middle East, and we are about to produce a "60 Minutes" in Arabic. Don Hewitt of "60 Minutes" is signed on to be on the board of counselors. We are probably going to be able to develop the first "Crossfire" debate show, and we will have a pilot for that hopefully before the end of the summer. I am proud to say that Tom Friedman has agreed to serve as one of the guests on this, and there will be others around this table who I'm sure will be invited. Again, the key is to open up lines of communication. We have no illusions; we are not ourselves the experts. We need to engage Arab producers, directors and writers in this effort. Even Al-Jazeera has come to us and said, "We'd like to co-produce some of this with you."

And just to wrap up, Pete Peterson, who will be with you tomorrow, when he chaired the Council on Foreign Relations task force came up with a great article in Foreign Affairs magazine calling for a way in which to engage the private sector in this country, and suggested the creation of something called the "corporation of public diplomacy." It's a great idea because it combines an opportunity for both the public and private sector to tap into each other's resources, to think long and hard about producing a

new way to engage Madison Avenue and Hollywood in a variety of public diplomacy programs that will make this man's job far easier because there are so many people around this country who do want to engage and donate their time.

I said to Pete a few months ago – and David Morey, who is here, is working with me on this as well, if he would help us get Layalina Productions launched, we would take the lead in helping to develop the outlines for a legislative initiative to create this Corporation of Public Diplomacy, modeled comparably on the federally charted Corporation for Public Broadcasting. We have a memorandum that we prepared, David and I, Julia and others, and Dick Fairbanks went up to the Hill the other day to begin talking to members of Congress to get this on the agenda to be sponsored.

I think that Layalina Productions would be the perfect illustration of the first private sector initiative as part of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. It's one small step for mankind, one small step for outreach. I know that the U.S. government is also engaged in an effort to launch a Middle Eastern television network. It deserves all of our support. We need to help make it succeed. The taxpayers shouldn't have their money go down the drain. It's something that we want to see succeed, but we also believe that there needs to be programming for existing Arab satellite and cable systems that reach current Muslim and Arab eyeballs in the Middle East.

MR. HARB: Thank you very much. I just returned from a three-day conference in Kuwait. I arrived last night, so I'm a little bit jetlagged. For three days, I was listening to my colleagues in the Middle East, discussing themes and ideas for the first time in a very awkward way. The good news is that people have started to ask the right questions. The quick collapse and the fall of Baghdad, along with the famous Iraqi Information Minister, - which is now, you know, the theme of a lot of jokes in the Middle East – led many people to raise, for the first time, real questions about what's going on in the Arab media.

The bad news is, those important themes and issues that were discussed go back to about 50 years ago. If you were to hold that conference after the 1967 war, it is likely that people were dealing with the same issues. This leads one to believe that what is missing today in the Middle East is a mechanism to bring about change with regard to any issue. If you pull a newspaper from the archives in 1948, 1967, or 1973 and you look at the local sections of these newspapers, and you open a newspaper from today or yesterday, you will find the same issues, sometimes even the same names, and nothing can be resolved.

Let me go back to the media and give you all a quick and brief description of the media today in the Middle East. We have a lot of satellite channels. We have a lot of radio channels. We have a lot of magazine and newspapers, and definitely the Internet. But unfortunately what is missing among these new organizations is ethics. **One of the themes in the conference that I just returned from in Kuwait was ethics of the profession. People are still debating basic issues, the role of the media and whether journalists should be on the payroll of the ruler. There are certain things we take for granted in the West**, and mainly in the United States, that people in the Middle East are still debating: is it part of democracy, can you coexist, can you have a free media when you don't have a democratic system? So this is, I think, an area where a lot of help is needed for the Middle East, whereby you can help indigenous media.

You have communication problems not only between the United States and the Arab and the Muslim world; you also have communication problems between Arab states, between Arabs and Muslims, and between Persians and Arabs. However, since the United States is the only remaining superpower and people living in poverty in the Middle East, who do not like the status quo nor their living conditions, look up to the United States, they blame the United States for not helping them.

Adding insult to injury, when you talk to people about democracy and the freedom of speech, they raise the issue of double standards. Most of the time they say, we don't hate the United States just because it is the United States, but because the United States today represents their own regimes, which they hate. So you have people – and I don't want to name countries because I don't want to offend anyone – that hate their current regimes, and because these regimes enjoy the support of the United States, subsequently they hate the United States.

It's probably the only part in the world where the explosion of satellite channels by media institutions did not help improve the education and the awareness of the masses. It's the only part of the world where the more the number of channels increased, the more backward people in the Middle East have become. The Arab masses today are more backward than they were 10 years ago. So you wonder what happened, if this explosion of information technology and the availability of these institutions really helped improve the level of education in the Middle East. But this is not the subject of our panel today. Nevertheless, it goes back to who really fund these channels, what the message of these channels are, and what they're trying to accomplish.

Going back to what Sawa is trying to do, in a very short period of time – in a year or less, Sawa has managed to attract large audiences wherever it is available on a clear signal, mainly FM. Before Sawa was launched, we conducted a lot of market research. It was no surprise to learn that 70 percent of the Arab population is under the age of 30. So it makes a lot of sense to have a radio station that tries to appeal to a younger audience. And when you do that, going back to what Geoff was saying, you first decide on the audience and the message, and then you choose the medium. So it makes a lot of sense to have a FM radio station, if you want to attract a younger audience. And we are using American broadcasting techniques to accomplish this.

Some people criticize Radio Sawa, saying it's the victory of production over substance. I disagree with that because I think that what we are trying to do with Radio Sawa is to use American production techniques to attract an audience and then deliver the message. And I think it's working in the case of Sawa.

I'm surprised to hear that the anti-Americanism is very high in Jordan, because Radio Sawa is the number one radio station among the youth in Jordan today. We have the figures and numbers from independent companies to support that. What one would conclude is despite the fact that most people know that this radio station is funded by the United States Government, they listen to it, anyway. And it's something, you know, it's worth looking at and considering that there is room for U.S. international broadcasting to bring about change to an audience in the Middle East.

Let me conclude by talking about the television station, which is our next project. We hope that we can launch the network before the end of the year. **Most research would show that television is the primary source of information for Arabs; and if the United States wants to be present in the Middle East, you cannot do so**

without having a media presence, and not by proxy. My colleague on this panel mentioned giving access to Arab satellite channels to deliver the message, and I would raise one flag in this regard; that is, it is not enough to grant access to Arab television channels because what happens before and after that interview is where people can make up their opinion. Most of the time, American official statements are taken out of context; and as you know — like anywhere else, maybe in a political campaign – people will wait to hear the spin masters after the TV debate to formulate their opinion. It is true that Arabic channels are giving airtime to U.S. officials, but this is not enough because it is taken out of context.

At Radio Sawa, we not only give access to American officials, who are not the only officials which are given access to our radio station, but we also make sure that American policy is accurately presented – not promoted – on our radio station. Promotion is not our job. However, policy is presented clearly and in context. And this is why I believe that after September 11, the U.S. cannot idly subcontract public diplomacy. The U.S. relied a lot on other media to make its case; however, most streets would show you that it's not working. We hope with this new television station, we can follow the same guiding principles as Radio Sawa. We are going to use American broadcasting techniques to attract an audience. When people are listening, then you can engage in dialogue and work on educating the people. Thank you.

MR. IDRISS: Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me to speak. Briefly, for those of you who don't know, Search for Common Ground is an international conflict resolution organization. We have headquarters in Washington and in Brussels, about 375 full-time staff members, and offices in 13 countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and here in the United States. The organization is 21 years old and our mandate is to shift the way the world deals with conflict, away from adversarial win/lose approaches to collaborative problem solving approaches.

We do this through creative interaction, everything from using sporting events, to track-two diplomacy, to the use of media. And we have developed our own media production division that does television, radio, print, and Internet-based media everywhere we work; because everywhere we work, mass media is an incredibly powerful tool, either to bridge divides or to exacerbate them. I don't have time to go into the details of the specific projects in which we have been engaged, but I'm going to go into some of the main principles that we have drawn from for our work in the Middle East, particularly over the last nine years, and for our work elsewhere in the world, using media to bridge divides between people.

But first, before I do that, I want to draw a distinction between public diplomacy and cultural dialogue. Dr. Abshire mentioned in his presentation the Council on Foreign Relations report, which said in part that there is a stereotype of the United States throughout the Muslim world as being unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue. The inability to engage in cross-cultural dialogue, or the perception that the United States is unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue, and the efforts of public diplomacy are two related but very separate things. The approach, the principles, the methodologies, and the philosophy behind effective public diplomacy and those things that underlie cross-cultural dialogue or cooperation are very, very different.

In this light, **the media actually is the message in the work that we do. That is, the programming that is selected to be developed in the media, the peo-**

ple who are engaged in developing that program, and how that message is developed and broadcast, all have as much of an impact as the clarity of the message itself. There is talk that emphasizes the importance of the message being clear — the clearer the message, the more effective the message, the more credible it will be. That is, if you can just get out the clear facts, broadcast the truth, the message would be more effective.

In most of the places where we work where there is ingrained mistrust, suspicion, and sometimes a degree of hatred, it's actually the other way around — **unless you have a credible message, you will not be effective. And the way to develop a credible message is to actually co-create it with those people with whom you disagree**. I'm not talking about the people far out on the fringes that you can't even get in the room with. **The credibility comes from where the message originates, not by how professionally it's put out or by how clear the message is.**

The main principles that we have learned in doing our work around the world are first that, as Ambassador Ginsburg said, it is long-term, and you can only hope for advances in incremental shifts. At best, you have incremental shifts in attitude. If you're trying to shift attitudes between peoples who really disagree with one another and there's a deep, mutual suspicion, you can only obtain incremental shifts over the long-term.

The second principle we have learned is that sustained dialogue – and this comes as much from mistakes we have made as successes we believe we had – is that **sustained dialogue is necessary but totally insufficient. Sustained engagement and dialogue is helpful because it builds relationships, but only cooperation based on mutual interests actually develops a sense of trust and long-term relationships**.

So, when using media, we seek to engage media that is owned together by different sides of whatever conflict it might be; to identify together what their shared interests are, what their mutual concerns are, and then to come up with programming together that can address those concerns. To do that, all cooperation has to be based on a sense of true mutuality.

Some current efforts reflect mutuality in rhetoric but not in practice. By mutuality I mean that there is an openness – that when you engage in cross-cultural dialogue, there is an openness and an assumption that you have as much to engage, to learn, and benefit from that engagement as the people you're engaging. That is the premise of cross-cultural dialogue that is effective, and no matter how uneducated the people are that you may be engaging, they can sense when that is not the case. They know when they're being respected and they know when they're being patronized. **So if mutual exchange programs are done, where people from the Muslim world are brought to the United States to learn, while people from the United States go to the Muslim world to teach — that does not represent mutuality. That is only mutual in terms of the geographic location of the activities. In both cases, it is based on one-way teaching and not on the assumption that there is something to learn from both sides**.

To reflect that thinking, the exchanges that we have been developing with local partners throughout the Muslim world are exchanges that include training based on what their interests are and what they feel they need at that time to professionalize their work. And what we have found without exception, in the Muslim world and every-

where where we work, is when engaged by media organizations other than those run by governments or even us, as an NGO — when we engaged through our media division to other media outlets, there is always an openness to talk about what training people want and how they would like to develop it.

So our journalism exchanges do start with training, but then they also concentrate on communication between American journalists and media professionals to media outlets throughout the Muslim world and vice versa, to spend time with one another, seeing what the daily issues are that we each deal with on a daily basis, and how we can cover those programs with the hope that perhaps over time, that will lead to swapping of journalists, co-optive op-ed pieces and relationships between the different professionals in the field.

The third principle is the model that we need to bring about from the beginning, and if what you're looking to bring about in our view is better relations between the United States and the Muslim world, then your advisory boards, the people participating on the program from the very beginning, need to be balanced between the different sides of the issue. We have had a lot of experience and success with that in the Balkans, as well as and with some of our work in the Middle East.

The fourth principle, which was already mentioned by Geoff Cowan, is to give a voice to people. **Oftentimes, what people are looking for most is to have a voice. They want to see their voices reflected in the media, either by people who are speaking in a way that they seem to have credibility or through the call-in programs and opportunities to voice what their concerns are directly through the media. So we develop programs like that with local partners**.

The fifth – and this is part of our methodology, because it's cheaper and we think it's more effective in some ways — is **do not develop stations or broadcast outlets, but rather develop studios and production houses. The difference is that stations are oftentimes seen as competition, vying for airtime and vying for funding; whereas studios develop programming, get it done in a credible way, and will give that programming for free to any station that wants to air it**. And if done not from the American government or from an American non-governmental organization but from one media outlet to another, you can oftentimes get that programming broadcasted. **Developing studios and production houses, which I assume is along the lines of what Layalina will be doing, is a lot cheaper than developing your own transmitters and stations**.

The last principle I would like to mention is that – and I think Dr. Abshire mentioned this in his introduction as well – that **perception is as important as reality**. That's not the same thing as saying that image and reality are the same thing. There is a lot of research by sociologists, psychologists, and other social scientists that shows that **people's perceptions are based as much on emotion, gut instinct, personal experience, as they are on facts. So when one tries to counter and alter perceptions by throwing facts at people about what the United States has done in the world, how the U.S. has given aid to this part of the world or that part of the world, if people have a worldview based on perception — insecurities, personal experience, whatever it might be – they will take the same exact facts and interpret them in completely diametrically opposed ways**.

So, if people who are suspicious of the U.S. and think the U.S. is taking over the

world and is going to become more and more hegemonic see a broadcast that talks about all the good things that the U.S. is doing around the world, they will take it as proof that the U.S. is finding any way to get into their societies. In general – and this isn't just in the Muslim world, this is here in the U.S., this is everywhere - people's perceptions are as much driven by those insecurities and emotions and fears as they are by facts. So when we're trying to bridge those kinds of gaps, we look to engage, to give a voice to those fears and concerns.

What are the concerns that people have, in terms of globalization? I think John Zogby mentioned that in the polling there was a real interest – or it was in the Pew Poll, that there was a real interest, in a favorable sense, in the Muslim world about globalization. At the same time, there is a real fear of globalization, and that is no different than in the United States or pretty much everywhere else in the world. Everyone realizes more and more that we are increasingly in a world, whether we like it or not, where we are in a shared global system of environmental stability, economic security; and we are dependent on one another. Our borders are increasingly porous; and that's wonderful for economic opportunity, that's wonderful for technology and interaction between cultures, but it also means that weapons go back and forth, diseases go back and forth, violence or problems in one country spill over into another, and that is the reality of globalization.

Both the fear and hope that comes with globalization is felt by everyone around the world; and since September 11th, that certainly has been felt here in the United States. So it is important to engage at the level of how do we make globalization and interdependence work for us, not against us, and use media outlets to do that, such as talk shows, where people from throughout the Muslim world and in the United States can talk openly about both their fears and their hopes for this new increasingly interdependent world.

I will just close with a summary of suggestions. Instead of trying to answer the question about how we can refine our message as Americans, **I would encourage us to think about how we can go about co-creating messages with people from throughout the Muslim world that identify our shared interests, our mutual fears, and the concerns and hopes of people around the world — they are not all that different from one another. I also encourage us to develop programming; everything from documentary-style, to children's, to current affairs talk show programming that gets into those issues and gets into them openly and honestly**.

I realize that that is not necessarily the role that governments can or should play. **The public diplomacy office can't necessarily be encouraged to do this because they have a job with regards to American policy. But as Ambassador Ginsberg said, private industry can do this, non-governmental organizations and nonprofits can do this, and that's what we're engaged in trying to do at Search for Common Ground**.

The last thing I will say with regard to this is that we have formed a partnership with Prince Hassan of Jordan and are holding an initial meeting in July to bring together media professionals, development experts, education officials, and people who have launched dialogue centers, with each of those working groups reflecting an equal balance of Americans and people from throughout the Muslim world, the Middle East

and Southeast Asia. The goal of that effort will be to start identifying some of the shared interests, mutual concerns, and cooperative projects that can be developed. We're not going there so much with a message as with an interest in seeing what message they come up with as a shared group.

MR. COWAN: I think you're absolutely right that public diplomacy has to be understood as much broader than what the government can do. And, I hope in this dialogue today and during the next couple of days, David, that one of the themes will be to identify the different ways in which people can play a partnership role.

MR. MALIK: What I would like to do very briefly is sift through a few points, just a brief introduction, in terms of our business in the Middle East. Secondly, I would like to delve into some of the dynamics of consumer boycotts, which have clearly risen to the forefront as a result of not only the recent conflict but also for historical reasons in the Middle East. Following that, I will briefly skim over some of the messages that we have tried to put perhaps in this context, and ultimately draw a few conclusions on the role that business can potentially play within the region.

If I look at our business in the Middle East as Coca-Cola — I'm actually based in Vienna, Austria, where our headquarters are, and we cover 48 countries from Vienna. I get the developing markets which have lots of potential for us. When it comes to dealing with the Middle East, I think the current context for us, as Coca-Cola, given the iconic brand that we are and the associations that people make with that brand, the identity really put us in a unique position compared to other businesses, not only in relation to the name Coca-Cola, but also in our corporate name as the Coca-Cola Company. There is always perception about what we represent.

Now, when we look at the Middle East specifically, our business is affected by two major perceptions. The first belief is that Coca-Cola is somehow a flagship of U.S. foreign policy — that somehow we are out there as an uncritical supporter of U.S. foreign policy. The second is that we have somehow taken a political position in favor of Israel as opposed to the Arab world, as a result of the boycott that we face in the Arab League. Now, those are deeply held convictions that have existed for many years, and we face significant challenges in dealing with these perceptions.

The messages that we put across to them have to be, by definition, grounded in the facts of our business. So we talk about our business model. We talk about the fact that the Coca-Cola Company is focused on marketing and innovation; it's focused on bringing that innovation into markets with local business partners, with local businessmen and women who have the connections within their societies to invest, to hire people, to make optimum investments, and to build sustainable businesses over time.

The other message that we try and bring across — and I think we have a very delicate balance to play given the nature of our brand or brands – is that we are present in over 200 countries around the world. We show that, as a business system with our partners, we employ approximately 1 million people around the world, and that 90 percent of those employees are outside the United States. We use over 125 different languages as we conduct business in our daily affairs. The cultural, religious, ethnic diversity of our company, I do believe, is quite unique. **As an entity itself, we are trying to**

move away from being perceived as a monolithic, hegemonic business that many would like to associate us as, and stress the point that 75 percent of our revenues are generated outside the U.S.

Our American legacy is very important to the nature of our business, but it is not necessarily as important as it once was, when we look at the international linkages that our business has created. So we try and settle into a dialogue with our consumers which is always accompanied by this background of boycotts. I do believe that, as a business, we have missed out on a generation of consumers as a result of the Arab League boycott.

The irony of the situation is that Coca-Cola has been present in Indonesia since 1927, in Malaysia since 1946, Pakistan since 1953, and in the Gulf countries since the early '50s. The context is one where we are strictly subject to misinformation about our business. We employ 35,000 people in the Middle East. We have any number of relationships with suppliers, distributors and public business partners, where we believe we have multiplied the benefits of our business, both upstream and downstream, thus multiplying the economic benefits we bring.

That's another point we can try to emphasize. Again, the idea is not to take money out of the countries, but to pay local employees, to pay national treasuries with social security and taxation, to invest locally in training in order to ensure that we have viable and sustainable businesses over time. I liked Mr. Idriss's point about who controls what facts. That is all rational, then you need to get to the heart, you need to be able to talk about what you do beyond your pure business interests.

And again, while I don't believe we have necessarily developed the sort of mutuality that Mr. Idriss's organization is working towards, we are trying in our own modest way to favor the sorts of exchanges that can improve and increase awareness, whether that be in the area of education, by providing equipment for the schools, or in helping a specific child through courses. But, I do believe cause-related marketing for us is going to be increasingly important as we look at the region as a whole.

With the Iraq war, clearly our concern has been consumer calls for boycotts — or informal consumer calls for boycotts, versus political calls for boycott by governments, which may intensify and spread.

So we have had a very interesting recent few months seeing how those dynamics have played out, and what we have seen is that consumer awareness of boycotts is incredibly high. When you go to Morocco, 65 percent of people polled can spontaneously tell you that the consumer boycott is something that they know about and think is possibly a good idea. The figures are higher in Saudi Arabia. When you then break down those figures and look at the different components, you would probably find a core of let's say 5 to 10 percent of the people who are hardcore boycotters. There is nothing that will change their minds about the rectitude of boycotting an American company. But then you have the partial boycotters, the floating boycotters, and then the people who do not boycott.

What we're finding is that clearly print media and broadcast media are aware that people have many sources of information from which to draw conclusions. But increasingly we're finding that not only are schools, mosques, friends, cafes important for that information to flow, but we're also seeing that Muslims more generally are becoming more collective.

We did some polling in Great Britain prior to the Iraq war, and when we compared an average British consumer with a British Muslim consumer, you see the mosques, the school, and friends playing a much greater role in how a community is formed than perhaps your average British consumer. So the inside player, it seems to me, is this greater connectedness between Muslims, whether they're in Palestine, whether they're in the Gulf heartland, whether they're in Asia or Malaysia, or whether they're in Western Europe. And that is something that I think for us as a business poses some particularly interesting opportunities for the future.

I will now speak about the sophistication of methods of communication. I must say, these **mobile phones have got to be one of the most effective means of communications we have seen. In the Middle East, everyone loves sending short text-messages**. We recently had a barrage of text messages sent from consumers in Great Britain to India and the Middle East saying: is it true that Coca-Cola there makes four days of its profits in the state of Israel? And this was done on such a wide scale that, you know, the power of the mobile phone has become really extremely important.

Clearly, the Internet has allowed for development of more sophisticated boycott campaigns. Web sites allow people to take a draft letter and to mail it out in a blast mailing to any number of people. So that's becoming increasingly sophisticated, including the use of flyers, leaflets, stickers, and so on and so forth. One dynamic that is becoming very important is female empowerment within the boycott. Women are the decision-makers in many Muslim homes, and the boycott has become a way of exerting greater influence and power within family life. Therefore, this emotional intensity has found its expression in a number of different media.

So, I come back to the point about needing to appeal not only to the head with the facts, but also to the heart. There are no silver bullets; there are no easy hits here. What we as a business and many other businesses are trying to do is to ensure that we have the basic infrastructure and relationships that will allow us to better influence the environment around us. So that when we do bring the right marketing or consumer promotions campaign, we are as relevant as possible to our consumers.

We're trying to make sure that we connect with our employees much more. Employees are subject to a great deal of peer pressure such as: "How can you work for an American company?" and "Don't you know what such and such company is doing as a result of U.S. foreign policy?" So making sure that our employees really understand what we stand for and what our principles are is increasingly important.

Our key strength is our business partners. We realize that it's not the strength of our brand alone that will carry us; it's our local businessmen and women who will make the difference regarding our ultimate success. And, to that extent, we're very much dependent on them to give us the insights into the sources of community programs that will connect us with consumers.

At the end of the day, we are in it for the long haul. This is a long task. It's one where I think business has a role to play. When we look at the economic impact of the business, when we look at the potential impact of free-trade agreements across the Middle East, when we look at how we can help develop further foreign direct investment in the region, we see that we do need the support of U.S. embassies locally, to help ensure that that dialogue takes place.

Ultimately, the message, if we are to succeed, is to help convince Muslim

consumers that we are there for the long-run. And just as a final quip, we have our business in Palestine and in Israel; we have our business in India, Pakistan; we even have a business in the United States and in France; so we are definitely there for the long-run.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: Best Practices and Technologies for Communications

MR. IDRISS: **With regard to funds allocated for public diplomacy initiatives, oftentimes what happens is that a lot of money gets injected into a certain initiative today, but tomorrow something else becomes the big issue, and the money for the first initiative drops off. In fact, this type of scenario can actually do more harm than good. If one had to choose between receiving a large infusion of money now that would last for one or two years and receiving a smaller sum of money over a sustained period of time, thus enabling one to make long-term commitments and to refine things over time, I would actually go with the latter**.

MR. COWAN: One thing I think we always have to be thinking about is that, while we're talking about the Internet, it may in fact turn out that cell phones and text messaging become the thing that's happening. You always have to be in front, if you're going to reach your target audience. For example, we know that those text messages are how demonstrations were organized around the world. So that's become a whole other phenomenon. Now, what is going to be the next new phenomenon that we need to be aware of?

Another thing that struck me was that, **in all my years of lobbying on budgets, I don't ever really remember having the business community as a strong ally. Maybe others did, but after all, the business community does have a strong interest in this, and it may be that we have underutilized them as an ally when you consider how important America's reputation in the world is to commerce**.

AMB. GINSBERG: Well, on that very point, earlier this morning, I addressed a group of about 70 to 80 business executives on the issue of the Middle East and said, "there is something that you all need to go back to your companies on because **we want to start a network of corporations that are truly interested in helping to figure out how they are going to contribute their technology and their information ideas in public diplomacy." One of the motivating foundations for this corporation of public diplomacy is to get corporate America involved in helping to wage this war more effectively**. We're not just talking about the razzmatazz of Hollywood and Madison Avenue…There are dozens of multinationals that are struggling to deal with the situation in the Middle East. Coke perhaps is maybe one of the most well known, but there are many, many more that have been there just as long, just as interested, and just as capable, by the way, of tapping into foundation money and other funds to support this initiative.

I must say, every company, including Coke and others, work for their parochial

interests, understandably so, but there's a greater issue here that's at stake and it's going to take presidential leadership as well as our leadership to reach out to these corporations, but we are beginning to form that loose network of companies to support the idea of a corporation of public diplomacy.

UNIDENTIFIED: On the issue of boycotting, those who are calling for a boycott of American products are really advancing their message and using production techniques as well as the latest technology. I was watching the Hezbollah television station the other day, and saw a very smart commercial – maybe they have people from Madison Avenue to produce commercials. In the first shot, you see, a Marlboro pack, and then in the second shot you see a bullet. And then you move on and it says, "This one costs $2." Then you move to the other one, and it says, "This one costs $2, too." Then they show the cigarette again and say, "This one kills. Then you move to the other one, which is the bullet, "and this one kills." Then they move to another shot of the cigarette, "This one kills you," followed by another shot of the bullet and say, "This one kills your enemy. Boycott American products. Donate your money for the resistance." They're using very, very advanced techniques in calling for an American boycott.

MR. HELMKE: The basic problem the United States faces is this—**for every one dollar we spend on the military, we spend seven cents on the State Department. You want to talk about failure of American diplomacy, you can see it right there. In three years during the 1990s we did not hire one new Foreign Service officer**. Secretary Powell complained to Chairman Lugar at a hearing at the beginning of the year saying, "it's like the military not hiring any second lieutenants. You're not going to have any generals in five to 10 years if you do that."

The overall budget for public diplomacy in the United States government is about $1.2 billion, which pales in comparison to I think what Coke's overall advertising marketing budget is worldwide or maybe a major corporation in the United States. The overall budget for public diplomacy at the State Department is $698 million. In the State Department authorization bill passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee we, increase it by $57 million. The Foreign Relations Committee marked $30 million of that for increases educational exchange programs directly related to the Middle East. The Broadcasting Board's budget authorization for this year is $572 million. That's an $8.9 million increase over the administration's request. So that's the total amount of money we're spending.

Now, should more be spent? Yes, but it's going to be a slow process of moving those total expenditures up, year by year, in the next years to come as we try to deal with budgetary constraints on a regular basis.

MR. COWAN: What would be the most effective way to make that argument? What would be the ways in which people who feel strongly about this might address the Senate more effectively?

MR. HELMKE: Well, the biggest problem with diplomacy in general is that there is no constituency for it. You don't create jobs with it, there's no pork

barrel back home with it; you have to tie it to national security. We have to do a better job of communicating to our own congressmen that public diplomacy in and of itself is a national security issue. What I argue is that we engage in public diplomacy not to make the rest of the world like us; we engage in public diplomacy because our national security is dependent on not having people hate us so much that they try to kill us. That's what it's all about from America's standpoint.

Now, there are other things that can be done, too, which Chris has started to work on at the Office of Public Diplomacy at the State Department. For years and years and years nobody ever thought of keeping a catalogue of everybody who was ever a Fulbright scholar. And that's one of the basic things of politics: you maintain records of everybody whoever went through your program because, from a grassroots standpoint and from a political standpoint, they're your constituency. You know, you have people all over the countryside, all over the world who have gone through that program over the years. Well, we need to do that because that's a constituency we have, not only in the United States, but also around the world that we can tap into. That needs to be done more often. Step by step, we have to figure out who's benefited from these programs at universities and small towns, all over the place, so that we have that constituency ready there for us to help us when we get to these kind of budget gaps in Congress. So we can start letting people know that, yeah, people have benefited from ECA programs, from cultural exchange programs, from whatever.

MR. CHAMBERS: My name is David Chambers. I'm with the Middle East Institute here in Washington, D.C., and I actually wanted to address a question that Marc had started to raise, but actually to Mr. Malik if I can. Marc had appeared at an AJC program about a month and some ago with a colleague from the Washington Institute, and this WINEP scholar claimed that Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Proctor & Gamble and one other U.S. multinational were sponsoring ads on Hezbollah's Al Manar TV. As a former Andersen consultant myself, based in the Middle East, I knew, even though I specialized in media and entertainment, that our Pepsi bottling clients are majority-owned by local bottlers, which led me to ask the scholar from WINEP whether if any such ad payments had been made by one or more local Pepsi bottlers, by Pepsi regional offices in Jeddah and Dubai, by their division headquarters in Geneva or from world headquarters in the U.S. He said he would look into the matter — I haven't heard back from him on that — and my questions to you are, have you heard such allegations about Coca-Cola? Is there any truth in the allegation that Coke has paid for advertising on Al Manar TV, and could you clarify that? And lastly, how do you interpret the goal of such allegations?

MR. MALIK: Yes, I've heard of such allegations. About six months ago we were contacted by the U.S. embassy in Lebanon asking us how we were going about our advertising. Our local colleagues had clearly entered into a relationship with Al Manar TV about six months prior to that, which when we had got to hear about we quickly looked at the situation, and the contract itself was a short-term one and we left it at that.

So, yes, I have heard of these allegations. No, we do not currently advertise on Al Manar TV. We're very sensitive to the political implications of doing so. And I know also that our corporate peers in P&G, in Pepsi, have also taken a very hard look and currently I don't believe that any advertising is taking place on Al Manar TV by any U.S. multinational.

MR. LAGANA: (In response to a question about the U.S. Government's interaction with Muslim Americans)

First on the issue of how we make use of Muslim Americans. Certainly Muslim Americans have been brought into the exchange programs, and that's been important. And the projection of how freedom – what freedom and living in a free society has meant to Muslims, the fact that – I mean, we could argue that Muslims are freer to practice their faith as they choose in this country — or as free — than in other Muslim countries. But what's been going on that's most important, I think, has been going on privately between American Muslims and Muslims overseas. **I think there's a great debate that's being generated now about the nature of Islam, and much of this important work is being done by Muslims in this country, who are free to research and free to publish**. So that has been very important.

Secondly, on the issue of the public diplomacy effort that was made in the State Department that got a lot of publicity [video on the life of Muslim-American in the U.S.]. You know, we try a lot of things. I think that Under Secretary Beers has to be given credit for doing something for the very first time that tried to deal with some of the emotional issues. As I said, government doesn't do that very well, and she tried to do it. It was one of many things, and actually I thought the spots were pretty good, but it was something that we tried to do, and some of them didn't get on the air.

The other point I'd like to make is that we tend to talk about public diplomacy and attitudes, and in this country we tend to have a culture that fosters the view that we can fix things. Public diplomacy programs can do so much, but I'm convinced that it's big events that are going to move opinion in a massive way, and in the Middle East, as conditions in those societies improve and as people feel a greater sense of self-confidence, a greater sense of inclusion in the world — there are many, many, many emotional factors – then attitudes will begin to change more. We push them in one way or another, we deal with the immediate, we try to contribute in the long term by planting seeds and other things through our public diplomacy programs, but it's going to be broad changes in the world that I think will change public diplomacy.

WHAT TO COMMUNICATE ABOUT AMERICA

CHAIR:

THE HONORABLE DAVID M. ABSHIRE, President, CSP; First Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting

LEAD DISCUSSANTS:

DR. JACOB NEEDLEMAN, Professor of Philosophy, San Francisco State University; Author "The American Soul: Rediscovering the Wisdom of the Founders"

MR. MICHAEL BARONE, Senior Writer, U.S. News & World Report; Author, "The New Americans: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again"

MR. JOHN ZOGBY, President and CEO, Zogby International; Editor, "Zogby's Real America;" Contributor, What Arabs Think, Beliefs and Concerns"

Chair: What to Communicate About America

DR. ABSHIRE: I have the pleasure of chairing this panel. It is a subject about which I feel very passionate — that we haven't effectively communicated around the world what America is, the American experience, nor the universality of that experience to the rest of the world, recognizing that we have shared values, but we can't impose our particular brand of democracy on others. As I said in my opening comments, women didn't obtain the right to vote until 1920, and we didn't have emancipation until 1863. So we've been in a process that has taken time to evolve. In our consultations that Phyllis d'Hoop has put together over the last three months with a range of scholars on Muslim regions around the globe, **we find that there is a stereotyped image of America that does not begin to reflect the true America, just as there is a stereotype of the "Muslim world." That's why, in our work, we refer to it as the Muslim communities**. They're very different from one another; we're very different from one another. As you all know, we have a very sizable Muslim community in the United States.

But what should we communicate about America? I have come to know Dr. Jacob Needleman, Jerry Needleman, some four or five months ago in San Francisco. I had seen him on the Bill Moyers Show. I read one of his books, The American Soul: Rediscovering the Wisdom of the Founders. I've written books. I'm so envious; if only my books read with the ease and the poetry that his do, but I don't quite have that talent, he does. He knows history, he knows philosophy, he knows religion, and he is a wonderful interpreter of the American experience.

Lead Discussants: What to Communicate About America

DR. NEEDLEMAN: I'm a philosopher, who is coming at this whole question from a different angle, I believe, dealing with the whole question of what the ideals of America mean, how to think about them more deeply, and how to penetrate the philosophical and spiritual meaning of the ideals and values that have shaped the founding and the ongoing life of the United States of America. This **America was once the hope of the world, and probably still is, but is no longer perceived as such**.

I think I can come at this question of what to communicate about America from my angle by just telling you a little bit about my experience with my students last year. I gave a course at San Francisco State University on this whole question of the meaning of America in the world in and for itself. And, this was at a university, San Francisco State University, which has a very, very volatile, very mixed, very dynamic collection of students. In this class of about 50 students there was tremendous anger and hurt about America. They did not want to hear anything positive about America except for one or two people. Almost all of them felt frightened, hurt, betrayed. And for them, America meant arrogance, power, brutality, unfairness, and betrayal of ideals.

What happened was that through trying to think more deeply about America, about some of the values of America — what, for example, does freedom really mean? What did it mean for the Founders? What can it mean for us? Is it just the freedom to do whatever you want? Is it the freedom to get lots of material goods? Is it the freedom to say what you want when you want, how you want, no matter what? In other words, we began to take all the rights, the Bill of Rights and all the rights that we speak of as constitutionally guaranteed, which we value so much, and try to penetrate more into the question of what are the deeper inner meanings of these rights, and what obligations, what duties, what responsibilities go along with them, conceptually, ideally, from the point of view of the founders but also just intrinsically from the point of view of all the great spiritual traditions of the world?

Something like **freedom obviously did not just mean external liberty, although that is extremely important and very necessary for anything else, but it had to do with some kind of interior freedom**, which the Founders studied when they studied the classic authors of ancient Greece and philosophers of centuries ago. They asked, what does freedom of speech mean? What is the obligation that goes with the freedom of speech? And they started to think about that, and **it became very clear, after a while, that with every right there is a duty**. I was not wagging my finger or anything of the kind; it was a question of thinking, of going into things more deeply, more conceptually, more in terms of ideas, because if what we need is the ideas of America, we need, ourselves, to think and try to deepen what we mean.

So the freedom of speech has an obligation attached to it, and it turned out that it was very clear after a while: **if I am free to speak I am obliged to let you speak**. And the class became quieter and quieter. And if I'm obliged to let you speak, then I'm obliged to listen to you. And they became yet quieter and interested. And if I'm obliged to listen to you, I need to understand, "what does it mean to listen to another person?" Does it mean just to stay quiet while your mind is racing for something to say when they have a space in between their words or does it mean you make, inside yourself, room to let in what's being said? **And people feel when it's being let in. They were very interested in that**.

We talked about the rights of many, many kinds of freedom — of information, access to information. What is the obligation, because every right has an obligation with it, in nature as in human life? The obligation that goes with the freedom to have information was not so easy to come by, but after awhile it became clear: it was the obligation to try to think, because information by itself is not truth. Facts by themselves, as we've been seeing, are not truth. They need to be thought about, they need to be pondered, and they need ideas to meet them with.

So all of this is just by way of introduction to the point I'm making, that these angry students, after just one or two classes of this – it's not that they lost their fear, their resentments, their sense of what's wrong with America, it's just that they began to see that **America was really an idea, a great idea, and that it was composed of many great ideas that require and inspire us to consider them**. The class then became very respectful of the process of thinking about America and what America might really stand for.

I only say that because this is my experience with meeting a group of American students. Granted, they are American students of certainly a very cultural mix of every sort, but still, they are American students; they're not in another country, they're not in the Middle East. But I'm wondering if something comparable to that might be a contribution to the whole question we're facing this weekend of what does it mean – could it mean that we need to deepen our own understanding about the ideals of America? What does it mean that America is a religious nation?

And as you go and study the ideals of the Founders and those who followed, the Jeffersonian ideals, the freedom not only to worship as you please, the freedom of religion, but as it has been said many times, the freedom from religion, and that is a spiritual freedom. It's not religious in the sense of sectarian, but it's that aspect of the freedom to cultivate that aspect of a human soul, the human mind, which can think independently and come to the possibility of searching for access to one's own conscience.

It became very clear that with regard to all the greatness, power, and rights of America, one of the fundamental purposes we came to – and I've come to in my own understanding – one of the fundamental ways of understanding the role of America at the moment in the world, it's meaning in the world, that could justify all of its economic, military, financial and cultural influence and power is that **the Constitution, along with all that is the structural part of America, is there to guarantee and protect the possibility of human beings searching for conscience within themselves**. And that is sometimes called secularism, which seems to have turned into materialism. **The freedom to not be religious, as well as to be religious, has to do with the protection of the possibility of searching in a community, and by oneself, for access to that element called conscience, which is the source of all the great spiritual and philosophical traditions of the world**.

So, America, we came to see, was the guardian of that search. Now, in that sense I made a distinction – I extrapolated from a distinction Thomas Paine made in *Common Sense*. He made a very useful distinction between government and society. Government, he said, was legal, it was punitive, it was strong; it could be physical, it could be hard, but it was there to protect something softer and more refined, which is society. And society is the realm of ethics, of subtle human relationships, and I would put it, of the search for spirit and conscience within oneself. And so, America, I began to see, was to be understood as the guardian at the door of this fundamental human search.

I think if we're met by other cultures, which are deeply embedded in a religious tradition such as Islam or any other great religious tradition, the question is, are we meeting them with ideas that are as profound as the ideas which have shaped all the great religious traditions of the world and therefore which have shaped almost all of the life and conduct of mankind for better and worse throughout history? And I think we are. I think the American value, what the Founders were searching for, was not the pursuit of happiness defined as pleasure, physical or social, or comfort, physical or social, but virtue, but not in any puritanical or restrictive sense but virtue defined inwardly as the access and manifestation in life of conscience.

So, in the light of certain ideas like this, going into it more deeply to think, to step back from your presuppositions to understand, we ask what is the act of thinking? We need to think together with others, not just talk together but talk as a form of thinking — dialogue as a form of pondering, of questioning. I think every scholar from any tradition, every source of vitality, of any culture, of any tradition, needs to be able to recognize the need in this culture, in this day, to come to some part of the self that is able to stand back from one's suppositions, presuppositions, and think and listen to each other. That I take as not just academic or philosophical in any academic sense, but as deeply spiritual.

Here, for example – and this just bears on it a little bit – if I may read a couple sentences from Vaclav Havel's talk which he gave at Stanford University in 1994. He was talking about the form of American government. It's a couple of short paragraphs, but I think you'll find it very relevant.

"The separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, the universal right to vote, the rule of law, the freedom of expression, the inviolability of private ownership, and all the other aspects of democracy as a system that ought to be the least unjust and the least capable of violence, these are merely technical instruments that enable man to live in dignity, freedom and responsibility. But, in and of themselves, they cannot guarantee human dignity, freedom and responsibility. The source of these basic human potentials lies elsewhere, in man's relationship to that which transcends him. I think the fathers of American democracy knew this very well" ("Democracy's Forgotten Discussion," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6 #2, April 1995).

He goes on, "Were I to compare democracy to life-giving radiation, I would say that while, from the political point of view, it is the only hope for humanity, it can only have a beneficial impact on us if it resonates with our deepest inner nature and if part of that nature is the experience of transcendence, that which goes beyond us, in the broadest sense of the word; that is, the respect of man for that which transcends him, without which he would not be and of which he is an integral part. Then democracy must be imbued with the spirit of that respect if it is to have a chance of success."

And finally he says, "In other words, if democracy is to spread successfully throughout the world, and if civic coexistence and peace are to be spread with it, then it must happen as part of an endeavor to find a new and genuinely universal articulation of that global human experience which even we Western intellectuals are once more beginning to recollect, one that connects us with the mythologies and religions of all cultures and opens for us a way to understand their values."

That's what I think is possible as another level of exchange, another kind of con-

versation, which I would like to call a possibility to open up with the Muslim world. It can't replace anything that's been said, of course, and all that's been said in terms of economic, political, social, psychological, geopolitical, cultural aspects are extremely important, but this is at another bandwidth of human conversation, of human exchange, of human relationship, which we call the spiritual without any associations with sectarian religion at all. And, I would suggest that it's worth pondering and worth considering and worth taking steps to open further. It's in our own Constitution. It's in our own Founding Fathers' words and thoughts. And, it's in our own history, our own heroes, our own crimes, and our own failures, which can also be faced in the light of the great spiritual values of the world.

So I'm just calling for a deeper examination of our ideas. If we need ideas, they are there waiting for us in our own history, calling for us, if we will, to look at them openly and freshly.

MR. BARONE: I agree with much of what Jacob Needleman has been saying. I think perhaps I'm anticipating John Zogby a little bit. We have many polls which show that people in different countries around the world have hostility or negative feelings toward this country. I don't think we should ignore them. I think that we should at least try to put them into context. Some of the recent surveys I've seen suggest that people think that the United States has too much military power, and they are somehow fearful of this. You can see it in commentary in this country and abroad – you know, the big bully United States is attacking poor, innocent little Iraq. Well, it turns out, of course, as we know, our military forces were overthrowing a horrible, despotic regime, the people in Iraq would not want to go back to the Saddam Hussein regime, and we've actually done fairly well there.

I was at a luncheon today with a speaker who spent the last month in Baghdad. He made the observation – this is an Arabic speaker, someone academic who has spent a lot of time in the Middle East – that this was the first time he had been in an Arab country where he would talk with people from a wide range of life – lead people, ordinary people – and that the discussion wouldn't move to the issue of the Palestinians in the first five sentences. He said they might get to it eventually, but they were talking much more about this question of how you build a decent society and a decent government, because that is the task they have before them; that is the opportunity that they see that is before them. And I think, basically people in Iraq showed a certain amount of faith in the U.S.'s good intentions. I mean, in the course of the war, I am told by reporters who were on the ground there and learned from news accounts that Iraqis would line the banks of the Tigris River and watch the bombs come down on the Ba'ath Party's government installations. You don't do that unless you have a high degree of confidence in both the intention and efficacy of the United States military forces – the intention being, obviously, to target the regime and not the people; the efficacy in that you seldom miss. And that is quite a testimony which I think we have to weigh along with the negative poll results that have come in.

People have a lot of complaints about the United States, but at the same time, at some level, beneath the surface negative dialogue, those people standing along the Tigris River and watching the bombs showed that there is a confidence in the good intentions and high abilities of the United States of America. This is a fascinating sort of episode. Actions speak as loud as words.

We should remember as well that if you had taken a poll in Germany in July 1945 or in Japan in November 1945, you might not have gotten entirely positive results about the United States. So far as I know, such polls were not taken. I've never seen reference made to them. **I think one of the things that's happening in Iraq and in the Middle East is that minds are changing. Iraqis now – and I suspect Arabs later – will be concerned not just with the fate of the Palestinians, but with this question of how to build a decent society and government**. And to the extent that they are concerned about and focusing on that question, I think that is good for the United States. I want to echo what I think Professor Needleman was saying, that **what we really have to communicate here is that, over a long period of time, the people of this country have built and are still building, through trial and error and sometimes considerable strife, a society and government based on principles that have universal application**. This has been enunciated by our leaders on a number of occasions. President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to do this before the United States entered World War II, in August of 1941, when he proclaimed the four freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear – attempting to sum up, for our country and for the people of the world, the causes for which we would fight.

George W. Bush did this in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. I don't think these words got the attention that they deserved from our press. At least until last Thursday, the leading print organization in the United States, The New York Times, was largely devoted to tearing down the reputation and hurting the political prospects of George W. Bush and his administration. Whether it will continue to be so under its new editor I do not know, although that clearly is the policy preferred by the publisher of the New York Times, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr.

I'd like to quote George W. Bush. He talked about the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. I think this was a clear attempt to echo, for our time and in the circumstances of our world, what President Roosevelt said in 1941. And it's a somewhat different list. Roosevelt's list in the 1940s was the sort of list you might expect to get from a Democrat – New Deal Democrat, although there was really nothing in it with which his Republican domestic political opponents disagreed.

George W. Bush's list is the kind of list that you might expect from a conservative or, if you will, a compassionate conservative Republican, but there's really nothing in it that Democrats in this country would disagree with in any serious way. We argue about our rights, about the edges of our rights and where those edges should be. And those are reasonable things to have disputes about, but within our domestic politics, there is a consensus on the vast body of rights; just disagreements at the margin.

The rights that Bush enunciated were the rule of law. Interestingly, this echoes the theme in Farid Zakaria's recent book about the Middle East, where he talks about the need to build civil society and the rule of law before you start having elections, lest you follow the procedure too often used in Africa, which is one man, one vote, once. He goes on to talk about limits on the power of the state – an interesting thing, respect for women – and that's obviously carefully phrased for the Muslim world, to be consistent with, I guess, different forms of Islam. I mean, the restrictions on women are justified in Islam, are they not, to some extent, by the idea that this is the way you respect women? In any case, this was, I think, an attempt to be multicultural, if you will, without specifying precisely how we would show respect for women, and indeed, that is a sub-

ject on which we have disagreement within our own country.

Private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance – I think it's a pretty good list, and I think it's a list that represents the achievements of the United States over the course of the years. Now Bush makes the point that Dr. Needleman made – no nation owns these aspirations. **President Bush said, "America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture, but America will always stand for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity."**

I think Bush has produced a very good message here. I'm sorry that it did not get transmitted more by our media, much of which is devoted to trying to deconstruct him and his Administration. Nevertheless, I think that it's a message that we need to send out to the world.

If I could just add another message that I think we need to send out or amplify in different ways, "give people an example." This is the message I tried to send out in my book – I'm not just trying to sell books – *The New Americans: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again*. I wrote this book because I was struck by the fact that a lot of people keep saying that we have, for the first time in our history, a multicultural society. And, a lot of people suggest that we should keep people in their different boxes; you know, blacks belong over here and then they get so many quota people; Hispanics belong over there, we should teach them in Spanish, not in English, as we've done in bilingual education for a long time; Asians are over here, they are greatly discriminated against, they need all this help and so forth.

It seemed to me that this was wrong. It seemed to me that, in fact, this is not the first time that America has been in such a situation and has faced large numbers of new people coming from different countries and somewhat different cultures, and in fact, the minority groups of today resemble the immigrant groups of 100 years ago – Blacks resemble Irish, Latinos resemble Italians, Asians resemble Jews – and 100 years ago many people in America said these people are different races – they used that term "race," which has meant different things at different times – these people are different races who can never become assimilated into America, who can never become interwoven into the American fabric. Well, today we hear a lot of people – we hear the Pat Buchanan right, we hear the multicultural university left say, well, these people, they're different races, they can never be fully assimilated into this racist country like – well, Buchanan would not, I suppose, complain that it was a racist country – they can never be assimilated into this country, and some of these people say we shouldn't want them to, either. We should leave people in their separate multicultural boxes.

I think that view will be proven wrong in time, too, and I think it should be proven wrong. The long experience of people coming from different cultures, religions, and languages, goes back not just to the 1840's and the Irish potato famine, but back to colonial days in most of the original thirteen colonies. **We have had the experience of interweaving new peoples into the American fabric and weaving a stronger fabric in the process. I think that is an experience that presents valuable lessons for nations all over the world. It is relevant to the construction of a decent society in Iraq, where you have substantial numbers of peoples of different religions, of different ethnic backgrounds, with different languages**.

It is certainly relevant to our friends in Western Europe, who are grappling with

problems of immigration, and who do not have, in most cases, the capacity to assimilate new peoples as Americans have had over the years.

We tend to be critical of the way we treat immigrants, the way we treat minorities. It is good in many ways that we are critical, that we are alert to our shortcomings, and that we try to spotlight them in order to do better. But, I think we should also not miss the fact of the greatness of the achievement of this country in interweaving new peoples into the American fabric.

This is something that was not inevitable; it is something that does not happen in every society. This country has, in its folkways and in the family histories of just about everybody, family lore. We have developed a sort of DNA about how to do this. And while some people are insisting that the situation today is totally different, in fact it is very similar to what we have done before, and I think that is a lesson that we should try to proclaim around the world.

As we become critical – and, we have a media which tends to be so – a lot of elite media tends to be very critical of America and hostile in many ways to this country — we ought to also keep in mind the great achievements that this country has had.

DR. ABSHIRE: Before we, move to John Zogby's comments, I want to throw out a challenge to you (Mr. Zogby) and also to Ambassador Chris Ross. I reread *The Federalist Papers* recently. The authors studied the ancients and why democracy in Greece and Rome went wrong. Hamilton and Madison, as we see in "Number 10" but in other papers as well, were afraid that the search for liberty would produce the tyranny of the majority and then we would get into one man, one vote, one time. And in our language, beginning with the President, we talk about "democracy." We've talked about how we'll have a Palestinian state that's going to be a democracy in three years. But, it took us much, much longer. As I said in my opening address, women didn't have the right to vote until 1920. So there is a challenge of how we create realistic expectations. These have now come down upon us so hard as we look at the post-Iraqi military victory and dealing with factionalism. And so, in our public communications, how do we, without giving up the ultimate objectives of democracy, convey to these people that there is a process? And of course that is a theme in Fareed Zakaria's book.

MR. JOHN ZOGBY: Thank you, David. I'll be very happy to have Ambassador Ross deal with that challenge.

First of all, let me say that this is a great country when three people named Needleman, Barone and Zogby can be invited to discuss how best to communicate the best things about America. That indeed is proof in and of itself.

This is my first interaction with Jacob Needleman. I am deeply moved. As a recovering academic, let me assure you that your book will be read by next week, and I hope to be as moved by it – I'm sure I will be – as I was by your brief comments.

One of the best minds in this town, and any town for that matter, is Michael Barone, but I'm saddened that some of my comments might disappoint him.

With that said, David so eloquently over lunch laid out for us the three-to-one principal, how the moral is three times more important than the physical. Using that as a guiding principle, I would like to lay out what I believe is a one-and-a-half commu-

nication strategy, one-and-a-half meaning that in our effort to communicate with Muslim communities, that we go halfway. And so, with that as an overall guide **I'm going to suggest some areas of commonality, some points, some concepts, some ideals that we both share, us and the Arabs and Muslims together, but within an understanding that it cannot always be entirely on our terms, and that we have to listen and to understand**.

Here are some areas, I think, that are things that we both respect and that could be the basis for an effective communications program. These are in no special order of importance. **The first is entrepreneurism**. This is shown, not only in our polls, but more importantly by those who come here to the United States from the Muslim world and the Arab world. **There is just a very short skip and jump from the entry level in the United States to starting a business**. It is obviously something that if it is not in the blood of our people is something that is clearly important to our people. **This is one message: this is a nation that understands entrepreneurism, was built by entrepreneurs, respects entrepreneurism. It's a message that needs to be beamed to the Muslim world.**

Second is the importance of information technology, not only as a process but as a path to future growth. I was particularly struck, and I hope that you were as well, by the initially positive attitudes of young people towards things American. And I know that at conferences that I've attended, and that I have also polled, young people in both Beirut and in Cairo were information technology-oriented – and that doesn't only mean that they were facile on the Internet; what it also means is that they were working in software development and in high technology kinds of industries. **This is another message: that the United States welcomes information technology and promotes information technology; this is something that clearly reaches the youth of the Muslim and Arab worlds**. It's an empowering message, and it is also something I think that can neutralize some of the negatives that this group of young people may feel after the war in Iraq.

The third concept is this country's history and its identification with economic cooperation and economic growth. Anytime I have polled the Arab world and asked them about economic cooperation, it has always come out as something that they are very favorable towards, especially young people. Regional Pan-Arab cooperation, regional cooperation in general, cooperation with Europe and in Africa, cooperation with the United States, **this is something that is not missed on Arabs as a key to their future**. They also understand that there must be a political solution, but **at the same time that we are promoting a political solution we need to beam the message that we understand that this can be a region that can triumph through greater cooperation**.

Tolerance and civic participation, in our Arab values poll, rated very, very high. We both value tolerance and civic participation – Americans do and Arabs, too – Muslims must give to the poor. It is the essence of being a Muslim. **Civic participation and tolerance for others — there is a history of Islamic tolerance toward people of other religions. We both value it. This is an area of commonality that we share and that we need to promote**.

Hope and a shared future. We need – as you just pointed out – and this is my weak attempt to answer your question – **democracy is indeed a work in progress, and we need to temper expectations when it comes to exporting democracy,**

although I'm not really very comfortable with the notion of exporting democracy. I think there is a bit too much hubris there. But we are engaged in democracy building. We need to share with people that we didn't do it overnight.

And lastly – and this seems so unrelated but it really isn't – I am very, very much a fan and a devotee of the globalization of music. It is amazing to me what MTV and others have done in this country in terms of promoting and achieving better race relations, in terms of promoting and achieving a greater sense of the kinds of music that exist in other countries and in other cultures. Music is a common language. I'm thinking of young people and that music is something that needs to be exploited in the best sense of the word.

These are areas of commonality, but there are two overarching problems that we have. Number one – I have to say this. With all respect to Ambassador Ginsberg, who is a good man, I think he unfortunately used the term that Palestine is a cliché. Palestine is not a cliché. Palestine is a bloodstream issue for Arabs. Yes, you can get them to talk about other things but, as Jacob Needleman points out, even big powers have to listen. **Palestine is an embodiment of disrespect. It's an embodiment of an unwillingness to listen. It is the *sine qua non* of any success in communicating between the United States and the Arab world, and much of the Muslim world as well**.

The second problem is that **when we communicate, we need to communicate with a sense of humility and not with a sense of hubris. We have big ideas, but we also have self-interests as a nation, like other nations, and too often – and the rest of the world understands this – those big ideas and those self interests clash with each other. We need to understand how that clash can create agony or promote agony; and we need to communicate that agony**.

Arabs understand and Muslims understand that they're welcome in America – good theme. But Arabs and Muslims also understand that there is a tradeoff, that when immigrants come to this country from the Arab world and the Muslim world, that unfortunately there is a tradeoff between, on one hand political neutralization and disrespect, and on the other hand, an exchange for the opportunity to succeed. This is not a deal that all Arabs and Muslims these days are willing to make anymore. It's a deal that my father made and that many Arab immigrants made to this country: we'll shut our mouths about our concerns, just give us a chance to succeed. My father did, and certainly was able to see his children grow and prosper in this country. But the fact of the matter is that new Arab immigrants and new Muslim immigrants are not willing to make that tradeoff so readily anymore.

And so on the home front, we need to show greater respect for Arab Americans and Muslims. I certainly welcomed the remarks – and many welcomed the remarks by the President after 9/11, but it wasn't enough. We need to respect Arab and Muslim organizations. And how do you do that? By listening to their issues, not by saying, you're welcome to the White House but shut the heck up about what you want to talk about. We need to listen to what they want to talk about. At the same time, will the President condemn Franklin Graham or Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell, who are perceived as racist and as bigoted because, quite simply, they are racist and bigoted towards Arabs and Muslims?

And so, in order to stop that tradeoff of Arabs and Muslims in the United States,

there has to be greater respect for issues. That's Palestine, that's Kashmir, that's a whole host of other sorts of things. And those are some of my ideas.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: What to Communicate About America

AMB. ROSS: Well, it's a difficult environment to work in, in that on the level of ideas we are very much committed to this process at the same time that the strategic interests often take us in the direction of supporting governments that are anything but the way we might like them to be. So in a way, we have to work indirectly and with humility. **And the approach that we've taken within the government, for some time, has been to talk, not about democracy or exporting democracy and somehow applying the U.S. model in other countries, but rather, on a country-specific basis, to work through our various information and exchange programs on developing the building blocks of what, at the end of the road, could become a democratic system of some sort that takes into account the local traditions and conditions**

Among the elements that we've worked on – and **some of this is illustrated by the things we've said vis-à-vis Iraq. One has been to promote the idea of the widest possible participation in a political process, to open the door to everyone from every religious, ethic and social group. We've done some work on the notion of the alternation of power, which is not something that happens very frequently in the Middle East. We've done some work on free elections, and how they are organized. We've done a lot of work on transparency and the issues of corruption. We've promoted the idea of independent legislative bodies and independent judiciaries.**

All of this is a way of working with what, in many cases, are nascent institutions of civil society in order to increase awareness of, and put in place, the building blocks of democracy that over time could lead to a different and better form of governance in these countries.

DR. ABSHIRE: That's very helpful. Jeffrey [Starr], let me draw you into this. You're watching, from the Department of Defense, what's going on in Iraq and our attempts to move towards a more representative structure. Obviously, realism sets in, and this is going to take time. I wonder what your reaction is regarding what we're learning, and how we convey how we are dealing with this immediate situation.

MR. STARR: If you don't mind I'd like to defer comments on the specifics of Iraq. I mean, I'm happy to give my two-cents worth — there are probably people here a lot more knowledgeable than I – but, I'd like to make an overarching point about how we approach the concept of public diplomacy, because I think we've all said a lot of good things about public diplomacy. Everything the ambassador said is on the mark. It is all good stuff, the programs are all good. Charlotte Beers' attempt was a great attempt. Nevertheless, it all misses the boat in some respect – every single thing misses the boat in some respect, and I think an important one.

I offer this as an observation to see and get reaction from the people around the table, and the panelists, to see if this is a ridiculous notion or not.

Part of the flaw of our communications strategy, it seems to me, personally, is that we seem to think that if we project our image and our values abroad to different cultures, then that is a sufficient basis for making those cultures – let's just talk about Arabs for the time being, the Muslim world – understand us better, and some would believe, therefore, dislike us less, or like us better, or trust us more. **My critique of our own public diplomacy strategy is embodied in the notion that the projection of the American image abroad is a sufficient basis for making them understand us**.

If I can oversimplify about why the "Muslim Life in America" tapes didn't work in Indonesia, it's because – you know, they're great video tapes showing that you can be Muslim in America and you can still go to work, your kids can still go to school, you can still participate in economic and political life in America, and you can still go to baseball games. But the reaction was, "who cares? Our problem isn't with how America treats American Muslims; our problem is how Muslims treat Americans."

Too often in our communications strategy, we don't, or are not willing to, put ourselves in the shoes of the target audience. We're not willing to get inside of their logic systems and to understand the world as they see it. It might be that we want Iraq to be a secular democracy, but are we prepared to accept a theocratic democracy, whatever that means? I don't know. I don't think we know as a government or as American people, necessarily. We aren't anticipating well the developments going on in Iraq, because we're not playing the influence game in a very effective way. A lot of good things are happening in Iraq that people don't know about. You know, the water service is better, the food service is improving, and the electricity is better – at least certainly, in some regards, better than it was under Saddam. We don't get much credit for that.

We don't get much credit for the military interventions of the last decade which were done on behalf of Muslims around the world. It may not have been the sole reason, but it was at least one aspect of, for example, our intervention in Kosovo, for which the United States gets very little credit in the Muslim world.

The question is, why not? Maybe the answer is, as Mr. Zogby said this afternoon, that facts don't necessarily change perceptions. Our public diplomacy fails to say that maybe there is more to building a relationship than projecting American values. And that's not a popular thing to say in an inter-agency meeting, by the way. You don't get very far when you talk about how maybe democracy is not the image we need to project right now; or that maybe inclusiveness of American society is not relevant to this particular problem.

And so the question is, how can we do that, all that projection of American image, which is good to do, but not sufficient, and couple that with working on the inside of the logic system and value system of other peoples? A specific example, which we've been working on, is how do we understand the problem of suicide bombings? How can we build an influential campaign in the world to denigrate suicide bombing as a currency of practice? There is a view in the Pentagon, for example, that it would be great if suicide bombings became viewed, in the international world, similarly to how we view slavery as today, whereas 200 years ago or longer, it was an accepted form of economic production. Now, it certainly exists in the world today, but it has no moral legitimacy at

all, anywhere in the world, even though it still exists in some places. So, how can we get suicide bombings to be viewed in the same way?

And in order to have that happen, projecting purely American values about the character of these acts, these phenomenon, probably is not going to be sufficient. Even though, again, when you're sitting in an inter-agency setting, it's pretty tempting to end the meeting, pat yourself on the back, say you've done a good job, even though talking about the ethos of a suicide bombing network is not a very popular thing to do because we don't recognize it as a moral act. We see it as an inherently immoral act, and yet there's a long preparation period that you go through to be recruited, to have your commitment developed with the help of your handlers. You're part of a cell structure; you're not acting as a loner. You're not necessarily psychologically unbalanced. In fact, the ones who are psychologically imbalanced probably aren't taken by the recruiters.

I'm going on way too long. I'll stop. My point is that **since the war on terrorism began, we have failed to grasp, as a government, at least, that the manner in which we can influence the world isn't solely a function of projecting American values overseas. It's also a function of getting in on the inside of the other's value and logic systems and challenging their assumptions**. And doing that leads us very quickly into conflicts, which have been raging in Washington – not in the newspapers necessarily but raging in Washington between the public diplomacy and public affairs communities, psychological operations communities, and there's really very little resolution of it today.

DR. ABSHIRE: Those were very discerning comments.

We have, at the Center for the Study of the Presidency, sixty-five wonderful Fellows from the great universities of America that write presidential papers. They all rate the panelists who speak during our three-day Fellows Symposium in the spring, and John McElroy got a top rating from our Fellows. So you've written on America and so forth, and you're from Arizona, and you've been all over the world. What's your observation on these things?

DR. McELROY: Well, if I could, I want to address the Center, but before I do that I'd like to say if I didn't know better I would think that Professor Needleman and Mr. Barone might have read my book and lifted certain things from it. But the reason I know better than that is if you stop and think about what this country is, if you really deeply think, which was Professor Needleman's big point, you've reached the kind of conclusions that Mr. Barone was talking about. In the book that I wrote, which I call *American Beliefs*, I use the methodology of comparisons. And what you find out when you compare the demographic that is the population history of the United States with Canada and Spanish America and Brazil, the major cultures of the so-called new world, is that this was the only society that was made up of self-selected immigrants.

The governments of France, which had dominion over Canada in it's early history, Portugal, which had its colony in Brazil, and Spain - they all screened immigrants according to nationality and religion. The kings of England permitted unimpeded immigration because they wanted to create, as rapidly as possible, a large agricultural population to transform this wilderness into farms. It was an economic consideration, I think, more than the fact that the kings of England were more liberal than the kings of

those other three European imperial powers.

I think that the reason that we need to communicate American culture, as I call the unique set of beliefs that arose out of the behavior of this unique population of self-selected immigrants, is that **it seems to me that the Muslim world blames us for their situation, and our main task is to challenge that attitude, by pointing out to them that we are, in our history, a self-determining people, and that they must be a self-determining people in their own histories, starting today**.

The orientation, that I perceive at least, in the Muslim politics, is profoundly oriented towards the past. They live in the past. They harbor these grudges. They're still searching – according to Bernard Lewis in his important books, they're still searching for the explanation of why, since the 10th and 11th centuries, their civilization has no longer been the leading civilization in the world, as it was almost a thousand years ago. And they see the West generally as the source of their decline: as the West rose, the West put down Islam and Islamic countries.

And I think that we have to address that problem very frankly and very directly by doing a better job of making it clear as to what is unique in our country's history, what is good, and I think of course it is because — as James Madison said in Federalist #10 —we're not angels. If men were angels, you wouldn't need government. So that, to me, is the reason why the emphasis ought to be really on making clear to the Muslim countries just what, you know, America's about.

It doesn't mean that we shouldn't also listen respectfully, that we should not have a proper respect for their history and its peculiarities, which are different from the peculiarities of our history. **We must frankly recognize that, for the U.S., the chief determining, definitive, unique event was the transformation of a stone age wilderness to continental expanse from ocean to ocean, in just a couple of hundred years — three hundred years. The definitive event in Islamic history was the expansion, beginning with the death of the prophet in 632 to the building of an empire that stretched from northern India clear to western Spain, the whole Iberian Peninsula. Their culture is defined by that event just as our culture is defined by what we did; and until they recognize that and we recognize it as well, I think it's going to be very, very difficult to communicate between the two cultures**.

DR. ABSHIRE: I think you raise an interesting question because, you know, my innate reaction, which I have been sort of talked out of, is that it was a good thing to go back to their golden age because they were globalized; they were into science, they were leaders in science and philosophy; they studied the classics, ancients; they had tolerance. A great mistake when the Christians took over all of Spain was then to run the Jews out which produced a financial collapse. And Christians and Jews worshiped in, I guess – in Damascus and in southern Spain, so it was a period that they were integrated and had great tolerance — more than, let's say, the Jesuits did during that period in some of the things that were going on.

And yet, the counterargument is made that no, to go back to that is an escape, or that gives in to the idea that they were deprived by the West of this situation rather than their turning inward at the time that the West. Christians had the reformation and turned outward.

DR. McELROY: Before we get too excited about the fact that we didn't emancipate slaves until 1865 with the amendment to the Constitution, Saudi Arabia did not abolish slavery until 1962, I think it was. And the only place in the world that still practices chattel slavery is in the Sudan, a Muslim country. So, you know, we don't have to, in my opinion, be apologetic for, you know, the culture that we have had because the emphasis, certainly in my reading of American history, has been on freedom, the principle of individual responsibility, practical improvements, of welcoming people from other countries to participate in the opportunities that are available here.

I think that those things need to be emphasized. We do ourselves and the rest of the world, I think, a disservice if we accept, as Mr. Barone said here correctly, a hypercritical attitude on the part of many intellectuals in the media.

MS. d'HOOP: I wanted to make one quick comment, and I do say this with so much respect to Dr. McElroy. You know, in this project, we have gone through a big educational process. And in looking at what we have learned both from our work on this project and recent polls, it does seem that the most significant source of the problem stems from U.S. foreign policies and the message that our actions send, in terms of our attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims abroad and in terms of how much these actions or policies are in sync with "American values." And, I think what you said was very interesting about whether there is a correlation between explaining well who we are and our popularity abroad. That is not to say it is of no relevance to Muslims abroad how the U.S. interacts with its own citizens. Obviously, Muslims who have recently immigrated to the United State can share stories of their experiences and how they are treated in the U.S. with family and friends back in their country of origin.

I think a perceived hypocrisy — when our policies do not seem to reflect our values — makes matters even worse and creates a lot of frustrations. I still think it is important to be clear about what America is and to have a good communications strategy, but the policies along with a perception that our actions are not informed by our values play the most significant role as a source of anti-Americanism.

AMB. ROSS: Just very quickly, I think it's fair in this meeting to judge public diplomacy on the assumption that projecting America's image abroad is all that public diplomacy does. With the appearance of the "Muslim Life in America" initially in all the headlines, that was the impression that was out there. But I think it does a real injustice to the daily work of public diplomacy practitioners around the world.

There are two broad areas in which public diplomacy works. The first is the daily and arduous task of policy advocacy. Public affairs officers and their staffs around the world explain and clarify American policy and its background, and that is there as the 500-pound gorilla in this room right now, the policy aspect.

But the other very important element of public diplomacy is in an outreach for the purpose of dialogue and engagement. This is seen most particularly in our educational and cultural exchange programs, whose very purpose is to expose Americans, sent overseas, to the cultures and values of other countries and to expose foreign guests in this country to the cultures and values of

this country and to discuss the commonalities and the differences. That is not the same thing as projecting America's image; it's a much subtler form of interaction.

So I just ask you to keep that in mind as we discuss public diplomacy because yes, "Shared Values" was out there in the headlines, the "Muslim Life in America" – the fact is, it occupied 1.5 percent, roughly, of the public diplomacy budget for that year. So a lot more was going on in public diplomacy than "Shared Values."

DR. McELROY: I have a question for John. I was going to ask John also to comment on this because I think we have two very interestingly taut but diverse views. I'm a political consultant, and in my business, credible political communications require that you start with understanding how a targeted audience looks at a particular issue, what their hopes, their fears, and their concerns are.

Setting aside the merits and the substance of what you're saying, my question to you is: how would you recommend that we communicate the message you articulated in a way that builds the credibility of American communications without putting us in the posture of hectoring people? Essentially saying hey, get off our back, this is your problem, which John Zogby, I think, has cogently pointed out is an issue that has to be addressed, and I would say as a political consultant is endemic to effective political communications.

MR. JOHN ZOGBY: I think that one of the characteristics of any culture – obviously, your Muslim country's culture or any other cultural group – is that, if it's a real culture, if it's a living culture that they – people in it who are participating in it, naturally think that their culture is the best. It's the set of beliefs that have historically been acted on by that people, and have served as the guide to general behavior and thinking, and what we commonly refer to as the values of that people. So, to me at least, that is the basis for any kind of intercultural exchange. So, it is perfectly legitimate, right, natural, and good for us to think that our culture is the best and for you to think that your culture is the best.

The thing that anything worth the name public diplomacy ought to achieve, it seems to me, is an understanding of why this people and that people and this other people have that culture and why they think it's the best. My complaint, as I expressed it a while ago, is that I perceive in the Muslim world the idea that it's your fault that there is so much poverty, that there is so much misery, that there is so much political corruption as a system – not that we don't have political corruption here, but I think, still, it's not, you know, the system.

And that was my point, I guess, and how that would be achieved would vary, I think, from one Muslim country to another because there is a great deal of difference between Islam as it is practiced in Indonesia and the way that it's practiced in Sudan or in Morocco. It seems to me, you can't just say that this ought to be our general policy for explaining the self-determining nature of American history.

DR. BUKHARI: America and Islam, they have the same problem. With both Americans and Muslims, it is very common to see a difference between what these individuals believe and actually do – a disconnect between values and actions.

MR. JOHN ZOGBY: I want to answer your question and I want to get back to what Jeffrey said there. We have got to sell a bar of soap.

Forgive me for being glib here, but there are three ways to get me to buy a bar of soap. One is to say: I have got good soap, makes you clean, if you don't buy it I'm going to attack you. That will make me buy that bar of soap once, but I don't think it's going to work after that. The second way to do it is to say this soap is so wonderful it's going to make you Zest-fully clean and your underarms dry. Well, that's wonderful; but if I don't want my underarms dry and I don't want to be Zest- fully clean and pirouette around the room, that's not going to work. The third is to find out what is going to work for me; and I'm just suggesting to you that among the messages could be if it's going to make you successful, if it's going to make you a loving father in your family, if it's going to tweak a value that you hold to be very dear to you. That's how you get people to buy soap.

Most successful advertising image in the world: the Marlboro Man. You see that in Minsk, you see that in Islamabad, you see that everywhere in the world because it cuts right to a value that's important to the consumer: I want to be independent, I want to be free. I'm merely suggesting what you're asking, I think, Jeffrey what you're saying as well, that I think that we went off on a campaign, it obviously didn't work.

And with all due respect to Ambassador Ross, I know that advertising is a small piece of public diplomacy, but the polling data is so clear that something just isn't working. I think we need to go back to the basic kinds of advertising principles that get at the values of what are important to the consumer that we want to impress, not what's going to work for us.

AMB. ROSS: Just a right-to-reply comment. I think we're loading public diplomacy up with too heavy of a burden here. **Public diplomacy cannot change attitudes overnight. There are so many other huge factors that play in the creation of attitudes, and the biggest one is the 500-pound gorilla called policy, and how it affects people wherever they live. That is not something public diplomacy can affect directly. It has an indirect impact by reporting to decision-makers about attitudes abroad, yes; but once that is done, the decision-maker will give it the weight he or she deems appropriate, and the policy will emerge full-blown. At that point, it will have an impact, and public diplomacy will work only at the margins**.

DR. ABSHIRE: Chris, I think that's a good point. **Don't proposals like the Corporation for Public Diplomacy give greater weight to opportunities to do things that the government can't do?**

AMB. ROSS: It's a fantastic idea. There's a huge role here for the private sector and the corporation is a good vehicle.

DR. HADDAD: I'm sitting here, very concerned that our attitudes sound as though we are living about 100 years ago in some Turkish colonial office, discussing them and us. And I think the world has moved so that they are here, they are us, and we're still talk-

ing about the Muslims and the questions that you raised, quoting some scholars. But basically, these ideals that Mr. Barone mentioned, that President Bush articulated, these values that Muslims share: human dignity, rule of law, limits of power of the state, private property, free speech, equal justice, religious tolerance, and the respect for women. **There is no problem resulting from a difference in values; it is the policy that is the big problem.**

All of these are considered to be hypocritical because we don't live up to them, specifically on the issue of Palestine. We can spend billions of dollars on telling them how wonderful we are, that he has made the commitment. But, really **all President Bush has to do is say, "I grieve for the Palestinians that were killed." He didn't. He grieved only for Jewish people who died. And until we can grieve for Palestinians, you can spend billion of dollars — it won't make any difference. Unless we treat them as human beings with equal value, with equal dignity, it's not going to work**.

MR. IDRISS: Our systems are interlinked whether we like it or not. There are not problems in the Muslim world that this country does not also share, just as there are not problems that this country has that are not affecting the Muslim world.

We have to, in my view, find a way to engage one another with a degree of mutual respect that tries at what are our shared problems.

Even how you frame the discussion can help you do that. We talked about the polling that Zogby International did, and you presented it this morning. I could be wrong, you have done polling in the States as well, you can tell me – but my understanding is, the main difference between the perceptions in many of those Muslim countries that you polled towards Americans and perceptions of Americans toward Muslims these days is as follows: **Whereas in Muslim countries there is an increasing suspicion and fear of the United States yet still an acknowledgement that the U.S. still has something great to offer in terms of technology and economic prowess, in the United States, increasingly, Americans have a major concern, suspicion, or fear of the Muslim world and don't believe it has anything positive to offer.**

If that's the major distinction between the world views towards one another which are held by many people in this country and throughout the Muslim world, we have a shared problem. **It's not about blaming the United States for the problems of the Muslim world or vice versa; it's about acknowledging that we are, whether we like it or not, connected to one another; and we have got to engage on that level.**

And I would – really, with all due respect to Michael Barone, whose work I have read and I have seen on television - I would really caution against quick judgments based on anecdotes. Without being flip, you know, somebody who doesn't know much about the United States, sitting in the Muslim world, watching the attacks on the World Trade Center and seeing New Yorkers standing on the street watching the towers, would it be reasonable to assume that the Americans are standing there, watching the towers because they have great faith that Osama bin Laden is also not going to try to hit them?

There are people who have been engaged in intercultural dialogue who have been trying to figure this out not because they blame the United States for everything,

but because we are concerned as global citizens. Whether we want to be global citizens or not, that's the system we're in, we're mutually dependent at this point. We need to engage on a deeper level.

I know there are a lot of differences between the Israel and Palestinian situation and the relationship between the United States and much of the Muslim world. But, if you look at the ways in which the Israeli government has gone about trying to assure its security, whether its targeted assassinations, curfews, increased security measures, or the full draft for men and women in Israel, have these things brought great security to Israel or not? This isn't a critique of Israel. It's simply a practical question, have those methods resulted in great security or not. Practically speaking, those same kinds of approaches, militaristic, security approaches are not going to assure us of our security.

So even if you don't buy into the valuated worldview approach to this, even if you're just looking at practically, how do we as Americans protect ourselves from the rest of the world? Even if that's your approach, I think it calls us not to blame or be critical of the United States but rather to act with a real interest in finding out what our shared problems are and how we can work together to address them.

MR. SNYDER: I would just like to leave you with this thought. And I look at this as someone with experience both in the government, in the executive branch in USIA, and in the private sector with the networks and so forth. I'm looking at this in the context of where you expect this message to be carried in a broadcast sense. I think that there are two outlets.

The existing outlets, let's say, in the Middle East, are the Middle East Broadcasting and so forth, Al-Jazeera, and the new Middle East Television Network that is being funded by the U.S. Government. In either case, I would like to say that **I have heard too much emphasis placed on programming and dialogue that is focused on us and what we offer, in terms of our democracy, and not enough about the target audience. If you want to get carriage on television, you're going to have to relate to the viewers of the existing channels or to the viewers of your new television network**.

I run a business that does a lot of distribution to television stations in the United States, and we have to get carriage on local stations. A lot of the television interviews you see on morning news broadcasts are what we originate: *The Today Show, CBS Morning News,* and local shows around the country. The first thing that we're asked when we're trying to get someone on an interview — and I would suggest that that's what you're trying to do here, you're trying to get people to express the point of view that promotes policy objectives — the first thing they ask is, "what's the news in this and why should my viewers be interested?" And they're going to ask this no matter where you are in the world. There has to be less talk – the message has to be very subtle.

And I agree totally with Mr. Starr, if you merely talk about the issues that we have discussed in terms of talking points, I don't think you're going to get very many people to watch. But I think if you work those points in artfully and subtly, and relate those to news events when they come up in different parts of the world, then you will get a lot of carriage, you will get a lot of people on television, you will build an audience for your television network, and you will make points that are very important for the U.S. government in the process. But I think it's a very sophisticated avenue that we have to look

at, and it's more than just talking about why we function so well as a democracy. Because I think you're going to turn people off and not get very much of an audience. But you can get those points across, if you do it very carefully.

MR. MASMOUDI: Just two very quick comments. Based on this discussion, I think there is a lot of ignorance about Islam and Muslim history in this room. And, please, if we want to talk about Islam and Muslims, we need to know a lot more about the history. Reading one book by Bernard Lewis is not going to do it. Please, you can do a lot of damage if you go on TV or anywhere else in the public media and say that Islam spread through military conquest. I can talk to you for as long as you want tonight or tomorrow and I can prove to you that that's not the case, but that's not the point. But, let's educate ourselves about Islam and Muslims first, that's my first point.

And then the second point is, let's practice what we preach. People love our ideas: people love democracy, people love freedom. All of the polls show they love it in the Muslim world more than they love it here. So, there's no point in going to them again and saying, "Yes, we like democracy. But we're not supporting it." Just today, in this session, we heard how it takes a long time, and we have to temper their expectations. How much more do we have to temper their expectations? **They have been living under tyranny for the last 50 years, and it is because we have been supporting those dictators. We have to practice what we preach. If we believe in democracy, if we believe in human dignity, if we believe in freedom, let's do it.**

DR. ABSHIRE: I want to conclude with this thought, before I leave as a chairman. We talk about them, the Muslim world, the Muslim community, and then we talk about us. It seems to me that that gets us away from the fundamental thing of what Dr. Gregorian said in that statement that I read: the Muslim world, where is it? It's in Washington, it's in Detroit, it's all over America. **As we look at this debate, we see that Muslims are a part of the American experiment. In fact, we have some of the finest scholars of the Muslim world. And, I would like to see the United States become one of the great intellectual centers of the study of Islam.**

THE GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGIONS

SPEAKER:

DR. PETER BERGER

Director, Institute on Religion and World Affairs; Director, Institute for the Study of Economic Culture; Editor, "Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World"

DR. BERGER: There is a French proverb that says, "Never excuse yourself; never explain yourself." And I believe there is now a Washington consensus that we don't pay any attention to wisdom coming from the French. So I will not follow this proverb.

And I do feel I have to explain that I am not an expert on Islam, and I'm certainly not an expert on public diplomacy. My assignment here was to put the American encounter with Islam into a global context of contemporary religion, which is something I do know something about, and which our center at Boston University spends a lot of time thinking about.

Now, one very simple thing to say about globalization as it affects culture, including religion, is everyone is talking to everyone else, all the time, and that has enormous implications. I should add that this fact, which is certainly clear to everyone, leads often to the mistaken assumption that as everyone talks to everyone else, they understand each other better. And that would be a very big mistake.

Which, by the way, reminds me of a joke, that some of you probably know, about a man who walked into a Jewish restaurant on the lower east side of New York and was very surprised that there was a Chinese waiter who spoke to him in very elegant Yiddish. And when the customer left, he talked to the owner and said, "That's very interesting. You have this Chinese waiter." He says, "Yeah, yeah, he came from Hong Kong last year." "He speaks very good Yiddish." And the owner says, "Psst, he thinks he's learning English."

So let me repeat the fact that everyone is chattering to everyone else, using every conceivable form of communication, including, I think, the most reprehensible one, which is the cell phone, doesn't mean that, therefore, we understand each other better. Now, **one thing I want to emphasize, from the start of my remarks, is that we must leave behind the notion, which is still quite common despite massive evidence to the contrary, that the modern world is a world of secularity.**

There has been a body of literature about this, somewhat grandiosely called secularization theory, which basically states that modernization brings about an irreversible decline of religion. I myself, in my younger years, which is like 105 years ago, when I started out as a hungry young sociologist of religion, I also thought that, and there was some evidence for it — we were not crazy when we said this.

But we were mistaken. And as I often say to my students, one of the advantages

to being a sociologist, as opposed to, say, a philosopher or theologian, is you can have as much fun when your theories are falsified as when they are supported. And I found it tremendously interesting when I discovered that some of the things I wrote in my younger years were wrong.

Modernity does not bring about secularization. On the contrary, the contemporary world is one that is passionately religious over most of the earth, and we are full of powerful eruptions of religious fervor in all major religions. There are two exceptions to this, and I don't have time to go into this, but I think I should mention it — two exceptions to the statement that we live in a passionately religious world.

One exception is sociological, the other is geographical, and both are very intriguing. The sociological exception is that there is an international intelligentsia, mostly people trained in Western type humanities and social sciences, and that international stratum is indeed very secular, which, by the way, may be one reason for secularization theory, because social scientists from the United States or Europe who travel around mostly talk to each other, to other people like them, and then they think everyone is like that.

So if you go, for example, to the faculty club at Delhi University, and you come from Harvard, you think all the Indians are like that. Well, they are not. Just as when, if you go to the Harvard faculty club, and you think that this represents religion in the United States, you'd be somewhat mistaken. In fact, I know a German scholar who came to the University of Texas and felt very much at home there. It was very much like being at home: no one was religious at all.

And then, he rented a car and drove through Austin on a Sunday morning. And every station he turned on was some sort of evangelical preacher. And then, he ran into a traffic jam because everyone was going to church. He then realized that Austin, Texas was not like Gottingen at all.

Well, that's the one exception, this international intelligentsia. **The other exception is geographical, and in a way, it's even more intriguing, and that is Western and Central Europe. In Western and Central Europe, I think it is correct to say that as these societies have become more modern, they have become more secular**. And one of the most intriguing problems in the sociology of religion is, "Why is this the case?"

The comparison, by the way, between the United States and Western Europe in this respect is very important. The United States is a very religious country, by any indicator. Western Europe is not. If modernity were the basic factor, this would be totally inexplicable, as you cannot argue that the United States is less modern than, say, Belgium. So something else must be happening there.

I will leave you in suspense about this issue, because that's not what I was asked to talk about tonight. Let me only add a small commercial. Our research center has a study group on this issue, what I've called Euro-secularity, and they are coming close to the finish of their work. I'm sure we will publish it and, perhaps, answer these questions.

Okay. I said a moment ago that **all major religious traditions are engaged in globalization, without exception**. Of course, Christians are all over the place. **Evangelical Christianity, especially, is enormously spread around the world**.

Groups like the Mormons, for example — by the way, you may be happy to know, in case you don't, of all religious groups in the world, the Church of Christ of Latter Day Saints is the one that's growing most rapidly, barring no other church. And they're all over the place. In fact, a couple years ago, for the first time I visited Buenos Aires with great expectations. I had read the novellas of Borges, who wrote wonderfully romantic things about the streets and squares of Buenos Aires, and I was looking forward to being in this world of Borges. But as my taxi left the airport, the first thing I saw was an enormous Mormon Church, with an angel in gold looking down upon us.

Here was a religion born in the burnt over district of upstate New York, taking root in Argentina. But the same is true of all other traditions. **Now, the Roman Catholic Church, of course, has been a global institution all along. In fact, it's the oldest global institution, with enormous ramifications all over the world**. We'll say something about Islam in a moment.

Buddhism is coming massively into the West. People now estimate there are about — it's hard to say, because religious statistics in the United States are not very reliable — but maybe something like three million Buddhists, four million Buddhists in America. But 800,000 of them are converts. And the question of what does it mean to be an American Buddhist is a fascinating question. The Diaspora of Hinduism is fascinating, especially in the United States. Jewish groups with headquarters in Brooklyn are making a big impact on the politics of Israel.

Everyone is globalizing. One could talk at great length about each one of these cases that I have mentioned. I want to focus on two. And I think one can argue plausibly that **two trends constitute the two most dynamic cases of religious globalization. One, of course, is resurgent Islam. The other is the explosion of Evangelical Protestantism, especially in its Pentecostal form.**

I want to say a few words about that, because it is still less well known. Although, the phenomenon is so massive that even people who are reluctant to look at it for various philosophic or prejudicial reasons, are forced to look at it. One of our early studies was a study of the explosion of Pentecostalism — there's no other word for it — in Latin America, by a British sociologist by the name of David Martin.

Martin estimates now there are about 50 million Protestants south of the U.S. border. Something like 80 percent of them are Pentecostal. Almost all of the Pentecostals are first generation. They are converts from Catholicism. **Worldwide, Pentecostalism is spreading in black Africa and doing very well in parts of Asia, as well as among groups you'd never think of, the most astounding one being Gypsies in Europe**. In fact, the Gypsies are one case where secularization in Europe has not succeeded. Martin studied a convention of Pentecostal Gypsies in de la Maries, which is an old Gypsy shrine in the south of France. Ten thousand Pentecostal Gypsies congregated in this place. Protestant Gypsies are a delightful paradox, in a way.

Now, I know most about the Latin American case because we have studied it very carefully. I think, though, we can't be completely sure that very much the same can be said of Pentecostalism elsewhere. It is a cultural revolution. It brings about a cultural revolution. It brings about radical changes in people's, not just beliefs and values, but in their behavior.

And basically, what it does, at least in Latin America, I can say with confidence, it does exactly what sectarian Protestantism did in Europe and North

America two or three centuries ago. Max Weber, over 100 years ago, wrote a little book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* arguing that the Protestant Reformation produced values and habits, which were congenial or functional, we would say today, in the early development of a modern economy.

I, with the projects we have out of our center, usually have a mental subtitle, and my mental subtitle for David Martin's study was, "Max Weber is Alive and Well and Living in Guatemala." I mention Guatemala not by accident. It is the most Protestant country in Latin America, estimated at about 25 percent Protestant; in the capital area, about one-third.

Now, this is a massive phenomenon, interesting, obviously, in and of itself. A very interesting question is, "why is it so successful?" I can't go into that either, although I think I know. But the point I want to emphasize is, just as Weber thought about Protestantism a few centuries ago, I would argue, and more importantly, our researchers would argue, that this is a development in the world, which, whatever you may think about it religiously — and let me say, I'm not enthused about it; I'm a liberal Lutheran, and this is not exactly my kind of religion — but **if you look at it objectively, I think one can argue that the spread of Protestantism is a phenomenon which is conducive not only to modern economic development, but also to democracy**.

In terms of economic development, it has to do with the values that are promulgated by this group, by this population. In terms of democracy, what is very interesting and very visible in Latin America is that these are institutions that are created from below. There is not some outsider who comes in, whether it's clergy, or intellectuals, or agitators, who create these institutions. They are created by people, usually very poor, uneducated people, who never before controlled any social space, and they now create their own social space. David Martin thought these churches were schools for democracy.

Now, comparing this with resurgent Islam, I think, is interesting. And we're dealing, I would say again, with the two most dynamic religious phenomena in the world today. How do they compare? And what can one learn from this comparison?

In terms of geographical scope, there's a very interesting difference. Both are vast, but the **Islamic resurgence occurs almost entirely either in societies that were already Muslim, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, or among Muslim diasporas in Europe or elsewhere**. Some conversion to Islam is taking place here, of course, probably the largest example in this country is the conversion to Islam among African-Americans.

However, on the whole, we are dealing with people whose heritage is Muslim. That is not the case with Pentecostalism. It is penetrating into areas of the world where it never existed before, Latin America being only, I guess, the most dramatic case. I mentioned the Gypsies. Pentecostalism is rapidly growing among hill tribes in northeast India and in Nepal; always poor, marginal groups, where when missionaries come in, there's an explosion of this kind of religion. This is a very interesting difference.

Now, also, what I think is quite important is that **there are a difference in these two groups in terms of state/church relations. I don't know of any Pentecostal group anywhere in the world that wants to set up a Christian**

state. They don't have this kind of political ambition. They're concerned with salvation. The political consequences, in other words, are inadvertent. They are not a project.

On the other hand, of course, as we well know, **there are very important Muslim groups — and I don't only mean extremist groups, which are obviously important, but a minority phenomenon within the Muslim world — but quite respectable, if you will, Muslim groups that believe that the state should be a state ruled by Sharia, by the religious law – a very important difference.**

And then, I think **a very crucial difference is in the realm of personal morality, especially with regard to the role of women**. I was quite surprised — I did not expect this when the data came in on Pentecostalism. **Generally, I would say Evangelical Protestantism in developing societies is very largely a women's movement. The preachers are usually men, not always, but usually, the missionaries, the teachers, and the organizers are usually women, and formidable women**.

In Latin America, the Protestantism is an anti-machismo movement, and these strong Protestant women, either they domesticate their husbands, who stop drinking, and fornicating, and so forth, and instead, work hard, save, and take an interest in the education of their children, or they throw them out, and either stay alone or get some nice little Protestant to become their new husbands — very interesting, indeed.

We don't find, I think, anything like that in the Muslim world. And most economists I know would agree that — you don't have to be a feminist to say this — that the status of women is a very important factor whether a society successfully develops or not. Now, I'm well aware of the fact that there are very respectable scholars of Islam, some probably in this room, who say that **there's nothing in Islam that necessarily denigrates the status of women**, and I'm willing to believe them.

But, in fact, in Muslim societies, whether this comes from Islam or is a defamation of Islam, the status of women is not, to put it mildly, very good. And that has important implications, I think, for economic development. Now, this morning when John Zogby gave his report, there were fascinating data about the Muslim world. And I recently saw — I'm sure some of you also did — data that Ronald Inglehart has been reporting about — I think they came out of this World Values Survey, or whatever it's called — which indicate very much, much of it in line with what John Zogby was talking about this morning. That is **if you look at the Arab world, or the Muslim world in general, there is a surprising degree of agreement with what you find in the United States about things like democracy, human rights and market economies.**

So the idea that there's something powerfully anti-democratic in the Muslim world just doesn't seem to be correct. But what other data show — and this is what Inglehart reports — there seems to be a chasm when it comes to issues of sexual morality, whether it has to do with sex before or outside marriage, homosexuality, or abortion. These are very fundamental differences in moral beliefs.

And it seems to me that this is an interesting issue if one asks about the communication of American values in the Muslim world or, for that matter, anywhere else.

Now, one other thing I think one should emphasize is that — and I think David Abshire made the comment about it this morning — **when we talk about exporting American values, or representing American values abroad, one has to ask, "Which American values?"**

We have had, over a number of years, **in the United States**, what, in effect, has been called **a culture war.** It is **precisely these issues of sexual morality, sexual behavior, that have been at the core of this culture war**, with abortion having a privileged status among the problems at issue. **Which side of the American culture war does the public diplomacy that you people want to foster, represent – one side or the other, or impartially both?**

It seems to me that's a very interesting question. And **in the Muslim world, the data seem to indicate that this is crucial.** Now, I'm soon coming, I think, to the end of my assigned time. **Let me, as a result of these considerations, suggest a very tentative hypothesis, in terms of communicating with the Muslim world. The main problem, it seems to me, in this communication, is not the issues of human rights, in general, or democracy as a political system, but rather, issues of gender and sexuality.**

I think the question that one must answer — and I don't have a very easy or dogmatic answer; I'm simply raising the question – **is are Western liberal values on these issues essential to the democratic ideology which United States policy is supposed to espouse?** A few years ago, my wife and I were in Turkey, and I didn't do this, but my wife watched a lot of television and was struck by how much American produced pornography she could watch on our television set in the hotel room.

She was quite upset by this, not that she's particularly prudish, but she asked, "Is this the image of America that we want Turks to have?" And we know, from all sorts of data, that many Turks are appalled by this and identify this with the United States. Now, what are we supposed to do about this? Leaving aside the issue of sexuality, gender, the role of women, et cetera, there is, more generally, the right of the individual for almost unlimited self realization, even if that self realization goes against his own traditional community, or his community of descent or heritage, with which, let me say, I'm very sympathetic.

One thing that struck me when I came to America as a young man is that one could be anything here; one could do anything one wanted. That's part of the greatness of America. But is this part of the image of America that we want American government policy to represent, and if so, does it include, broadly speaking, self-realization through sexual emancipation?

We talked the other day with somebody in New York who was interested in these issues and what kind of conference it would be useful to run in terms of Islam in America. And I suggested — I don't know whether he's going to follow up — an interesting topic would be Islamic modesty, a very important concept. A kerchief covering one's hair is a symbol of Islamic modesty. What can one do with this? Is this a concept that is totally unacceptable in terms of our notions of the role of women, the autonomy of the self, male or female, or is this something from which one might learn?

I don't have the answer. I'm not suggesting an answer. But I think it's something to take into account. Let me make one other point, and that is the issue of language. One of the projects we have at the institute at the moment, and we are trying to

get into a new phase of the project, was designed by a colleague of mine, Adam Seligman, a sociologist. And his project is a very hands-on project, to create curricula on tolerance for religious schools, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian, in the Middle East and in the Balkans.

He had three working groups on this, one in Jerusalem, one in Sarajevo, and one in Berlin. The one in Berlin has been lagging behind a bit. But the ones in Jerusalem and Sarajevo have done a remarkable job. In Jerusalem, they had a group — this has been going on for three years — of Jewish and Muslim educators meeting throughout the whole intifada, and have come up, now, with two volumes. One is a textbook for teachers, in English, about how one can teach tolerance using the language of traditional Jewish and Islamic religion? There is also a textbook, which I can't read — it's all in Hebrew and Arabic — of texts that can be used, traditional texts.

Seligman's point is that **the international discourse on human rights and democracy, generally speaking, uses the language of the Western Enlightenment**. And while he has no particular problem with this — I certainly don't — **this is not language that is heard very easily in Myesha Arim, in Jerusalem, or in Qum, or, for that matter, in a Serbian Orthodox monastery**. That is really Seligman's project, to communicate tolerance, pluralism, and democracy in these settings, and be heard.

The final point, I think, to conclude with, **for all inter-religious and intercultural encounters, it seems to me, we have to find a middle ground between two attitudes which are still very common among people who deal with these issues.**

One is ethnocentric arrogance, the notion that we have all the answers, our institutions can be exported to anyplace in the world, dropped by parachute, and that's what we have to represent. During the Reagan Administration, I remember a conversation with a political appointee in the State Department, who said to me, "The purpose of American policy is to represent Lockean individualism in all international forums," which struck me then as a very implausible proposition, and which certainly hasn't become any more plausible since then.

So this is real ethnocentric arrogance, and there's a lot of it around. **And on the other side is a kind of supine relativism, which has respect for every culture and every religion, except one's own, or perhaps, psychologically, to say it more accurately, except that of one's parents**, because much of this is directed against one's parents.

It seems to me, **one has to find a middle ground here of assurance about one's own values and one's own traditions, but which at the same time is accompanied by an empathetic outreach to the values and the traditions of other people in this world. I don't think this is very easy, but I think it is by no means impossible.**

UPDATE ON THE CFR REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SPEAKER:

THE HONORABLE PETER G. PETERSON, Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign Relations; Chairman, Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Council on Foreign Relations; Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Chairman, Institute for International Economics

MR. PETERSON: I was presumably educated at the University of Chicago, and our patron saint there, you know, was Adam Smith. And Adam used to tell us that we ought to focus on comparative advantage, among other things. So in thinking about today, I asked myself, what could possibly be my comparative advantage in the presence of such experts on the Muslim world, as Shibley Telhami, who was on our task force, and John Zogby, and I'm sure others.

I have no intention of displaying my comparative disadvantages today, so what I'm going to do is not focus on the content of the public diplomacy effort, but on the priorities, the practices, the processes, and the resources that are being alluded to. It's been said that all analogies are imperfect, and this one is certainly imperfect, but I'm struck with certain similarities between our task force and the one that I recently co-chaired with John Snow, the Conference Board Commissioner on Public Trust and Private Enterprises.

We asked ourselves there, how deep is the breakdown in public trust in American business? We never asked, "What difference does it make if there is a breakdown in public trust?" Nor did we suggest that it doesn't even really matter.

Next, we asked, what are the causes of the breakdown? Because it's patently obvious that the better job you do in defining causes, the more likely you are to end up with a better solution.

One speech from me is one too many, but let me give you a two- or three- minute summary of how we went about that. We asked ourselves, what is the key cause of the breakdown in public trust in American business? After a lot of work, we concluded that it was not just executive compensation in general, but it was egregious compensation in companies that had failed or were failing. However, there were also some other structural problems. For example, the theory of corporate governance has always been that you have outside directors to ensure they're un-conflicted, but you also had un-conflicted advisers, namely the gatekeepers: the outside lawyers, the auditing firms, the compensation consultants. The more we looked into this we discovered that they really weren't outside in many cases. They had been conflicted because instead of seeing the shareholder and the outside director as the client, they tended to see the management as the client that had to be served.

We concluded also that there was a serious cultural problem in many companies, the lack of an ethical culture. And we had a variety of suggestions on how

companies and boards might go about doing something about that. And then we asked, what are the best practices or reforms to improve the situation?

Using that analogy, we followed roughly that approach in this task force. We worked very closely with individuals from the Pew Research Center and others. We wanted to see how deep and unvarying the breakdown in public trust, around the world, was in the United States. **We found there was a substantial malaise in attitudes towards the United States among our best allies**.

There was a melancholy sameness to the findings, which I found depressing. I'll give you two or three of those. There was **a pre-Iraq poll by *The London Times* that showed the British evenly split between who represents the bigger threat to world peace, President Bush or Saddam Hussein. Particularly stunning to me was that after 9/11, was that even Gerhardt Schroeder express unconditional solidarity. He then later decided it was good politics to run against our country**.

To cite another melancholy statistic, in seven out of eight nations in Europe, all except Great Britain, a plurality believe that American foreign policy is having a negative effect on their country. So we came to the highly brilliant conclusion that indeed there was a very substantial problem here that has accelerated substantially in the last couple of years.

The second question, does it even matter, really? I don't find the short-term situation very reassuring. In the case of Turkey, which I think is illustrative, in the face of $20 billion or more, or whatever euphemism you might use to describe that money in an economy that desperately needs it, I think the public opinion was obviously a defining factor in turning down the U.S. use of their military bases.

But to me it's longer-term indications that are more troubling. **We say rather glibly that global terrorism is a transcendent national security threat. And there is an understanding, I think, that the big battle can't be won by our military alone. In addition, there is a growing understanding that the rebuilding of these countries is going to be a long-term effort. Given all this, I would have thought we would have decided that having strong and willing partners around the world is utterly indispensable**. So we began to make a highly original conclusion – I'm joking — that it matters a lot that there is this malaise in attitudes towards our country.

The third question we asked is: what are the causes? And obviously when you compare this administration to others, there are certain macro or generic factors here, for example, the sense of decline, hopelessness and the humiliation associated with U.S. policy toward Israel. Obviously, with regard to Arabs, this is a major issue. But we concluded there were also some micro-factors that were specific to the Bush Administration. Polls show that the rest of the world does, in fact, to a certain degree, find us arrogant, unilateral, self-absorbed, self-indulgent and somewhat contemptuous of the opinions of others.

We also concluded that there were certain, what you might call presentational issues that are quite apart from our policies, the way we debate or just present these issues.

Much has been said about our outright rejection of the Kyoto Agreement. It was presented in such a way that, I'm afraid, what it communi-

cated abroad was that we really didn't even care about the issues. One wonders whether it wouldn't have been better to express a good deal of understanding about the problem, and then discuss, quite clearly, what the issues are in the Kyoto agreement that trouble us and perhaps seek possible solutions. But to simply outright reject it betrays a certain insensitivity, it seemed to us.

Now, we have presented our findings to a variety of officials in the Administration and elsewhere, and I'm not going to get into recounting tales here, but it won't surprise you that in certain levels of our government their enthusiasm for the idea that perhaps this Administration and its policy has contributed to this malaise is a bit strained. In one such meeting that we had — and we had a lot of meetings with Administration officials — the person involved said that, well, in studies of these kinds, there are so-called exogenous variables – exogenous, as you know, being caused by the outside. **But it seems to me, if our government officials can't accept the fundamental premise that they are one very important source of the problem, then we're not likely to get a very dramatic solution**.

The idea that we're going to get everyone to love us is preposterous on the face of it. There are obviously those who are fanatics, whose views of the United States are deeply ingrained and irrational. We think it is far better to focus on the segments of the foreign public who, while there may be anti-Americans among them, are reasonable.

Secondly, we concluded that **the U.S. should focus much less on what we chose to call one-way push-down mass communication and replace it with genuine dialogue, debate, and with a lot more listening. I was rather struck by the numbers. In this country, we only spend about $5 to $10 million on opinion polls overseas, and that's less than some governors or senators spend in one state.**

The second concept is that public diplomacy in our country tends to be episodic, crisis driven, reactive, defensive, after the fact. We were instructed by Edward R. Murrow, who you may recall, more than 50 years ago said that public diplomacy should, as he put it, "be present at the takeoff, not just the landing." In other words, he instructed us that too much of our public diplomacy takes place at the landing, and often after there has been a crash-landing. It is for that reason that **we recommend an ambitious public diplomacy coordinating structure, rather like the National Security Council, which would indeed ensure that, as foreign policy is being formulated, it has, at its creation, substantial input from the public diplomacy side**. Now, David, as you pointed out, there's been some progress in that general direction with the Office of Global Communications. But if you get around to reading our report, our proposals are substantially more ambitious than that.

We are not suggesting that public diplomacy supersede national interests, with a tail-wagging-the-dog type of phenomenon here. At the same time, it seems naive not to face the fact that foreign attacks can obstruct the success of our policies. Therefore, **we think there should be standard operating procedures, when we are considering a given policy, to think through carefully what the foreign reactions to those moves might be. Where sensible, you can make the policies mesh more with those of others. We're not suggesting you should be an apologist, but we**

think the U.S. should have a stance that we have planned in advance and which we can explain to the world.

We think it's very important that the U.S communicate, and even demonstrate, its belief in democratic and open debate. After all, ours is a culture that thrives on this, and we think it could be a powerful form of public diplomacy. We strongly advocate debate and dialogues, which has not been widely present in our previous procedures.

It's very important that we don't leave public diplomacy solely in the hands of the government. We must use the private sector more. We thought it was unlikely that the government could attract a sufficient number of truly creative professionals and utilize the newest, most cutting-edge form of media and communications available. Furthermore, we believe that the most effective spokespeople may be far more likely to cooperate with a private or non-governmental organization than they would if the U.S. government directly funded their activities.

To bridge this gap between public and private sectors, as David has indicated, we did propose setting up this independent, not-for-profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The analogue there would have been the Corporation for Public Broadcasting when it was established. My wife happens to be the founder of Sesame Street, and I was the vice-chairman of the National Educational Television Network. I know a fair amount about where the great programs started, and it's really quite amazing how many of the most significant television efforts have come out of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and not the federal government. I'm quite sure that a number of the best programs would never have emerged from a government activity.

We think the Corporation for Public Diplomacy would have the capacity to act as a heat shield in some cases between the government and controversial subjects. It would be a place where the private sector would feel comfortable in getting involved in diplomacy. We could accept private sector grants. You may have forgotten that in the case of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Walter Annenberg contributed $300 million, which gave the entire program a substantial thrust.

We think that we can attract media personalities who would not normally be willing to work for the government, along with more credible messengers. It is also good to keep in mind that a good deal of U.S. government activity is directed at foreign governments and their officials, where one is obligated to follow certain protocols. But in any event, we concluded that this was an important area to consider.

Dick Fairbanks, Marc Ginsberg, David Morey, and others have been deeply involved with the Congress, Senator Lugar, and others. We're getting a very good response.

One of our task forces took a good look at the training of our diplomats in public diplomacy, and our conclusion was that up until very recently, this training was minimal. For example, the State Department offered a two-week training seminar for new ambassadors, but as we looked at the agenda, only a very small amount of that time had anything to do with public diplomacy. We learned that the State Department provided a one- or two-page printed summary on public diplomacy in the country to which the

individual was assigned. There were two days that were assigned to media skills training; this was not mandatory and not all ambassadors participated. We understand there have been some improvements in that regard, and let's hope we do a better job. I can't imagine why it isn't in our interest to have our ambassadors, who are on the frontlines, be much more trained and skilled in the issues of public diplomacy.

We suggest that it is probably a good idea, as part of this effort to involve others, to get locals to shoulder some of the burden. In other words, **we ought to be thinking about who are the most credible local messengers, such as young and moderate Arabs and Muslims, mullahs, journalists, talk show personalities and others who can criticize their own country more credibly than a U.S. diplomat ever could.**

We ought to identify more credible, independent messengers from American life, including the Arab-American firefighters and the police officers who rushed to the World Trade Center, Arab and Muslim Americans and their children or families who may have died in this, the Muslim Americans who are thriving in the United States — and they can attest to the respect we have for their religions. It may seem corny, but I can't believe that we can't figure out ways of using some of our sports stars, including Muhammad Ali and others, to help in the communication process.

We had an extended discussion about the relationship between U.S. government and foreign journalists. And the prevailing view was that, too often, foreign reporters feel as if they're being treated as second-class citizens and as if they are on the fringe. Yet, these are the people that are communicating with the people back home. So we have a variety of suggestions on this matter, and there's been some progress there.

We've got some things to say that are quite obvious about satellite broadcasting. Marc Ginsberg, as you perhaps know, is working on to develop and produce Arabic language programming to be broadcast on satellite television. Some of us are contributing financially to that, and we think it's very important that we get launched in that area. As far as the Internet is concerned, I can't even use a word processor myself, but **I've listened to people who I respect who believe that the audience that can be reached via the Internet is an important and growing audience. We ought to be figuring out how to use it much more.**

On the resources side, the funds allocated to this area are trivial, especially when you consider the problem. Having been in government, I am fully aware that not much gets done on resources unless Congress wants to get it done. One of the reasons that public diplomacy has been marginalized is that there really isn't a base for it in the Congress. We are trying to build one for public diplomacy and have a variety of thoughts on how might that be done.

So let me summarize in the following way. **We think the U.S. has significantly under-performed to capture the hearts and minds of foreign populations. We believe our minimalist approach to public diplomacy has left a legacy of under-funded and uncoordinated efforts. We think the lack of political will and the absence of an overall strategy have rendered past programs nearly impotent in today's crowded world. And while we understand that sound public diplomacy is most certainly not a silver bullet for our problems, we think making it a serious component in the making and communication of for-**

eign policy is vital to the nation's security. If I could sum up what we're saying, it's let's stop marginalizing public diplomacy.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: Update on the CFR Report on Public Diplomacy

MS. KIPPER: I didn't hear you talk about the message. I was in the Gulf just as the war ended and there was tremendous confusion because there was no message. People could not understand what the American message was. I'd like you to comment on the clarity of the message and how you get to that.

The second thing is I wonder if you have a view on whether you think it's a good idea for the U.S. to get into the business of having its own television station, in this case in Arabic. I assume if they do it would be the first of many.

MR. PETERSON: Well, certainly on the second question, there is no question, we need a dramatic increase in the television exposure.

With regard to making public diplomacy work, that, to me is the great importance of having public diplomacy present at the creation. I have a feeling that the policy-formulation and policy-execution phases would improve significantly if, when we formulated foreign policy, we were to have a vigorous discussion about how the policy is going to be perceived and received abroad. Some policies might change, but, at the very least, we would have a program in place to communicate that policy in terms of the values and attitudes of the other people in order to optimize its acceptance. But I have the overwhelming feeling that public diplomacy today is essentially reactive and defensive. And we finally get into it when there's already been a firestorm raised, and then you're reacting defensively and negatively.

DR. TELHAMI: We hear in the public debate that it's really about making our policy look better, but that policy should not be changed depending on the reaction of the international community.

I think that it's very strange that these policies are instruments. **Policies are not ends in themselves. You don't change your interests depending on how people react. But if the policy is not conducive to your interests, which is exactly the reaction we are getting on the international side, it would be strange and counterproductive not to reassess the policy.**

MR. PETERSON: Domestically, every modern President in the United States has traveled to every one of the 50 states. They've had intensive public opinion polls. They know in advance what the attitudes are going to be on virtually everything. And in some cases this seriously affects the policy itself. But in all cases, they are prepared for whatever the response is going to be and they tailor the message to try to optimize its impact.

Now you go abroad and, let's face it, most of our Presidents have done

very little traveling abroad. They understand, firsthand, very little about how other people react, and yet we are spending such a trifling amount trying to understand where other people are coming from. Don't tell me that Karl Rove doesn't understand the importance of understanding other people's attitudes when: (a) formulating a policy and (b) communicating it. Clearly, they're heavily driven by what they think the public wants to hear.

DR. ABSHIRE: The people in the White House, State, and Defense are so focused on the daily demands and there's not a framework for strategic analysis in terms of content and message, which creates a weakness. After 9/11, we urged the White House to set up something that in structure would be like the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

MR. HELMKE: I work for Senator Lugar in the Foreign Relations Committee. I just wanted to report that he is leaning toward pursuing an investigation into the possible privatization of the Board of Broadcasting Governors. And I wanted to get you're thinking on whether or not this idea of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy might merge into a concept of a congressionally chartered corporation. This would basically eliminate the Board of Broadcasting Governors, taking all of the broadcasting entities and putting them into a new Congressionally chartered corporation with the capability of running all those entities. It would also have the potential of maybe spinning off certain entities in various countries as those countries achieved levels of democracy and as the ability of those entities in those countries to survive on their own developed.

The reason this came about was that in the President's budget request this year for the Broadcasting Board, there was a request for the elimination of 14 language services in Central European areas. This would be in countries from the Baltic countries all the way down to Bulgaria. This is a cut of $9 million for the Broadcasting Board, VOA, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. As soon as these requests were made, every one of those countries started to write Senator Lugar letters complaining about the cuts. Of course, Senator Lugar knows all these countries' Presidents and parliaments, from his work in Central Europe following the fall of the Berlin wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Now, OMB made these cuts; the Broadcasting Board of Governors did not request these cuts. OMB made a valid argument that many of these countries now were a part of NATO; they were democracies. Lugar asked me to ask the Foreign Broadcasting Board if these countries have free and fair press and if they are legally protected. And the Broadcasting Board said, "well, we don't know; no one ever did a study."

A number of the foreign ministers started to visit Lugar. We asked them questions: "Do you have a free and fair press," and "Do you have the legal protections in place to ensure that you have free and fair press?" And many of the foreign ministers had to shrug and say, "Well, maybe sometimes we do." Many of them later said, "We just really like your broadcasting service." And I replied, well, is that something taxpayers of the United States of America should continue to pay for? Lugar would say, well, is this something we should continue to do with public diplomacy, just to maintain good relations with these countries? They're still in transition, for example.

I talked to Tom Dine who runs Radio Free Europe. I asked if they could privatize. Could Radio Free Poland, for example, continue to survive on its own? After all, Radio Free Europe is a pretty good brand in these countries with its survival as a commercial station. He said, "Well, it's worth a study, but right now I don't have the authority to spin these things off."

So, at the end of the day, we kept the $9 million in the budget and asked the GAO to do a study on what criteria should be used by the committee to determine whether or not Radio Free Europe in Poland, for example, could be spun off and when. Now, all this would be much easier if we had a privatized entity to undertake this effort rather than the BBG with its existing structure as it is today.

Now, as I understand it in the next couple of weeks, the GAO is going to release a report on the Broadcasting Board, and it's going to say that the current structure of the Broadcasting Board is confusing, contradictory, works against itself and probably should be privatized.

MR. PETERSON: Other than that it's a good idea.

MR. HELMKE: Don't you think the two things could be complimentary?

MR. PETERSON: I'll tell you, I'm about to miss my plane. I'm not ducking your question; I just have a quick and probably superficial reaction.

One of the reasons we proposed the CPD is to see how much private support we get. I think we'd get quite a bit, but I wouldn't want to engage in a privatized effort that ended up with even fewer resources going into this area. So I guess I'm being conservative. I'd kind of like a step-by-step approach. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting could easily decide to spin itself off if there was plenty of private support for whatever that effort was.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

CHAIR:

MS. JUDITH KIPPER, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS; Middle East Forum, Council on Foreign Relations

LEAD DISCUSSANTS:

DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution;
Author, *The Stakes*

DR. MICHAEL HUDSON, Professor of International Relations, Georgetown University; Editor, *Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration*

DR. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, University Professor & Director, Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University; Author, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*

DR. RADWAN A. MASMOUDI, President, The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy

Chair: Principal Sources of Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World

MS. KIPPER: I think this is such an important topic, and I appreciate the chance not only to participate but to chair this panel and to do wrap-up later in the day.

I think Pete Peterson set a very good foundation for our discussion, the principal sources of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. It seems to me that there are a lot of people who say, who cares? We're big, we're powerful, we should be able to do what we want; bullying is a policy option. And that's certainly prevalent in some quarters. But if we look at the kinds of strategic threats today to the United States, they are not the traditional threats. Culture, democratization, and what were the soft issues during the early, Cold War days are now the critical issues, and clearly our institutions are geared for something different.

Virtually all of the threats to the United States today are transnational threats. I think 9/11 was a perfect example. Weapons were not used. It happened to us, it changed our country, it changed the threat perception in the United States and the

world. But in order to counter what happened to us on 9/11, we needed the cooperation, and will continue to need the cooperation of countries all over the world because we can't handle it by ourselves.

We could manage the war in Afghanistan by military means chasing the money trail of the bad guys, and but dealing with the socioeconomic and cultural problems that produce individuals that are willing to blow themselves up just to hurt other people is not something the United States can do alone, even as the overwhelming superpower.

Transnational threats require us to be able to cope with other cultures and to deal with people who don't necessarily agree with us in a respectful and cooperative way, so that we can get something accomplished in the world.

Other transnational threats include: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, SARS, AIDS, global warming, freedom of the skies and the seas, clean water, computer viruses, et cetera. In order to deal with transnational threats, we have to figure out a way to be perceived as a cooperative country, and not simply, as Pete [Peterson] said, arrogant and pushy.

Many years ago, after I'd already had two careers, I decided I had the time and the money and I wanted to see the emerging nations of Asia firsthand. I drove from Paris to India. It was a life shaping experience. I learned something that has had an impact on my thinking ever since: why the United States was a gold standard, why people who had at that time no communications, not even radios, nevertheless had pictures of American presidents in their broken-down huts. Their children were hungry and all of that, but they knew something about America, and I tried to figure out what it was. Sure everybody wanted, you know, a piece of the material pie. They wanted VCRs and the latest jeans and sneakers and whatever else we've got to sell. But **the single best asset that the United States has is that human dignity is not reserved for ruling elites in this country.**

Take for example, our hostages in Lebanon, all six of them, it was a hideous tragedy for the six people and it marked them for life. But it was not a strategic threat to American national interests, nevertheless the country was totally wrapped up in those people, as it should have been. Remember the little girl who fell down the well in Midland, Texas? The whole country focused on her. The same happened with the miners who got trapped in West Virginia. **This respect for the individual in our melting-pot country is such an important asset.**

Maybe 80 percent of anti-Americanism is because we're big, we're noisy, we're young, we're dominant, we change our mind, and we're everyplace. But there is a percentage of this anti-Americanism, 10, 20, 30, whatever percentage, which has something to do with not projecting a foreign and defense policy that is received as being based on American values and good intentions. People don't think we have good intentions anymore.

Now, let's turn to our speakers. We have a terrific panel. All of them are friends, and I'm happy to welcome them to look at some of the principal sources of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.

Lead Discussants:
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

DR. TELHAMI: Let me put this in the context of how important the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in the attitudes toward the U.S., at least in the Arab world.

It's become a political issue even simply to decide whether the Palestinian-Israeli issue is important or not. In reality, when you look at the objective history, of course it's important. In fact, **I would argue that the Arab-Israeli issue is the central issue in the relationship between the Arab world and the U.S. It is the prism through which Arabs see America**. It's not that there aren't other important issues and it's not as if, if you take it out of the mix, you're going to have a harmonious relationship.

The survey that John [Zogby] and I did shows that the low favoribility ratings of the U.S. everywhere in the Arab world: 4 percent in Saudi Arabia, 6 percent in Jordan, and 13 percent in Egypt. Obviously, all of that would not completely disappear if the Arab-Israeli issue were resolved. Look at it globally. We don't have an Arab-Israeli issue in Latin America, yet there is resentment towards the U.S. in Latin America. We don't have an Arab-Israeli issue in Africa, and yet we still have resentment toward the U.S. There is a global problem beyond the regional problem. But to the extent that there is added value in the Middle East, much of that added value comes from the Arab-Israeli issue.

I think two things have distorted the debate about the importance of the Arab-Israeli issue in America. One is what I suggested, that it's become a political issue. Should there or shouldn't there be pressure? This has become part of the mix. But the second issue is al-Qaeda and 9/11. It is fair to say that al-Qaeda did not do what it did because of the Arab-Israeli issue, although, the Arab-Israeli issue may have been a factor. **I think it is also fair to say that even if you did not have an Arab-Israeli issue, al-Qaeda's agenda to have an Islamic empire would remain.** Whether they would target America specifically or not is a different issue.

There have been groups in the Middle East which clearly have an ideological or religious agenda, but the reality of it is that's not why most of the public supports them. And that is what I call the demand side.

The real issue isn't that you're going to have some groups that will never reconcile themselves to Israel or to a good relationship with America. That is always going to be the case in every region of the world. The real issue is what happens with the broad public opinion? What happens with the support for these groups? These groups cannot survive if they don't have financial support, political support, and recruits. And that public opinion is not determined by their agenda, whatever it is, but by what the source of the resentment is.

When Osama bin Laden goes on television to justify his attacks, he doesn't use his Islamic empire metaphor as the central feature of his position, he uses the Palestine issue, because it resonates. Whether he means it or not, it

doesn't matter. The fact is it resonates, and it resonates because this issue has become an identity issue in the Arab world. It's an automatic issue through which Arabs see America.

All of our surveys show that Arabs' attitudes toward America are mostly driven by American policies, not by American values. And obviously the history of America's relations with the Arab world indicates that as well. There were periods of ups and downs in that relationship, and they have been very much a function of what America does and doesn't do, largely on the Arab-Israeli issue, not a function of American values. America was admired at various junctions in the 20th century and is not now in Arab countries.

When you ask people about the Palestinian-Israeli issue specifically, it is clear that most people in the countries that we've surveyed identify it as the single most important issue to them. Now, I don't take that, by the way, to mean that it's more important than the economy. I take it for what it is, which is that they see this as an identity issue. They see this as a core issue through which they see all other issues.

I think it is very strange to think that it wouldn't be so important to Arabs and so critical to Arab public opinion. If you look at the history of the 20th century, particularly the second half of the 20th century, Arabs fought the 1948 war, a devastating war that left a scar on the psyche of an entire generation and that formed the opinions of Arabs in the region for the next decade.

They fought the '56 war with Israel; the '67 war, which was another devastating war that left a huge scar on the collective psyche of a generation, the '73 war, and the '82 war. Every decade has been marked by a major war except for the 1990s, but then there was the Intifada. And since then, the events of last spring, the first suicide bombings in Israel and the major attacks by Israel in Palestinian cities on the West Bank and Gaza, actually had a consequence on the psyche of the Arab world that is akin to a major war, for a very simple reason. This time these events were amplified many times over by the immediacy of the new media. Unlike in 1948, day after day, people watched what was happening on their television screens.

And I think the sense of helplessness, being unable to deal with it or do anything about, it is going to leave an impact on another generation. So when you look at it in the context of how people see this issue and America's role in this issue, it would be hard to believe that this would not be a critical issue in the same way. And I would suggest that the issue of Israel is becoming a part of the contemporary identity of Jews around the world, including American Jews.

You don't have to like Ariel Sharon or even agree with him, but if you have a sense that Israelis are dying or Israel's survival is at stake, you put all of that aside and you rally. And this becomes the central issue for you because that is what you see as the threat, even if it's not an immediate threat to you personally.

That is the way it works in the Arab world. And I think it is for this reason, obviously, that politicians use it. **Politicians have used the Palestinian issue in the Arab world. Arab governments have used it in the Arab world in the past. And I think that they've used it because it works. They've used it because Arab populations are often willing to put aside other issues because this is so critical to them**. And the oddity of it is — think of the picture of Arab leaders standing with

George Bush in Sharm El Sheikh only a few weeks after the U.S. had waged a very unpopular war, which remains a very unpopular war today in Iraq and is perhaps even growing increasingly unpopular because of the perception that it's an occupation. Despite everything else that is going on, they are willing to come together in a picture that shows that the U.S. is going to be involved in this issue.

So, in my mind:

(1) The Arab-Israeli issue remains the shortest way to winning hearts and minds in the region. It's not the only issue, but is the fastest shortcut to winning hearts and minds in the region. On the other hand, if it's not addressed, it's going to amplify everything else that's out there.

(2) Iraq is an independent issue.

(3) Authoritarianism in the region, and the extent to which America supports authoritarian regimes, is a major issue.

Yet all of these could be mitigated if there were hope for an Arab-Israeli peace. Or they could be amplified if there isn't. I would even go one step further; if there is no solution and no hope to move forward on it in the next year or two, then I think we really are on a slippery slope toward what many of the neo-conservatives have been arguing all along, a clash of civilizations. This would then become the issue that would determine the shape of relations between the U.S. and Arab countries.

U.S. CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND DOMESTIC POLICY

DR. HUDSON: I don't think it's easy to be more pessimistic than Professor Telhami, but I will try. I think the Zogby data and everybody's historical impressions bear out exactly what he has said, and I don't think he exaggerates in the slightest. But I think that while the Arab-Israeli issue is central in shaping public attitudes toward the United States throughout the Arab region, and increasingly throughout the whole Muslim world, it's not really the only factor.

I'd like, in a perhaps more academic way, to offer a few historical reflections. Because the more I reflect on this truly depressing situation, one which I rather doubt we can really do a lot about frankly, I'm wondering whether in fact we're not racing back to the future, or more precisely, back to the period of the 1920s. This is the period in which European imperialism reached its zenith in the Middle East and North Africa and ushered in a couple of decades of increasing popular restiveness against the colonial or the imperial presence.

Of course, the colonial imperial presence in those days, classical imperialism was from old Europe, and from Britain and France in particular. And if one looks over those decades, Palestine of course hits the radar screen, but it is a period in which nationalism takes on more than the kind of narrow, solon-like intellectual, structural character that it had had in the late 19th century and early 20th century, and becomes more of a mass movement. What I'm wondering is, as we look to a period in which the United States, in a rather different way, yet in some ways, a more penetrating way, becomes the new imperial force in the region, whether this is not something we have to look forward

to ourselves. It's not fun being an imperial power in a region like this, particularly one that is not only highly politicized, but now thanks to the accelerating effects of the information technology revolution, is even more edgy.

My friend Roger Owen, who is an economic historian on the Middle East at Harvard, remarked, that maybe this is the fate of empires: you can't be liked and you might as well not even try.

I don't think that there's really a lot that public diplomacy, spin, Radio Sawa, or the most effective kind of exercise of soft power can really do to change the fundamentals of American hegemony in this region. But, we can, at least, perhaps soften it around the edges. And that would be the only slightly positive comment I have. I think I am representing a stratum of Arab opinion that I know fairly well. These are the chattering classes of the Arab world. These are the intellectuals. These are the journalists. These are the opinion makers. And these opinion makers have, as we've seen from the data, an extremely low opinion of the United States.

So, what I'm not talking about, which seems quite paradoxical in a way, is the, not just correct, but, very warm and friendly relations that the United States government has with a number of specific governments and leaders in the region. We will hear from our friend, Ambassador Kawar of Jordan later today, and I think it is very likely Karim Kawar will say that the Jordanian-American relationship is splendid; and it is in a way. But that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm talking about the people down below, the people underneath for whom the American presence is about being big, intrusive, arrogant, and pushy. It's about a new imperial presence. And what I think it may be doing is resuscitating, in a slightly different form, the old sort of paradigm of political discourse in this region that goes back to the 1920s, which is one of nationalism versus imperialism.

We often tend to think, and with good reason, that what we're looking at is a clash of civilizations with a religious aspect. There's no doubt that there's a lot of that there. And certainly, we ourselves, in constructing the war on terrorism, have been perhaps a little bit careless in conflating that with the problem of Islam. That cannot be argued with, but I don't think it's really the whole story.

What I'm beginning to wonder is whether we may see a kind of historical repeat of a very long and intense struggle for liberation from foreign opposition that shaped the minds of an older generation of Arab intellectuals.

That's what I'm afraid we may be looking at. **The story is not just us versus Islam, it's also I think, from their point of view, nationalism versus imperialism, the struggle to maintain sovereignty against increasingly intrusive American hegemony**. And from the point of view of the politically articulate people in the Arab countries, there are three U.S. challenges.

One is a challenge to national identity, which re-invokes the complicated sense of nationalism which, with the death of Nasser in 1970, we thought had waned.

It's a complicated thing. **I think that the sense of being under attack, as it were, in so many places has revived a sense of Arab identity and a need to protect it**. It is true enough that in the last 24 hours, the U.S. forces have killed approximately 100 Iraqi Ba'athists, as they were called in the newspaper. Whatever you think

of the Ba'ath, and we certainly don't think very well of the Iraqi Ba'ath in particular, it was, for better or worse, mostly for worse, the main vehicle of a national idea that rose, waned somewhat, but I suspect it's coming back. And unfortunately, **there's a kind of a polarity, which as that sense of Arabism reemerges, sees the U.S. as the principal problem.**

So, on the part of the articulate folks, and when it comes to national identity, they have a lot of support from the less articulate folks, there is a sense that there are attempts to remake national identity into a form that is more acceptable to what the leaders of the United States feel is important.

There is a sense that goes along with this – we see this in Iraq certainly at the moment – with a favoring of ethnic and sectarian minorities. There is a sense that the U.S. is encouraging the fragmentation of political entities in this region, discouraging any kind of integration or cooperation among them and, therefore, that there is a new occupier in the region and a whole historical process that most Arab intellectuals, now in their 50s, felt was irreversible has been reversed — the West is back again.

The second dimension of the problem has to do with sovereignty. **The U.S. military footprint in this region is everywhere. It may be a small footprint in some places, a big footprint in others, but it seems to be everywhere. This has already elicited strong and worrying opposition in places like Saudi Arabia. But you can be sure that there is plenty of other opposition to an American military presence, however benign we might think it is, in other places as well.**

Cherished old ideas, again going back to the old political discourse, the ideas of struggling for liberation, trying to achieve self-determination and sovereignty, all of these things that they thought they might have achieved in the 1950s and '60s now seem to be under question by what is seen, and particularly I think with this administration, as a highly rough American presence.

There's a perception that goes along with this that the existing regimes, which cooperate and in many cases are deeply dependent economically and financially upon the United States, are mere dependencies, are mere puppets, are mere clients. And that, of course, fuels the kind of internal tensions that sap the legitimacy of regimes and leaders that we like to think of as moderate, friendly, and so forth.

Thirdly, something that is met with great alarm by intellectuals in Arab countries in the realm of domestic politics, **there is a new sense that not only is the United States offering these general challenges to these abstract but meaningful concepts of nationalism and sovereignty, but now they are also getting into the nitty-gritty of trying to organize and decide domestic politics. We're getting into the domestic political arena of many countries there. And this is a tendency that has accelerated since 9/11 and is exemplified best by the demands, in some parts of the American political establishment, for educational reform in the Arab countries.**

They think we want to rewrite the textbooks and reform the school curriculums. They might need the reforming, but the concern is about who is doing the reforming and who's making these demands. We are being perceived as wanting to reshape the minds of the young, to change the value systems of everybody in order to, as some of our leaders have felicitously put it, drain the swamp of rogue and malign tendencies, ideas and values.

That's getting into domestic policies. That's bringing an American advisor, directly or indirectly, into the Education Ministry and saying, "well, you're going to do it this way," or saying, "you've got to reduce the influence of the Ministry of Religious Affairs," and so on. That's one sort of important cultural dimension.

There is also an important economic dimension, which is well known, and that is the attempt, as it is seen out there, to impose a certain liberal economic doctrine which has an American label on it on the fiscal, financial, monetary and domestic economic policies of countries, and that gets into equally sensitive matters as subsidies and so forth.

So finally, what do we do? I don't know what we can do. It would be nice instead of being so big and so intrusive to be a little bit smaller, to have a smaller footprint and maybe somehow to be less intrusive. That's hard since we feel that the war on terrorism requires direct preemptive intervention on our part to do things in those places. If they can't do it them themselves, we will do them for them. That's what draining the swamp is all about. But the problem we're seeing is that as you try to drain the swamp, you may actually make the problem worse.

I don't have a happy ending to this. Naturally cooperation and openness, more exchanges, more contacts would be good. I think, frankly, they bring more value-added than say television broadcasting. But even if you do this, we're looking at a broad, deeply rooted historical structure that is not going to change easily. And I am afraid, therefore, that it may prove, even with the effective exercise of soft power in this region, which we are currently not doing very effectively anyway, that we're still going to have problems and to be loved is I think perhaps an elusive goal for us.

MS. KIPPER: At this very moment a private firm is making millions of dollars rewriting Iraqi textbooks, which I question because Iraqis are highly educated and are perfectly capable of writing their own textbooks, and I'm not exactly sure why the American taxpayer should allow a private company to make profit by doing that particular job.

WAR ON TERRORISM OR WAR ON ISLAM?

DR. ESPOSITO: Let me begin with an observation, and then I'll move to my major comments. **I think one of the things we have to face is that anti-Americanism is rampant, that our credibility is minimal, and that it's not just due to the fact that they just don't understand us.** And therefore it's just not going to be addressed by a public diplomacy approach that doesn't deal with policies and, instead, just talks about our relations would improve if only we could show them enough videos about what we are really about and how happy all those little Muslim families are.

It's also not enough to simply talk about what went wrong. And when talking about what went wrong, to imply that somehow they all got it wrong and now they're going to have to get it together. "What went wrong" means that there is a recognition that both sides are a part of the problem, even if we believe one side has been more of a part of the problem than the other. And we will not be able to reach a solution unless both sides recognize that. And I would say that parenthetically after 9/11, I heard a senior State Department official, in a meeting with Arab and Muslim leaders, acknowledge

that on behalf of the Secretary of State. But regrettably, the Bush administration in promoting its public diplomacy — and I'm only naming the person, not to criticize the person, but the period — went with the Charlotte Beers approach and not the policy approach.

So let me now move to my main comments. The day after 9/11 I received an email from the Middle East from somebody who is a political commentator, an academic, an Islamic activist, a mother of six, and a very, very critical thinker. She said, "It's terrible what happened. I hope you and your family are okay. It's terrible what they did to America and it's certainly to be expected that the United States will go after Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda." But she then said, "We wonder whether this is the beginning or the end." I sent her an email back and asked, "What do you mean?" And I knew what she meant. She emailed back and said, "Will this become an excuse for America to redraw the map of the Middle East?" And that theme pervades.

Within a couple of months after 9/11 — and all of you know this from the studies that have been done by John and many others — the goodwill and concern that was there, eroded in many quarters. **When I went to the Gulf to speak, in a major hotel such as this, to the chattering classes or, if you will, to some of the elites, during my introduction, someone said, "We're really glad to have John Esposito here who can explain to us America's war against Islam and the Muslim world." And the person said this in a very matter of fact way. And, this is somebody who travels here all the time and deals with us, owns a home here, and sends his kids here.**

And at dinner I said, "Were you trying to provoke me?" and he actually looked incredulously at me. We talked about it and he said, "That's the way many of us view it." And again, I want to emphasize this isn't the militant voices that we are talking about; in fact, we're talking about our friends, as it were.

Let's think very briefly about the U.S. and the Muslim world pre-9/11, and then I'll focus on post-9/11. In the 1980s, we focused on the export of revolutionary Islam, radical Islam, and Iran was the country we were concerned about. Calls for uprisings occurred, et cetera. The 1990s showed a more nuanced approach. But one of the things that happened in the early 1990s, late '80s and early 1990s, was the visible emergence of mainstream Islamic activism as a social and political force both in terms of social services as well as participation in elections in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. And what was the response? The response of governments in the region was to slam the door shut, to suddenly discover they were all extremists, then to crush them. And where was the United States and where was Europe at the end of the day? What role did they play? What role didn't they play?

One remembers that Assistant Secretary Ed Djerejian had stated a policy on Islam and U.S., which was re-articulated by Bob Pelletreau later during the Clinton administration. But the fact is, when you actually look at the way in which the United States responded when the Algerian military stepped in, and in effect, voided the results of elections in Algeria, that sent a certain kind of signal. And U.S. policy with regard to continued support for authoritarian regimes would have a cost, U.S. policy in Palestine, the sanctions against Iraq, look at the situations it's kept in Kashmir, Chechnya, et cetera.

Now, post-9/11 President Bush made a very forthright statement distinguishing between Islam and global terrorism. But how people actually per-

ceive it will be based on how they see it played out both in U.S. foreign and domestic policy, and I want to emphasis both.

With globalization and communications people don't need CNN anymore to see what's going on in Palestine and in other parts of the world. This was driven home to me when I was in Egypt, two Aprils ago, to address a large audience at Cairo University about foreign policy. And one participant asked, "What about the raids in Virginia and Georgia," which had just occurred two days before. They knew more about what went on than I did in terms of whose houses were raided and how were people treated. They also knew that it was called something like "Operation Green Quest." Well, that's kind of interesting because you remember the Bush administration backed away from the use of the word "Crusades" or use of the word "Infinite Justice." Now you have a raid against Muslim homes and you use the phase, "Green Quest." Green, remember, in the eyes of some, is the color of Islam.

Now, let's look at our foreign policy and how that contributed to the perception that this is not just a war against global terrorism but a war against Islam and the Muslim world. Initially, we announced we were only going after Osama and al Qaeda. And then we extended it to Afghanistan and the Taliban because they wouldn't give over Osama. But right after that we began to talk about second frontiers with all kinds of speculation, areas of Africa, Southeast Asia, making it very clear that we were the unipolar power, we had the military ability, and that we might indeed feel that we could go any place in the world. Provocative statements made by some members of the Bush Administration in a kind of "feeling-our-oats" mood, that is, that we could and might go any place in the world in fighting this, contributed to the idea that the U.S. was the new power, that it felt it could and would go wherever it wanted to go. This is very important. We saw this raised with regard to Iraq — and to do it in a unilateral way rather than a real multilateral way. I want to underscore that issue and that concern.

Then we talked about the axis of evil, and even included some additional countries in it. Then we focused on Iraq, while at the same time, moving Palestine and Israel to the back burner. And that's how it is perceived in the region. While the violence and terror was going on, on both sides, we tended to use language like, "Arafat needs to control that terrorism" and "Sharon is a man of peace." We worked with the U.N. to draft a couple of resolutions, but then, in many ways despite those resolutions and the Secretary of State saying that this has to desist in three days and then in maybe eight to 11 days, et cetera, we then turn to Iraq and let months and months go by, during which, both Hamas and Sharon and the Israeli military were committing violence and terror in the region. And that is part of the reality that many people see, and whether they are mainstream or militant.

So when we move to Iraq, then what do they see with regard to Iraq and their image of America? They see the emphasis on Saddam, weapons of mass destruction, and on al Qaeda links. They don't see the evidence; they see the contradictory statements that are made. They also look and ask, "Well, what about North Korea." And not just because North Korea has nuclear power, but if you want say "Saddam is -" and we all know what Saddam was and is, how about the ruler of North Korea. What kind of a government does he run? How are his people treated? However terrible Saddam was, Saddam built an infrastructure within Iraq, in terms of the oil fields, the engineers, and the educational system. But take a look at the Korean situation.

Then, as we actually were moving in those last months, Mr. Powell stated publicly, what had been said privately, and began to talk about the Road Map for the Middle East, democratization, and the willingness to accept those who would be elected as result of a democratic process, even if they might not have been our first choice, including Islamists parties.

I remember a senior government leader saying to some Arab and Muslim leaders, "I know when I talk about how there's going to be a reexamination of policy and that we're also going to encourage our allies in India, Pakistan, in Israel, Palestine, to reexamine their policies. I know based on past records you are not going to believe this, and that's okay. You should judge us by what we do, not just by what we say." He said that at least three or four times, but nothing then did happen.

During the lead-up to the Iraq War, that promise was made, and that's what makes post-war Iraq and the Road Map to the Middle East so critical today.

But I think we need to keep in mind a couple of things as we deal with this phenomenon. Number one, what has Iraq shown us? We thought Saddam and the Ba'ath were secular. We thought the Shi'a were crushed. So, we never expected what we saw in terms of Shi'a Islam — and here I don't want to make Shi'a Islam monolithic. People can be Shi'a culturally, as well as religiously, just as you can be Catholic culturally as well as religiously. I think many naively thought that people like Chalabi could be projected to the top. They didn't expect to see the cultural and religious revival of Shi'aism demonstrated in the march on Karbala, nor the way in which religious leaders and institutions proved to be not only ready to move in, but also able to play a viable force. How we will deal with that is important.

So, when the Secretary of Defense jumps out front and says, "it's going to be their democracy, but we are not going allow theocracy," and doesn't bother to define what he means by theocracy, it can create problems. I think what theocracy means is rule of the clergy. There is going to be a religious tone to regimes. Having religion involved in government is a reality in the Muslim world, and it will be a reality for the foreseeable future. We have to figure out how to deal with that. Because if our allergic reaction is to say, "if you are not secular, you are talking theocracy," and we are not going to be inclusive in this new move forward, we will likely get caught in our contradictions and end up with a major problem.

Radwan Masmoudi is here from the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy — just to be transparent, I'm vice chair. At the Center's banquet a few weeks ago, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Democracy gave a wonderful speech, but when questioned by somebody about what U.S. policy is with regard to Iraq, whether it will be a controlled democracy or really open. He said, "The Iraqi people will determine it." The person was very smart. He got back on line and asked the same question. He said, "I just was to make sure I understood you correctly." The Assistant Secretary restated it. The next day the headlines read that Mr. Bremer announced, no interim government, we are moving to advisory.

I think that what **we need to realize is that people are going to be looking at the rebuilding of Iraq and the Road Map to the Middle East. I wonder whether or not the Bush Administration, given the realities of American vested politics, are going to be able to bite the bullet on the Palestine-Israel situation. No administration, Democrat or Republican, has been able to do that.**

Will they be able to do that? We'll have to see. Will they be able to say that it is unacceptable for Hamas to commit acts of terror, but that it is also unacceptable and untimely to have an attack against Rantisi without considering the impact on the Road Map of a response by Hamas's which in turn allows for a predictable Israeli response.

The other challenge is how we will handle Iran and Syria. It struck me that, as we were fighting in Iraq, in the part of The Washington Post covering Iraq, on the right hand side were already all the speculation about what we might be doing with Iran and Syria and about the fact that part of the reason was weapons of mass destruction, et cetera, when we had not yet even found them in Iraq. I think that kind of signal has to be cleared up.

And finally, public diplomacy; as I said before, **public diplomacy has to not only communicate who we are and why we do what we do, it also has to address policies. And we have to address them and we have to show them we are open to reexamining them. Not to change, at the end of the day, everything that we do, but to be open to reexamining policies. If we are not, we have a major problem.**

And it's not just foreign policy; it's also domestic policy. The issues of civil liberties are not something to look away from; and it's not just secret evidence; and it's not just the Patriot Act. It's talking about new Patriot Acts. And it's just not arresting people. If we need to arrest people, we should arrest them, but when we arrest significant numbers of people and then we release a significantly high percentage of them constantly, what does that say about our system? We think we're showing just how critical and liberal we are. Well, if they arrested members of our families and held them without evidence, et cetera, and incommunicado for a long period of time, and then said but look how good we are, we didn't bring them to trial and we released them — if my wife or my brother were imprisoned for a number of months or years, with no reason, and then released, I can tell you, I wouldn't come away and say, isn't America's justice system really wonderful? I think our civil liberties issue is out there.

THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNANCE IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

DR. MASMOUDI: I am honored and privileged to be part of such a distinguished panel this morning, which includes some of the most prominent scholars of the Arab world and the Muslim world. And in a way, I'm in a little bit of a tough position coming after such distinguished scholars because I'm not a scholar myself; I'm an activist. I'm an Arab-American and a Muslim-American who has a Ph.D. in engineering, and up until seven months ago or eight months ago I was working as an engineer to support my family.

But now I am dedicating the rest of my life to the issue of Islam and democracy. I am the founder and current president of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, which is based here in Washington, D.C. I'm pleased that John [Esposito] is vice chair and a member of the board, and we also have two other members of the board here today, Joe Montville and Bob Schadler.

I think that there is no question that we live in a very dire, tragic, and danger-

ous situation, which could easily get much worse than it is today. I think the challenge that all of us face is to understand what we can do to improve the future and make it more peaceful.

We heard yesterday and again this morning a lot about the reasons for the Arab or Muslim anger toward the United States. There are several reasons. The primary reason that keeps coming up all the time is, obviously, the Israeli-Palestinian issue. I certainly will not disagree with that. The U.S. is seen as biased in favor of the Israelis and as not caring about the Palestinians. I think it's very, very critical and important that we try to do whatever we can to solve that problem in a peaceful and just way. Hopefully the last week's events, with President Bush committing himself and his Administration to try to solve that problem; I hope that's a positive sign. The fact that he visited the region, I also hope will lead to a positive development. However, I am not very optimistic about being able to solve it very quickly, unfortunately.

If U.S. policies toward the Palestinian issue are the most important reason for resentment of the United States, the second reason is the anger and the frustration over our support for autocratic regimes in the region. I think this is a big reason. I also think that it is very closely related to the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the reason being that we are seen as hypocrites. While we have talk about human rights, democracy and freedom, in the Arab world, we have, in fact, been supporting autocratic regimes that are not representative, not elected and not accountable to anybody. I'm very optimistic that we can do something about this, and that we will in the near future.

The first point of my presentation today is that Islam and democracy are compatible. I think there is plenty of evidence to that effect, from many books and papers. We had our fourth annual conference here in Washington just less than a month ago, and we had about fifteen papers that were presented at the conference, all of which emphasized this theme.

The second point is that Muslims want democracy, and there is plenty of evidence to that effect. The most recent Pew research poll also showed that Muslims and Arabs like and want democracy. And I think John Zogby's poll, presented yesterday showed that they even like and want American freedom and democracy, with a majority of 55 or 60 percent, I think, was the result across the Arab world.

My third point is that democracy is good for the Muslim world and democracy in the Muslim world is good for the United States. The reality is that governments do what they think is in their best interests, and that includes our own government. And I would argue that it is in our interest to promote democracy in the region. It may not be in our short-term interests. If we only focus on the next year or two, then yes, it makes more sense from our own selfish perspective to support dictators because in the next year or two we know exactly who will be there and we can influence their decisions.

Democracy in the short-term, poses some risks, some unknown factors and outcomes. However, I would argue and I hope most of you will agree, that in the long-run democracy is the best answer, and it is in our interests.

My fourth point, in this brief presentation today, is that Muslim and Arab Americans are at the forefront of this struggle for democracy and human rights in the Arab world, because we believe it is in the interests of the United

States and also because we believe it is in the interest of the Arab and the Muslim worlds.

I think all of you know the situation in the Muslim world is extremely bad. I don't think it's right to blame the United States for all these problems. I personally put the blame mostly on the governments themselves, and they are, let's face it, they are failing. They are completely out of touch with the people. They are completely out of touch with the realities in the streets and I think the status quo is just unbearable. It cannot continue.

There is a lot of hopelessness, anger, frustration, economic stagnation, and unemployment in the street. Unemployment for young people ranges between 30 and 40 percent, and I'm talking about educated people who have degrees from major universities. They cannot find jobs. They cannot get married. They cannot rent apartments. They cannot do anything.

With regard to human rights violations, we had Saad Eddin Ibrahim at our conference a couple of weeks ago. I think if you had attended, you would have seen two-thirds of the people with tears in their eyes because of the suffering that he went through. And he mentioned that he was only one of at least 30,000 political prisoners in Egypt alone. **In the Arab world there are an estimated 250,000 political prisoners.**

We need to stop supporting dictators and we need to start sending a clear message to the governments, to the rulers, as well as to the people, that we do stand for freedom and for liberty. Mr. Abshire yesterday mentioned how in the Cold War we sent a clear message to the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. That message was conveyed and was received very well by the people in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

But the big difference between now and then is that at that time we were not supporting the regimes that were oppressing those people, so the people believed us when we told them we stood for freedom and democracy. The message did not contradict the reality. In the Arab world the message is contradicting the reality. We're telling them, yes, we stand for freedom and democracy. At the same time we meet with all these tyrants and then the following day, the front page of the newspaper reports how the President of the United States said how great this leader and his economic, democratic, and social progress are. People look at this and ask, what is this? Which planet is this guy from?

Yes, we are involved in a battle of ideas in the Muslim world, and I think that's very clear. I think secularism is losing. We were very surprised when we organized our workshops, the secular parties that we invited said, "Please, don't call us secular"– all of them unanimously.

All of them in these three countries told us the same thing: Secularism is losing in the Arab world and people want Islam to play an important role in their life, in their society, in their government, in their habits, and that's going to be a fact. The question is what kind of Islam? Is it a tolerant Islam? Is it a progressive Islam? Is a moderate Islam, or is it the most extremist and most radical interpretation of Islam? So the battle is within Islam itself. Who speaks for Islam and who can interpret what Islam says?

I'd like to say a few words on Iraq. What we do in Iraq in the next six months, maybe even less than that is critical. As we all know, there's a great deal of anger, frus-

tration, and suspicion about the Iraqi war in the Arab world and in the Muslim world. Initially we said that we went there because of the weapons of mass destruction. Well, we're two months later, and we still haven't found them and a lot of questions are being raised.

The other reason we said we went there was to establish freedom and democracy, but already we are starting to back down from that and we're starting to say, no, no, no, we really need to temper their expectations or be patient, it takes time, you know, we don't really know what the outcome will be. For which democratic election anywhere in the world do we know the outcome beforehand? I mean, that's part of democracy, that's part of the risks of democracy. Yes, we don't know the outcome, but we have to go through that experience and we have to be patient ourselves in letting the Iraqi people choose their own rulers and holding them accountable.

I think that clearly, if there are elections tomorrow in Iraq that the moderate Islamists will win the elections. I will venture that if there are elections 10 years from now in Iraq the moderate Islamists will still win the elections. And I think we would be making a big mistake by postponing these elections a decade. The risk is that we will be seen more and more as occupiers and as enemies of Iraq and the Iraqi people. I think that would be a dangerous and tragic mistake.

The path to democracy is not always a straight or sure path. But we have to be patient, because the risks of oppression and occupation are much greater than the risks of democracy.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: Principle Sources of Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World

MS. KIPPER: For our discussion let me just raise a couple of points.

I wonder if the American idea of stability in some of the countries we're talking about today, to have a friendly leader who keeps his people quiet at any price and allows us to have military and intelligence relationships under the table, is really stability. Has it really served the American purpose to get hooked on the man in some countries, a good man or a bad man, because we like the man? We hate Saddam, we love this one, we hate that one. Maybe it is our institutions of governance, that were really built for bilateral and alliance relationships for the Cold War, that are going to need to be reformed, because the threats have changed.

The other point I want to bring up is that in the Middle East **one wonders if it's a good idea to spend a lot of money on U.S. television in Arabic, when there isn't a single American studies program, taught in Arabic, in any university in the Middle East. There are several American universities now being built in the Middle East: Cornell Medical School in Qatar, Texas A&M in Bahrain. Kuwait now has now an American university, and that's a very good sign, but all those are teaching in English, and English is still the second language. But there are no American studies programs in major Arabic or Persian.**

We have our own problems with language. After 9/11, I was appalled to see on CNN and the other cable stations, at the bottom of the screen, "if you've been a citizen for three years and speak Farsi or Arabic call 1-800.gov," or something. **Our inability**

to learn other languages is significant, because language is not just language; it's a window on the culture. And if you read even a superb translation of something from ancient languages into English or from any language, it's going to be different. **We have to learn how to communicate; part of public diplomacy is to speak languages.**

The United States policy did not begin to focus on democratization for the Arabs until after 9/11, a long time after 9/11. Before that, our priority was stability, stability, stability, and be nice to Israel, don't do bad stuff, and cooperate with us. But nobody talked about a better way of life for the Arab people, a process of democratization, economic reform, building civil society and so on. We just never, never used those words. And believe me, the 70 percent under the age of 20 or 25 in the Arab world, who are hooked on television, like everybody else, knew what we did in Eastern Europe. They heard what we said. They knew what we did and they concluded, we're somehow inferior, and therefore we're humiliated. Our identity and survival is at stake, and so we don't like the United States.

And the last thing that I will say is about petrodollars. **Probably the worst thing that ever happened in the Middle East was petrodollars, the influx of billions and billions of dollars, wealth without work. That produced a lot of white elephants, lots and lots of new universities that are extremely poor. Petrodollars produced avarice and greed and did not produce institutions, democracy, or economic development. The Middle East is the slowest growing area in the world economically, the fastest growing demographically, people can't find apartments, they can't get married, they can't find jobs and there's no way really for an average person in the region to get a decent education that will allow them to have a job in the global economy.**

So I get back to the first point I made, maybe we in the United States have to revisit what is our idea of stability, of keeping the non-democratic guy in power?

And Radwan brought up Saad Eddin Ibrahim. The fact that he also has an American passport and that he languished in jail for years [in Egypt], I find appalling. If our relationship with Egypt is what it's supposed to be, and Mubarak is a friend to the United States, and there's such a degree of dependency, it seems to me that there could have been an arrangement by which Mubarak's face could be saved while allowing Saad Eddin to be extricated from prison. Imagine if somebody close to the President had whispered in Mubarak's ear that this was a problem for the President of the United States and that it would be hard to invite Mubarak to the White House until it's resolved. Twenty minutes later Saad Eddin would have been on a flight to Geneva.

AMB. ROSS: I think it's important as we address the issue of anti-Americanism, to first look at what anti-Americanism is. In its purest form, it's a generalized antipathy toward everything American, and perhaps the poster boy for this is Osama Bin Laden. But should we apply the same label to the thoughtful commentator who writes a piece criticizing aspects of American policy or the man in the street who expresses opinions about specific actions that affect him in our policy stances? I think we do need to differentiate between various forms of hostility toward the United States or towards things that the United States does.

What comes out clearly in the panel discussion this morning is that in fact there are many reasons for hostilities toward the United States and what it does. We've discussed our stance on the Palestinian-Israeli and on the wider Arab-Israeli issue. We've discussed our support for authoritarian regimes. We've discussed our perceived threats to national identity and national sovereignty. We've discussed our generalized tone of arrogance in addressing others. The question is, "What can public diplomacy do about these feelings?"

One thing that public diplomacy cannot do by itself is win hearts and minds or change attitudes overnight. It's clear that our policies play a major role in shaping attitudes, and this is an area in which public diplomacy can play a role, but there is a limit. The role that public diplomacy plays in policymaking is to keep policymakers informed of the attitudes of foreign audiences towards existing and prospective future policies. There is a section of the State Department that dedicates itself to monitoring the foreign media and reporting on what attitudes are reflected therein. Embassies report daily on attitudes gleaned from face to face discussions throughout the Arab and Muslim world; and this is a function of public diplomacy which informs the policymaker of attitudes.

But once that is done the policymaker must judge what weight to give those foreign attitudes as opposed to other factors that would come into policymaking, most notably domestic attitudes. And then once policy is set, public diplomacy has a very important role to play in articulating, explaining and clarifying that policy. And this is work that goes on everyday here in Washington, out in the field.

Since 9/11, senior U.S. officials have appeared much more frequently on Arab and Muslim media. Ambassadors and public affairs officers have been much more active in the field in this effort of policy advocacy.

It's not sexy, it doesn't catch headlines, but it forms the core of what the practitioners of public diplomacy do everyday. In addition, there is a parallel, much longer-term effort to build dialogue, engagement, and understanding between Americans and foreign audiences. And that was what Undersecretary Beers' effort with the "Muslim Life in America" initiative was about. There are many views on what that all meant, and what it achieved. One of its merits was that it did trigger a very widespread debate in the Arab and Muslim worlds about the state of relations with the United States.

But as I said yesterday, that was not the be-all and end-all of public diplomacy as our headlines sometimes would have it. The resources devoted to this "Muslim Life in America" initiative represented something like 1.5 percent of the total resources available to public diplomacy. So those are some reactions to the panel discussion and I'm sure there are lots of other views.

DR. NASR: My name is Seyyed Hossein Nasr. I'm the university professor of Islamic Studies at the George Washington University. I want to go back to the question of why there are anti-American feelings in the Islamic world. First of all, what should be labeled as anti-Americanism? There are many families in this country who are totally opposed to the public education system in the United States, and they school their children at home. But, you cannot say they're anti-American. There are many things that come from America to the Islamic world which are opposed by certain Muslims, as they are by certain Americans. I think there has to be a redefinition given of what anti-Americanism is.

First, we keep talking about what is best in America. In the popular jargon, of course, what is the worst in America oftentimes eclipses what is best in America. And that's not going to go away simply through advertisement.

Secondly, the question of American popular culture, which nobody touched upon here, is very sensitive topic in the Islamic world. When Great Britain perhaps dominated over what is called the Middle East today, the culture they brought with them was the high culture, which they tried to impress upon the high elite of those societies. The popular culture of the Islamic world remained untouched by the colonial experience, to a large extent, aside from a few popular exceptions like France and Algeria. Whereas today, the situation is different as result of media and so forth and so on. Just remember, when we talk about American culture, we're not talking about the high arts of the United States; we're talking about a pop culture that is essentially hedonistic and offensive to people all over the world for that very reason. And therefore, people have their guards up.

There are families in the U.S. who are as much opposed to rock and roll as the Muslim families in Delhi. It's not simply the region. There are some out there, especially in the Bible Belt, that don't want their daughters to listen to certain things.

Now, this is very, very important that we do not identify the attitude towards America with those towards American pop culture, and the criticism against it should not be taken as being irrelevant, as bigoted, as closed-minded, especially since the West has had a long, long time to slow these criticisms and respond to it. When the bikini first was introduced in this country, we were opposed to it, but since it came from within American society, gradually transformations took place. And I think this whole judgment that is being made regarding American pop culture is not necessarily a reaction against America by any means.

Another problem that's very recent, and which is horrendous and very, very unfortunate, is the litigation of Islam by Christianity, which comes up only out of America and not out of Europe. Fifty years of ecumenical meetings with Catholicism, with Protestantism, the World Council of Churches, Rome and the Vatican, all this has gone down the drain in a year and a half in certain sectors of American society, not European society. And it has been very surprising to learn that other Christian groups, Catholics and mainstream Protestants, who are against this, have been, to a large extent, silent. To try to undo this in Islam has to mean, more than anything else, to allow voices within the United States who are opposed to this litigation.

Finally, **I think we have not said enough about the impossibility of the United States setting all the agendas for the Islamic world. Those textbooks that were just referred to in Iraq, I think these are absurd. They're never going to succeed. A dynamic change for this society has to come from within itself**. There is not enough knowledge, and some of the presumptions about Islam that are being taught and revised from Washington, have caused the majority of sophist thinkers to say, well, it's just like someone from northern Iraq or Kurdistan coming and rewriting the physics program of MIT. And this simply aggravates the situation that is already there.

Many scholars within the Islamic world do want to revise educational programs. Let us not forget that a hundred years ago – over a hundred years

ago - the British and French established Western-style universities to change the traditional system of the Islamic world. We all know that. **A hundred years later we are still talking about it.** This is because this transformation did not come from within Islamic society. **This mistake really cannot be made again.** Otherwise, it is likely to cause a new wave of nationalism for the preservation of identity, and make it much more difficult for the relationship between the United States and the Islamic world.

MS. EGGSPEUHLER: My name is Cari Eggspeuhler and I work for the State Department in the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy. I've worked with Undersecretary Beers since she came into the department — I'm a civil servant — and work with Ambassador Ross as well.

I think what's interesting, and frustrating at the same time, is that I've heard so many ideas that have come up today, and they're all excellent observations, but then what do we do about them?

A lot of the work Undersecretary Beers tried to do was, not to sell the United States - that was pretty much dictated to her; rather, she was trying to change the way we communicate as a government. This created a huge clash with the establishment, not only the State Department, but the rest of the federal government.

I think it is interesting that we did the "shared values" thing, and yes, everybody thought it was awful and attacked it, but what did we learn from it? Nobody ever has talked about this. Nobody ever has published it. But, we did research on the recall of those ads and mini-documentaries, and amazingly, it was almost 70 percent in some cases. People remembered who was in it, and it made them think: maybe there is something different out there. I want to know about this. I want to learn about this.

The idea was never for it to be just an ad, but rather that it would serve as an opening for future discussions. We had town hall meetings after that. We had dynamic meetings with audiences both here and in Indonesia. And then the Indonesians took that programming and put it throughout their country on their television stations, it was a credible messenger. We learned that certain things did not work, but also that certain things did. And why couldn't we use that as a model to move forward?

Instead, we're pretending that it never happened, let's just move on, oh, that was so controversial, because, God forbid we do anything controversial in the government. But what it did do and what we learned was that it made people think that there was another thing out there. Something that was different than their leadership in the religious communities, which we're vehemently not only anti-American, but saying that the U.S. was trying to implement a Christian kingdom around the world. And they were e-mailing us in massive droves. We had a website — Open Dialogue.net — the emails were amazing. They wrote that they had no idea there was religious tolerance in the United States, or that there was another way. They wanted to know more. And a dialogue began.

We see these exchanges, know that they make a dramatic impact, but because they are attacked again and again, we don't encourage initiatives such as this that do work.

With regard to languages, Ambassador Ross was on every single Arab station all the time. But what have we done to increase Arab language? Have we really done that

much in the last year-and-a-half? No. We're still talking about the same issues but nothing is actually moving forward.

That is what is really frustrating from the government's side of it. If the State Department doesn't have the structure needed to take the lead, then who will? We have to get academia and the private sector unified and just go for it. Because the private sector is doing it on its own here and there and Academia has it own initiatives, but there is no unified effort.

DR. BERGER: It seems to me that the tendency of what has been presented here was to say that antagonism to the United States is because of what we do and not what we are. And I would just like to introduce a little element of doubt into this. There's been very little focus this morning on the real cultural differences between the United States and the Muslim world, which do have to do with what we are and freedom.

I think if there's one phrase which is prototypical of American culture today on all levels is the freedom to choose. And that not only refers to abortion, though that is not an unimportant issue, it refers to sexuality, to freedom of expression including pornography, last not least freedom to choose one's religion — wonderful American phrase, religious preference. I remember a few years ago in Indonesia I tried to explain to a group of Muslim scholars what is meant by sexual orientation in American discourse. They were not so much outraged as completely puzzled. They didn't understand it. They thought I was talking about people who walked on their hands instead of their feet.

Now it seems to me that these issues which are obviously difficult for the United States government to deal with since they're mostly presented around the world by private media. But, as I suggested yesterday, it seems to me this becomes an issue of public diplomacy, whether it is public diplomacy by a government agency or by some sort of private organization, these issues have to be dealt with in one way or another.

DR. JAMES ZOGBY: Michael made an important observation that I don't think we pay enough attention to generally, that is that **there is a broader and deeper set of historical problems here between our world and the Muslim world** of the people that we are discussing.

I'll talk in a moment about the people themselves and who they are. **If anything, among Arabs and Muslims, the last 150 years have produced a sense of powerlessness and of a feeling of a world out of control, one form of which is the Israel-Palestine issue, which is just a manifestation and has become, as our polling has shown, a symbol of this being out of control. What we hear Arabs saying is that, "As Palestinians go, so go I in my life."**

But the problems are bigger and deeper, and we must pay attention to them. The broader issue is that we have now become the inheritor of the mantle of the British, the French, and everybody else. As we walk down the streets of Baghdad, they see us in a different way than we see ourselves.

The other question that concerns me is who are we talking about. And **when we talk about the "Muslim world," we're almost playing into an agenda that is unworkable or even, in many instances, not understandable. I am not sure that you can design a policy that fits all — Morocco to Indonesia** — and have it

even make sense. To have a Muslim agenda in Egypt disenfranchises by definition at least 10 to 15 percent of the population who are Christian, and maybe even many more than that, who are women who feel very threatened. I've spoken at conferences in those countries and find that they're concerned about that.

In Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt when you have women come forward and talk about their concern about the future of their countries, they're very concerned about an Islamic agenda in those countries. My sense is that we almost need to tailor the discussion by country, and not pretend as if one can have an Islamic agenda. There's a way to talk about Egypt and its concerns, a way to talk about Saudi Arabia and its concerned, and, yes, Indonesia and Pakistan as well.

One of the things I find, at least about the old USIA programs that I participated in, was that there was an understanding that maybe at best you could have some Gulf concerns but really when you talk to people in Saudi Arabia it's different than when you go to Kuwait, and you have to recognize that.

Finally, the issue that Radwan raised about the regimes and language like dictators and tyrants, I'm not going to be apologist for them because the policies are in fact at times abhorrent. But frankly speaking, let's understand that if we put in the context of the discussion that Michael was raising about this 100 and some odd year history where the borders were created, the regimes were a function of those borders, we have to be sensitive to the fact that in many cases when they arrest political prisoners, they're political prisoners because they not only oppose the regime but they oppose the regime because of the regime's friendliness with us. It's not that we endorse the regimes as much as in some instances the regimes endorse us.

I remember when the Palestinian leader said why don't you do what Sadat did? He said because we don't have enough prisons. And there was a fact to that we need to pay attention to. The synergy between our policies and the regimes, it's not a one-way street. And in some cases if we are not sensitive to that, as in the case of American policy vis-à-vis Arafat, we end up actually becoming viewed with more hostility in the region because people do have some investment in those regimes. It's not just the regime against the people.

I dare say there are many Saudis who feel themselves to be Saudis and have an investment in the monarchy, not just the Royal Family. And that is true in many of the other Gulf countries. For better or worse identities have been created in those countries that are real. People today are Lebanese, people today are Jordanian, people today are Egyptian and Saudi and we can't ignore that. And finally, I just came back from Saudi Arabia where I gave a couple of public addresses. And I began both by talking about September 11th and what it meant to me personally, what it meant to my family.

And I got the same reaction from both groups that I addressed - they said that no American had ever come to them until then to talk to them about the personal stories of September 11th and what it meant. Now to some degree, I think our public diplomacy effort ignored the reality of the fact that people didn't know the personal stories of those who died.

And, frankly, I think that our programs have failed when we don't engage on a personal level and we don't listen to what they're saying to us so that we know what the message ought to be back – which is what they're asking us to say to them.

A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

SPEAKER:
HIS EXCELLENCY KARIM KAWAR, Ambassador,
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

AMB. KAWAR: Dr. Abshire, General Meyer, your Excellencies, distinguished guests; I don't think I'm worthy of addressing such a group of experts who know more than I do about Islam and the Arab world. And, therefore, I hope to keep my remarks very short and maybe to open up the debate and respond to your questions, which, hopefully, I can address.

I come from a region that's quite troubled nowadays with religious tolerance. I can share with you my practical experience. Growing up I was educated at a Christian missionary school in Jordan. Throughout my childhood, I sat on a bench in the classroom without being able to tell whether the student sitting next to me was Christian or Muslim. And this is actually the world we grew up in, but I guess September 11th changed a lot of that.

In fact, actually, I went to two different missionary schools, the first one at the age of five in first grade. This is where we got away with starting early. And my brother was two years ahead, so he was seven. They said that the Christian students had to go to the chapel for prayer while the Muslim students could play soccer, so I turned to my brother and I said, "What are we?" And he said, "We're Muslims." So, we played soccer for a couple of weeks and then they came looking for us. They said, you know, there are two Christian boys that are missing from chapel, so that ended that pleasure.

I want to touch on three main topics. The UNDP Arab Human Development Report highlighted three main issues, education, women, and democracy in the Arab world.

First, we see some countries in the region have been criticized on their educational system. **In the case of Jordan, I can say that education has been a challenge. Given that half of the population of 5.2 million is under the age of eighteen, education poses a big challenge for our economy as a whole. These youngsters are not contributing to economic growth and this creates a burden on our economy. Consequently, educating our people has been a primary objective.**

During Islam's golden ages, it was the most advanced culture. I have visited Alhambra Palace in Grenada and was very, of course, impressed with what was constructed there over 700 or 800 years ago. What we have been doing in Jordan is actually undergoing an experiment where we're turning our education system head over heels. We're shifting from an instruction-based system to a learning-and-exploration-based system. We're introducing English as a second language starting from grade one, because we believe in this day and time people have to be bilingual in order to keep up with the development that's taking place around the world. We're introducing comput-

er literacy also starting from grade one. Under this program, our 3,500 public schools now each have at least one lab with 20 PCs connected to the Internet. Being a small country also gives us an advantage, in that, by the year 2005, we will have all schools connected through a broadband network.

Our 22 universities all teach computer science and now it's a prerequisite that no student can graduate from university without having proved proficiency in a foreign language as well as in computer literacy. We also introduced a program called the International Computer Drivers License, the ICDL, as a standard for all government employees. The significance of this is that you open up the horizon by saying that knowledge is no longer monopolized by the instructor or through a rigid curriculum, which dictates what students should learn and memorize. Instead, students can seek knowledge wherever exists, and the teacher's role changes to that of a facilitator in helping expand horizons, learn more, and become part of a global society.

On the issue of women, highlighted in the Arab Human Development Report, we see that women in Jordan have always played an important role. Jordan is a country where there are no restrictions on women, there still are social restrictions that we now recognize and are addressing. **Women throughout the Muslim world have taken on key positions. If you look at countries today such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Turkey, you find that they have all had women premiers. And that goes to prove the theory wrong that Islam and women in democracy, cannot coexist.**

In Jordan, women have the right to run for elections and to vote. And now as we hold our fourth parliamentary elections on June 17th, this will be the first time that we introduce a quota for women, so that there will be a minimum set of seats for women who do not win on their own in their own districts. This is significant. In Jordan women have historically been appointed to ministerial, cabinets-level, or senatorial positions in the government.

The third point regards democracy in Islam. The first political system after Prophet Mohammed was a democracy where Abu Bakr was elected as the Caliph. This proves that, democracy can thrive in an Islamic society. Tolerance has always been exercised in Muslim communities, especially towards other monotheistic religions and thus, there can be development in this area. But, we have to recognize the challenges ahead.

In the war on terrorism — I would like to quote from His Majesty King Abdullah. The first quotation says, "But this is not a challenge for Muslims alone. All religions have suffered from the violence and the extremism of a few. Even as we begin the 21st century, an era of global exchange and exploding knowledge, God's name is being exploited to promote rifts and justify conflict. Differences between faiths become differences between people, and all humanity suffers."

Again terrorism is not restricted to a religion, a people or a race. Many nations have suffered terrorism, and usually terrorism comes from within. And this is where we have to, of course, join forces to fight terrorism. Jordan is one of the countries that has joined the U.S. and other nations to fight global terrorism.

The second quote: **"This is the true voice of Islam but it's not the voice that the Americans always hear. Instead they hear the hatred spewed by groups mistakenly called Islamic fundamentalists. In fact, there's nothing fundamentally Islamic about these extremists. They are religious totalitarians in a long**

line of extremists of various faiths who seek power by intimidation, violence and thuggery." And, again, here we need to know what we are fighting and how we are fighting it. This, of course, comes close to home in our war on terror.

I believe that the United States might have been overreacting in its response to the war on terror and maybe taking on actions that could be counterproductive, especially in building walls to keep people outside of the U.S. There must be a smarter way of identifying potential terrorists and keeping them out other than exercising some form of a mass punishment from which many people stand to lose.

I'm someone who received his education at an American university. I'm one of 25,000 Jordanians who've studied here in the U.S. Half of our current cabinet is U.S. educated. This is why we consider that Jordan is probably in a better position to understand American culture and American values, which helps to create a stronger relationship between the two nations. Now, as fewer and fewer students come to study in the U.S., I think the cultural gap will grow. And we also need to encourage Americans to visit our region, so that they can learn more about the diversity in the cultures and our heritage.

In the war on terrorism, I feel that we have only touched the surface. When focusing only on militants who have led attacks against the U.S. or others, we fail to address the root causes of terrorism. I believe **wherever there is oppression, wherever there is poverty, where there is absence of hope, that's where terrorism breeds; and it's very important for us to address those root causes**.

And here, when we look at our region, and specifically the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, as long as the Palestinians are not freed from their occupation, then they will continue their actions, though these actions are not justified by any means. But this is where it's our responsibility to reinstate hope for the Palestinian people, and, hopefully, to put aside the argument that many Arabs and Muslims use whenever they – or the minority of them –take on certain actions. If the Palestinians and the Israelis accept the roadmap as it's presented and reach a peaceful settlement, then the Arabs come out to be holier than the Pope. If the Palestinians accept that final status, then that would be accepted by the majority of the Arabs. Hopefully, we can bring about peace in our region.

And here I would just end my remarks by saying that it is important for us to encourage on diversity. We need to increase and enhance communications between people around the world, focus on understanding our different cultures and backgrounds, and respect those differences. We all have differences, and it's very important to understand and respect them, in the hope that we can bring about a world where people can coexist and live in peace.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: A View from the Middle East

MS. MOWER: I'm Joan Mower from the BBG. Can you comment on the recent Pew Polls?

AMB. KAWAR: **Certainly, public opinion is affected greatly by the media.** The

majority of the Arabs today watch Al-Jazeera or stations similar to that. And the images carried by Al-Jazeera with regard to the war in Iraq were very different from what was carried by CNN. And this, of course, has an impact on Arab public opinion.

Today, for example, whenever you switch on an Arab broadcast to watch the news, the majority of the news broadcast will cover the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and will show more on the Palestinian side, how those people are being oppressed and are being subjected to humiliation.

When it comes to Iraq, the conspiracy theory in the Arab world is that it is all about oil, that the U.S. wants to control that resource, set up bases in the region, and continue attacks on other nations, be it Syria or Iran. And people believe the U.S. will install a government in Iraq that will fulfill those objectives. This is where Jordan's position has been one of caution; not to promote Ahmed Chalabi, for example, because installing him as a leader in Iraq would serve to validate that conspiracy theory - this would hurt American foreign policy.

And this is why, **with regard to Iraq, it is important to manage the expectations and not to oversell democracy, because the people of the region know that democracy cannot happen overnight, that it's going to take many years. Let's talk about a representative government first, or a representative system, a system of inclusion, and then talk about democracy as it evolves.**

We need to talk about the pillars of democracy. Those are education, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, human rights, freedom of the press, civic society, good governance. We believe those are the issues that we should focus on rather than democracy itself. Once we achieve development on all of those fronts, we will achieve democracy, which will be built on a solid base, rather than having premature democracies which could be hijacked by new dictators.

With regard to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, **the Arabs see the suffering of the Palestinian people, more than 70 percent of whom live on less than $2 a day. They see the humiliation. You know, it takes eight hours to cross from the Jordanian borders to Ramallah, which is a 14-minute drive. There are over 300 checkpoints in the West Bank, and Palestinians are subjected to those on a daily basis. There are mothers who deliver babies at checkpoints because they can't cross to the other town to go to the hospital. Those are the images that the Arab people see, and they associate that with U.S. foreign policy;** and this is what is probably reflected in the Pew survey.

MR. FOUTS:

I am Joshua Fouts with the USC-Annenberg Online Journalism and Communications Center. I was struck by the efforts you have made to create computer literacy in Jordan, and one of the things that we have noticed in our studies is that a tremendous number of young people between the ages of, say, 14 and 25 are also using the Internet to communicate with each other and to develop relationships outside their own countries - relationships, that I think, are beneath the radar of traditional public diplomacy concerns. Could you speak to what Jordan's policy is on this issue.

AMB. KAWAR: As a father of an 11-year old kid, I'm concerned about some of the computer games that they play, which encourage violence. I'm someone, who has to check the rating of the games to make sure that they are playing something that fits their age. And I see other parents who just don't care whether their children are playing other games or not.

In Jordan, the Internet is open. There are no restrictions on the websites that people can access. That is different from, for example, Saudi Arabia , which has the largest proxy servers in the world, so that there are only a few sites that you can visit and many that you cannot.

In Jordan today, we are trying to do away with the Ministry of Information and feel that it is not necessary to have such an arm for the government. We are replacing it with the Higher Council of the Media, which will address larger issues, but in addition will also bring about more freedom of the press – which is a challenge that our government faces, especially after September 11th.

We believe, in Jordan, that the access to knowledge should be open. But also, you will find that there is a lot of misunderstanding or inaccurate assumptions among Internet users. The mere fact that something is published on the Internet makes it a reliable source for many. If you ask them where they got specific information from, they will respond, from the Internet, which is, in their eyes, a completely reliable source.

And unfortunately, when it comes to the soft publishing industry, there are so many people out there that can put all kinds of information on the Internet, and that certainly doesn't make it accurate or fair or reliable. This is important. I don't know if that can ever be regulated or that it should be regulated. This is where, in Jordan, we should focus on building awareness so that individuals who access such information can make the decisions themselves as to whether an Internet source is reliable. I can't help but mention *The New York Times* — even the reliable sources are sometimes unreliable. And that's just a minor issue in the Arab world, where many tabloids carry all kinds of news and reports that are more fiction than they are accurate reporting.

MR. MONTVILLE: Mr. Ambassador, I'm Joe Montville, Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Could you tell us about the Jordan River Foundation?

AMB. KAWAR: The Jordan River Foundation might have a misleading name. It is a NGO that focuses on three areas: the empowerment of women, microfinance, specifically in business-development services, and the prevention of child abuse. Those are three areas of focus for this foundation, which is chaired by Her Majesty Queen Rania, who is also addressing other issues such as family protection and other issues along those lines.

DR. ABSHIRE: Mr. Ambassador, I had mentioned in the conversation before lunch the initiative that was taken by Senator Ted Stevens, Jim Billington at the Library of Congress, and Jim Symington, where hundreds and hundreds of young and middle-level Russians have been brought to this country on international exchanges. It's an amazing initiative for which Senator Stevens, being a very powerful chairman, got the money appropriated to the Library of Congress.

I guess I would describe it as something of a massive Eisenhower Fellows Program; you were an Eisenhower Fellow. I thought about talking to Senator Stevens to see if we could take the report we have done here and attract his powerful attention to some kind of initiative in the Middle East direction; and, of course, including Jordan, which in these exchanges, has been upfront. Maybe there are some other countries that are in dire need of this kind of experience: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq. I think the difference between the Stevens program and the Eisenhower program is that — as I understand the Eisenhower program — the Eisenhower Fellows are given great liberty to decide what they do, whereas with the Stevens program, they have a very set program. It has been an amazing thing, and it seems to me that, when we talk about something bolder for the Middle East, this might fit in. What's your reaction and advice? And I will be quoting you to Senator Stevens.

AMB. KAWAR: I think it's very important to address the issue of exchanges, and those exchanges have to work both ways, as well. Having young leaders participate in exchange programs in the U.S. is very rewarding in many ways, and I would highly encourage that.

The difference between having a flexible program versus a structured program, I guess, all depends on the numbers that are enrolled in such a program. If it's a small number, then it's easy to have individual programs, each designed by the fellow and the organizing party. But if it's a large program, then having it structured so that it would expose the fellows to the various parts of the U.S. as well as to the various sectors – whether it is in government, academia, the corporate sector, the nonprofit area, or in the culture and the arts –can accommodate a bigger number of participants.

I would highly encourage it, and if I can do anything to assist in that regard, I will be more than happy to do so. I'm not sure if anyone here is knowledgeable about the MEPI program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which is also being expanded, and part of MEPI should address exchange programs. I'm not sure if that has been underway or not; I know that the Department of Commerce, as we speak, is hosting a group, mostly of women, from the business community, that are looking at specific relations, which is a two-week exchange. But I think we need to look at longer and longer periods, and more diversified programs.

MR. RUSSELL: I'm McKinney Russell from the Public Diplomacy Council. I would like to ask you about another American recent initiative, the creation of a radio station called Radio Sawa. We have heard that it has a very high listenership, not just in the Middle East overall, but particularly in Jordan. What would be your view, Mr. Ambassador, on the appropriateness of that kind of broadcasting, the content of it, and whether or not it should be followed by expanded television broadcasts by the United States to the Middle East area?

AMB. KAWAR: Radio Sawa has had a positive experience in Jordan, and I believe some of the surveys that Dr. Zogby has conducted reflected that Sawa, for example in Jordan, had probably the largest market share in terms of listeners. Although Radio Sawa is not aired in all Arab nations, it appeals to the senses of the many, which for those who don't know plays one Western song followed by one Eastern song. and I think

it proves that many people in the Arab world, and specifically in Jordan, enjoy listening to music from different cultures, and appreciate that form of entertainment.

But I guess the key word here is entertainment, so if you are looking for that, then Radio Sawa is the station to listen to. Their strategy has been to have, for example, one hour of music, mostly, with two newsbreaks, one at 15 minutes past the hour and the other at 45 minutes past the hour. So again, they have tried to use the music to attract the listeners, but then to provide news broadcasts that are very concise; and I would say that it has been a fair news representation. Now, many would criticize Sawa as being a propaganda machine, being the voice of America under a different skin, but I don't see it that way personally.

Now, when it comes to hardcore news listeners, they actually don't listen to Sawa. They listen to the BBC, for example, which has a higher credibility level throughout the Arab world, I would say, and in Jordan specifically.

When it comes to the TV broadcast, I think there is more competition. For what they are offering in Jordan via the radio, they have very little competition. There is the Jordanian official radio; plus the BBC, which is mostly news and documentary; and Radio Monte Carlo, which also broadcasts in French, and in Jordan, where French is not widely spoken, it's not as popular as, for example, in Lebanon or in Syria. Traditionally, you could listen to those stations on the AM band; but now in Jordan, for the past three or four years, you can listen to them on the FM band. So you get better quality that way, especially for music.

When it comes to TV, I think there is competition, mainly from Al-Jazeera first and foremost, other stations such as the newly established Al-Arabiyah channel, the Abu Dhabi channel — those are the satellite channels — and MBC. Again, it depends on what sort of programming you want to offer. When it comes to entertainment, there is probably an overload of that, especially from ART and Orbit, they carry a lot of programming that's entertainment-driven. So I think this is where the challenge would be for a TV Sawa if they're trying to compete for space there, because again, they would have to compete on the Arabic side with those stations, but also on the Western side they would have to compete with MTV as well as other broadcasts from the Far East.

I think it would be a good exercise, and certainly the Arab world needs more balanced reporting, you know, where you take emotions out of the broadcast. But certainly, I think there is space for other players.

DR. ABSHIRE: Could I just ask, before we leave this topic, the bottom line would be that, right now, BBC is doing the fairest job of the Western broadcasters?

AMB. KAWAR: They are, but BBC also doesn't appeal to all the audience. They appeal to a certain group who are interested in news. You know, they're the ones that are probably watching news 24 hours, but again it does not appeal to the younger generations who want to see more entertainment, who want to see video music.

DR. JAMES ZOGBY: You know, I think there are a number of factors here. I agree with everything you have said in your presentation. What I would add is a couple of observations. One is that part of it, from the American view, has to be the cost compo-

nent. Do we need to spend the amount of money it would take for such a channel, in terms of its ultimate effectiveness? What would it provide that currently doesn't exist? And two, are there other ways to provide the same programming that that are less costly? **Can we work with some of the television networks that you speak of? Many of them are very open and actually have been pursuing partnership projects with American networks. MBC and al-Arabiyah just signed an agreement with CNBC. There is the *Abu Dhabi Discovery Channel-New York Times Discovery Channel* cooperation agreement, and also some PBS agreements that are underway. They are always interested in partnering with American companies, American production companies, American networks, to do alternative programming.**

I think that I've made the point about some of our public diplomacy work before, that sometimes they are too supply driven versus demand driven. We don't go to the region and say, what do you need; we don't listen to see what the needs are first. This way, we avoid having the product being understood in a way that was unintended.

So I think that on the TV issue, there are other ways to do this. We find that more people watch CNN in the Middle East than are watching it here in America. And they're watching FOX, and they're watching MSNBC. I'm not sure these are good things, but they are being watched. There simply is a much more diverse package of entertainment, news and other kinds of programming available that is often realized.

For example, we found that the most popular show, when we did our polling there, was "Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?" That show is watched more than any of the news. Arabs aren't sitting home watching news all day long. They're as bad as Americans. They're watching movies, soap operas, game shows, and even *Baywatch*. They're watching a whole lot of programs; like an average American viewer, Arabs are flipping through the stations.

With regard to my show for example, people frequently will say to me, I love your show on, and will get the station's name wrong. They don't even know what network they're watching; they're simply just flipping dials looking for something they'd like to see.

When I heard the cost estimates for a TV channel, I have to ask what we need to be doing in terms of our public diplomacy, and if there are better ways in which we can be partnering with companies in the region to provide information that may not be there now?

AMB. KAWAR: I would say the short-term solution is to address the visual media because that will get to the largest audience possible today. But I think **one of the challenges that the Arab Human Development Report alluded to was the book publishing industry. For example, Greece translates into Greek, which is not widely spoken outside of Greece and Cyprus. They translate more in one year than the whole Arab world translates books into Arabic. And Spain translates into Spanish more books in one year than the Arab world has translated in all of its history.**

And this is an area where there is a challenge and we need to focus on finding ways to motivate people to actually read more. And I think the Internet can provide a very valuable tool, if it's properly used, to focus on the context rather than on content.

It's a developing thing — developing content that's relevant to the culture and the environment.

MS. MOWER: I just want to make a couple of points. First of all, I think there was a partnership — and correct me if I'm wrong – between the BBC and an Arabic television station?

AMB. KAWAR: MBC.

MS. MOWER: MBC – which BBC I think welshed about $15 million dollars on, because the first week the Saudis were only going to be allowed to view news coverage. And the BBC said, you know, we're not giving up our editorial control. And I think that really is the point. You must control transmission in order to get the transmission across. If you're relying on somebody else to transmit your news, you've got problems.

AMB. KAWAR: I think this is where my opinion would be not to control it but to open it up so that you can have as many broadcasts as possible, and then leave it to an educated consumer to decide what they want to watch. Now, maybe for entertainment they do want to watch some lousy coverage just for the fun of it, such as going back to Iraq, the misinformation minister — he has developed a following in the region. So certainly I think, in the Arab world we should move towards more open broadcasts.

UNIDENTIFIED: Just one correction: the BBC affiliation was with Orbit Satellite Network, and it broke because early on one of their stories was about a Saudi dissident in London. And it was canceled.

U.S. PRESENCE ABROAD: POWER, PRINCIPLE, AND PERCEPTIONS

CHAIR:

GENERAL EDWARD C. MEYER, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former Army Chief of Staff; Chirman, George C. Marshall Foundation Board of Trustees; Chair, CFR Task Force Report "Balkans 2010"

LEAD DISCUSSANTS:

THE HONORABLE MAX KAMPELMAN, Chairman Emeritus, American Academy of Diplomacy, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Freedom House; Former Ambassador and Head, U.S. to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1980-1983); Recipient, Presidential Medal of Freedom (1999)

DR. ANDREW BACEVICH, Director, Center for International Relations, University of Boston; Author, "American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of American Empire"

DR. ABDUL AZIZ SAID, Mohammed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace; Director, Center for Global Peace; Director/Founder, International Conflict Resolution Program, American University; Editor, "Vision 2020"; Author, "Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam"; Editor, "Cultural Diversity and Islam"

Chair: U.S. Presence Abroad: Power, Principle, and Perception

GEN. MEYER: There are three areas that David has outlined for us to talk about: power, principle and perceptions. And it seems to me that if we want to have a discussion about Muslim communities and how we interact with them, we need to go back and review where we are as a nation and with regard to our foreign and military policy. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been involved with Europe and NATO. We've been through the defeat of communism. And, we are still in Northeast Asia 50 years after the Korean War. We've had troops in the Sinai for 25 years, through two wars. We've been in the Americas countering drugs. We've been involved in the fight against terrorism.

When we look at the political, social, economic, and military reasons for being involved in the world, and particularly in the Middle East, we must realize that all of the things that went on before have an influence on where we are today. Our current

evaluation of our role around the world is shaped by our past actions. As a superpower, the U.S. faces great challenges. For example, it was only because we were the sole superpower that we could take action with regard to Iraq absent agreement in the United Nations. The principles upon which our nation stands have an impact upon where and how we use force. I don't think that's well understood in the United States, and I don't think that's well understood overseas.

Our presence abroad is also impacted by perceptions. Dr. Zogby's observations are helpful in understanding better what Muslim views are and how our presence is perceived in the region.

What will the role of the United States be, that of a sole superpower, that of a member of the United Nations? These are serious questions relating to the U.S. role in the world.

The challenge is to focus on the U.S. role in this century. That means both the principles and the power behind our foreign policy, our business policy, our military policy, and our information policy. How do they evolve? What mantle do we wear as the sole superpower, and how do we use our power?

David indicated that I chaired the Council on Foreign Relations study on the Balkans. I'm going to be very honest. When I went to the Balkans I was absolutely certain that the United States should get out as soon as possible. Here's a region in Europe where the European Union and NATO are capable of dealing with problems. But when I got there and examined the various challenges faced, I saw things differently.

In looking at the way in which nations evolve, when they have gone through the kind of turmoil that took place in the Balkans, there are several simple procedures that are absolutely essential. First, you can't have a successful business in any country unless you have laws. So you need laws, judges, and the entire administrative apparatus supporting the rule of law before anybody is going to be willing to put money into a company for the future.

You also have to have a way to come to grips with the challenges that emerge. For example, in Kosovo, there is still, and will continue to be, tremendous animosity between Muslims and Serbian Orthodox Christians. But the animosity is nothing compared to seeing 25,000 young men standing alongside the road with no jobs and nothing to do. So steps at the basic levels in areas like this must be taken. Our ability to deal with religious and cultural differences has an economic effect on the citizens, and will impact upon how long it takes. In my judgment, it's going to take at least 10 years.

One of the other things that I learned a long time ago in the military is that you lay out a program that says what you have to do first, second, third, fourth and how many years it takes to get there, and accept the fact that it's going to take 10 years to get there. But there are certain steps that have to be in place before you can get to the next ones. In the end, the questions we have to ask: What is the military to do? What is it that we want to do here?

So, how do we communicate effectively with Muslim communities? Well, we have enormous assets to do that, but they need to be focused. We need to ensure that the way in which we orchestrate these thoughts is clearly understood, not just by the recipient, but also by us, as we prepare the thoughts for use. So it takes integration of ideas and thoughts back here in Washington before we set off.

Another area that should be addressed is the role of non-governmental

organizations. I remember when NGOs were first being used in Europe. When I got there, I learned that you couldn't function without NGOs. They take up such a large share of the functions with which they have true expertise and which we couldn't afford to have within the government itself. So, non-governmental organizations are absolutely crucial to the way in which we carry out our policies.

I think that, as I said before, if you look at the Middle East, in many ways it's very much like the Balkans: religious problems, economic problems, social problems, military problems, all of those are there. Except that there is one difference, and that is that in the Middle East, we have nuclear weapons; and that is an issue that doesn't exist, at least so far, in the Balkan area.

So, the question remains: How do we communicate effectively with Muslim communities? We have enormous assets. We need to ensure that we're able to get the message across on policy; and not only the message, but the actions that support that policy. And my hope is that, from the discussions that we have here today, we can outline what steps need to be taken, to have a better understanding of what's required as we look at the future of our involvement with the Muslim communities of the region.

Lead Discussants: U.S. Presence Abroad: Power, Principle, and Perception

AMB. KAMPELMAN: Our subject is a timely one. We, as a nation, have principles and are proud of them. Do we have an obligation to advance them, the right to do so, the ability?

Evolving technology has brought us to the era of globalization, a word with real meaning and more than a slogan. The communications revolution we have experienced means that the sound of a whisper or a whimper in one part of our globe can immediately be heard in all parts of the globe. Furthermore, as a result of radio, television, and motion pictures, a mother who lives in an impoverished part of the world learns that a better world — one that is better fed, better housed, healthier — exists only a few hours away; she wants those benefits for her children; and her children, many of whom feel deprived, want those benefits for themselves. Armed guards can keep people from crossing borders, but they cannot keep out ideas. There is no denying that the world is our neighborhood; and the behavior, welfare, and needs of our neighbors affect us.

Our President, coming to grips with this reality, has declared that our country's international objective is to help make the 21st century the "Century of Democracy and Human Dignity." Freedom House, which publishes annually the most authoritative human rights report card in the world, tells us that a larger percentage of the human race today — 63% — live in democracies and near democracies than ever before in human history. This is double the number of 30 years ago. When we recall that China, with the largest population in the world, is part of the remaining one-third not living in democracy, we realize that our goal for this century is attainable. **The Arab Middle East contains the next largest component [after China] of resistance to democracy.**

There is obvious resistance to democracy and its rule of law, human

rights, and gender equality components on the part of those whose power is being thereby inevitably challenged and undermined — monarchs, dictators, and some radical religious leaders. Their resistance presents a current challenge, but the winds of change are strong.

American leadership is essential in this task. Our recent efforts to organize an international Community of Democracies dedicated to that end is underway. Its organizing meeting was held in Warsaw three years ago, with more than 100 foreign ministers and senior officials attending. Its second meeting was held in Seoul last November. At that meeting, the message from Secretary of State Colin Powell was that:

> America stands resolutely with our democratic friends and allies, today and every day. Working together we can consolidate and promote democratic institutions at home, regionally, and globally. We welcome the Seoul Plan of Action, which will challenge all of us to take the lead within our regions to build democracy and foster cooperation between regions.

The next meeting of the Community of Democracies will be held in Central America in two years. Work is now underway to create a substantive program to strengthen and advance a coordinated approach for peace and freedom. Democracies, of course, have their differences, but there is agreement on the fundamentals of human rights. In that context, irresponsible political leadership has at times been annoying, but not serious. Indeed, with seven new states invited to join NATO and ten new countries invited to join the European Union, their unique approach will be further diminished. What is more serious for Europe, with implications for all of us, is the threatening decline of Europe as the rest of the world slowly but steadily moves toward political democracy, the rule of law, and free markets.

Our traditional psychic link with Europe is slowly fading. The United States has traditionally looked upon itself as an offshoot of European culture. We are changing. For two generations now, the new blood coming into our country is no longer primarily European. Our immigrants are primarily from Asia, Central and South America, the Near East, and the Caribbean. Increased Mexican immigration during the past 40 years has, for example, changed the face of California. In fact, very few of our recent immigrants are European. This change is also reflected on many of our campuses, where there is a new emphasis on Asian, African and Latin American studies. In my day, French and German were the foreign languages of choice on college campuses. Spanish and even Chinese are today the new languages of choice. This development is accompanied by growing evidence of Europe's regrettable decline:

- The gross domestic product per capita in the entire European Union is less than 2/3 of that in the United States, and is likely to fall from the current 22% to about 14% — not a particularly attractive opportunity for American business.
- African Americans comprise America's poorest sub-group, but the annual income for African Americans in the United States is higher than it is for the typical European.
- Europe's productivity and growth are significantly behind our own, while their unemployment is much higher. Stagnation is threatening the European economy.
- Birth rates in Europe have been catastrophically low for more than two decades.

European populations are shrinking and aging, in contrast to our fast growing and statistically younger population. All the countries of the European Union have a birth rate far below the level needed simply to replace their current populations.

- It is projected that the German population will shrink from 82 million to 67 mil lion over the next fifty years; Russia's population is expected to go down to 100 million, with 17 Russians dying — mostly from HIV/AIDS, contagious disease, alcoholism, or tuberculosis — for every 10 Russian births; and Italy's population is projected to shrink from 58 million to 39 million. Medical advances may well permit populations to live longer, but this will increase the financial burden of state support for European senior citizens without a corresponding increase in economic growth. America's birth rate, by comparison, is projected to bring us from 281 million to 410 million during this same period.
- European military spending has reached the point where the entire European continent has approximately the same force protection power as the Swiss Navy. Indeed, the United States today pays for nearly 80% of the world's military research and development. Without acknowledging that, the Europeans have essentially decided to rely on us to keep them safe at the same time, as some of them mistakenly believe that diplomacy alone can defend us against an obvious new wave of extreme terrorism.

With this background and perspective, it is clear that it will be Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East on which America will concentrate its foreign policy and economic energies in the future. This is disturbing to those of us whose orientation has been towards Europe, but I believe that Europe and America will and must remain close. We are still joined at the hip, with more than $1.5 trillion of trade and millions of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic dependent on foreign investment. None of this is to deny that, without unexpected significant changes, this challenging trend toward separation will continue.

At the same time, we should note that **globalization provides the vital lubricant for economic development in hitherto unreachable parts of the world, where there is an unsatisfied hunger for the benefits seen and heard on international radio and television**. Far East areas — Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea — have overcome their cultural resistance to engage with the outside world. We no longer hear that the Confucian culture is inhospitable to Western principles of human dignity. China, which regrettably remains a closed totalitarian regime, nevertheless is beginning to see a movement toward change. Significantly, that movement has led to economic growth for them.

The seeds of democracy have also been planted in the reluctant Islamic world. There are strong inclinations to democracy in Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Morocco and Jordan in the Arab Middle East. The clerics of Iran are now facing that movement. India, with 120 million Muslims, is prospering at the same time that it preserves and expands its commitment to democracy. Indonesia, with perhaps the largest Muslim population in the world, has remained steadfast to its democratic principles in spite of the challenges it faces from cultural and tribal terrorists. Turkey in Europe symbolizes the harmony of democ-

racy with Islam. Without minimizing the problem of resistance to democracy from those religious and political Muslim leaders whose power is threatened by gender equality, the rule of law, and democracy, writings are appearing in the Middle East asserting that the Koran calls for people to choose their rulers and to respect Jews and Christians, people of the Book "… in the most courteous manner … and say we believe in what has been sent down to you; our God and your God is one."

We all understand that polls in other nations must not determine our national values or establish our national security requirements. But polls can be useful in evaluating the practicality of our political objectives. **In a recent authoritative poll taken in Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, 71% of Muslims and 76% of non-Muslims said that democracy was preferable to any other form of government.** What they most associated with democracy was free speech and civil liberties, more than free elections. **A similar reputable survey of Arabs in eight countries — Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — found "civil and personal rights" to be their most important political objective. In that connection, looking at economic implications, the World Bank reports that the total of all manufacturing exports of all the Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa total $40 billion, about the same as Finland. The absence of democracy produces an absence of economic opportunity and development.**

It is significant to note the growing influx of Muslims into Europe. In France, for example, 7 - 8% of the population is Muslim of Arab origin, mostly under the age of 20, where they comprise about a third of that population. We in the United States have been able to accommodate and harmonize our immigrants with our democratic ethic. Whether Europe can do so, given the militant stimulant provided by Saudi Wahabi funding and training associated with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad remains to be seen.

September 11 changed America. It brought with it a new National Security Strategy Document, which states: "… while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, in exercising our right of self-defense by acting preemptively."

What does all this mean? An international partnership of the world's democracies is called for that seeks to make the world a place that recognizes the human dignity of all peoples. We know that the pillars of democracy — free speech, free press, free trade, free market economics, free elections, equal rights for women, the rule of law — work.

None of this is to deny the need for us to wage a more effective "war of ideas." **Our reputation in the world, particularly among Arabs, has significantly declined. For shortsighted reasons, we disarmed ourselves of the weapons of ideological warfare. The United States Information Agency and the CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom — all these effective instruments have disappeared and have not been replaced**. The United States Information Agency and the Arabic Service of Voice of America were abolished. We now have a Radio Sawa broadcasting pop music to Arab youth. Fortunately, our effective National Endowment for Democracy constructively forges ahead, even with its inadequate funding and limited scope. We need new and additional resources. We need eloquent, effective pro-

American and pro-democratic spokespeople and organized groups of champions. We must win the war of ideas.

The path to democracy will not necessarily be an easy one. We know that. It will be accompanied by its share of disappointments. But it is vital to the human race and our welfare as a state.

That is the perspective and vision that must emanate proudly from our government. It is that perspective which can help bring dignity to increasing numbers of human beings. Our commitment to that goal, and our support of peoples and democratic countries dedicated to that goal, is the best guarantee for our own security and welfare.

DR. BACEVICH: I understand my task today is to reflect a bit on the American presence abroad, and I will do so in the context of the American military presence abroad. The older I get, the more I am persuaded that the most important facts are those that we really don't pay much attention to because we take them for granted. And one of those very important facts that we take for granted — but should not — is not simply that, as General Meyer said, we're the world's sole superpower, but that **we are in the habit of maintaining a globally deployed military establishment.**

It hasn't always been that way, although it's been that way for a long time now, which is one of the reasons we take it for granted. But if you cast your eyes back over the course of the 20th century, for the first half of that century, essentially, apart from a very modest military presence in the Philippines, we kept our military in the Western Hemisphere. And apart from a very modest involvement in the nations of the Caribbean, we kept our military right here in the homeland.

Now, when did all that change? All that changed with World War II. **As of 1945 and the end of the war, we got in this habit of maintaining a globally deployed military. How did that habit come about? Well, it came about, I think, because of the particular circumstances that existed at the end of World War II. Correctly, American political leaders determined that, in order to create and to guarantee stability in places critical to the United States where stability was in question, it made sense to base U.S. forces abroad – especially because we could achieve stability at a relatively reasonable price.**

Furthermore, as part of this calculus, from stability, there came prosperity in places like Europe and in East Asia. And, though perhaps less evenly, there also came progress toward democracy. I'm not trying to argue that because there was an American military in Japan or in Germany that all things came to pass, but I would argue that was an important factor.

So there was this justification, this rationale — **it served American interests in the aftermath of World War II for this habit of global presence to develop. Because it has now become such an ingrained habit, we don't ask ourselves, today, in the 21st century, whether this logic of "presence equals stability, stability leads to prosperity, and prosperity leads to democracy" still pertains**. And from my perspective, it is not particularly evident that that logic does pertain.

It is not particularly evident that maintaining a military that is globally deployed still serves U.S. interests as it did throughout the post-World War II era. And to take those traditional focal points of American military interest, Europe and East Asia, it seems to me that U.S. military presence is arguably no longer neces-

sary to preserve this order and to maintain stability in places like Western Europe and Japan; or in Korea, which, as General Meyer says, lo and behold, 50 years after the end of the Korean War, we still maintain a large garrison.

In many of these places in Europe and in Asia, democracy is today deeply rooted; and it seems to me it's time to recognize the fact that these nations are able to fend for themselves in ways that they were not able to fend for themselves in the 1940s or the 1950s, perhaps even in the 1960s. Now, the cost of maintaining U.S. presence in these places is not necessarily excessively burdensome to us, except in the context of making fewer resources available for other priorities. And there are other priorities. And when I say resources, I don't mean dollars. We're spending less than 4 percent of our GDP on the military. We did, during the Cold War, habitually spent much more. The scarce resources are people, military people.

Now, shifting focus to the Middle East and Central Asia, the regions of the world that are of particular interest to this conference. There, a U.S. military presence that was relatively modest for much of the Cold War has grown by leaps and bounds over the course of the last decade and a half, and is, at least seen by many to be, an irritant and as having helped to create the conditions out of which the crimes of 9/11 emerged. That is not, for a millisecond, to try to blame the United States for what happened on 9/11; but rather it is to acknowledge that the events came out of a larger context, and a U.S. military presence in the Middle East formed part of that context.

So one could argue from the perspective of 2003 that the costs of maintaining our military presence in these regions, the Middle East and Central Asia, have already been very large, they're mounting, and they're likely to continue to mount in the future. **Moreover, in contrast to Western Europe and East Asia, the evidence that this U.S. military presence will lead to economic development and then democracy is, it seems to me, pretty slight. Will Afghanistan and Iraq, or the Balkans that General Meyer referred to, see a repeat of the postwar miracles in Germany and Japan? At least from where I sit, the signs are not all that encouraging.**

This is not to suggest for a second that democracy cannot take root in the Islamic world; I'm actually agnostic about that. **But I'm not at all certain that the United States has the capacity to force the issue**. But the trend in U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War, especially pronounced since 9/11 with the current administration, has been actually to expand that U.S. presence abroad even more. The American military footprint continues to grow. There is, by the way, a very nice color graphic in the current issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, which lays that out visually.

I'm sort of late getting educated in life, and the book I'm currently reading is a very famous book from the 1950s that many of you will know, and probably most of you read before I ever got around to it, called *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills. Now, he came very much from the left, I am definitely not on the left, but I am finding an enormous amount of still-relevant material in this book. And one of the things he writes about — and this is from a perspective of the early Cold War – is, again from his perspective on the left, how he sees an America of the 1950s. And he sees America gripped, by what he terms, a military metaphysic. What he means by that is, from his perspective, Cold War America is too quick to automatically frame problems in a military context, and too quick to assume that, whatever problem exist internationally, the most

expedient solution to that problem somehow relates to the use of military power.

So, I'm reading that and saying to myself, "that is what's going on today." We are in the grip of a military metaphysic today that causes us to see problems and then to look to the military instrument. That national security strategy that Ambassador Kampelman referred to, it seems to me, expresses that eloquently.

Now, the official justification for this growing global presence and greater willingness to use American military power is that doing so will pave the way for a transformation of the local political economy, that the use of military power and American military presence can lead to a development of stable, liberal democracy and bring other countries more into alignment with our values. I don't know if American policymakers believe that rhetoric. I actually think they do believe that; that is to say, it's not rhetoric, it reflects actual intentions.

But whatever the intentions, we cannot deny that the effects on the ground have been to — as people discussed this morning — exacerbate the perception that our actual motivations are imperialistic. It doesn't matter if they really are, it's perceived to be that way. And in that sense, it has given rise to imperial problems, especially evident at this very moment, as we struggle to get our arms around the situation in Iraq. It is a stunning fact, at least to me, that two months after, what we judge to be and we welcome as, a decisive victory — described in some quarters as an unprecedented victory — we still have American soldiers that are getting shot and killed on about an every-other-day basis and that, as of yesterday, we're employing major firepower in order to try to bring stability. Now, for somebody like me, not on the left but somebody who describes himself as a conservative realist, all this is enough to make me enormously uncomfortable. Our commitments are expanding; they're not getting smaller. Costs are rising, both financial and human.

As part of this military metaphysic, as a people, we have bought into the notion that the war on terror is going to go on how long? It's going to go on indefinitely. That's what we're told, and that's what we accept, sort of without blinking: the prospect of war out to the far horizon of time. Already our resources are stretched to the limit. I was at a meeting with the senior U.S. Army general a month or so ago, I don't know exactly what the situation is on the ground right now — General Meyer probably knows — but he told me that, within a matter of weeks, we'd have 16 out of 33 active U.S. Army combat brigades in Iraq. That's half of the U.S. Army in Iraq, which wouldn't matter if they were going to come home in six weeks or three months or six months. I myself don't think they're going to. So resources are stretched to the limit, and I don't see much indication that the American people are willing to shoulder additional burdens to support these ventures abroad.

So my conclusion might invite the charge of isolationism; I'm not an isolationist, I don't want to be tagged as one. My conclusion is: **the time has come for us to examine this assumption about the presumed positive benefits to the United States of America of maintaining this global military presence; to consider whether or not it would not make sense to reduce that presence, at least selectively, in parts of the world that can handle their own affairs, — certainly Europe, 50 years after World War II, ought to be able to handle its own affairs — and perhaps to consider whether or not there may be some alternative ways of exercising influence and projecting power in a military context, an alternative to**

permanent long-term basing on foreign soil, or, as an alternative to the use of military power, to pay greater attention to the non-military instruments of power so that this military metaphysic won't continue to have such free play in public discourse. So I thank you very much for including me in this event and I look forward to our discussion.

DR. SAID: You have a paper that has been circulated and co-authored by the soon to be Dr. Lynn Kunkle, who is with us. Among those of us who are in peace studies, what we share in common is a genetic defect: we suffer from optimism. And we pray that we should never be cured from our genetic defect. My message, as you will note in the paper circulated, is entitled "Reconciling America's Historical Legacy in the Middle East."

I want to put before you the following proposition: that **good U.S. communications with Muslim and Arab communities is possible, desirable, and urgently needed. The price is changing our minds**. This requires both head and heart because it has to be argued rationally and it has to be felt. It has to be defended passionately.

Let me put before you my points about why and how. My task has become simplified and made easy by virtue of the tremendous amount of light that has been shed upon my points by various speakers who have already spoken. As I look at the nine points I want to make, most of them have been covered; so I will take the liberty of glossing over some, expanding over others.

Deliberately, the title of the paper is "What Went Wrong?" So my first point is, **if indeed we want good U.S./Muslim/Arab communications, we cannot be limited to merely asking the question, "What went wrong with them?" We must also ask, "What went wrong with us, with the West?" We have to look at the context of historical relationship between both sides.** We have to look at what happened in the 18th and 19th centuries with Europe. Indeed we have to also look at attempts by Muslims and Arabs to reinterpret history since World War II. Now the question here arises, where does the U.S. fit in? The U.S. has had no colonial or imperial tradition with Muslims and Arabs. The antagonism with the U.S. dates back to after World War II. The United States assumed colonial legacies of Europeans, Western Europeans, and we have heard about the establishment of the state of Israel; meaning American policies towards Israel.

Today, ladies and gentlemen, the U.S. and the Arabs and Muslims are estranged from one another. As someone who has worked with peace analysis and conflict analysis, most of the conflict analysis of big events in the United States tends to delete the essential, and instead, focus on the determinant factors, such as pursuit of economic resources and power. By doing that, the analysis reduces a complex phenomenon to simple abstractions such as fundamentalism and terrorism. And the Muslims and Arabs do the same. They reduce a complex phenomenon to a simple abstraction, such as colonialism and imperialism. If we are to communicate, that has to stop on both sides.

Increasingly, explanations about Muslims and Arabs or about the encounters between Muslims and the West have been retrospective: "clash of civilizations," Max Weber's theories of Protestant culture, 'Orientalism.' For me, many of these explanations tend to be ideological and, as such, tend to be retrospective. What we need is a prospective view of history. We, on both sides, need to expand our cognitive lenses, and under-

stand collective memory and different levels of reasoning. There has to be an appreciation of collective memory and different levels of reasoning.

Point number two, which was discussed earlier, is American leadership. American leadership has been described and discussed earlier today. There's no question that the U.S. is predominant militarily and economically. There's no question about that. There's no question about whether America has lost its stature. No, it has not. The real question or concern in the Middle East is that America lost its sense of purpose; meaning the leadership of the United States has lost its purpose.

As someone who has lived here for more than 50 years and makes a living from learning and teaching about international relations, I have come to the following opinion: **Since the end of the Cold War, we Americans have become deprived of a framework with which to judge the wisdom (or lack thereof) of our foreign policy, and our leadership is deprived of a compass by which to direct it.** During the Cold War, we knew what we were fighting against; it was Moscow, it was Communism. Now what are we fighting against? We don't know. Although, unfortunately, a number of people have suggested that indeed we do know – Islam. That has been suggested too.

With regard to present time, the Bush Administration has fallen into a Realist trap. It has sufficient military force to impose its agenda, but it has forgotten that the compelling force of American power has always been its universal morality, at least among Muslims and Arabs. The U.S. had never colonized them.

As an observer living in this city, what I see before my eyes is a crisis in American leadership because to lead and to follow depends on whether there's agreement on where to go. To lead and to follow there has to be a common appreciation of the environmental factors. This is a basic requirement of leadership. There has to be an action program and goals that can be agreed upon. Without a consensus on shared goals or aspirations, coercion replaces assent; and what I see with this administration is coercion and not leadership.

Third point has been mentioned, I don't want to belabor this point, is the perceived disconnect between American ideal and policies. A number of speakers have definitely addressed that, but I want to make an additional comment on this issue with regard to public diplomacy. **Public diplomacy, to date, has reaffirmed that it is still a part of the American double standards, while categorically failing to assure, convince, or demonstrate American goodwill. American diplomacy has not succeeded in demonstrating goodwill**. Now, someone may want to suggest, "Look here, we need a different audience," but that's the audience we have. And that audience has not been, for whatever reason, convinced of American goodwill. Instead, the Bush Administration has addressed the problems of international terrorism through intimidation and projection of military power driven almost exclusively by American fears, stereotypes, and preoccupations.

Point number four is a simple point. Where are the Arab-Americans in our foreign policy establishment? Arabs and Muslims look at who is around the table making decisions. They don't see Arab-Americans; they don't see Muslim-Americans. Oh, they do appreciate many of the traditional "Arabists" who are not actually distinguished Arabists. We have many distinguish Arabists here among us, such as Ambassador Chris Ross.

To address this negative perception, and to help formulate policies that are constructive and engaging, **Arab and Muslim Americans should be made visible members of the official decision-making apparatus, and engaged as full partners in efforts to advance genuine security. Ending the exclusion of Arabs and Muslims from the circles within which policies are formulated can help to discredit the defeatist and polarizing theories about the "war on terrorism," which are now circulating in the Islamic world. At the same time, this could significantly enhance the effectiveness of efforts to establish cooperative, mutually beneficial relations with Muslim societies. Through their contributions and counsel, Arab and Muslim Americans can help to ensure that the U.S. does not inadvertently trigger or escalate a potentially catastrophic religiously based conflagration. They can also help to increase the effectiveness of policies intended to provide Arab and Muslim Americans with opportunities to demonstrate their genuine commitment to American ideals and rapprochement between communities.**

Point number five is that, for public diplomacy to work, Muslims, Arabs, and Westerners need to experience themselves "in relationship" rather than "out of relationship" to find meaning in the common tragedy of their present estrangement. The pain that Americans have experienced as a consequence of September 11 has a subtle counterpoint in the pain of those who have been unable to make their voices heard. A call for respectful dialogue and mutual engagement can help to transform this legacy of pain, resulting in deeper knowledge of what the "other" has to say, a more realistic understanding of present opportunities and dangers, and an enduring basis for peace.

My own son — blue eyes, American, born here, with an American mother – who has a job on New York Avenue and 14th Street, called me on 9/11. He said, "Dad?" I said, "Yes." He said, "What do I do?" His name is Jamid. I said, "What?" It was 9/11. He said, "I see police and military people asking people for their IDs." He said, "If I show them my ID, my name is Jamid Said, where might they send me? Would they send me to camp? Would they send me to prison?" He was 22 years old, born here, schooled here. No one acknowledged what he had experienced.

My sixth point relates to avoiding victimization. Public diplomacy should avoid the trap of victimization in its approach. The danger of focusing on America's victimhood as a result of 9/11 is that it may draw attention away from the tragedy and instead come to be understood as justifying and rationalizing future acts of anti-Arab or anti-Muslim violence. And for Muslims, when they focus on victimization, they also serve to legitimize the struggle against the Western domination. Our focus must move away from seeking to control or manipulate emotional responses of others through the politics of victimization. Instead, we need to focus on how to heal a relationship that is clearly situated within a clear historical context.

My seventh point concerns Iraq. In Iraq I have served as an external resource for the State Department's "Future of Iraq Project." I have met with Iraqis over a period of a year. There were about 16 working groups. My responsibility included serving as the resource for one of the 16 working groups, which focused on democracy. We met with Iraqi professionals, artists, physicians, and scholars who lived in the States, Iraq, Europe, and Africa. These are women and men who came to these meetings, leaving their jobs unpaid, because they are committed to building a democratic Iraq.

Other working groups met on security, justice, and constitutions. What happened to our report after so much effort was made on the part of the Iraqis for the Department of State? It was placed on the side. I discovered the same was done other reports – not by the Department of State – there were references made to bureaucratic infighting. It is worth re-examining that, because these were serious Iraqis who spent a great deal of time trying to put together what they thought were important ideas.

Iraqis, ladies and gentlemen, simply put, must be empowered to have ownership over the process. And it's nonsense to say that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Those who make that allegation equate the American form of democracy with the substance of democracy. The substance of democracy is universal. Let's face it. As has been mentioned earlier, it is a respect for dignity, rights, safeguards, participation. But the forms of democracy are cast in the mold of a culture.

Democracy is an indigenous, fragile flower that can grow only when nurtured. And Islam, as a religion, performs social as well as political functions. Islam provides the Muslim with recourse to a transcendental authority to hold their rulers accountable. Islam provides a language for resistance, for change, and to deal with corruption.

But what really concerns me, as an academician, are those people who say Islam or religion cannot pave the road to democracy. They are really not serving us well because they are overlooking their own historical development of modernization and democracy in the West, where religion happens to have played a very important role in modernization and democracy. And that is oftentimes overlooked.

Point number eight focuses on acknowledging Muslim responsibilities. Yes, Muslims have to acknowledge their own responsibilities. No question about that. And I put that in my paper. There is a great need in the Muslim and Arab world to deliberately integrate the person, the citizen and the Muslim. This involves a search for truth within Islamic traditions and contexts that begins at the level of the individual. Christianity has emerged with a close linking of personal behavior with citizenship and social values, while Muslims today are on the threshold of discovering the obligations and meaning of Muslim citizenship.

Muslims need to ask: What kinds of citizens, animated by Islamic values and contexts, can Islam create? What kinds of solutions can Islam bring to affect participatory decision-making in the absence of authoritative guidance in social matters? What Islamic values and social mechanisms can be brought to bear for ameliorating the conditions of modern, urban living? The flowering of the individual as citizen within Islamic community can inspire new avenues of meaning and institutions that testify to - and fortify - what is enduring in Islam.

Today's challenge for Muslims lies in the expansion of the original ideas of Islam, and a willingness to demonstrate curiosity about the historical experiences and achievements of the West. Where are the Muslim "Lawrence of Arabias'" who seek to know the Western Christian worldview? Why has there been so little research among Muslim scholars on the Christian perspective of the Western experience, or the encyclicals of the Catholic Church, or the Christian struggle to find religious meaning in politics? Much insight may be gained from the historical political trials of Christianity for Muslims at this time, as it emerged at a time of profound oppression, injustice and during occupation. How did this path cope with such circumstances, organize their community and move beyond them? And here public diplomacy can do a great deal. No question about that.

My ninth point is my last point and connects with this panel. I remember as a graduate student back in the 1950s reading a speech by President Eisenhower. And this speech was given on October 18, 1956, in Portland, Oregon. It would be good for the government to remember what Eisenhower said: "America is great because America is good, and when America ceases to be good, America will stop being great." So my ninth point is entitled "Good, Great America." That's the test of American diplomacy.

It is important that we revisit and expand the American vision. It's important that we work on healing, since we are talking about the West and Islam, America, Arabs. In the past we have met, competing with one another. In the past, Muslims, Arabs and Westerners throughout history have met many times exploiting what the new vision is all about. It's for Arabs and Muslims to give the West the best they have in exchange for getting from the West the best the West has. So an exchange of the best from one side to the other, and the best from the other side to the other, that's how healing is going to begin, because I ask my students in class, graduate students, tell me one or two good things that Islam has given to the world. They don't know. I say, tell me one of the great things America and they answer. And, these are graduate students. So it has to be a new meeting; not a mutual exploitation but an exchange of the best of America to Muslims and Arabs and the best that Muslims and Arabs have to offer to America.

Select Comments from Open Discussion: U.S. Presence Abroad: Power, Principle, and Perception

GEN. MEYER: I'll open our discussion by responding to a couple of questions I was asked. Someone asked, "What responsibility does the military have for explaining their actions and the purpose of their presence in the region?" And I argue that if military officers throughout the world are not able to stand up, speak out, and adequately explain what the purpose of the military is, then they ought not to be in the positions that they hold.

We have a program that trains individuals to be foreign area specialists. Commanders in chief of any region or area will tell you that the first person they meet with, when they arrive in a new region, is the foreign area officer, because he spends his whole career working on one particular region of the world. And some of the other absolute necessities are putting, the senior military in particular, through some sort of charm school to teach them which end of the microphone to speak into and how to respond to someone when suddenly he walks up and sticks a microphone in your mouth.

We'll go ahead and take some questions from anybody around the table to anyone. Questions?

MR. HEIL: Ambassador Kampelman and I were talking during the break about the Helsinki Process in Europe. We were remarking about how successful it was, in terms of the spread of information throughout Eastern Europe and the activation of people, the sort of budding democrats of the era and an educated people, to the advantage of democracy. Ambassador Kampelman was saying that there was a move afoot to apply this also to the Mediterranean countries, and I would be very interested in learning more about how that process is moving forward.

AMB. KAMPELMAN: The final Helsinki Act was signed by President Ford in 1975. As he later explained to me, it was against the advice of his political party, and also against the advice of his Secretary of State. When I was asked to get involved in the Helsinki Process, I really knew very little about it. This was a declaration signed by 35 countries, every European country, 33, plus the United States and Canada. In it there was a human rights democracy component associated with it.

The reason why people didn't want us to sign the Helsinki Final Act is because the Soviet Union was one of those involved and everybody knew the Soviets did not live up to that. So whatever their motivation was, they signed it. And we looked upon that as a declaration by the European countries about what ought to be. It was not consistent with the "is" but with the "what ought to be." It also had a security component and a business component, economic component. And it proved to be very successful. We talked a little bit about what the Poles, the Czechs — I mean, the disintegration really began with the American emphasis on the "ought to be" and the comparison of the "is" to the "ought."

Now, at the moment, Freedom House, which is a 60-year old organization created originally by Wendell Wilkie and Eleanor Roosevelt, is working with this administration in an effort to persuade them to spread the "ought to be" to the Mediterranean.

Now there is a move on. The foreign minister of Denmark recently made a speech here at the Woodrow Wilson Center in which he urged this spread. Obviously, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Italy are Mediterranean states, but they are also part of Europe. So this initiative would extend the process somewhat to the Northern African, the Gulf states. We are finding some receptivity there on the part of the North African countries. It is not yet official American policy, but there is an effort underway within the administration, which is studying this, to see if they will come ahead to try to do this.

The Helsinki Process, which began with Europe, now goes into Central Asia because of the breakup of the Soviet Union. And when I was involved in it, it was 35 countries. Today it is 55 countries, and we would add probably another eight or 10 if this process continued. And, of course, it's all within the context of trying to get agreement on how nations ought to behave; this is the process.

DR. ABSHIRE: Could I ask how this expansion is taking place?

AMB. KAMPELMAN: The expansion has not yet taken place because the Helsinki Process has not yet decided to invite the Mediterranean states in. This is what the United States government is working on currently. Within the last month, I've consulted with three undersecretaries of State who are interested in this, but they've got their hands full with a few other things at the moment. So I cannot tell you that it has begun, but the idea seems to be taking hold and also taking hold in Europe.

DR. ABSHIRE: But the Central Asia edition came with the breakup of the Soviet Union?

AMB. KAMPELMAN: Automatically, those countries, which were asked, all agreed

to sign. I would say that the movement that now exists to further the democracy in these Central Asian countries is today all being spearheaded by what is called the OSCE, the Helsinki Process.

DR. ABSHIRE: I think there could be some kind of application of this regard to the Middle East, which would still have to be worked out, but which we still might consider.

MR. HEIL: Very definitely; we could start with 22 countries that make up the Arab League. And you have Crown Prince Abdullah, who has also expressed the kinds of thoughts that suggest he has agreed that it's time to take a fresh look at that system. It seems to me they fit together.

DR. SAID: They advanced that notion among themselves, of a Helsinki Process for Iraq, as well as a notion of a commission for Kirkuk to deal with the whole issue there. I don't think much has been done with either idea as of yet.

Concerning Iraq, the various working groups that met consisted of Iraqis, most of whom are living outside Iraq, exiles. Others were Kurds living in Iraq. Those who participate in the working groups did so, more or less, independent of any political affiliation. In some cases, of course, you knew that some of them were apart of certain groups. Both David Phillips, the other resource person for the group, and I were singularly impressed with their commitment, the amount of work they put into it and the kinds of questions they examined.

They looked at four building blocks. One examined the issue of secular versus theocratic: Would Iraq be a secular state similar to the U.S., or a theocratic state similar to Iran? Evidently, the majority of the Iraqi population is against a U.S. model of a secular state. Is there a middle ground between? They also discussed the possibility of a middle ground between these two extremes. Another important issue they debated was the individual versus the group. Will the rights of the individuals be upheld by the new Iraqi state or will the primacy of the group be of key importance?

Decentralization of power, checks and balances versus centralization of power was also debated. And here, federalism became an issue for them. Because the Kurds are happy with what they have., they insist on federalism. But there were Arab Sunni Muslims, who were not so excited about federalism. In their discussions, they tried to reconcile between the American notion of federalism, periphery versus center, with Swiss and other perceptions of federalism, such as ethnic federalism. And to their credit, the Iraqis were able to work out many of the differences among themselves. The other area they focused on was mechanisms for peacefully changing power versus constitutional constraints.

Now, you asked me the question, "What has happened?" To give you one example, Sharif Bassiouni was with another group as a resource person on the legal system in Iraq, and what happened to his group was similar to what happened with the group that I worked with. After finishing the whole report, tension and infighting within the bureaucracy and the Bush Administration resulted in placing these reports on the backburner. They are not being used. Instead, from what I heard from Sharif Bassiouni,

after this group of Iraqi jurists, lawyers, professors, and scholars made the time and effort to conduct these studies, we are now sending or may have sent a team of American judges to help them with that.

It is important that this be an Iraqi political process. Democratic behavior is not easily advanced, so it has to be a process in which they are involved. And, I agree that it has to be gradual. I speak with Iraqis on a daily basis. They are confused and uncertain. They don't know what the American plans are or what to expect. They get mixed messages.

So it really has to be an Iraqi political process. I am very much impressed with the fact that Barzani, Talabani, the Kurds and the Shi'ites are talking with one another very seriously. They are talking with the Sunni Arab tribes, the Shamars, and they debate very seriously about what is happening. Someone mentioned that earlier. This whole situation is accentuating an Iraqi identity, which is healthy.

GEN. MEYER: I've asked if Mr. Starr would talk about the current U.S. position as far as Iraq is concerned.

MR. STARR: Well, I'm not going to rebut anything that Professor Said said because it's true there are mixed messages, it's true not everything is proceeding smoothly and cleanly. But there has been progress, which is often lost in the headlines of the day and in the new offensive military campaign, which began in the last couple of days as a result of the security problems in Iraq. Nevertheless, there is a lot of work going on as people undoubtedly understand, in trying to restore basic human services in a category that you could call reclaiming civil society, as well as in trying to facilitate development of a political system, even if that has its forward motion and backward motion also.

But within the area of basic human services, progress has been made in simple things like ensuring adequate supply of water, of safe drinking water, getting the water treatment plants up and running. There are more water treatment plants now running in the Basra area than there were during the rule of Saddam. In the area of food distribution, the World Food Program is donating enormous amounts of food to the tune of almost 500 metric tons, which is being distributed fairly effectively and without much glitch, as far as I understand, to ensure that there is no food crisis in Iraq today.

The OCPA, Ambassador Bremer's new organization, the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority, is arranging the purchase of Iraqi grain. Heavy gas is being swapped for propane so that there is plenty of fuel, and to try to eliminate problems with fuel for cars, for example, as well. There's a lot of work being done on distribution of electricity, and that's been difficult for technical reasons, getting spare parts and things like that. But progress is being made, slowly but surely. Schools are being rebuilt. Assessments are being made of local health clinics and rehabilitation units to ensure that they are re-equipped and, if necessary, rebuilt.

Things are moving slowly, but things are moving surely. What I wanted to discuss — what Ambassador Abshire had mentioned — is the communications infrastructure in Iraq and what's happening to that since we've been talking during the course of this conference about radio, television, that type of thing. Beginning before the war, but continuing especially during the war and in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, work was being done in the Pentagon and with our interagency colleagues on

developing what we then called the Iraqi Free Media program. We now call it the Iraqi Media Network. The basic idea was that the U.S. government would facilitate or ensure the reconstruction of the communications infrastructure and facilitate the development of an Iraqi free media that's run by and programmed by — the content being determined by Iraqis. The premise — the hypothesis, in my view, was there wasn't much experience in an independent media in Iraq, and I'm not expert enough to know what the details of Iraqi media were during Saddam's period. But we proceeded along that assumption.

So the first task was to get coverage going in Iraq via radio and television. The forward-based team was in Kuwait City, even during the war, preparing for its activities after the cessation of hostilities, including and interacting with Iraqi ex-pats who would become part of the program. About a week after Baghdad fell, we had forward elements moving up to the airport outside of Baghdad to begin work on assessing what remained of the communications infrastructure in and around Baghdad. They also began to make plans to utilize it or to bring in other transmitters, for example, from outside.

And today, what we have is AM radio coverage in Baghdad. There is AM radio coverage of most of the major population areas in Iraq, and over the coming weeks and months, over the course of this summer, that will be expanded so that broad areas of Iraq are covered, not just the major population centers.

DR. ABSHIRE: Is this Armed Forces Network or is this under an Iraqi label?

MR. STARR: We're purchasing programming, for example, and running Radio Sawa on some of these transmitters. The military is putting on FM, rebroadcasting Radio Sawa under agreement with Radio Sawa. The programming content is being developed by Iraqis, and there's interaction with OCPA or ORHA under Garner. But frankly, there is a lack of Americans who can speak Iraqi Arabic to provide the editorial work. So a lot of the content is, in this particular part of the program, Iraqi content. It has music, it has news, it has readings from the Koran and discussions, and this content is being developed locally, and it's being developed as an interaction of Americans and Iraqis. This is not Coalition messaging, though. There may be public service announcements, but does not consist of coalition-driven messages.

FM is a much higher quality signal, but it's got a much smaller footprint. We have FM coverage in some of the major cities in Iraq, and that will be expanded about three- or four-fold by the end of the summer to cover most of the major cities, going up the central part of Iraq and covering the south, central and into the north of Iraq. So the general picture is one of expanded radio coverage.

We also have, covering the entire southern part of the country, a large transmitter in Kuwait where the content is being developed by Americans and Iraqis, in coordination with the Kuwaiti Information Ministry, to provide programming over AM radio, particularly to the south — in the southeastern to south central part of Iraq. We have increasing television coverage. There are about seven isolated areas of television coverage that have sprung up, at least under American rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, since the war ended. And in the north, there is separate Kurdish production and content, but we have television coverage in isolated spots. We are looking toward about 11 new areas of television coverage over the course of this summer.

Now these are based on some assumptions about security and some assumptions

about power, which have been problematic, particularly with regard to television programming. There are newspapers developing. USAID and the U.S. government, as well as the British, have been assisting in providing printing presses. And, of course, there are indigenous local newspapers that no Westerner is involved with and no Westerner is organizing. All kinds of newspapers are springing up all over the place, some of which have impressive local distribution.

So the overall picture I'm trying to paint here is — and I'm just talking about what the United States is involved in assisting, and there are other countries involved pursuing their own agendas. There's a lot of local indigenous activity as well. So you see, a communications environment that is becoming more complex, that is reflecting many more points of view, including conflicting points of view is developing in Iraq. This is true today and it will be expanding more in the future. And some of these transmitters are terrestrial based as I said, and some are satellite broadcast over satellite channels.

We are also working with USAID to hook the Iraqi ministries together with information technology, with computer links so that there's e-mail eventually among Iraqi government ministries and public buildings. We face a number of obstacles though.

Also on television, I should mention we've been hoping to get Arabsat coverage on television, but that's proving to be – there are a number of issues that need to be resolved before we can hook up with Arabsat or transmit across Arabsat channels for our television.

A number of obstacles are key in Iraq. Number one, of course, has been security. During the weeks after the war officially ended, TV towers would be put up in the day, cables run at night. Those cables would be cut, pulled down, towers damaged, and there was little control over that initially. It was explained by talking about looting. Later the explanation had more to do with intentional disabling of the television towers, and of course, that kind of problem has culminated in what we've seen in the last couple of days with efforts to root out some of the — what are being claimed or are assumed to be, Ba'athist influences remaining in Iraq. But security has been a major problem.

Somebody mentioned earlier that you can't move around in some countries if you're an American diplomat without being in a Bradley fighting vehicle. That's certainly true in Iraq and has been true, and that has impeded the ability to interact with local Iraqis. It's impeded the ability to conduct assessments on communications, infrastructure and technology left behind after the Saddam period.

Power has been a second major issue in Iraq. Power has been subject to intentional — and probably non-intentional — but technically based redirection. **Power has been subject to sabotage**; power has been fluctuating in the city, which has been affecting the ability to carry out communications activities, especially with regard to the television, which has a higher power requirement.

OCPA is still organizing itself, particularly in the aftermath of Ambassador Tutweiler's departure, because now there isn't a media coordinator working for Bremer, and that's something the U.S. government needs to solve shortly. We in the U.S. government have been talking about how to make better use of Iraqi Americans, to tap their expertise, their contacts, their bond to Iraq and their interest and willingness to, in many cases, go back to Iraq, but even to work from the United States on content, on production, on facilitating the development of a communications industry in Iraq.

And I would parrot that same comment with regard to non-governmental organizations. There are a lot of new ideas being developed but being resurfaced such as adopt a town, to create bonds between American towns and Iraqi towns. But there are new challenges that we are facing all the time with regard to counter-American propaganda, for example. Anti-American influence operations you could call them, in Iraq, and it extends from sermons to street-side demonstrations to handbills and posters to anti-American and anti-coalition comments in the radio and television programming.

There was an incident — there's no reason why I shouldn't tell you this one — but there was an incident where there was to be a television program some weeks ago, after the decision had been made that there would be a program in which the Koran would be read on television apparently, and right before this program was to begin, the signal was overridden with another TV signal which was hardcore pornography. So people who were tuning into this program to listen to a program and watch a program of the Koran being read, were suddenly watching this film and it took about a minute, a minute and a half apparently, before people realized what was going on, to pull the plug, to get control of the TV signal again. There are contrary counter-American or counter-coalition influence efforts and propaganda efforts to damage the credibility of the U.S. So that represents another sort of a challenge, even just within the communications arena.

MR. ZORTHIAN: Can we explore this attitude with the Iraqis and particularly the Arabs towards the U.S. military a little more? There is a thesis, which I simply put on the table, that it really doesn't matter in pursuing U.S. interests whether the Arab street likes us or doesn't like us; that what the Arab street or even the Arab governments really respect is military success; that the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq has created — for want of a better word — fear of U.S. military power and this is causing governments like Syria, once their warnings have gone off, to pay a lot more attention and react to our demands. Now I really ask: Is fear of the American military or respect for it a factor in our relations?

MR. JOHN ZOGBY: I have some thoughts on that. **American is not a very good adjective right now in the region**. It hurts me to say it, but the data are clear from my survey, it's reinforced in the Pew survey. I'll be going in the field in Iraq as soon as I can get some clearance to do that, but I know I'm going to hear in Iraq. It's what I'm hearing everywhere else.

We have a relationship with the University of Texas Medical School. They had personnel on the ground. We were talking about working together to establish a system of medical clinics in Iraq. They brought all their personnel home — anything attached to American — and this was just a couple of weeks ago. **Anything overtly associated with American, even if it is humanitarian, is just not working right now, and it's dangerous**. I don't have the inside track on some things that you have. I know that there are things that are being done, Jeff, but I can only tell you what we're hearing and what we're seeing on the ground.

MR. STARR: I have another question for the panel. This is the first panel that has carried the hint of — because it's focused on power, through the hint of American mili-

tary power, is one of the subjects of the discussion, and I want to ask a question about the — I guess the ethos of American military contribution to American communication strategy.

We've talked about public diplomacy, I include the Defense Department, you can break American communication strategy more or less into public affairs, public diplomacy and psychological operations which people may or may not understand, but it's a well defined art in the U.S. military doctrine.

Public affairs is a discipline of — at least with respect to American government — involving conveying information to the public for the purpose of informing the public. In theory, it's supposed to be value free. It's not supposed to be an adequacy platform. The American government has an obligation to inform the American public and, in so doing, it adopts an obligation to inform the world about the facts of what's going on in the American government, decision-making, political life, or military.

Public diplomacy in my view has a slightly different purpose. It's got an advocacy purpose. Its purpose is to explain and explain American government policy to the foreign world, primarily. Public diplomacy also extends to the American public where government positions are explained.

Overseas, it normally takes a form of the embassy and public affairs officers interacting with local communities on television, radio, newspapers, etc., to explain, to advocate U.S. government policy, and it has an overall purpose of persuading through logic, sometimes through debate, foreign populations as to the wisdom of American policy or the correctness of American policy, or the functionalism of American policy as opposed to disfunctionalism.

Psychological operations have a different connotation. Such activities are mostly practiced by the military in very tactical situations and mostly for force-protection reasons. But its purpose appeals — it appeals less to debate and advocating American positions and appeals more to emotions. It's not so much designed to persuade people about American policy and to change attitudes, like public diplomacy is; it's more designed to change behavior, to modify behavior and in a local tactical situation it might have to do with how to interact with an American military and how not to.

Much discussion has been given to the question of whether psychological operations really has a strategic dimension also, although the term itself kind of conjures up kind of a wrong image in some respects, but I'm not talking about disinformation. That's something totally different than psychological operations. I'm not talking about any kind of falsehoods. I'm not even talking about gray or black kinds of operations where the American hand is not clearly present. So my question is: If the world can be divided in these three areas of public affairs, public diplomacy and psychological operations, in the current situation, is there a role for psychological operations at a more strategic level of interaction, especially given the observations made about the presence of the American military around the world? What should the ethos be about the interaction between this kind of communication and public diplomacy kinds of communication, where maybe in the psychological operations arena there is an ability to address emotional issues more effectively, or in a different fashion than, say, public diplomacy?

DR. BACEVICH: I have no expertise in the psychological operations. My sense is that the just-concluded war was preceded by an unprecedented effort at psychological opera-

tions. As a guy who just reads the newspaper as an observer, it did not seem to me that the payoff was very great. My own sense, however, with regard to military presence, is that **I'm not sure that we appreciate the multiple ways in which our mere presence affects perceptions in ways that are probably not intended, but particularly it seems to me, in this part of the world, further inflame already existing negative reactions**. How psychological operations could amend that, I don't know. I'd be pretty skeptical. General Meyer knows more about psy-ops than I do.

GEN. MEYER: Yeah, my answer to that would be, yes we ought to consider doing it, but I don't believe that we have the expertise still left in the military to do it. It used to be a major function that we taught and which was performed and with some success and with some failure, but if it's — as you say, it's not being considered, that's a mistake. I mean it's a part of the arrows in your quiver as you start to take on this war on terrorism and the other kinds of wars that you're going to have to respond to.

Apropos to that, I would say the other thing is I have a retired general that lives in my condominium, and he brought me up an article that he wrote for a newspaper about — it's not exactly psychological operations, but it's deception planning where what happened in World War II, how they went about creating divisions that didn't exist so that people didn't know what was going on. So, there's nothing legally that impairs you from doing that and, therefore, you need to keep a capability extant and particularly in your office.

MR. STARR: I have a 30-second comeback to that to explain one thing. An example of what I'm talking about are the psychological operations that the United States conducts in Colombia today, and this kind of a program is a counter-narcotics program. It is done with the full knowledge, of course, and cooperation of the — at the request of the Colombian government, and there's no attempt to hide the American hand to the Colombian public. But it's essentially assisting the Colombians in developing ads, an awareness about the dangers of narcotics, trafficking, narcotics use, and to inform them about the increasing importance in their economy — not in a positive way, by the way — of narco business. This is a task which is done under the jurisdiction of the American Embassy in Bogota, but it goes beyond the range of skills available to the embassy through traditional public diplomacy because they're doing cartoons and posters.

De-mining is another example, and it was done extensively in Latin America for example, and in other countries, too, in other combat zones, to teach kids — to teach children and others what they can't touch. And they did cartoons to make people who are unfamiliar with military issues or technology aware of the threat of mines, especially mines that might be dispersed aerially or something like that. And that's a role of psychological operations, and that's a very good story and a very positive role, and of course psychological operations has many dimensions. But the point is that it's simply a tool that goes beyond the realm of presenting an official U.S. government position and extolling its virtues in the fashion that traditional public diplomacy does. It does represent a new arrow in our quiver, but there are some challenges in figuring out how it might be applied, if at all.

DR. ABSHIRE: I would like to raise a very basic question with the two panelists and

others. I guess it's got to do with the exit strategies versus Joe Nye's "bound to lead," and **there's no question that our residual forces and in Saudi Arabia became a psychological target that Osama Bin Laden played on. They were near the holy places, and it was a set-up for him. I can't think in our military history of such a dramatic case, and no one foresaw it. We've got over-deployments in certain places, and I think Europe is one. I think drawing down some of our forces in Korea after the current crises may be wise, but we carry a certain stabilizing influence in Asia, helping prevent what happened for 400 years in Europe, the constant shifts in balance of power. That's a good side of our presence. Where we get into trouble, it seems to me, is when our power is used inappropriately.**

Then, when we get to Iraq, we yearn to turn it over to the Iraqis. But if we were to pull out and just turn it over to the Iraqis, we would have an inconceivable mess. And some faction would come to power; maybe it would be a radical Islamist faction. So as we look at pulling back from these things, and Joe Nye's wonderful expression, "bound to lead," that can be overdone.

And what about the Israeli-Palestine conflict? George Bush has to get involved, and he's finally done it. Even between India and Pakistan, the United States has to get involved. I felt one of the biggest mistakes we made was not getting involved in Yugoslavia earlier. The first President Bush did brilliantly in uniting Germany and getting it into NATO. But when Jim Baker went to the NATO meeting as Yugoslavia was beginning to fracture, he said, "We don't have a dog in that fight." Ambassador Zimmerman was very alarmed at that. He saw that once we were out, the Europeans would get out of step, go on their own course, and then the whole thing would unraveled.

So we're sort of damned if we do and we're damned if we don't. And there is an art of strategy and diplomacy somewhere in between, but it has to be a very smart art because it seems to me it was a mistake to use the word "preemption." We all know we're going to preempt in certain times. Eisenhower had a strategy of preemption on the nuclear level, but you don't talk about those things. So, how do we manage a transition to a lower posture without — whether it's with weapons of mass destruction or a lot of other things — creating a lot of new problems?

DR. BACEVICH: Strategy is an art. We're not going to be able to prescribe principles or to inscribe them in stone. But I would offer the following thoughts.

Number one is, we make it possible to reduce our commitments by reminding ourselves that all commitments are of a temporary nature — and you just made reference to Eisenhower. In my study of the Eisenhower presidency, I found that it was clearly his understanding that the commitment Truman had made to European security in terms of U.S. troops on European soil was a temporary one. Temporary got to be a long, rather lengthy period of the time because the Cold War endured for such a long time, and by the time that Cold War ended, we forgot that it was supposed to be temporary. So we begin limiting our commitments by constantly reminding ourselves to reexamine requirements, and to the extent that they begin to outlive their original purpose, then let's revisit them and reexamine them. And it seems to me that Europe is, at this moment, the case that calls for that.

At this particular moment, Korea doesn't. I would not be arguing to pull U.S.

troops out of Korea tomorrow because at the moment there's a tenuous situation. On the other hand, if you look at the correlation of forces on the Korean Peninsula, one could perhaps look to the opportunity to reduce our commitment there in the not-so-distant future. So that'll be point number one – to remind ourselves that military deployments are not intended to be permanent commitments.

Point number two would be to be at least somewhat sensitive to what might be some of the unintended consequences of establishing a presence. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, I was serving in the Gulf at the time. I was an operator guy, with no particular political sensitivity, and I remember sensing the extent to which the Saudis were resistant to us keeping forces there. And from a soldier's perspective, I though, "What's wrong with these people?" I mean, we just came over and saved them and all we want to do is to keep a brigade set of equipment and a few troops. What's wrong with them? Well, now I would say in retrospect, alarm bells should have been going off, that there was more involved here than simply operational considerations.

So I wonder if, for example, today, where we are — without a lot of media attention — expanding our military footprint in Central Asia, if that ought not to be something that — and I think we're doing it strictly out of operational considerations, to provide bases to help support operations in Afghanistan – we reconsider and contemplate what might be some of the unintended consequences of establishing our presence there. Is the risk involved truly worth what we're going to get in terms of additional operational capability? I don't know what the answer would be, but I wouldn't just allow the assumption of operational considerations to settle the case and lead to an additional permanent military presence that may actually produce some kind of a backlash.

And the third thing I'd say – and this gets to Iraq — is to have realistic political expectations. I was not, particularly, a supporter of this last war, but to me the case to be made for the war was, in a sense, the case that Barry was suggesting before, that if there was a, quote, unquote, "good that was going to come out of this," it was going to be the good of striking the fear of God into other regimes that might be inclined to support terror or provide weapons of mass destruction to people who wish us ill. And from that point of view, I could make an argument that it was in our national interest to engage in a preventive war and bring down this regime. And then say that was our objective and certainly not withdraw U.S. forces the next week and therefore allow chaos, but to say that our political purposes are simply order; our purposes are some sort of legitimate successor regime and then we're going home. **We do not necessarily have to maintain a longstanding major military presence in a region where that presence tends to create a severe backlash, as I fear that long-term military presence in Iraq is likely to do**. We'll see, but that would be my fear.

DR. ABSHIRE: Well, let me just latch onto your last statement because I totally agree with you in theory. Didn't you give an estimate of how many years you thought we were going to be there? I wonder if we're going to be able to get out. I think it's a little like Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson knew things weren't going well, but he didn't know what to do. I worry that with best efforts in Iraq, we may still be having a lot of disorder, and so there is a certain trap to it that I think is very difficult. If we're out of there in a year from now, do you think it's manageable?

DR. SAID: I agree with you, the issue of security and all the other things that you referred to. But for me, when we speak of an exit strategy, and when I speak with the Iraqis, what I say to them immediately when there's a question, is, "Please do not create a situation where Americans will go back in body bags, because if that happens you are the losers. You are the losers."

I sat with a member of Congress about two weeks ago and he made the following statement. I won't mention his name; he's not here to defend himself. He said, "You know in six months from now if things are bad, the President will tell Congress that these Arabs can't govern themselves. No one will give a damn. We'll come back." He was exaggerating his point. For me what's important for the U.S. as an exit strategy is to support the Iraqis to develop consensus on a framework. Consensus would include a framework that would work for them, a timetable that would work for them. What I see is the opposite at this time.

When you asked the question about exit strategy, we have to work on the software as well as the hardware, so to speak. Sure, no question, both of them have to go together and I agree with you. **When I speak with my Iraqi friends, what they say to me, "When we try to see Ambassador Bremer, we have to go through 16 checkpoints. We can't see him, we can't communicate to him, and then what we get are conflicting messages from others."**

You mentioned power, David. In my business, in peace studies, we work with the proposition of "power with" rather than "power over." How do you move from a perspective of "power over" to "power with?" That's what we're working with. How does one do it?

Going back to Ken Boulding's famous book, *Three Faces of Power*, he talks about power of the hug, power of the stick, power of the carrot. It seems that we vacillate between the power of the stick on the one hand or, if not the stick, the carrot. But there has to be a power of the hug, so to speak. We have to know when we refer to changing circumstances. Globally, circumstances have changed both on the material level, meaning the level of forces and circumstances, but also on the subjective level — the level of ideas and beliefs.

My students have been trained to deal with the changes on the level of objectives forces, circumstances, et cetera, but not ideas and beliefs. We are beginning to understand that we have to begin to deal more with that. We have to begin to understand the subjective forces that are operating. So when we talk about an exit strategy, for me it has been "power with." How can we move to "power with" rather than "power over"?

GEN. MEYER: I have a different view than what's been expressed here. The part of the world that is not susceptible to any of the kinds of solutions that people talk about for a lot of reasons is the area of the Middle East — Iraq, Iran, Israel.

If we go anywhere else in the world, every other place in the world, there are significant forces of some kind that we're going in to support. There's no other area of the world that's like this, uniquely, and we created it uniquely. We let Iraq and Iran build up forces when they were part of a command that ran through that area, and we didn't permit other countries to create, to have the sort of technological advanced forces in that area because of Israel, and as a result we have this unique area which has all of the problems which should not drive the way in which we go about creating our forces for the

future. We should understand that this area is different and so, Andy, when you get into your final phase of looking at this, look at how you deal with an area that is going to fester for a long period of time.

At the same time, you look at the increased capability. You've got satellites that can tell us everything that's going on. We're going to be able to travel quickly around the world. We can get people there more quickly and it's more susceptible to using the kind of technologies elsewhere, but I've never been able to come to grips with how you deal with the large Iranian force, the Iraqi force, it's just been dealt with, but I'm not sure that an attack on Iran is something that any of us wants to be involved with, but that area is going to continue to require special people who are dealing with it from a force-structure point of view, from a tactics point of view, with an understanding point of view.

Barry was talking earlier about foreign area officers and so on. You're going to need people who are far more knowledgeable about that region for the next decade. It's not going to be resolved, in my judgment, in the short period. So you can take that for what its worth.

It's time for us to stop. I would like to express my appreciation to all of you, Max, Andy, Dr. Said. I think you've given all of us enough to think about and to provide us with some of the history of what's caused us to be in the situations in which we exist today.

WRAP-UP: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

SPEAKERS:

DR. DAVID M. ABSHIRE, President, CSP; First Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting

THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER ROSS, Special Coordinator for Public Diplomacy, Department of State

MS. JUDITH KIPPER, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, CSIS; Director of the Middle East Forum, Council on Foreign Relations

MR. MARK HELMKE, Senior Professional Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman

MR. BARRY ZORTHIAN, Partner, Alcalde & Fay; Former President, Public Diplomacy Council

DR. ABSHIRE: **Our most important challenge is effectively conveying the urgent and critical role that public diplomacy, and our global communications as a whole, play in meeting our national security problems, namely, that we're in serious trouble, and incremental changes will not do**. In addition, it does seem to me that the Executive Branch remains fragmented among the various agencies.

We're talking public diplomacy, but maybe we need a new term, something broader than the normal concept of public diplomacy, and a grand strategy that brings that together. And that leads me back to the idea that we tried to propagate four months after 9/11, but I think we should take it up again, and I think Karl Rove is really the person to talk to, which I have.

Perhaps the Executive Branch should have something analogous to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, except with a board of consultants that you bring in and out, instead of permanent advisors. They don't have to be big shots; they're all in there for their expertise, not whether they know the President, or something of that nature. And, of course, really the best, just as Brent Scowcroft chairs the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, it'd be wonderful if Karen Hughes, who is really close to the President, is part time, and Brent is part time. **You would also want an expert or two on the Islamic world; you would have an expert or two in advanced communications, and maybe somebody in the science and technology field, and so forth, but a small strategy group**. Of course it's easy for me, not being in government, to criticize people for not thinking over the horizon and across the horizon, but frankly, were I in government, I wouldn't have that time under current circumstances.

As you know, Eisenhower broke up his National Security Council structure — he had a planning board, a board that looked ahead, and that was separate, and a crisis management board, the operations/coordination board.

Now let me quickly list a number of points that I jotted down during our various panels and discussions.

First, I think we've got to get a Congressional caucus going in this area. In my day, when we saved Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Bill Fulbright had gone on vacation, and it was going to go out of business within 10 days, and Mike Mansfield came to our aid and we got a year's delay under the State Department, and then the Eisenhower Commission. But that network developed, really, over 15 years.

If you had to pick one person that was the intellectual leader, I'd say it was Dante Fascell, who was so articulate, and Senator Lugar, and we've got a range of people. But the reason you need a caucus today is that you've got to get through the appropriations committees. I always had my own caucus on Capitol Hill, because if you want to get something done, you get them behind you, and you get it done. That's the way to crack the Office of Management and Budget.

The next point is that polling indicates that globalization is something that people really identified with. And I think that gives us a whole new opening in broadcasting, and how you do it. Another issue concerns Muslim communities in the United States. Why shouldn't America become known as a major Islamic intellectual center?

I believe that we have to accept the limitations of official public diplomacy. The point was made very effectively that we've got to reach beyond official public diplomacy in government, and we've got to reach beyond official public diplomacy in terms of the private sector. The creation of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy is a positive recommendation. However people on the Hill worry about oversight, and so forth, of any new corporation. But we've got an active campaign.

The next thing concerns partnering with American networks. Now, as Jim Zogby said, in the old days of USIA and USIS, we were more country specific, and in dealing with Muslim countries, we've got to be country specific. There's no Islamic agenda. When I was on speaking tours going to different missions, USIS officers would reorient me from the country I'd just been to. And, Ambassador Kawar noted in his presentation that the UNDP report is something really should be pushed.

Next, we certainly are concerned about the barriers that are being raised, and the impact of that on foreigners and foreign journalists. Also, as I said in my opening comments, **I am concerned about the simplistic use of democracy. And again, I think it might have been Jim Zogby that talked about democracy is a work in progress, and that we should not raise false expectations, but instead propagate representative government and the rule of law, which will lead to democracies.**

I was also impressed by Shy Meyer's comment that it is important in Iraq to develop a clear set of measurable steps. I think he was talking both about fostering democracy and about us getting out. I think that would be good politically back here. It would be good with the Congress.

Next, I'd really like to work on Senator Stevens on exchange programs, doing something like they've done on Russia for the Middle East. I was also very impressed with the discussion about theocratic democracy and the notion that many Muslims don't want their government to be secular. The United States is a religious country, and many

Muslims live in religious countries, and **I think we can do much more in terms of interfaith dialogue.**

My next note is on propagating the "Road Map" to peace in the Middle East. The President has made a commitment that nine out of ten people didn't think he would make three weeks ago. We've had a mess that's occurred since then, but I know more people that said, "You know, he won't touch this until after the election. He won't really commit his prestige to it." We've had this terrible setback, but we've got to convince people in the Middle East that he is committed to the road map. People can argue with some of President Bush's policies, but if you look at when he gets a commitment, he goes for it. He's made political history in several of the things he's gone for. He doesn't give up.

I was also impressed with the discussion that we had on the unintended consequences of military commitments. Certainly, when there's popular opposition, we should have learned a lesson from Saudi Arabia that these commitments should be better explained and their purpose. And many of them are a temporary purpose, and it's certainly a temporary purpose in Saudi Arabia.

I was also intrigued when Max Kampelman spoke about Helsinki and the CSCE process to the Middle East. I really thought that was – CSCE (now the OSCE) is such a brilliant accomplishment in the Cold War and after, and that could really be something if some way it could be put together.

Finally, I like the idea of a book translation program. In the heyday of USIA, books helped us win the Cold War. I'm stunned that we stopped our translation program.

MR. ZORTHIAN: I want to remind everyone that this is a meeting on U.S. communications with Muslim communities, which to me, at least, is more than public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is part of U.S. communications, but it's much broader than that. During these two days we covered the three essential elements of this field: structure of how we communicate, the means we use to deliver our message, and most important of all, the message itself.

On structure, for two years people have been discussing — I hate to use the term, — the need for a tsar of public diplomacy, a tsar of communication in the White House, someone who's able to walk into the Oval Office and talk to the President, who sits in on national security and has input, not the control, not only on the formulation of policy, but also on the projection of policy.

Pete Peterson, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, gave a very impressive talk reflecting CFR's study on public diplomacy, which the Council will soon issue. One of the top recommendations was to establish a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. Now, there's some argument as to whether that makes sense or not. But the principle behind it on mobilizing the NGOs, the business community, and others is important, because globalization is a very real factor in what people think about the United States overseas and how they accept our policies.

With regard to the media, most of the information about what the United States is doing, thinking, and acting on comes from the U.S. media, whether it's CNN, MSNBC, or the overseas editions of *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, etc. Someone should be working with them. And I don't mean they control it, but that they respond to it, that they communicate to it.

Treating foreign journalists better is also very serious issue, but let's keep in mind that communication with the U.S. media also has an effect overseas. **There are no walls between the U.S. media and the foreign media. Communication today crosses over the boundaries of the oceans and the continents very quickly.**

We need to continue to emphasize the importance of research. If we would just use research as is done now in a political campaign, and get people thinking about how we modify our message given the data, then that would affect our policies. Congress seems ready to come aboard to endorse this concept. But how it does it, what the effect is, what resources it provides, I'll leave to Marc.

The second big area is delivery. We didn't pay much attention to the use of new technology, which could be the way to improve a good deal of the communications, as could the use of local people, the use of surrogate speakers, and resources, provisional resources - where do we get the funds for this?

As a personal aside, I would note that many of the things we're talking about don't need more money. They need a change of mind, they need a change of approach; they need an adjustment in the structure we have. Sure, we need more resources, I'm all for it. But let's make sure we're not wasting money on fly-by-night operations.

Most important, and where we spend most of our time, is the message. One of the key points Pete Peterson pointed toward, something that everyone who's been dealing with this business for the last two, three, 10 years, public diplomacy, communication, the articulation, both the development and the articulation, and the message has to be in on, quote, "the takeoffs as well as the landings."

That takes many forms, but most of all, it has to come right at the White House, right at the top. **The Council on Foreign Relations, Center for the Study of Diplomacy, and The Center for the Study of the Presidency have all recommended, the appointment of a tsar of public diplomacy, someone who's in the White House and can call the shots, can give direction, can give coordination to all the agencies involved in this business, State, Defense, various other elements, and can walk into the President's office and say, "Mr. President, this is the way we have to present this, or bear this in mind if you're going to have such a policy."**

We don't have anyone in that role. Karen Hughes might have been able to do it. Karl Rove could do it if he divorced himself from political campaigns, but that's not happened. We need a powerful voice in the White House, Tucker Eskew, in the Office of Global Communication, is a step in the right direction. But it needs a much greater upgrade and involvement in the NSC, and involvement in the inner circle of decision-making. That we don't have.

Our discussions have progressed along two general lines. One focuses on longer-range issues, including the cultural, context, the searching for common values, dialogue, and the need for Americans to listen. We have plenty of suggestions. We have expertise on that. I assume it's being adopted. Chris will talk about this later. But there is an opportunity, a need, a desire for more dialogue, for more communication, for more searching of common values with the Arab community.

More immediate, obviously, is the political issue. And here, everyone concurred, or at least all those who were knowledgeable said, "Give primary attention to Palestine, to the Israeli/Palestine conflict." We're not going to change that overnight. But some-

how or other, the White House unit that provides some control and coherence, perhaps some of them can rein in some of our hawks, if you will, so that we can project a more evenhanded approach to problems in the Middle East.

The President clearly made some progress when he went to Egypt, when he went to Jordan, when he talked about a Palestinian state. He didn't solve the problem, obviously, but it's a step in the right direction. I urge him to follow up. What is critical on this is listening, listening, listening. We've got to get off our high horse. We've got to get a little humility. We've got to get a little appreciation and respect for the other parties. And that came through very clearly to me in our discussions. There's got to be some empathy, some sympathy, some positive reactions to the position of others.

My biggest conclusion is that it's about time to stop talking. We've been at this for two years. I've gone to 10 conferences of this type. Now, that doesn't mean nothing's going on. Chris Ross and people in the field are doing what they can with their resources. But, what is needed is a determination and leadership by the White House and, as David has said, a great quantum leap forward in how we think and talk long-term about strategic challenges.

MS. KIPPER: It seems to me that communications is the right term, rather than public diplomacy, but we've been using them interchangeably here, and I hope we understand that it's something much larger than just selling a policy, because to me, there's no difference between public diplomacy and the policy. And **if we have a policy that people don't like, we can stand on our head and turn blue, and throw as much money at it as we want, but it's not going to do much good. So the need for deep understanding, at the policy level, of how our policies may or may not work in different parts of the world, is very important.**

For me, communication begins at the grassroots. We have to start in our own education system. We've got to start teaching foreign languages in kindergarten or before. Children can learn several languages at one time. They know exactly when to use "which" and "with whom," and it opens up their mind to a whole new experience, and to culture, and to different ways of thinking.

We need to teach geography. And we need to help our citizens, through our education system and other things, to be more culturally sensitive, to go on the basis that not better, not worse, simply different, and let us appreciate our differences. And I think though we are a country of foreigners, we've had a very, very hard time doing that. When we think that other people are modernizing, are beginning to have free market economies, and even democracies, most Americans expect that, oh, they're going to look just like us. And that's, of course, not going to happen.

Democracy has many of the same characteristics, but it has different forms in different places, as do economic systems. And wherever democracy and free economic systems are going to survive, they need to survive within the cultural context of that particular country.

We need a strategic outlook, not a tactical outlook. While I was a supporter of President Clinton, I felt very sad about the last year of his presidency; that he was tactical and not strategic. There was huge possibility of having a Palestinian-Israeli peace at that time, but he needed a strategic outlook**. We need to have a vision in**

this country of where we want to go, and not simply be putting our finger in the dike on a daily basis in terms of policy.

Obviously, there are two previous speakers, who've said we need exchange, dialogue, and we need to learn how to listen. But listening doesn't always mean the same thing in every place, in the Middle East, for example, it is absolutely unacceptable to say "no."

No one will ever tell you no, whether you're asking them, "Will you sign a military alliance with me, or would you like to go for coffee tomorrow afternoon?" You have to learn to pick up the cultural cues in order to be able to listen. Without it, you will constantly make a mistake. How many times has our secretary of Defense gone to Saudi Arabia, or other places, ends up in Paris and has a press conference, "Yes, we agree, we agreed, we agreed." And on the second or the third page of the newspaper the next day, there's a little item that, no, the country, Saudis, or wherever he was coming from, didn't agree.

He didn't hear no, but that doesn't necessarily mean that you've heard a yes. So understanding the cultural cues is extremely important to being able to listen with understanding.

I'm very scared because there are so many different parts of the U.S. government that are doing the same thing at this moment. And squandering resources is not my worry as much as the fact that little bits here and there of different agencies, different offices, competing and trying to accomplish the same task, are going to produce a failure, and people will then say, "Oh, well, it doesn't work, so let's chuck it."

I think we do need a strategy. We do need a coordinated effort in all departments of government, so that we have the same message, and that nobody is duplicating other peoples' efforts. We need to travel. We need to listen. We need to engage in dialogue. And we need to understand that while we are an enormously powerful and rich country, and we are a country of foreigners, who work hard, and have a great deal to be proud of — there's no country in the world that has the kind of critical thinking that we have — our size, our power and our accomplishments make other people feel a sense that their self-esteem is very low when they look at what we've accomplished.

They feel humiliated, they feel alienated, they feel out of it; they feel hopeless. And so, as Barry said, a little bit of humility, moving toward people at a level — and I don't mean dumbing-down, but I mean understanding and having a degree of empathy is absolutely essential to any effort by the United States government, or private sector, to be understood, for our policy to be heard, for us to be able to influence and shape events in the world.

There's nothing different about Muslims than anybody else. But it happens, at this moment, that there are many places in the Islamic countries that are having problems. They're having the same problems that Europe had, that the United States had, but we're over them, and now it's the turn of the people who are in the Muslim countries, and we need to be very understanding of that, but at the same time, not pretend. Let's not pretend.

When we have best friends that are tyrants, and we say, "That's a domestic affair, we can't meddle," that's not good enough — that's not good enough. We have no more Cold War communist threats that enable us to befriend

tyrants without saying something about it. It doesn't mean you have to humiliate the tyrant in public, but the tyrant needs to know that we know what he's doing, and that we expect a change in behavior.

And we need to talk about our values in a way that is going to project a policy that is based on our good intentions. Public diplomacy can't do it. We've got to have a good policy.

DR. ABSHIRE: I want to raise this issue of terminology. Center for the Study of the Presidency did a bipartisan, strategic reform paper that we had in outline form in 2000, and then later published. We wanted the Administration to adopt it.

We focused on global communication before 9/11, because we were always thinking broader than the older concept of public diplomacy. You know, the Council's report was labeled public diplomacy, and so when I was explaining global communication somebody would say, "Oh, you're talking about public diplomacy."

So we sort of retreated back to that what I think is a narrower label, and doesn't encompass everything. So if we're talking about a strategy for global communications, or a grand strategy for global communications, and one or two people say, "It's this technological thing," and I say, "No, no." And in some of our grant requests, and so forth, we talk about communicating America, but it's more than America that we're communicating. So we need to come up with a broader terminology than public diplomacy, particularly if we're making a new effort.

AMB. ROSS: What I'd like to do as briefly as I can is outline what public diplomacy is doing today, what it plans to do in the near future, and what issues it faces as it moves forward. I've learned a great deal during this day and a half, and this is going to inform not only my remarks, but also the informal report that I present within the public diplomacy family at the State Department.

The first thing that we clearly all agreed on was that hostility to the U.S. is at a very high level in virtually all Muslim countries. And we have polling, other research, and embassy reporting, to confirm this. **The reasons for this vary from country to country, but a high degree of hostility is a common threat. I think we also agree that even the best public diplomacy can't transform hostility into love overnight.** And I think there are at least two reasons for this, and we touched on them in the course of these two days.

First, in the Muslim world, after decades of involvement with the outside world, audiences are fairly sophisticated politically. They know the different between words and action. They know that actions speak louder than words, and it's very clear that our policy actions have a very large impact on attitudes. A second reason why public diplomacy can't do it all alone is that many aspects of the interaction of the U.S. with Muslim countries are beyond the reach of coordination or control.

And I would take, as a clear example, the impact of Hollywood in this regard. Both these factors make it very difficult to evaluate the impact of public diplomacy. Evaluation is a golden word in Washington today. Everyone wants to see evaluation, and they want it especially to be quantitative evaluation. The fact is that it is very dif-

ficult to evaluate the impact of public diplomacy given these other factors that I've described.

That said, what, in fact, can public diplomacy do to address attitudes, even if only at the margins? I think there are three things that it can do. **First, the practitioners of public diplomacy contribute to policymaking by helping to keep decision-makers informed of the attitudes of foreign audiences toward current and prospective policies.** They do this by monitoring foreign opinion, by listening to foreign views, and by reporting their findings, both, formally and informally, back to Washington. Now, what weight decision-makers will give these attitudes is, as several people have pointed out, problematic, and quite beyond the reach of public diplomacy.

Second, public diplomacy practitioners engage in daily public policy advocacy. I felt obliged to repeat this several times, because certain commentators continue to believe that all that public diplomacy does is put ads on TV, paid ads; in other words, to engage in soft diplomacy. Quite the contrary, there is daily public advocacy presenting, explaining, clarifying policy and its background, and countering the all-too-frequent disinformation and misinformation that occurs.

In the Middle East, it is very common, from one party to another, to interpret U.S. policy as it sees fit, and to announce to the world that this is U.S. policy. It is important for those of us in public diplomacy to make sure that even if we're going to disagree on a given American policy, at least let us disagree on the policy as it is, and not as someone else says it is.

Since September 11, in this policy advocacy field, we've taken a number of steps. First, an unprecedented number of senior officials have engaged with Muslim and Arab media. Whenever possible, they've done this in a foreign language, usually in Arabic — I think there's only one of us, two of us, who do that. We have also, greatly increased our translation of written materials, speeches, statements, interviews, et cetera, and distributed these much more widely, relying quite heavily on the Internet.

Third, as Greg Lagana pointed out yesterday, we've greatly improved the access to senior officials that we afford representatives of the media from Muslim countries, which are currently working in the U.S. Fifth, we've set up an office in London, again, as Greg mentioned, to develop our relations with the pan-Arab electronic and print media.

Clearly, there's room for improvement. We can do more, and we can do better in carrying out this policy advocacy function. And I think this is especially true when we look at the possible linkage between the formulation of policy and the formulation of a public diplomacy strategy in support of that policy. But the fact remains that policy advocacy is a main killer of public diplomacy.

The third thing that public diplomacy practitioners can do — and this is the other pillar of public diplomacy — is to engage in opening and intensifying our dialogue and our engagement with audiences in the Muslim world, this in an effort to achieve greater mutual understanding. This takes many forms: face-to-face conversations, exchanges in both directions, video conferences, and video-based town meetings across the Atlantic.

In all of this, we look to build on commonalities and to gain a better understanding of differences. This was the purpose of the Shared Values Initiative that

Charlotte Beers launched, the Muslim Like in America Initiative. A great deal has been said about it in this day and a half. Let me very quickly run through its rationale. It was conceived right after September 11th as a reply to an issue that was hot then, as a reply to the charge that the U.S. was anti-Islam.

And it was conceived, also, as a way of generating dialogue with Muslim audiences, and it was not conceived as a way of changing attitudes overnight. It had several facets beyond the paid TV ads that have become the focus of so much critical comment. There were radio and press dimensions. There were speakers who went out, some of them from the Muslim-American community. There were town hall meetings across enormous distances.

What it suffered from was two things. First, the contractors took 11 months to finalize the content of the campaign, and by the time it was ready, the issues had moved elsewhere. And the criticism that was made was that this campaign is not addressing what we want to know right now, and it's irrelevant. You'll be interested to know that one reason for this delay was the review that we were obliged to conduct for the Department of Justice of the texts of the messages. Why?

Because the Department of Justice is in charge of guarding the bounds of church/state relations, the mere fact that we were talking about Muslim life in America was seen as potentially crossing the line of advocacy for a certain faith. That took several months, and that conclusion was that in this long interim, security measures adopted in the U.S. rendered the message we were trying to impart about the respect in which the Muslim community was held, somewhat dubious. Nonetheless, we went ahead. And in the end, a dialogue was created. We got enormous free publicity in all the pan-Arab and Muslim press. Everyone wrote about this campaign. Many conversations were opened about the nature of U.S. relations with audiences in the Muslim world.

And also, for the first time, the hidebound culture of the Department of State was obliged to consider the fact that one can use the mass media to communicate with mass audiences, in a very special way. All of this is over. We are now looking at further initiatives, which won't be placed on paid media, which, for the moment, are grouped under a rubric that we're calling "A Shared Future."

We with audiences in the Muslim world share this globe, share a common humanity, and share responsibility for the future. And we are looking, wherever possible, to partner with institutions, both in the United States and in the Muslim countries, to move programs under this rubric forward.

Now, in all this work that we've been doing, what have been our guiding principles? We've had several. First, from the beginning, after 9/11, we saw that we had to reach broader and deeper audiences — broader in the sense that we wanted to move away from the narrow focus on elites that had been necessary in the decade from the collapse of the Soviet Union to September 11.

That focus had been necessary, because resources had been greatly reduced. Depending on whose figures you believe, **public diplomacy funds had been cut from 35 to 40 percent in real terms in that decade**. We wanted to go beyond that focus on the elite and reach out to a mass audience. At the same time, we wanted a deeper penetration to the younger generation that traditionally had not been part of our public diplomacy efforts.

When I say the younger generation, I mean going down into high school. One of

the initiatives that we've taken in response to this need to enter into dialogue with the younger generation, which, in a few years, will be responsible for its own future, has been to launch and Arabic language magazine targeted at the 18 to 35-year-old audience in the Arab world. This is a magazine whose first issue will appear in July. It's intended to be monthly. We hope that there will be funding to continue it.

The second guiding principle that we've worked under has been to find, wherever possible, ways of magnifying the impact of specific discrete public diplomacy events, so that when someone gives a speech in front of a selected audience of 100 people, that speech and the discussion that follows can be relayed to a much larger audience, typically through the mass media. Our third principle, as has been recommended over and over in this day and a half, has been to use the new media. Satellite television is one of the premier new media.

In an initial phase after September 11, because Osama bin Laden had chosen Al Jazeera as his medium of choice, we, too, used Al Jazeera. But in the months that followed, we very quickly realized that we were doing an injustice to other channels, and so we began to work with all of the Arab satellite channels, and continued to deal with Al Jazeera, but just as one among the many.

Another example of the use of satellite television — and this also illustrates the principle of magnification — was the Secretary of State's appearance on MTV, which was a unique initiative. No previous Secretary of State had gone on MTV to enter into dialogue with youth audiences in several countries. But among the new media, also, is the Internet. We have developed Web sites in many languages.

These Web sites are maintained both here in Washington, by the Department, and also by most of our embassies in Muslim counties that have their own Web sites. **Among the things we've done, beyond putting materials on the Web site in a fairly non-interactive way, has been to engage in some Internet-based dialogues. One notable one in China is attracted an incredible audience**. I've forgotten the senior official who participated. I believe it was Ambassador Zoelick.

But we have also started to look at how one can deal with the phenomenon of chat rooms. This is difficult. There are many, many chat rooms in which the Middle East, and U.S. policy towards the Middle East, are openly discussed. Many of their participants are from the Middle East. We are not present. And the difficulty is that to be present is very labor-intensive. But it is an issue that we're looking at.

The other new medium that we're using is the cell phone. In Cairo, our public affairs section has gotten very adept at pushing out short messages to its list of cell phone telephone numbers. Sometimes it's just to alert people to the fact that the secretary of state or the President has just made a speech, and they might be interested, et cetera, et cetera. But that is a medium that they are using, and others will use, increasingly.

A fourth guiding principle has been to incorporate as much interactivity as possible into our activities, largely, or very much, to signal our interest in and our commitment to the notion of dialogue. The Arabic language magazine is a good example here. There will be a website associated with it. Readers will be encouraged, through the Web site, a post office box, the telephone, for that matter, to communicate their reactions to what is in the Arabic magazine, and to also pose questions about the United States, for which, we will then go out and find experts to answer.

We hope also somehow to find a way to have Americans posing questions about the Middle East for the readership to answer. All of this, we're going to run contests, particularly on poetry, which is a very important cultural phenomenon in the Middle East — all of this because of this recognition that in today's world, the interactive element is very important. A fifth element that I've touched on before, a fifth guideline, is a commitment to partnership, partnership both with various segments of the U.S. private sector, and with institutions abroad.

Looking ahead, quite apart from the current substance of our work, we are, in fact, moving to reshape our operations in several ways. First, with regard to the Arab countries, we have begun work on a public diplomacy strategy to define an overall policy approach to the Arab world and to bring together under one umbrella all the moving parts that now exist — the Palestinian/Israeli road map, the Reconstruction of Iraq, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Middle East Foreign Trade Area proposal, the Partnership for Learning that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is undertaking, and certain activities of the Bureau of Democracy and Human Rights, and Labor.

All of these activities have been taking place with a general sense of where we're going. Nevertheless, we have never sat down to try to create a document that spells out an overall strategy, into which all of these parts can fit, and against which all of these parts can measure themselves to avoid duplication.

I think where we're going to come out, as we try to define this strategy, is that **good governance, civil society, education, media training are going to be very important elements**, as has been suggested. **We have an interest in democratic values, but instead of imposing a democratic model on various countries, we prefer to encourage the development of the building blocks that, over time, can lead to a democratic process.**

Another thing we're doing is in recognition of the fact that, once we've set some strategic objectives, we should leave it to the field to define the programs and techniques by which these objectives can best be approached in each country. We're considering a return to the country plan submissions that were a hallmark of USIA, but which were lost in the integration of USIA into the State Department. There is a State Department mission planning mechanism, but there is not a specific detailed requirement for our public affairs sections to define what they would like to have done in their own countries. So that's something we're looking at.

A third thing we're looking at is, again, a need that's been touched upon in our deliberations — we're looking to improve the strategic coordination of communications on two levels, first, between the Department as the lead agency in public diplomacy and its field posts. In the days of USIA, there was a very coordinated, integrated approach to communication and strategic guidance. In the process of integration, this has been diluted somewhat, and we're working hard to reestablish the connection between the office of the undersecretary for public diplomacy as the strategic head, if you will, of public diplomacy and the implementers in the field.

The other level at which we're trying to improve coordination of communication is with our colleagues in other agencies. They do have, as we've pointed out, a large role to play in public diplomacy. Some of them have resources far beyond our own in the State Department.

There are two mechanisms for doing this in existence today. One is the Policy

Coordinating Committee that was setup some months ago last year and is co-chaired by the State Department and the National Security Council staff. It has met a few times and has done some good work.

The other mechanism is the White House Office of Global Communications. The difference is that the policy coordinating committee is intended to take a long term strategic approach. The Office of Global Communications is much more concerned with daily messaging and midterm messaging.

In addition, we are trying to improve on training. The administrative and general services officers received longer training sessions, so why not the diplomacy practitioners? There's a second area in which we're also looking to improve training, and that is to give every Foreign Service officer at least an introductory exposure to public diplomacy. Because in the end, **as the Secretary of State has pointed out, every Foreign Service Officer serving abroad is doing public diplomacy work, whether he or she knows it or not. And it's important that Foreign Service officers across the board be familiar with that work.**

A sixth thing we're doing — and Marc touched upon the importance of this yesterday — we are working on putting together a databank of exchange alumni here in the U.S. and exchange alumni abroad. This, of course, is meant to help us keep in touch with them; it's also meant to help us develop a greater constituency for public diplomacy in the United States. As Charlotte Beers used to say, the smallest car dealer in the smallest town of the U.S. keeps better track of his clients than public diplomacy has done over the decades. The data is there; it just has never been collected, so this is going to be a large task.

A seventh thing we're doing has been to increase our outreach to the U.S. private sector. Again, we've touched on this. In an initial phase, we've organized a little advisory group of some kind, involving representatives of the U.S. business sector. **We have worked in the past with representatives of Arab American and Muslim American communities. And this is something we want to do more of; because in many ways, the non-official Americans, as they work or travel abroad, are much more credible representatives of the United States than we are as government officials.**

Finally, on the substantive side, we're exploring several things. First, we're working toward a strategy for increasing the awareness of audiences in the Muslim world to the contribution that the U.S. government and the U.S. private sector has made, and is making, to a better life in those countries.

It's instructive to know that in Egypt, virtually everyone knows that the Soviets built the Aswan Dam, virtually everyone knows that the Japanese rebuilt the opera house, but there is not much recognition of the much more fundamental contributions that USAID has made in basic infrastructure. And so we're looking, in concert with USAID and with some of the major private sector actors in the Muslim countries, to try and develop some kind of greater awareness of what it is that we have done and are doing in those countries.

We're also looking, as has been recommended, to revive our Arabic book translation program. That's another area that, for the moment, I'm personally charged with. We have book translation programs in Cairo and in Amman. Their output is as extensive as current resources permit, but the fact is that we have not stepped

back and tried to determine what already exists in Arabic in the way of American books, where the gaps are, what kind of coverage of the American scene we would like to see in Arabic books, and what we need to do about it. So all of this is something that we're working on.

We are also looking to initiate formal training programs for journalists from the Arab and Muslim worlds. Recognizing that journalistic practices are sometimes dubious, it's not clear where or how we would do this. One of the dilemmas that the exchange program is currently facing is, in fact, the security requirements of entry into the United States. So it might prove more efficient to do training of this sort in England; we just don't know. But the subject of training for journalists is very much on our minds.

Finally, in the substantive field, in recognition of the fact that official U.S. government premises overseas have become fortresses, we're looking to develop what we're calling "American Corners," or American rooms, that local institutions, of one kind or another, might agree to sponsor. This is a completely untried initiative. We don't know where it will go, but it's a way of dealing with the fact that it's very hard for the average citizen in the Muslim and Arab world to come to the American embassy or to the public affairs section any more.

Now, there's a lot more here that needs to be done. We do have issues. We've all talked about the need for appropriate resources. And just to sketch briefly the lay of the land, the need for more resources have been identified within the public diplomacy family at the State Department. They've been put forward to State Department management; many of them have been approved and forwarded to the Office of Budget and Management.

But it's been hard to get resources within the State Department. On a one-time basis, we did get some internal realignment that provided additional resources immediately after September 11. There have been a couple of emergency supplemental budget requests that have gone forward to the Congress, and have been approved, some additional one-time funding.

But there are still additional needs. **The Congress, from what I can tell, is willing and, indeed, eager to provide additional funds despite the absence of a constituency.** And it's possible that there might be additional funds through modest incremental additions to our baseline budget each fiscal year. **But let's face it; any dramatic increase in baseline funding can only come if public diplomacy is given greater priority within the President's budget.**

And here, there are many players: the State Department, the NSC, OMB, the White House offices, Congress, et cetera. And at a time of budgetary stringency, there are many competing demands, so it's hard to be sanguine about the prospect of significant additional baseline resources.

Another issue that we face is one that was touched on is how to get our senior officials to speak in the same voice. Those of us at the working level can have the most coordinated policy in the world, but when senior officials speak in slightly different ways, in the Middle East, this is picked up immediately. After decades of exposure to all of this, Middle Eastern audiences are very adept at identifying small differences of vocabulary and nuance from one spokesman, or spokeswoman, to another.

And this is something that is difficult when you have very energetic personalities. **Part of the problem is that we tend to speak to our domestic audience in**

one way and want to speak to the overseas audience in another. The fact is that modern communications render this impossible. Whatever is said for domestic purposes is immediately replayed abroad. So that is a second area.

A third area in which we have an issue is in the realm of international broadcasting. We need to determine how best to coordinate the very important work that the international broadcasters of the U.S. government do with a wider public diplomacy strategy. I say that because, as we know, the Board of Broadcasting Governors, and the sector that it oversees, are completely independent of the Department of State, and quite deliberately so.

Nonetheless, as we've said over and over, **the electronic media are probably the premiere media in the Arab and Muslim worlds today, and so it's logical to ask how the message imparted there is consistent with the message that is imparted elsewhere.** Right now this is not enormously critical. Radio Sawa has a heavy program of music, about which there's no debate. It has a good program of newscasts, about which there is no debate. It has a good program of interviews, about which there is no debate.

On that day when U.S. government television opens up, the issue will arise full-blown,, because television is voracious and needs material. Who is going to select that material, on what basis, and toward what purpose? What are the talk shows going to be about? Who's going to be on them? What forms of entertainment might fill some of the time?

These are all questions that I think we will have to face in the future. A fourth issue that I would raise is, in fact, to relate it to international broadcasting. There is a debate raging about whether we should spend $60 million on setting up a U.S. government satellite television station or whether that money might be spent encouraging the private sector, and the government sector for that matter, to produce programming that could be placed on existing satellite channels. I'm not sure it's an either/or proposition.

Maybe there's room for both. But it is an area that needs to be looked at. A fifth issue that I suspect we will be called upon to address in the near future is the issue of the pros and cons of a Corporation for Public Diplomacy, and we shall see where that goes.

What may seem to be a minor issue, as a sixth issue, but which, in fact, complicates the life of public diplomacy tremendously, is that of contracting regulations. In the days of USIA, contracting regulations, as applied by USIA, were fairly flexible and fairly quick. Today, we are subjected to the contracting regulations and procedures at the State Department, which take a great deal of time. And there's some question about whether we can be nimble on our feet if every time we're contracting for an external good or service, we must spend six months doing it.

Lastly, **there is the huge problem, as David has pointed out, of the place of public diplomacy in the policy world. Are we going to be taken seriously as policy is formulated, or are we going to be called on only after the fact? Are we going to be in at the takeoff or only on the landing?**

We've had some wonderful ideas here, a lot of wonderful research has been done, but will policymakers be persuaded to take foreign attitudes more directly into account? To me, that is the big question here. And with that, I end.

MR. HELMKE: We are the most powerful nation in world history. No one has ever had the political, social, economic, military force that we have today. But, we are a reluctant empire. We have not set out to be an empire. But, we are an empire even if we don't want to be an empire.

A couple of months ago, I got a call from an old friend of mine, who I went to school with, a very successful German businessman – who went to school in the United States. He is very sophisticated and traveled a lot to the United States. He called me because Senator Lugar had been widely quoted in the international media for disagreeing with the President on U.S. policy toward North Korea.

When he called, he says, "Well, how can the senator disagree with the President on North Korea?" and I said, "What do you mean, how can he disagree?" He says, "Well, won't he get fired?" I said, "Well, what do you mean, how could he get fired?" And he says, "Well, isn't he in his President party?" And I said, "Yeah, but that has nothing to do with his job as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee."

And it finally dawns on me. Here's this guy, who's studied in the United States, knows the United States, but he's thinking of the United States government as a parliamentary system. Now, doesn't that help explain why, maybe, Europeans have such a negative view of the United States? They're thinking of the United States government in the context of a parliamentary system. They're not thinking of the United States in the rather complex Madisonian system. So **when we think about American public diplomacy, sometimes we forget that Europeans, even sophisticated Europeans, don't remember that our system is completely different than their system.**

Now, at about the same time, the United Nations brings about 10 Palestinian journalists to my office at the Hart Building. And I'm sitting there explaining to them about how the American system works. And a nice young Palestinian journalist asked me, "Why didn't your government denounce Jerry Falwell for equating Islam with the devil?" And I said, "What do you mean my government," and she said, "Well, your government." And I said, "Well, my government's not a monolithic organization." I mean, you know, I kind of gave her the total rap on three-part government: you know, there's the executive branch, there's the congressional branch, the judiciary branch. You know, and I represent the bicameral legislature. I'm on the Foreign Relations Committee. There's an advice and consent clause, and this is what the Senate does.

And she says, "Well, what did the senator say?" I said, "Well, the senator thinks that Jerry Falwell's kind of a nut." And she said, "Well, why didn't the senator denounce him," and I said, "Well, I guess, because, you know, I didn't think about what he said." I said, "I think he's kind of a nut. You know, it kind of just passed my mind." And I said, "Well, now that I think about it, I guess I should have said something that day."

You know, as I think about it, I probably should have said something, and I apologized, you know. I probably should have been more forthcoming, thinking proactively that this is something that I should do. But on the same token, why didn't she call me? You know, it's my responsibility probably, because Lugar wants me to be more engaged with the international media, and I should be more forthcoming in thinking about these sorts of things that should be upsetting to the international media, especially the Middle Eastern media.

So the next time you guys see something that's upsetting to you, please call me

so that I can react. This is another little part of American public diplomacy that we should be more thoughtful of; but it should be a two-way street.

I have another little vignette that fits into this overall process of greater understanding through a two-way street. I spent a lot of time last year in Europe, before I joined the Foreign Relations Committee again, working for Senator Nunn, in his foundation, doing Nunn-Lugar activity. And every time I was working on Nunn-Lugar issues in Europe, I heard the typical response from all Europeans, moaning and groaning about how the Bush Administration walked away from Kyoto and the International Criminal Court process.

And I would sit down with them, and I'd explain to them how the advice and consent clause of the Constitution works, and how the Senate has to sit down and, agree to treaties. And then, I would give them a long story about when Lugar became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee the first time, in late 1984 before he became officially the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Reagan had just been reelected President, and Gorbachev had become the head of the Soviet Union. Thatcher had just met with Gorbachev the first time, and Gorbachev had announced that he wanted to begin arms control negotiations again with the United States. Thatcher had said to Reagan, "I think we can do business with this guy." So President Reagan called Lugar, and Dole, and Byrd, and other leaders down to the White House to say, "What should we do?"

Well, Lugar had explained to President Reagan that, as a new member of the Senate in the late '70s, he had done a lot of work to defeat the SALT treaty that Carter had negotiated. And said that the problem with these big arms control treaties is that the Administration would negotiate these long, controversial, politically charged treaties, and there were no Senate observers there. He continued to say that there really should be an official Senate observer watching the negotiations, not participating, but observing, so that all the to-ing and fro-ing of the negotiations could be observed, acknowledged, and noted, so that when the treaty would come to the Senate for advice and consent, there would be a record kept by the Senate so that the Senate would know what had happened.

President Reagan had, one, the political wherewithal, the political confidence in himself, which is very important in a President, to say "That's a great idea, Dick. Let's do that." And so for the first time ever in American political history, an official Senate observer team was established. Now, I've always felt that this minor thing has been overlooked by historians. Imagine that Wilson would have had the guts to do that for Versailles.

But Ronald Reagan setup the official Senate observer team, and it consisted of two observers from the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the two leaders. And they watched both the START I and START II treaties, and those two treaties were passed by the Senate. That was an historic event.

So what I would tell the Europeans, I said, "Clinton negotiated Kyoto in the International Court treaties cynically. He negotiated those treaties with no intent whatsoever to send those treaties to the Senate," because he didn't. He negotiated those treaties for political, domestic reasons only. Now, if you see any President of the United States, Republican or Democrat, without an official Senate observer team, walk away, because that person has no intent of ever sending it to the Senate.

Well, that is a point, I think, that we have to educate the Europeans about all the time. That's part of public diplomacy. And, you know, I think we have to continue to drum that into our European allies, and also Asian allies, anytime we're talking about serious environmental treaties on climate change, the criminal court, or any other things.

Now, let me just step back and look at a bigger picture. The treaty that Lugar's been working on with Senator Nunn for the last 12 years, has been the biggest thing that Lugar's been working on since the break-up of the Soviet Union. It is one of the biggest issues that Lugar's been working on. And I think it fits into a lot of the discussion we've had in the last two days with the Middle East, because they basically deal with the same thing: the geopolitics of the leftovers of the Cold War.

The two leftovers of the Cold War are the weapons of mass destruction from the U.S.-Soviet battle, the massive amounts of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Already, we've cleaned up more than close to 7,000 nuclear warheads, thousands of launchers, missiles, and so forth. We still have thousands of warheads and launchers to clean up in the former Soviet Union. These are probably the greatest existential threat we face in national security.

The problems in the Middle East really also are a leftover of the Cold War. We propped up dictatorships. We had geopolitical relationships in the Middle East that were leftovers from the Cold War. And we're still dealing with them today in the Middle East. Now, even before the Cold War ended, Lugar began to address these issues in 1986, with the Philippines.

Lugar began to address this issue when he was first Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lugar began to say, with regard to Marcos, that we should begin to promote democracy and that this was more important than propping up dictatorships just as an approach to containment of communism. And so, we began to go about the careful process of promoting democracy in an ally, in the Philippines. And that had a very important public diplomacy impact, because the democratic revolution in the Philippines, in 1986, really spread a very important public diplomacy message that had really important messages across South America, at that time.

You started to see the spread of democracy throughout South America. It had an impact on the spread of democracy in Central Europe and that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, three years later in 1989. Now, where has that led us today? Well, we've had to fight every year for the continuance of the Nunn-Lugar program.

The Nunn-Lugar program is about $1 billion a year. Half of it is within the Department of Defense. The rest of it is spread within the State Department and the Department of Energy. The reason we put it in the Department of Defense rather than the Department of State is because Jesse Helms was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he wanted nothing to do with it.

Senator Nunn was chairman of the Armed Services Committee, so he put it in DOD. Currently, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter, wants nothing to do with the Nunn-Lugar program. And the Lugar program is about $500 million of the $400 billion defense budget. He has openly stated in the last two months that he believes that disarmament is not the business of the Pentagon.

Isn't that an interesting statement? Disarmament is not the business of the Pentagon. Now, I find it very interesting, in our last panel discussion, that we don't

want the military in Iraq too long because if the military stays much longer in Iraq, it might build anti-American resentment. We don't want the military in Iraq too long, because it will build anti-American resentment. We don't want the military to be involved in cleaning up weapons of mass destruction.

We have the most powerful military in the world today. Our military can beat anybody in the world today, but we don't want our military to be involved in disarmament, we don't want our military to be involved in democratic reconstruction, so our military is involved in feeding people. But our military does not want to become involved in cleaning up weapons of mass destruction. Our military does not want to become involved in democratic reconstruction.

That is what our House Armed Services Committee is saying; that's what our last panel is saying. So who is involved in the clean up of weapons of mass destruction? Who is involved in democratic reconstruction? Anybody have any idea, because I don't? Senator Lugar doesn't. I don't know who in our government is in charge of that today. USAID isn't involved in that. The State Department isn't involved in that today.

We don't have anybody in our government today to do that.

We've got a big problem. We know how to fight wars and win wars, but we don't know how to clean up weapons of mass destruction, we don't know how to rebuild countries, and we don't know how to build democracies. This is a big problem that the senator has. I guess our big problem is that, as we discuss this with public diplomacy, is that it is a new paradigm we have here today.

The frustration we have with public diplomacy is that public diplomacy is in its infancy. You know, all of our institutions were built to deal with the cold war, and we're struggling to kind of come out of those old institutional structures to deal with the new paradigm of this new war, this new long war. You came up with that phrase, didn't you? **And this new long war is something different; and we do not have the organizational structures to deal with this new war.**

Now, when it comes to what our public diplomacy's all about, Iraq's the ballgame, Afghanistan's the ballgame. If we don't win in Afghanistan, if we don't win in Iraq, we don't win. And we've got to figure out real soon how we organize ourselves to take care of Iraq and take care of Afghanistan. If the Defense Department decides it's not part of the game, then who is?

I mean, I know that **the Defense Department is still only four percent of GDP, but it takes $400 billion out of our budget. The State Department only gets $23 billion. Public diplomacy only gets $1 billion.** I mean, we can't get any more money out of OMB for these guys. It's very frustrating to figure out where we're going to get the money for this kind of work.

And we're going to have to go about it in a slow, methodical way. **But unless the Defense Department figures out a way to help us, I don't see how we can do this. They're the only people with the money right now. And if the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee decide that they don't want to give any money to the State Department and to USAID to participate in this project, I don't know where we're going to get the money.**

The only other solution, as Senator Lugar has said, is that we're going to have to get our money from our allies. We're going to have to get the money from NATO, and we're going to have to get the money from EU. So we're back to public diplomacy again.

And I don't think the Secretary of Defense helped us at all today, or yesterday, by basically telling our NATO allies in Belgium, "Well, we just won't help you any more, because we're going to leave Brussels." You know, that wasn't very good at helping out our NATO allies.

You know, he didn't clear that with anybody, I don't think. Did he, Chris?

AMB. ROSS: Not that I know of.

MR. HELMKE: Chris is a diplomat. I'm not. I'm a politician. Well, you know, you made a couple of other points; I guess I'll try to respond to them. How do you make public diplomacy part of politics? You know, when Lugar first became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee back in 1985, it was because Charlie Percy had been defeated as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

And everybody said, "Oh, no, this is the death of Dick Lugar," you know. "It's the kiss of death to become a chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee." So I sat there and said, "Well, everything that we do as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is going to have to be oriented, somehow, to Hoosier voters." And so I worked day and night to make sure that everything we did as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee somehow sold to people back home in Indiana.

And I've told this story to a couple people here today, and yesterday, that I think that every time we went on a trip, I made sure that somehow, wherever we went, I connected it to some kind of pork barrel project back in Indiana. And I think one of the most embarrassing, but proud, moments of my life was when we went to Indonesia in 1986, and this was at a time when America's horrible foreign programs were slaughtering pregnant dairy cows as a plan to raise dairy prices.

And rather than slaughter dairy cows, I figured out we could get USAID, the taxpayers, to ship pregnant dairy cows from Indiana to Indonesia. And so we shipped 20 pregnant dairy cows from Indiana to Indonesia. And I got so many headlines, stories out of Indiana about this humanitarian gesture. It was amazing.

People in Indiana were so proud of how we were feeding these poor, unhappy Indonesians. People were just so proud of being able to help out, these Hoosiers, you know, we were helping these poor starving Indonesians. We're still probably feeding them with these pregnant dairy cows; they're still getting pregnant every year after that.

That's why I hate the word "public diplomacy." When I left the Hill in '87 to set up a company, the vogue word was "strategic communications." I hated that word too. And I used to like the word "propaganda." I know the word propaganda's a bad word, but still, I wish we could use the word propaganda.

What we need in Iraq right now is a bunch of people like me, but younger, who are out there every day figuring out how we relate news to the Iraqis about how we're filling every pothole, turning on lights, and making things work.

When I worked for Lugar while he was mayor, Mitch Daniels, who was our nemesis when he was head of OMB, but he's now going to be our next governor of Indiana, he was Lugar's chief of staff when I was the press secretary. And what we used to do was fill potholes. I mean, that's what being a mayor is: you fill potholes.

So we were on a big kick to fill potholes all over Indianapolis. So one night in February, cold, dark, Mitchell and I were out having beers, and we had called a press conference the next morning. And so, we just wanted to make sure that for the press conference the next morning at 7 o'clock, which we had called all the media to, that the pothole was ready. So at 2 o'clock in the morning, we drove by the pothole. To our chagrin and horror, the pothole had been filled. So we had to run home, get our shovels, and empty it.

Now, that's what a good propaganda guy does. Now, that's what we need in Iraq, people who have the street smarts to go out there to make sure that the potholes are ready for the publicity. So, you know, we need lots of those people out there. I've suggested to the State Department that we get these types of people involved; and there are a lot of good propaganda guys out there like me, who are ready and willing to go to Afghanistan and to Iraq to do this good work.

DR. ABSHIRE: Well, I think we have gained a lot of wisdom during these past two days. I think this has been enormously helpful, and we're going to work hard on the follow-up.

APPENDIX

WHAT WENT WRONG?
RECONCILING AMERICA'S HISTORICAL LEGACY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

By Abdul Aziz Said, Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution

And Lynn M. Kunkle, Adjunct Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution

Paper presented at The Center for the Study of the Presidency conference on "U.S. Communications with Muslim Communities"

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Panel Theme: U.S. Presence Abroad: Power, Principle, and Perceptions.

Introduction: Acknowledging America's Historical Responsibilities

The question of "What Went Wrong", a popular book title by a distinguished historian, should not only be directed towards Islam, but must also be asked about America's relationship with the Muslim world. From an Arab and Muslim perspective, what has happened was a humiliating encounter with Europe and Russia beginning in the 18th century, whose colonial legacy formed the backdrop of the international system that the United States inherited upon assuming the mantle of global leadership. Yet the United States had never been a colonizing power, an important distinction that Arabs and Muslims have always recognized. Combined with a respect for the tempered wisdom of American leadership following World War II, the United States enjoyed the goodwill and admiration of the Arab and Muslim world. In asking what went wrong we not only have to consider the transformations taking place in American leadership, but also the impact of America's increasingly unconditional support for Israel, brought about in part by Israel's insistence that Israeli and American interests are synonymous.

Today the United States and the Arab and Muslim world are deeply estranged from one another. Intentions and communication are not clear, giving rise to fears over 'ultimate designs' and the need for defense or protection. Americans have become accustomed in analyzing conflict to delete the essential and focus on the determinant factors such as struggles for power and the pursuit of economic resources. Particularly in times of conflict, people tend to react by reducing their beliefs and essential identity into uncomplicated images and messages, thereby reducing complex reality into simple abstractions. Something as variegated and multifaceted as Islam becomes reduced to static notions of 'fundamentalism' or 'terrorism'. Muslims do the same in collapsing their views of the West as monolithically colonialist, imperialist and materialist. In both cases these responses are self-serving and self-aggrandizing, yet in no way historically accurate or representative of either cultural values or beliefs.

Explanation and scholarship on Islam has so far not contributed to a better understanding between the West and Islam. Neither has the empty ideological debate

on 'Orientalism' or the static understandings of Clashes of Civilizations or Max Weber's long-lived theories of Protestant culture and capitalism. These have only captured a retrospective vision of relationships. Instead, we need to develop a shared prospective vision that is grounded in the realities of historical relationship. It is an interesting function of power to ignore context and delete or revise history to suit the exigencies of the present. Yet the historical context forms an integral and inescapable component of America's relationship with the Middle East. Given the importance of historical collective memory in Arab cultural and religious identity, American efforts to reestablish goodwill in the region must consciously reconcile its historical legacy with leadership and in relationship today.

The Need for Vision in American Leadership

Although most of the world looks upon the American standard of living as a goal toward which to aspire, the Middle East and the global community today is failing to find in the United States a natural leader in world politics. In a military sense, the United States remains predominant. The U.S is not suffering in stature. But its claim to leadership has lost its purpose. Concerned Americans increasingly find themselves without an established framework to judge the wisdom (or lack thereof) of United States actions in world politics, while the American foreign policy establishment finds itself without a reliable compass to guide its conduct of foreign policy.

The Bush administration has fallen into a Realist trap: by aggressively believing that it has sufficient military and material carrots, and with enough implicit or overt sticks, to force its agenda on the world, it has forgotten that the compelling force of American power has always been its universal morality. America today suffers from an absence of vision. In a climate where there is no vision, pandering replaces leadership, mood replaces action, and charisma replaces leadership. Without a consensus on shared goals or aspirations, coercion replaces assent.

Leadership that does not inspire the highest values and trust of others ultimately will not last. If the Bush administration can only offer the world a traditional Realist perspective wherein great power is deployed to resolutely and remorselessly for its own interests and to preserve its own hegemony and access to resources, it can inspire only resistance.

Disconnected American Ideals and Values in the Middle East

America's historical legacy is closely intertwined – at home and abroad – with the universal spirit of democracy. The American political vision that upholds the dignity of the individual – regardless of class, race, gender, and creed - is the basis of its moral authority in global leadership. Yet at the heart of anti-Americanism in the Middle East today is the perception of a deep disconnect between these inspiring universal ideals and self-interested, narrowly defined behavior. It is on this basis that Arabs and Muslims have asked what has gone wrong with the United States.

Where most Americans see policies animated by ideological consistency and even moral clarity, Muslims see double standards and moral bankruptcy. The resulting perceptual gap – and the demonstrable hardships experienced by Palestinians and sanctioned Iraqis – have fed deep cynicism about American politics. Professed U.S. partisanship on behalf of democracy is viewed with irony, given a historical pattern of sup-

port for Middle Eastern monarchs and dictators in the face of popular opposition. In light of these perceptions, Americans should not be surprised that most Middle Easterners view U.S. efforts to 'liberate' and democratize Iraq as yet another veiled attempt to subjugate Arabs and Muslims, in an established tradition of Western imperialism.

Public Diplomacy to date has reaffirmed the stereotype of American hypocrisy and double standards, while categorically failing to assure, convince or demonstrate American goodwill. Efforts have not been backed up with any measure designed to engage Arabs and Muslims in community or to identify and overcome common dangers. Instead, the Bush administration has addressed problems of international terrorism through intimidation and projection of military power, driven almost exclusively by American fears, stereotypes, and preoccupations.

Mixed Messages and the Role of American Arabs and Muslims

As a result, mixed messages continue to profoundly undermine the credibility and integrity of the United States abroad. There continues to be no single, unified policy to guide policies with the Islamic world, reflective of the relative absence of Arab and Muslim American specialists within government to inform and advise on policy. When speculating about America's plans and intentions, Muslim observers pay considerable attention not only to the continuity or discontinuity of contemporary policies with past actions and proclamations, but also to the 'who's who' of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Where some American public figures inspire hope and even confidence (e.g., Colin Powell and a few remaining career foreign service officers), others are viewed with abiding distrust. There is profound despair among Arabs and Muslims who view the most influential foreign policy advisors on the region as being near uniform in their unconditional support of Israel. The absence of perceived support or visible allies in U.S. foreign policy decision-making leads many in the region to conclude that American policies are hopelessly anti-Arab or anti-Muslim.

To address this negative perception, and to help formulate policies that are constructive and engaging, Arab and Muslim Americans should be made visible members of the official decision-making apparatus, and engaged as full partners in efforts to advance genuine security. Ending the exclusion of Arabs and Muslims from the circles within which policies are formulated can help to discredit the defeatist and polarizing theories about the "war on terrorism" that are now circulating in the Islamic world, while significantly enhancing the effectiveness of efforts to establish cooperative, mutually beneficial relations with Muslim societies. Through their contributions and counsel, Arab and Muslim Americans can help to ensure that the U.S. will not inadvertently trigger or escalate a potentially catastrophic religiously based conflagration. They can also help to increase the effectiveness of policies intended to provide Arab and Muslim Americans with opportunities to demonstrate their genuine commitment to American ideals and rapprochement between communities.

Through public dialogue and political appointments that highlight shared goals and establish confidence in mutual commitment to the principles of this country, the active support of Arab and Muslim Americans can be won without coercion or exclusion. In this respect, it is worth noting that strong-armed security approaches have not won peace or security for any society throughout history; America's historical success in achieving domestic peace as an immigrant society has depended on its spirit of liberty,

tolerance, and democracy. Where strong-armed security measures fail by alienating ethnic communities and replacing desire to be of service with fear of punishment, an affirmative approach based on outreach has the potential to cement a profound and long-term relationship.

Public Diplomacy as "In Relationship"

Efforts should be taken to market a new American message of cultural coexistence internally as well as abroad. A change in perceptions would be immediately picked up by Arabs and Muslims overseas, who follow Western culture and media far more closely than is generally recognized. Positive contributions of lived and historical Islam to global community deserve particular attention, as do interfaith and inter-civilizational themes that highlight common values or communicate respect for "Islamic perspectives." This would have the added benefit of heightening the profile of Arab American and Muslim American leaders whose words concerning reconciliation between Islam and the West could be of great value in fostering constructive change in the Islamic world.

Muslims, Arabs and Westerners need to experience themselves "in relationship" rather than "out of relationship" to find meaning in the common tragedy of their present estrangement. The pain that Americans have experienced as a consequence of September 11 has a subtle counterpoint in the pain of those who have been unable to make their voices heard. A call for respectful dialogue and mutual engagement can help to transform this legacy of pain, resulting in deeper knowledge of what the "other" has to say, a more realistic understanding of present opportunities and dangers, and an enduring basis for peace.

Avoiding Narcissism and Victimization

Reconciling American values with American policy is essential over the long term for reconciling America with the Arab and Muslim world. Public diplomacy can play a valuable role in the process, provided it scrupulously avoids the twin traps of narcissism or victimization in its approach. In classic terms, narcissists fall so deeply in love with their own image that they believe they are complete, and become unable to love or connect with others. Narcissists deny others the right to exist independently and to have separate, individuated needs of their own, which are understood only in terms of clashes with one's own needs or goals. The temptation for Public Diplomacy campaigns to lapse into forms of narcissism compounds the difficulties overcoming Arab and Muslim perceptions of American disinterest, triumphalism, and self-absorption, particularly where Middle Eastern experiences have been at variance with American ideals and values.

The danger of focusing on America's victimhood as a result of September 11, 2001 is that it may draw attention away from the tragedy and instead come to be understood as justifying and rationalizing future acts of anti-Arab or Muslim violence. For Muslims and Arabs, discourses of victimization have also served to legitimize the struggle against Western domination. Our focus must move away from seeking to control or manipulate emotional responses of others through the politics of victimization. Instead we need a focus on how to heal the relationship that is clearly situated within a clear historical context.

Feelings of domination and injustice are daily reinforced with dramatic televised

images of occupation and humiliation. These images shape the reality and discourse dominating the Arab and Muslim world. Greater sensitivity to the experiences and impact of Western colonization – particularly by the British, French and Russian – in the region is essential to creating effective communication and promoting outreach. American efforts need to reflect policies that explicitly uphold the dignity of the individual as well as demonstrate cultural and religious sensitivity. We need to expand our cognitive limitations and understand the role of collective memory, and the different approaches to reasoning and reference to ultimate authority.

A positive first step in establishing goodwill between America and the Islamic world would be to change the root metaphors that have been used by leading political figures to explain September 11 and its significance. This will require an effort to move beyond clichéd World War II and Cold War metaphors (Pearl Harbor, containment, rollback) and slogans that merely reinforce the maladies they purport to describe (a "clash of civilizations"), towards a policy framework with a different tone and tenor. Modifying official rhetoric is the first step toward a new and more reflective form of public discourse about American relations with the Islamic world that defines the nature and objectives of the war on terrorism more precisely, establishes non-military criteria for success, and makes it possible for both Westerners and Muslims to develop confidence in the idea that intercultural peace is attainable. This discourse would accept the legitimacy of cultural differences, and frame terrorism as a shared problem rather than as a justification for political opportunism on behalf of partisan causes.

Whose Democracy in Iraq?

The United States has an unparalleled opportunity to demonstrate tangibly and affirm diplomatically their recommitment to American values and ideals in helping Iraqis successfully achieve their transition to democracy. The U.S. must acknowledge the responsibilities of its leadership, and not reestablish through its own example the authoritarian, top-down style of government that is antithetical to American values and governance. This means that the U.S. should facilitate the democratization process by actively empowering Iraqis to define what they want – to flesh out the answer to the question: "What does democracy look like for us (form and substance)?" The United States should ensure the active participation of Iraqis in the transition process. Education and the media will play a critical role in the transition process and for helping the Iraqi people find their voice after a protracted period of suppression and authoritarianism. Both are necessary for the indigenous development of democracy.

Democracy cannot be engineered by the United States. Democratic behavior is a learned behavior, and democracy can be learned only by practice. While repressive regimes can be imposed by subversion, democracy cannot be successfully implanted from the outside: it is an indigenous process rooted in the active participation of a broad spectrum of citizens in the political process.

There is a tendency to equate the American liberal form of democracy with the substance of democracy. The substance of democracy is a human society that has a sense of common goals, a sense of community, a process of participation and accountability in making decisions, and protective safeguards for dissenters. The form of democracy, on the other hand, is cast in the mold of the culture of a people.

Islamic social institutions are more dynamic and variegated than is widely rec-

ognized, and provide the basis for genuine participation at the social and political level. It is the Muslim community itself that must discover how this integration can apply to modern living, and in the process discover original ways of implementing Islamic precepts in changing social conditions. Muslims have the right to participate in the unfolding and direction of their community, while creating their own values and terms within the enduring context of Islam. Democracy is not built upon a particular variety of electoral institutions, but upon genuine participation. In this regard there are democratic precepts in Islam, as there are in other religions, to include both the preservation and development of the community, and social justice and consultative mechanisms.

What the United States can do instead is to consolidate their vision of a democratic Iraq and a locally responsive and adaptive Iraqi political process needed to attain it. At the moment, there are diverging and increasingly competing visions of American goals for a democratic Iraq within the Bush administration, which dramatically undermine the political effectiveness and strategic resources needed to ensure a safe and secure context within which the democratizing process can unfold. Instead, a united vision is needed to avoid drift and self-centeredness, mobilize energies, create reciprocal ownership, and prevent the process from being bogged down by lurching reactively from one contingency to the next.

Acknowledging Muslim Responsibilities

The West emerged after years of deep introspection, existential anxiety and conflict over its faith system with hard-won lessons and achievements in the realm of political coexistence. Muslims do not need to reach the same conclusions that Christians adopted with regard to their faith in order to develop an authentically Islamic response to political empowerment. There is a great need in the Muslim and Arab world to deliberately integrate the person, the citizen and the Muslim. This involves a search for truth within Islamic traditions and contexts that begins at the level of the individual. Christianity has emerged with a close linking of personal behavior with citizenship and social values, while Muslims today are on the threshold of discovering the obligations and meaning of Muslim citizenship.

For example, Muslims need to ask, what kind of citizens can Islam create, animated by Islamic values and contexts? What kind of solutions can Islam bring to affect participatory decision-making in the absence of authoritative guidance in social matters? What Islamic values and social mechanisms can be brought to bear for ameliorating the conditions of modern, urban living? The flowering of the individual as citizen within Islamic community can inspire new avenues of meaning and institutions that testify to - and fortify - what is enduring in Islam.

Today's challenge for Muslims lies in the expansion of the original ideas of Islam, and a willingness to demonstrate curiosity about the historical experiences and achievements of the West. Where are the Muslim 'Lawrence of Arabias' who seek to know the Western Christian worldview? Why has there been so little research among Muslim scholars on the Christian perspective of the Western experience, or the encyclicals of the Catholic Church, or the Christian struggle to find religious meaning in politics? Much insight may be gained from the historical political trials of Christianity for Muslims at this time, as it emerged at a time of profound oppression, injustice and during occupation. How did this path cope with such circumstances, organize their community and move beyond them?

Public diplomacy can aid Arab and Muslim efforts with programs designed to support and win the confidence of the secular democrats, and to foster dialogue with Islamic renewalists who support life-affirming and progressive values. Particular attention could be given to themes such as "religion and democracy" and "religion and development" as well as "dialogue among civilizations," highlighting common ground between the contemporary Islamic experience and the modern Western experience, in which religious currents such as Calvinism have played an important role in efforts to foster economic productivity and accountable governance. It is also important to acknowledge differences in perspectives, such as those dealing with sources of authority: For example, what do Muslims mean when they refer to the Qur'an? What do Westerners have in mind when they refer to the Constitution? Finally, specific feedback mechanisms should be designed to ensure that lessons learned from public diplomacy programs can be integrated with the broader policymaking process.

Conclusion: Good, Great America

As Eisenhower once stated, "America is great because America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great."[1]

The liberation of Iraq carries a tremendous moral responsibility for the United States. In this newly emerging and truly global civilization, the allure of the Realist instinct for self-preservation at the expense of others may only be symptomatic of a deeper uncertainty at how to lead in these unprecedented times. It is essential to remember in times of transition that moral authority and vision remain as important as ever in moving nations and forging coalitions. In this regard, what America does in helping Iraqis achieve a democratic transition is a critical test of American leadership, and whether the United States intends to connect "who we are" with "what we do". What America does in Iraq will be remembered. It will set the tone and form the backdrop framing American relations with Arabs and Muslims.

The traditional and dominant intellectual and political discourse about peace has separated security from justice. By so doing, we reduce security and justice to minimal negativisms. Security becomes the absence of war or violence, and justice becomes the absence of gross violations of human rights. Peace is both absence of war and presence of justice. Peace is also ecological, cultural, and political security.

We have to reconnect justice with security if we are to harmonize our actions with our values and create a sustainable foundation for peaceful coexistence. Peace is never made, it is always in the making. It is a journey towards a place where there is trust, mercy, and justice. It is a process of being and doing – of connecting 'who we are' with 'what we do'. Peace is both experience and task. In owning up to the challenges and responsibilities of 'who we are', the U.S. can recognize the genuine uniqueness and contributions of others. This is the indispensable task of American Public Diplomacy.

In embarking on these initiatives, the United States is not only engaging substantively and constructively with the Middle East, but it is also assuming its global leadership position and reconciling its historical legacy with American values and ideals. In the process, healing the relationship between Arabs, Muslims and Americans leads toward greater stability, security and justice for all.

[1] President Eisenhower quoting Alexis de Tocqueville in a speech delivered in Portland, Oregan on October 18, 1956.

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